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Abstract 
This thesis considers the question of justification of belief in a comprehensive 
metaphysical system, through an exposition and evaluation of the philosophy of 
Alasdair MacIntyre. It defines a comprehensive metaphysical system as a set of 
ontological and ethical presuppositions which are taken to encompass and explain 
the nature of the universe, and which provide a framework for human practical 
reasoning and action.  The thesis argues that such a system is primarily a way of 
interpreting the world and the place of humanity within it, rather than a speculative 
theory. It considers the extent to which the notion of justification can be applied to 
VXFKFRPSUHKHQVLYHV\VWHPVGUDZLQJRQ0DF,QW\UH¶VDFFRXQWRIWUDGLWLRQ-
constituted rationality (TCR) and George LiQGEHFN¶VDFFRXQWRIUHOLJLRQDVD
cultural-OLQJXLVWLFV\VWHP,WRXWOLQHVWKHGHYHORSPHQWRI0DF,QW\UH¶V$ULVWRWHOLDQ 
ethics and argues that the further development of that position in Dependent 
Rational Animals should be given a central role in the interpretation of his mature 
SKLORVRSK\7KHWKHVLVLOOXPLQDWHVWKHFRQFHSWRI7&5E\DSSO\LQJ/LQGEHFN¶VUXOH
theory of doctrine to the question of the identity of different traditions.  The account 
of tradition that emerges from this exercise provides greater specificity to the 
FRQFHSWRIHSLVWHPRORJLFDOFULVLVZKLFKLVFHQWUDOWR0DF,QW\UH¶VDFFRXQWRIWKH
superiority or inferiority of rival traditions. The account of superiority that emerges 
E\OLQNLQJ0DF,QW\UHDQG/LQGEHFN¶VZRUNSURYLGHVDUHWURVSHFWLYH measure of the 
extent to which one tradition can be held to be (provisionally) justified or (absolutely) 
unjustified as a comprehensive metaphysical system, and provides a rebuttal to the 
FODLPWKDW0DF,QW\UH¶VSRVLWLRQLVUHODWLYLVW,DUJXHWKDWZKLOH/LQGEHFN¶VRULJLQDO
account of the nature of religion as a cultural-linguistic system is vulnerable to the 
charge of relativism, it can be strengthened against this claim by the incorporation 
of a notion of TCR derived from MacIntyre. 
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Chapter 1 
 The Roots of After Virtue 
1.1 Overview 
This thesis considers how one might justify belief in a comprehensive metaphysical 
system, through an exposition and evaluation of the philosophy of Alasdair 
0DF,QW\UH:KDWLVPHDQWE\WKHSKUDVH³DFRPSUHKHQVLYHPHWDSK\VLFDOV\VWHP´
will become clearer as the thesis unfolds, but I will define it initially as a set of 
ontological and ethical presuppositions which are taken to encompass and explain 
the nature of the universe of which our species is a part, and which also provide a 
framework for human practical reasoning and action.  On the basis of this definition 
secular philosophies such as Marxism and religions such as Christianity are 
FRPSUHKHQVLYHPHWDSK\VLFDOV\VWHPV$FRPSUHKHQVLYH³WKHRU\RIHYHU\WKLQJ´
such as modern physics has tried to develop, would not be such a metaphysical 
system, unless it sought to encompass ethics and an understanding of humanity 
within its framework, as well as providing an account of ontology.  
I need to qualify my description of Christianity and Marxism as metaphysical 
systems. This is not an attempt to characterise all aspects of their identity in a 
reductive fashion. It is, however, a way of pointing to some common features of 
WKHVHEHOLHIV\VWHPVZKLFKFRQVWLWXWHWKHPDV³KHUPHQHXWLFIUDPHZRUNV´that is, 
all-encompassing ways of understanding the universe, humanity and human action 
(see Section 4.3). A comprehensive metaphysical system as defined above is, I 
shall argue, primarily a way of interpreting the world and our place within it, rather 
than a speculative theory. Whether it is legitimate to speak of the justification of 
such a hermeneutic framework remains part of the question I am exploring. The 
decline of Enlightenment epistemological foundationalism undermined notions of 
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universal standards of argument and legitimacy, and emphasised the importance of 
the role of authority and faith in underpinning commitment to such comprehensive 
PHWDSK\VLFDOV\VWHPV0\H[SORUDWLRQRI0DF,QW\UH¶VSKLORVRSK\DQGP\XVHRIWKH
work of the theologian George Lindbeck in the latter part of this thesis, is intended 
to deepen the understanding of the issues associated with the question of 
justification and commitment in a postmodern philosophical and theological 
context.1  
My reasons for exploring these issues are personal as well as intellectual. Like 
MacIntyre I am a child of the intellectual and moral culture of the mid-20th Century.  
My education emphasised the importance of intellectual rigour and objective 
justification as a pre-condition of belief, and rejected tradition as a foundation for 
rational investigation and knowledge. This education emphasised that the 
foundations of morality are indeterminable and encouraged tolerance of diversity 
and (less happily) moral relativism. It left me agnostic with respect to religion and 
the foundations of ethics, but it also left me with no choice but to act at a personal, 
community and political level, even though the principles that guided my actions 
appeared to be arbitrarily adopted. My education and upbringing therefore created a 
disconnection between my theoretical beliefs on the one hand and the principles 
WKDWXQGHUSLQQHGP\SUDFWLFDOUHDVRQLQJRQWKHRWKHU0DF,QW\UH¶VSKLORVRSK\KDV
sought to address such disconnection by developing an account of rationality as 
constructed and tested within a tradition of enquiry. The beliefs and principles that 
form the basis of such traditions are not demonstrable, but their adequacy can be 
                                               
1
 MacIntyre maps the challenges to such Enlightenment epistemological assumptions, and 
his account is discussed in Chapter 2.2. 0DF,QW\UH¶VSKLORVRSK\LVEDVHGRQWKHpostmodern 
view that Enlightenment ideals of knowledge are unachievable, but this assessment is 
contested. John Searle, for example, dismisses the claim that the Enlightenment vision of 
universal knowledge is unachievable (John Searle, Mind, Language and Society. London: 
Weidenfield and Nicholson, 1999, pp.4-6). However, my thesis explores the nature of 
justification RQWKHEDVLVRIWKHFRQGLWLRQDOTXHVWLRQ³If MacIntyre is correct in his 
assessment of our inability to demonstrate the truth of our presuppositions, is it still possible 
to create a robust account of the justification of EHOLHI"´As a result, I do not need to resolve 
the fundamental question of the (il)legitimacy of Enlightenment epistemological assumptions 
for my argument to proceed. 
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evaluated as enquiry unfolds. It therefore provides an alternative to the 
EnlightenmenWSHUVSHFWLYHRQWKHTXHVWLRQV³ZKDWVKRXOG,EHOLHYH"´DQG³ZK\
VKRXOG,EHOLHYHLW"´- Questions to which I will return at the very end of this thesis. 
This thesis, does not, of course, resolve the major and fundamental questions about 
the nature of knowledge and the meaning and legitimacy of the concept of 
justification. However, it makes a contribution to knowledge in four areas that are 
relevant to this debate. Firstly, it provides a contribution to MacIntyre studies by 
plotting the relationship between his early philosophy, and his mature position. It 
also argues that the later development of his position in Dependent Rational 
Animals2 (henceforth DRA) should be given a more central role in the interpretation 
of his philosophy than has been granted by some other commentators3 (Chapter 2). 
The concepts of tradition and tradition-constituted rationality are central to 
0DF,QW\UH¶VPDWXUHSKLORVRSK\DQGWKHVHFRQGFRQWULEXWLRQRIWKHWKHVLVLVWR
provide a more precise definition of the concept of tradition, by interpreting the 
³IXQGDPHQWDODJUHHPHQWV´WKDWFRQVWLWXWHWKHLGHQWLW\RIDWUDGLWLRQLQWHUPVRI
/LQGEHFN¶VUHJXODWLYHDFFRXQWRIGRFWULQHDVVHWRXWLQKLVERRNThe Nature of 
Doctrine (henceforth ND).4 This contribution provides greater clarity to the concepts 
of incommensurability, tradition-constituted rationality and epistemological crisis, 
ZKLFKDUHFHQWUDOWR0DF,QW\UH¶VDFFRXQWRIWKHVXSHULRULW\RIRQHWUDGLWLRQWR
another. It therefore strengtheQV0DF,QW\UH¶VRYHUDOOSRVLWLRQ 
7KHQRWLRQRIVXSHULRULW\WKDWHPHUJHVIURP0DF,QW\UH¶VZRUNSURYLGHVD
retrospective measure of the extent to which one tradition can be held to be 
                                               
2
 Alasdair C MacIntyre, Dependent Rational Animals: Why Human Beings Need the Virtues. 
London: Duckworth, 1999; henceforth DRA. 
3
 See, for example, Christopher Stephen Lutz, Tradition in the Ethics of Alasdair MacIntyre: 
Relativism, Thomism and Philosophy. Plymouth: Lexington Books, Paperback Edition 2009; 
(first published 2004). Lutz does not mention DRA in the body of his text, and dismisses the 
importance of DRA in his preface to the paperback edition (Lutz op. cit. pp.xi-xv; pp.xiii-xiv). 
6HHVHFWLRQEHORZIRUP\FRXQWHUDUJXPHQWVWR/XW]¶VDVVHVVPHQW 
4
 George A. Lindbeck, The Nature of Doctrine Religion and Theology in a Postliberal Age. 
Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1984; Henceforth ND. All references are to the first edition 
unless otherwise indicated. 
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(provisionally) justified or (absolutely) unjustified as a comprehensive metaphysical 
system. This notion of superiority therefore provides a means of reframing the 
question of justification in pragmatic and empirical terms. Lindbeck also seeks to 
provide an account of the superiority of one set of beliefs to another, and the third 
FRQWULEXWLRQRIWKHWKHVLVLVDQHYDOXDWLRQRI/LQGEHFN¶VDFFRXQWRIVXSHULRULW\LQ1'
Lindbeck is concerned not only with the question of how one might conceptualise 
the superiority of different religions to each other, but also with the question of how 
one position may be judged to be superior within the same religion. I argue that 
QHLWKHURI/LQGEHFN¶VDFFRXQWVRIVXSHULRULW\FDQEHDSSOLHGLQSUDFWLFHEXWWKDWKLV
SRVLWLRQFDQEHVWUHQJWKHQHGE\LQFRUSRUDWLQJ0DF,QW\UH¶VQRWLRQRIWUDGLWLRQ-
constituted rationality into his perspective (Chapter 4.7).  
Without a persuasive account of the superiority of one comprehensive metaphysical 
perspective to another, any philosophical position appears to be open to the 
challenge of relativism or perspectivism.  Both challenges are based on the 
assumption that a failure to establish some indubitable tradition-transcendent 
foundation for knowledge means that there can be no good reasons for preferring 
the claims of one tradition to another. The relativist makes this claim on the grounds 
that, if rational standards of justification only apply within each tradition, there can 
be no compelling basis for choosing between the competing claims to truth made by 
different traditions.5 The perspectivist agrees with this assertion but argues further 
that the incommensurability of rival traditions subverts the very notion of truth itself, 
DQGFODLPVWKDWGLIIHUHQWWUDGLWLRQVVKRXOGEHXQGHUVWRRGDVRIIHULQJ³YHU\GLIIHUHQW
FRPSOHPHQWDU\SHUVSHFWLYHVIRUHQYLVDJLQJ´ 6 the world in which we live.  
The question of whether one can construct a non-foundationalist defence against 
relativism is an integrative theme throughout this thesis. The final section of the 
                                               
5
 Alasdair C MacIntyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality? London: Duckworth, 1988; 
(henceforth WJWR) pp.351-353. 
6
 WJWR p.352. 
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WKHVLVDGGUHVVHVWKLVTXHVWLRQGLUHFWO\DQGFRQFOXGHVWKDW0DF,QW\UH¶Vposition 
SURYLGHVDQHIIHFWLYHUHVSRQVHWRWKHFKDOOHQJHRIUHODWLYLVPEXWWKDW/LQGEHFN¶V
account of the nature of religion is vulnerable to the charge of relativism without the 
incorporation of a notion of tradition constituted rationality derived from MacIntyre. 
This is the fourth contribution of the thesis (Chapter 4.8). The first step in the 
GHYHORSPHQWRIP\DUJXPHQWLVWRUHYLHZ0DF,QW\UH¶VSKLORVRSKLFDOGHYHORSPHQW
and this is the focus of the rest of this Chapter.  
0DF,QW\UH¶V(DUO\Philosophical Development 
Context 
7KLVFKDSWHUH[SORUHV0DF,QW\UH¶VHDUO\SKLORVRSKLFDOUHOLJLRXVDQGSROLWLFDOZULWLQJV
in order to identify the problems that led MacIntyre to write his most famous work, 
After Virtue (AV), 7 and its sequels. It undertakes this task in order to show how 
0DF,QW\UH¶VHDUOLHUFRQFHUQVKDYHVKDSHGWKHdevelopment of the notions of 
tradition and tradition constituted rationality in his later philosophy. It argues that the 
stimulus for the construction of his mature position was his recognition that his early 
work exposed problems that he could not resolve without the construction of an 
alternative approach to philosophy and ethics. 
The secondary literature has recognised that there is a significant continuity 
EHWZHHQ0DF,QW\UH¶VHDUly work and his mature position, but it has not fully 
articulated the logical connections between the problems that emerged in 
0DF,QW\UH¶Vinitial attempts to justify his religious, moral, and political beliefs, and 
the solutions to those problems that are set out in his mature work. For example, 
ZKLOH.HOYLQ.QLJKWDFNQRZOHGJHVWKHFRQQHFWLRQEHWZHHQ0DF,QW\UH¶VHDUO\ZRUNV
                                               
7
 Alasdair C MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory. London: Duckworth, 2nd 
edition 1985 (first published 1981) - henceforth AV. References are to the second edition 
unless otherwise indicated.  
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and the themes of AV in his introduction to The MacIntyre Reader,8  his otherwise 
H[FHOOHQWFRPSLODWLRQRI0DF,QW\UH¶VZRUNLQFOXGHVRQO\³1RWHVIURPWKH0RUDO
:LOGHUQHVVDQG´KHQFHIRUWK10:IURPKLVSXEOLFDWLRQVSULRUWR9 It does 
QRWWKHUHIRUHSURYLGHDQRYHUDOOPDSRI0DF,QW\UH¶VGHYHORSPHQW7KRPDV
'¶$QGUHD¶VH[KDXVWLYHUHYLHZRI0DF,QW\UH¶VZRUNGHVFULEHVHYHU\WUHHLQthe wood 
± but as a result, makes it difficult to discern the overall shape of the forest.10 Peter 
0F0\ORUKDVSURYLGHGDKHOSIXODQDO\VLVRIWKHUHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQ0DF,QW\UH¶V
Marxism and his Christianity, and his later adoption of an Aristotelian position in AV, 
DQG,ZLOOGUDZRQVRPHRIKLVSRLQWVLQP\GLVFXVVLRQ+RZHYHU0F0\ORU¶VPDLQ
IRFXVLVRQWKHDSSOLFDWLRQRI0DF,QW\UH¶VPDWXUHWKRXJKWWRWKHVRFLDOVFLHQFHV
rather than on the issues of rational justification that are my own focus. As a result 
0DF,QW\UH¶VODWHUZRUNLQ:-:5DQGThree Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry hardly 
figures in his account.11  
&KULVWRSKHU/XW]¶VH[SRVLWLRQRI0DF,QW\UH¶VGHYHORSPHQWSURYLGHVDQLOOXPLQDWLQJ
PDSRIWKHUHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQ0DF,QW\UH¶VHDUO\ZRUNDQGKLVPDture position, 
and his account of that development overlaps with mine to some extent.12 Lutz 
emphasises the difficulties MacIntyre faced in addressing the question of the 
justification of his Marxist and religious beliefs.13 +HDOVRQRWHVWKDW0DF,QW\UH¶V
adoption and subsequent repudiation of a form of fideism resulted in MacIntyre 
experiencing  a long-standing epistemological crisis, which was only resolved 
                                               
8
 .HOYLQ.QLJKW³,QWURGXFWLRQ´WR.HOYLQ.QLJKWHGThe MacIntyre Reader. Cambridge: 
Polity Press, 1998, pp.1-27; p.3. 
9
 Alasdair MacIntyre, ³1RWHVIURPWKHPRUDOZLOGHUQHVVDQG´LQ.QLJKWThe MacIntyre 
Reader pp.32-49; first published in The New Reasoner 1958-9, Nos. 7 and 8; henceforth 
NMW. 
10
 7KRPDV'¶$QGUHDTradition, Rationality and Virtue. Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing 
Company, 2006. 
11
 Peter McMylor, Alasdair MacIntyre Critic of Modernity. London: Routledge, 1994. See also 
3HWHU0F0\ORU³Marxism and Christianity: dependencies and differences in Alasdair 
0DF,QW\UH¶Vcritical social thought´ Theoria: A Journal of Social & Political Theory, June 
2008, 55:116 p45-66; Alasdair MacIntyre, Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry. London: 
Duckworth, 1990; henceforth TRV. 
12
 Lutz op. cit. Chapter 1. 
13
 Lutz pp.16-17. 
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through the construction of the position set out in AV.14  These observations are 
consistent with my own interpretation, as we shall see below.  However, my account 
provides a more detailed analysis of the factors that underlay the failure of 
0DF,QW\UH¶VLQLWLDODWWHPSWVWRDGGUHVVWKHTXHVWLRQRIWKHMXVWLILFDWLRQRIEHOLHILQD
comprehensive metaphysical position, and helps to identify the logical and other 
requirements that had to be met if he was to be successful in addressing these 
problems. It therefore provides a more comprehensive perspective on the genesis 
RI0DF,QW\UH¶VPDWXUHSRVLWLRQ 
Stages of Development 
In an interview with Cogito, Macintyre divided his philosophical development into 
three main periods: 
The 22 years from 1949...until 1971 were a period...of heterogeneous, badly 
organised, sometimes fragmented and often frustrating and messy enquiries, from 
ZKLFKQRQHWKHOHVVLQWKHHQG,OHDUQHGDORW)URP«XQWLOZDVDQLQWHULP
period of sometimes painfully self-FULWLFDOUHIOHFWLRQ«)URPRQZDUGV,KDYH
been engaged in a single project to which After Virtue, Whose Justice? Which 
Rationality? and Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry are central, a project 
described by one of my colleagues as that of writing An Interminably Long History of 
Ethics.15 
'HVSLWH0DF,QW\UH¶VFRPPHQWDERXWWKHIUDJPHQWHGQDWXUHRIKLVVWXGLHVGXULQJhis 
early years, an examination of his published work reveals greater coherence and 
focus than this description would suggest. His work during this period was 
characterised by his engagement with Marxist theory; with Christian apologetics; 
with the philosophy and sociology of religion; with the nature and foundations of 
ethics; and with the relationship between philosophy and social theory. He 
condemned the way in which liberal culture had fragmented human life into a set of 
                                               
14
 Lutz pp.20-21. 
15
 $ODVGDLU0DF,QW\UH³$QLQWHUYLHZIRUCogito´LQKnight (ed.) The MacIntyre Reader. 
pp.267-275; pp.268-269; first published in Cogito 1991, 5:3. 
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discrete and independent arenas, compartmentalising religion and secular life,16   
and his engagement with Marxism reflected his critique of Western society and his 
commitment to social improvement. He sought to defend Marxism as the most 
coherent basis for political analysis and action,17 and attempted to clarify the 
relationship of that SKLORVRSK\WR&KULVWLDQEHOLHI0DF,QW\UH¶VUHOLJLRXVFRPPLWPHQW
led him to contribute to Christian apologetics and philosophical theology,18 and he 
also explored the impact of social change on contemporary trends in religious 
belief.19  
His concern with society and social improvement also underpinned his work in 
ethics and moral theory.20 For MacIntyre, every ethical perspective implies a 
particular form of social and political organisation which enables the expression of 
its moral possibilities, and there is, therefore, an inter-relationship between his 
political, ethical and religious concerns, which is manifested in his critique of 
contemporary western society. A fourth strand in his early philosophical contribution 
is the critical evaluation of some contemporary theories in social science, 21  and 
one important focus of this work is the repudiation of deterministic accounts of 
human action.22 His rejection of determinism led him to focus on the explanation of 
                                               
16
 See Alasdair MacIntyre, Marxism: an Interpretation. London: SCM Press, 1953; 
(henceforth MI), pp.9-10. 
17
 See Paul Blackledge and Neil Davidson (eds.), $ODVGDLU0DF,QW\UH¶V(QJDJHPHQWZLWK
Marxism Selected Writings 1953-1974, Chicago: Haymarket Books, 2009, for a 
FRPSUHKHQVLYHVHOHFWLRQRI0DF,QW\UH¶V0DU[LVWZULWLQJIURPWKLVSHULRG 
18
 Antony Flew and Alasdair MacIntyre (eds.), New Essays in Philosophical Theology, 
London: SCM Press, 1955; Alasdair MacIntyre, Difficulties in Christian Belief.  London: SCM 
Press, 1959; (henceforth DCB). 
19
 Alasdair MacIntyre, Secularization and Moral Change. London: Oxford University Press, 
1967; (henceforth SMC); Alasdair MacIntyre and Paul Ricoeur, The Religious Significance 
of Atheism. New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1969 (the Riddell Lectures, 
first delivered 1966); henceforth RSA. 
20
 See for example NMW and A Short History of Ethics. New York: Macmillan, 1966; 
(henceforth SHE). 
21
 Alasdair MacIntyre, The Unconscious: A Conceptual Analysis.  London: Routledge and 
Kegan Paul, 1958; "Psychoanalysis: the future of an illusion?" Encounter, May 1965; 24(5), 
reprinted in Alasdair MacIntyre: Against the Self-Images of the Age: Essays on Ideology and 
Philosophy.  London: Duckworth, 1971 (henceforth ASI); pp.27-3; Marcuse, London: 
Fontana, 1970. 
22
 See, for example, The Unconscious; LQZKLFK0DF,QW\UH¶VDQDO\VLVRI)UHXG¶VFRQFHSWRI
the unconscious provides a critique of the underlying mechanistic model of causation and 
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human action in terms of purpose, and this led in turn to attempts to elucidate some 
telos that gives coherence and intelligibility to human existence. 0DF,QW\UH¶V
philosophical output during this period reflects the recognition that Christianity, 
Marxism (and other political philosophies), ethical theory, and social theory all 
provide differentiated and potentially competing perspectives on the question of 
what it is to be human and what it is to live a good life. His early work represents an 
ambitious attempt to reconcile these conflicting strands of thought, and through this 
to construct a comprehensive and coherent account of human nature that combines 
both religious and political perspectives within a radical programme for social 
improvement. 
The search for intellectual coherence 
A commitment to either Marxism or Christianity (or both) raises some fundamental 
questions about the extent to which the beliefs to which one is committed can be 
held to be rational, intelligible and true, and the degree to which they can provide a 
coherent basis for moral evaluation and ethical action. MacIntyre was conscious of 
the inconsistency and lack of justification of his beliefs at an early stage. He recalled 
in an interview with Giovanna Borradori: 
The reading that first my undergraduate and then my graduate studies required of me 
only accentuated the incoherence of my beliefs... I found it increasingly difficult to 
discover adequate rational grounds for the belief in Christianity that I thought I had 
and that faith came to look like arbitrariness.23  
                                                                                                                                    
human behaviour. See also "Determinism," Mind, 1957, 66, pp.28-41; "Purpose and 
intelligent action," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 1960, Supplementary Volume 34, 
pp.79-S³7KHDQWHFHGHQWVRIDFWLRQ´)LUVWSXEOLVKHGLQ%HUQDUG:LOOLDPVDQG$ODQ
Montefiore (eds.) British Analytical Philosophy. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1966; 
reprinted in ASI pp.191-210. 
23
 $ODVGDLU0DF,QW\UHLQ³$QLQWHUYLHZZLWK*LRYDQQD%RUUDGRUL´ILUVWSXEOLVKHd 1991; 
reprinted in Kelvin Knight (ed.), The MacIntyre Reader pp.255-266; p.257 (henceforth GB). 
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The need to reconcile conflicting strands in his belief system can be seen as 
RULJLQDWLQJLQ0DF,QW\UH¶VXSEULQJLQJDQGHGXFDWLRQ,QWKHVDPHLQWHUYLHZKH
commented that his early life  
... educated me in two antagonistic systHPVRIEHOLHIDQGDWWLWXGH«P\HDUO\
imagination was engrossed by a Gaelic oral culture of farmers and fishermen, poets 
and story tellers...[In contrast] the modern world was a culture of theories rather than 
stories...Its claims upon us were allegedly not those of some particular social group, 
but those of universal rational humanity. So part of my mind was occupied by stories 
about Saint Columba, Brian Boru, and Iain Lom, and part from inchoate theoretical 
ideas which I did not as yet know derived from the liberalism of Kant and Mill.24 
7KHLQFRQVLVWHQFLHVLQ0DF,QW\UH¶VQRHWLFVWUXFWXUHFUHDWHGE\KLVH[SRVXUHWR
Gaelic myth and liberal philosophies were mirrored in the tensions created by his 
commitment to both Marxism and Christianity. MacIntyre had become a Marxist at 
the age of 17,25 DQGGXULQJWKHODWH¶VZDVERWKDPHPEHURIWKH&RPPXQLVW
Party of Great Britain and a communicant in the Church of England.26 These 
commitments drove his earliest intellectual concerns, and his first published work 
was an attempt to integrate Christianity and Marxism into a single comprehensive 
framework for social and political action.27 However, his Christian commitment 
proved to be problematic and he was no longer a believer by the end of the 1950s. 
In 1961 MacIntyre described his religious and political position in the following 
trenchant terms: 
I was a Christian.  Am not.  It is less misleading when asked if I'm a Marxist to say 
µ\HV¶UDWKHUWKDQµQR¶%XWRWKHU0DU[LVWVKDYHEHHQNQRZQWRVD\µQR¶28 
                                               
24
 GB p.255. 
25
 Lutz Op. Cit. p14. 
26
 %ODFNOHGJHDQG'DYLGVRQ³,QWURGXFWLRQWKHXQNQRZQ$ODVGDLU0DF,QW\UH´LQ%ODFNOHGJH
and Davidson (eds.) Alasdair MacIntyrH¶V(QJDJHPHQWZLWK0DU[LVP pp.xiv-l; p.xxi. 
27
 MI. See section 1.3 below. 
28
 7KLVTXRWDWLRQLVWDNHQIURPWKHHGLWRU¶VSUHIDFHWR Alasdair MacIntyre, ³0DU[LVWVDQG
&KULVWLDQV´. This introduced the paper on its original publication in Twentieth Century 170 
Autumn 1961, pp.28-37. The preface and the paper are reprinted in Blackledge and 
Davidson Op. Cit. pp.179-186; see footnote 1, p.179 for the quotation. 
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His commitment to Marxism was sustained over a longer period than his initial 
commitment to Christianity, but the breach was more final when it came. In the 
¶V0DF,QW\UHKDGEHFRPHDOHDGLQJILJXUHLQ³7KH1HZ/HIW´DORRVH
agglomeration of leftist thinkers which had developed in response to the repression 
of the Hungarian uprising in 1956, and the resultant rejection of Soviet style 
communism.29 In 1959, MacIntyre had joined a Trotskyist organisation, the Socialist 
Labour League, but he left this organisation in 1960 because of differences with the 
leadership, and became a member of another Trotskyist grouping centred on the 
journal International Socialism.30 Over the next few years MacIntyre played a 
leading role within this organisation, but ceased active participation around 1965, 
and formally resigned from the editorial board of International Socialism in 1968.31 
His withdrawal reflected his growing disillusionment with left wing politics.  
By the end of the 1960s, therefore, MacIntyre had abandoned his commitment to 
both Christianity and Marxism.  His disillusionment ended his initial attempts  to 
integrate these belief systems into a coherent alternative to liberalism, an 
alternative that he had hoped would provide the basis for a new form of community 
that would embody the religious, social, and political relationships required to 
realise human potential and freedom. My argument in this chapter is that 
0DF,QW\UH¶VUHMHFWLRQRI&KULVWLDQLW\DQG0DU[LVPUHIOHFWHGKLVLQDELOLW\WRSURYLGHD
robust account of the justification of these comprehensive metaphysical systems. 
His mature philosophy represents his ultimate response to this question of 
justification in an intellectual context in which foundationalist accounts of knowledge 
are no longer considered viable. 
 
                                               
29
 %ODFNOHGJHDQG'DYLGVRQ³,QWURGXFWLRQ´2S&LWSS[[LL-xxiii. 
30
 %ODFNOHGJHDQG'DYLGVRQ³,QWURGXFWLRQ´2S&LWSS[[YLL-xxviii. 
31
 %ODFNOHGJHDQG'DYLGVRQ³,QWURGXFWLRQ´2S&LWS[OLLL 
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A map of this Chapter 
,QWKHQH[WVHFWLRQ,ZLOOGHVFULEH0DF,QW\UH¶VDQDO\VLVRI0DU[LVPDQG&KULVWLDQLW\LQ
his first book, Marxism: an Interpretation, in order to identify some of the general 
issues which arise when considering the justification of such comprehensive 
metaphysical perspectives. Both Christianity and Marxism embody presuppositions 
about the nature of the world, the nature of explanation, and the nature of humanity, 
which give them the capacity to create a comprehensive interpretative medium (in 
George Lindbeck's phrase32) that can be applied to all aspects of human existence.  
In MI MacIntyre characterises the narrative framework which generates this 
interpretive capacity as a "rational myth". However, neither Marxism nor Christianity 
conceptualise themselves as simply aesthetically pleasing or ethically effective 
ways of viewing the world: they claim to be true, and this claim requires an 
exploration of the nature and justification of such claims. MacIntyre addressed this 
question of justification in a number of works addressing the grounds of religious 
belief that were published in the 1950s, and these are discussed in section 1.4.  
Marxism and Christianity are not simply speculative theories. They both seek to 
answer the moral question "what ought to be done?", and their answers to these 
questions are linked to the beliefs they express about human nature, human 
potential and its relationship to ultimate reality. To reject these ontological beliefs is 
to undermine the foundations of the moral frameworks they provide. The nature of 
the relationship between a commitment to a set of theoretical beliefs and the ability 
to justify  a moral perspective was explored in two articles MacIntyre published at 
WKHHQGRIWKH¶V "Notes from the moral wilderness 1 and 2", and these 
articles form the focus of section 1.5.  In these papers MacIntyre had set out what 
                                               
32
 See George Lindbeck, The Nature of Doctrine Religion and Theology in a Postliberal Age. 
Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1984; p.80. /LQGEHFN¶VDFFRXQWRIUHOLJLRQDVan 
interpretative medium is the focus of Chapter 3, and Chapter 4 discusses the relationship 
EHWZHHQWKLVFRQFHSWDQG0DF,QW\UH¶VQRWLRQRIDWUDGLWLRQRIHQTXLU\ 
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he considered to be the preconditions of a coherent ethical framework. He argues 
that such a framework has to be rooted in the achievement of human desire, albeit 
desires that are moderated and mediated through participation in a community.  
This understanding of human desire, need and potentiality is ultimately dependent 
on beliefs about human nature that will be shaped by the conceptual resources 
available to a community at a particular point in time.  This understanding will 
therefore vary as the historical context varies. Section 1.6 reviews MacIntyre's 
analysis of social change in post-Enlightenment culture, which he set out in The 
Religious Significance of Atheism (henceforth RSA) and Secularisation and Moral 
Change (henceforth SMC). In these publications he argued that the dilemma for 
contemporary western culture is that the social changes associated with 
urbanisation had eroded the coherence of the conceptual resources required to 
formulate a substantive ethical viewpoint. This analysis illustrates the 
interdependency between ontological presuppositions and moral principles, and 
further illustrates the necessity of adopting such presuppositions as a precondition 
of rendering human life intelligible and constructing a substantive moral position.  
The dilemma for MacIntyre is that different conceptual schemes offer different 
images of human nature, different accounts of the moral life, and imply the 
construction of different forms of community if one is to be able to live such a life. 
Are such views all on the same footing, or is there some basis for judging that one 
is superior to another? Section 1.7 provides a brief exposition of MacIntyre's 
position in A Short History of Ethics (henceforth SHE).  In this book he appears to 
espouse an account of ethics in which it is not possible to demonstrate the 
superiority of the claims of any particular moral perspective, at least to the external 
critic who does not accept any of the presuppositions of such a perspective.33 It was 
                                               
33
 SHE pp.266-268. 
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his failure to provide an account of such superiority which led others to accuse him 
of a form of relativism or incoherence in ethics.34 
The overall conclusion of this chapter is that a substantive ethical position requires 
a set of ontological presuppositions about human nature, human purpose and 
human potentiality However unless these presuppositions can be held to be justified 
in some way -- or at least held to be superior to other rival notions -- the associated 
ethical position and its underlying interpretive framework will appear to be arbitrary.  
0DF,QW\UH¶VIDLOXUHWRSURYLGHDUREXVWDFFRXQWRIMXVWLILFDWLRQLQUHODWLRQWRHLWKHUWKH
ontological presuppositions of Marxism, Christianity or the beliefs that underpin an 
Aristotelian ethic, or indeed with respect to any of the alternatives, led to the period 
of re-evaluation he identified in his analysis of his philosophical development, and 
ultimately to the construction of the position set out in AV, TRV, WJWR and DRA. 
1.3 Marxism: an Interpretation 
0DF,QW\UH¶VILUVWERRN Marxism: an Interpretation (MI) was published in 1953, 
although it had been written a year earlier when MacIntyre was just 23 years old. Its 
purpose was to radicalise a Christian readership by showing how it was possible to 
integrate Marxism with a Christian faith.35 This process of integration would involve 
the radicalisation of religion36  DQGWKHFUHDWLRQRI³DIRUPRIFRPPXQLW\´37 which 
could exemplify a ChriVWLDQSDWWHUQRIOLIHDQG³VHUYHLQWKHUHQHZDORIWKHZKROH
FKXUFK´38 This integration of politics and religion would also overcome the 
unquestioned, but (to MacIntyre) pernicious, separation of the sacred and the 
                                               
34
 Preface to the 2nd Edition of SHE p. xv. 
35
 See MI p.120; MacIntyre was not alone in seeking to find common ground between 
Marxism and Christianity, despite the apparent opposition between a materialist philosophy 
and a spiritual religion. See Blackledge and Davidson Op. Cit.  pp.xxi. The SCM press which 
SXEOLVKHG0DF,QW\UH¶VERRNDGYHUWLVHGRWKHUZRUNVRQ&KULVWLDQLW\DQG0DU[LVPRQWKHGXVW
jacket of MI, including John C. Bennett, Christianity and Communism (1948); J.M. Cameron, 
Scrutiny of Marxism (1948) and A. Miller, The Christian Significance of Karl Marx (1946). 
36
 MI p.120. 
37
 MI p.121. 
38
 MI p.122. 
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secular in contemporary Western society, and ensure that all aspects of life were 
governed by religious faith: 
7KHGLYLVLRQRIKXPDQOLIHLQWRWKHVDFUHGDQGWKHVHFXODU«ZLWQHVVHVWRWKHGHDWKRI
a properly religious culture. For when the sacred and the secular are divided, then 
religion becomes one more department of human life, one activity among others... 
Likewise if our religion is fundamentally irrelevant to our politics, then we are 
recognising the political as a realm outside the reign of God. To divide the sacred 
from the secular is to rHFRJQLVH*RG¶VDFWLRQRQO\ZLWKLQWKHQDUURZHVWOLPLWV$
religion which recognises such a division, as does our own, is one on the point of 
dying.39 
0DF,QW\UH¶VDQDO\VLVLQ0,OHG him to make social and political proposals that are 
analogous to the programme he advocated in AV, in which he saw the practical task 
arising from his philosophy as the construction of ³local forms of community´ which 
would enable a society of the virtues WRVXUYLYHWKH³QHZGDUNDJHV´WKDWKHEHOLHYHG
were already evident in Western culture.40  $9¶VLPDJHRIDFXOWXUDOGDUNDJHLV
presaged In MI by the image of a society fragmented by secularisation.41 Without a 
renewal of Christian faith and institutions, the early MacIntyre feared that 
secularisation in Western Liberal societies would continue to partition the 
relationship between the individual and society into a set of ethically independent 
spheres of operation. In such a secularised society morality and religion are 
relegated to the realms of private conviction and the governance of personal 
behaviour, and do not have a wider function in terms of integrating social life.  
Contemporary Western society does not, therefore, provide a basis for the type of 
community that MacIntyre saw as being essential to the realisation of human 
potentiality. 
 
                                               
39
 MI pp.9-10; also quoted McMylor, Alasdair MacIntyre: Critic of Modernity pp.3-4 who 
makes a similar point. 
40
 AV p.263. 
41
 The nature of secularisation is discussed further in Section 1.6. 
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The Alternative to Western Liberalism 
For MacIntyre a community that is capable of realising human potentiality will be 
characterised by three elements. Firstly, an account of human nature, and of its 
potential, that is accepted by all members of the community; secondly, an 
understanding that the realisation of that potentiality should form the overall aim of 
the community; and thirdly, an accepted critique of the extent to which existing 
social arrangements fulfil such potential, which could provide a basis for communal 
action towards social improvement.  MacIntyre argues in MI that Marx in his early 
writings and Christianity in its original form42  could act as the basis for such a 
critique of society. They could also provide the ethical and spiritual basis for the 
construction of communities that could realise human potential, because both belief 
systems share a common schema of human corruption, redemption and renewal 
which Marxism had derived from Christianity.43  
He argues that the religious impetus behind Marxism can be seen in the early 
0DU[¶VPRUDOFRPPLWPHQWWRWKHSRRUDFRPPLWPHQWPRVWVWURQJO\H[SUHVVHGLQDQ
1844 manuscript entitled National Economy and Philosophy.44 MacIntyre 
comments:   
7KLVHVVD\LVDZDWHUVKHGIRU0DU[¶VWKRXJKW,WLVDWWKLVSRLQWWKDWKHJLYHVWKH
fullest meaning to the Christian patterns he inherits from Hegel.  He is far more 
Biblical than Hegel both in his concreteness and in his seeing the proletariat, the poor, 
µWKHOHDVWRIWKHVH¶LQWKHSDUDEOHRIWKHVKHHSDQGWKHJRDWVDVWKRVHZKREHDUWKH
marks of redemption.45  
MacIntyre argues that the DFFRXQWRIKXPDQLW\¶VDOLHQDWLRQLQ0DU[¶V early work is, 
OLNH+HJHO¶VDFFRXQWRIDOLHQDWLon, a recreation of the Christian image of the human 
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 MI p.83. 
43
 MacIntyre traces this correspondence between Christian and Marxist thought to the 
LQIOXHQFHRI+HJHODQG)HXHUEDFKRQ0DU[¶VHDUO\ZRUN See MI Chapters ii-v for his account 
of this development. 
44
 MI p.48. 
45
 MI p.57. 
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being estranged from God and her true self through the consequences of original 
sin.46 In Marxism the Christian image of the fall is replaced by the image of 
humanity deformed by economic and social relationships. MacIntyre comments that 
IRU0DU[³WKHHYLOLQWKHZRUOGJRHVGHHSHUWKDQPHUHO\DQDFFLGHQWDOSHUYHUVLRQRI
the will."47 Both the exploited and the exploiters are corrupted in capitalist society, 
for both the proletariat and the bourgeoisie are dehumanised by the economic 
system.  Marxism and Christianity therefore share a notion of an essential human 
nature which might be fully realised through a form of redemption. But Marx 
rejected a Christian vision of such redemption and envisaged the full realisation of 
human nature as being achievable through processes of historical development 
driven by class conflict. 
The Corruption of Church and Party 
However, despite the shared image of redemption and renewal that lies at the heart 
of Christianity and Marxism, MacIntyre holds that neither is capable of providing the 
basis for a coherent ethical and political life in the contemporary world, because 
both have been corrupted in ways that reflect their historical and social origins: 
Roman Catholicism in its worst aspects is the corrupted religion of a subsistence 
economy; Communism, the corrupted religion of modern industrial society.48 
7KHFKXUFKKDVEHHQGLVFUHGLWHG³E\WKHZD\LQZKLFKLWKDVFRQWLQXDOO\VDQFWLILHG
the political and social status quo."49 By assuming that the abolition of social and all 
other evils depends on the establishment of the Kingdom of God at the end of 
history, and embodying within its structure the inequalities of the host society, 
Christianity risks being unable to challenge exploitation or offer political guidance in 
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 MI pp.57-58. 
47
 MI p.88. 
48
 MI pp.108. 
49
 MI p.120. 
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the present. As a result, the church has disengaged from the social and political life 
of the community,50 and come to identify the good with the religiously orthodox: 
...the identification of outward religion with inward righteousness is just the source of 
that self-righteousness of religious believers that leads them to withdraw from the 
world for which Jesus died and to see the Church not as a community that redeems 
the world but as a fixed community of the redeemed. To escape this error we must 
look for ultimate significance in the secular world itself.51 
0DU[LVP¶VUHMHFWLRQRIUHOLJLRQDVVXSHUVWLWLRQDQGLWVDGRSWLRQRIDPDWHULDOLVW
ontology had indeed shifted the centre of significance to the secular world, and 
0DF,QW\UHDUJXHVWKDW0DU[LVP¶VXQFRQVFLRXVDVVLPLODWLRQRIthe central concepts 
of Christian belief had enabled it to assume the revolutionary mantle originally worn 
by the early Christian religion in a form relevant to a secular culture.52 It therefore 
represents the only belief system which incorporates Christian beliefs in a form that 
can challenge the complacency of the Western elites« 
... in a way in which the Christianity of the average parish will never do. For 
Christianity is a stranger in the modern world. The church has never come to terms 
with the world of science... Communism is in fact the form under which such strains in 
Christian thinking as were relevant had to enter the modern world: and because 
communism was religion it was open to the corruptions which always beset political 
religions.53 
However, the distortion of Christianity in the institutions of the Church is mirrored in 
the development of a Communist party that demands doctrinal purity and 
unquestioning obedience from its adherents - no matter how morally bankrupt its 
demands.54 Both Christian institutions and Communism therefore need to be 
cleansed of the worst elements of their corruption if they are to realise their 
revolutionary potential.  
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 MI pp.20-21; See also p.121. 
51
 MI p.21. 
52
 See MI p.15 and passim. 
53
 MI pp.106-7. 
54
 MI Chapter viii pp.107-108. 
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The church has remained ambivalent as to whether the establishment of the 
Kingdom of God ought to be pursued through human action, or should be left to 
*RG¶VJUDFH, and has rendered itself irrelevant to the modern world not only 
because of this political uncertainty but also because it has failed to accommodate 
itself to the modern intellectual context that is defined by science.  In contrast, 
0DU[LVP¶VDGRSWLRQRIDPDWHULDOLVWLFRQWRORJ\DQGDTXDVL-scientific methodology 
has enabled it to translate a version of Christian eschatology into a political agenda 
which is relevant to the modern world.  MacIntyre argues that Christianity must also 
identify and pursue political ends, if it is to become equally relevant to the 
contemporary world, GHVSLWHWKHFRQVHTXHQWQHHGIRULWWRGHDOZLWKWKH³KDOI-truths 
RISROLWLFDOPRUDOLW\´55  
If the Christian hope is to be realised in history, it must assume the form of a political 
hope... In other words, the religious content must be realised in political terms. But 
this is exactly what the young Marx did in his criticism of religion. Marxism is in 
essence a complete realisation of Christian eschatology.56 
Where Christianity has abandoned a coherent political role, Marxism has 
abandoned the religious beliefs that underpin Christian ethics because it has 
assimilated a Christian ontology of human nature and a Christian eschatology into a 
deterministic and mateULDOLVWFRQFHSWXDOVFKHPH0DF,QW\UH¶VUHLQWHJUDWLRQRI
Marxism and Christianity in MI requires the replacement of these elements with 
Christian beliefs, so that Marxism can be reconnected to its moral and spiritual 
compass. If this is done, Marxism will become available to Christians as a political 
and social programme that can reinvigorate the political relevance of a Church that 
has surrendered itself unto Caesar.  But this process of reintegration makes the 
coherence and legitimacy of Marxism dependent on the coherence of the beliefs 
and presuppositions of Christianity. While Marxism and Christianity share a moral 
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 MI p.120. 
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 MI p.120. 
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outrage at the fate of the poor and exploited, they embody incompatible beliefs 
about ontology and explanation. Marxism is a materialist philoVRSK\DQG³VLQFH
matter is the primary reality [it excludes] the possibility of the existence of a god or 
JRGV´57 and dismisses religion as superstition. Christianity, on the other hand, is a 
theistic system of belief. How could such a fundamental incompatibility be resolved? 
Marxism and the Rationality of Belief 
Marxism rejects religious belief on the basis that it is an irrational superstition which 
serves only to reconcile the exploited to their hardships.  But, MacIntyre argues, this 
judgement is based on some unevaluated assumptions about the nature of 
rationality. In MI MacIntyre suggests that different forms of human activity set their 
own standards of rationality, because these standards are constructed within each 
particular form of life or practice. There are no general a priori standards of 
rationality which can be used to evaluate these practice-specific standards.  
Marx assumes that there are standards of rationality and intelligibility to which human 
relations should conform...It must be said... that the formulation of a priori canons of 
rationality, of significance, is a highly suspect procedure.  For how can we determine 
a priori what are significant forms of discourse and what are not?  We must rather 
patiently work out a posteriori the different logics which govern different forms of 
speech.  The ultimate justification of religious language is that it is the only language 
in which man can understand himself as man-who-prays.  It is open to argument 
whether and in what ways prayer is a significant activity.  But one cannot a priori lay it 
down that it is rational for man to eat, to love and to think, but not to pray.58  
There are echoes of Wittgenstein in this passage, implicit in the view that practices 
such as prayer determine their own standards of coherence and intelligibility, and 
cannot be evaluated from a universal and practice-independent perspective.59 For 
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MacIntyre, prayer has to be understood in terms of the logic of a personal 
communicative relationship rather than justified through a demonstration of the 
rationality of some theoretical beliefs about God.  
When a man prays, he speaks not about God, but to God. He envisages himself in a 
dramatic, rather than a speculative relationship to God. The drama which he 
envisages takes the form of religious myth.60  
The practice of prayer is intelligible because it is embedded in a myth that gives 
FRKHUHQFHWRWKLVFRPPXQLFDWLYHDFWLYLW\:KLOH0DF,QW\UHDFFHSWVWKDW0DU[LVP¶V
FULWLFLVPRIUHOLJLRQDFWVDVDQHFHVVDU\SURSK\ODFWLFDJDLQVW³PDJLFDQG
VXSHUVWLWLRQ´61 he argues that religion as a whole should not be identified with such 
VXSHUVWLWLRQV0DU[LVP¶VDVVLPLODWLRQRIUHOLJLRQWRWKHLUUDWLRQDOLVGXHWRLWVIDLOXUHWR
understand the distinction between mythical and scientific thought.62  
First, myth pictures the world as a whole.  But to picture the world as a whole from the 
limited viewpoint of the myth maker who is himself part of the world means a 
stretching of ordinary language, so that extended metaphor is essential to the insight 
of myth.  Secondly, scientific thinking must eliminate the emotive elements, must 
distinguish sharply between the emotive and the cognitive... but some uses of 
language, among them those of myth, are both descriptive and evaluative.  For while 
myth and science both select certain facts as significant: they differ in their criterion of 
significance.  A metaphysics is a rational myth.  A superstition is a myth without the 
control and criticism of reasoning.  A religion is a myth which claims both a foundation 
in history and to point beyond itself to God. 63 
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0DF,QW\UH¶VREVHUYDWLRQVDERXWP\WKDUHQRWIXOO\GHYHORSHGLQ0,64 However, the 
points he make in the passage above suggest that a myth has five characteristics. 
1. It enables the individual who has been educated in the myth to interpret the 
whole universe, including herself. 
2. There is, therefore, no external perspective from which that individual can 
FRQVWUXFWDQ³REMHFWLYH´GHVFULSWLRQRIUHDOLW\ 
3. Where science seeks to construct value neutral descriptions of reality, myth 
attempts to describe reality from a perspective which is shaped by a set of 
values that form part of its interpretative framework. 
4. $P\WKFDQEHGLVWLOOHGLQWRD³UDWLRQDOPHWDSK\VLFV´LILWLVVXEMHFWWRFULWLFDO
scrutiny and challenge. 
5. A religion (oUSHUKDSVLWVKRXOGKDYHEHHQ³WKH&KULVWLDQUHOLJLRQ´LVDP\WK
that has a foundation in historical events and points towards the nature of 
God. 
,IRQHDGGVDQDGGLWLRQDOSRLQWDERXWWKHP\WKVKDSLQJWKHLQGLYLGXDO¶VDVVHVVPHQW
of right action to the lisWDERYH0DF,QW\UH¶VDFFRXQWRIDUDWLRQDOP\WKLVHTXLYDOHQW
to what I described as a comprehensive metaphysical position in Section 1.1 above. 
My addition is legitimate because worldviews such as Marxism and Christianity are 
forms of praxis, as McMylor points out,65  and underpin practical reasoning and 
decision making.66  What this passage also makes clear is that some elements of 
0DF,QW\UH¶VGHVFULSWLRQDUHDQDORJRXVWRKLVDFFRXQWRIDWUDGLWLRQRIHQTXLU\LQKLV
later philosophy. For the later MacIntyre, traditions of enquiry begin in myth, and 
become transformed into a rational metaphysics through processes of criticism and 
evaluation which lead to the formulation of standards of coherence and rationality 
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that are internal to the world of that tradition, as we will see in Chapter 2. MacIntyre 
makes a similar claim In MI when he argues that Christian beliefs should not be 
rejected as superstitions, EHFDXVHWKHLUUDWLRQDOLW\KDVEHHQVHFXUHGE\D³YLJRURXV
QHJDWLYHWKHRORJ\´DQGWKURXJK³WKHVWULFWHVWFULWLFLVPRI>WKHLU@IRXQGDWLRQVLQWKH
JRVSHOGRFXPHQWVDQGLQWKHOLIHRIWKH&KXUFK´67 It is their consistency with these 
internally generated criteria of coherence and adequacy that demonstrates their 
justification ± provided one accepts the presuppositions that define the overall belief 
system.  
0DF,QW\UH¶VSRVLWLRQLQ0,VXJJHVWVWKDWLQVRIDUDVUHOLJLRQVJHQHUDWHa ³UDWLRQDO
PHWDSK\VLFV´WKH\Dlso define their own standards of adequacy. Marxist criticism of 
religion therefore reflects a failure to appreciate the logic that governs the rationality 
of myth, and also embodies a misunderstanding of its own status as a form of 
knowledge. Although Marxism had come to conceptualise itself as a theory 
constructed within the natural science framework of the 19th Century, MacIntyre 
DUJXHVWKDWWKHHVVHQFHRI0DU[¶VLQLWLDOSKLORVRSK\OD\LQKLVHVSRXVDORID
Christian ethical perspective.  
0DU[¶VYLVLRQRI estrangement would have been impossible without his vision of what 
PDQRXJKWWREH0DU[¶VGRFWULQHKHUHLVDPRUDOGRFWULQH+LVYLHZRI/DERXU
derives not at root from economic theory but from moral insight... He moves between 
the poles of man fallen, man redeemed. 68 
Marxism (like Christianity) is, therefore, a form of myth and, in its early stages at 
least, provided a prophetic vision of life as it would be when human beings have 
been healed of their corruption by the advent of a socialist society. 
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6LGHE\VLGHZLWK>0DU[¶VGHSLFWLRQRIHVWUDQJHPHQW@LVDSLFWXUHRIZKDWKXPDQOLIH
QRORQJHUHVWUDQJHGVKRXOGEH0DU[¶VDFWLYLW\KHUHLVSURSKHWLFGLVFHUQLQJWKHVLJQV
of the times.69 
+RZHYHUDV0DU[¶VWKRXJKWGHYHORSHGKHDEDQGRQHGWKLVRULJLQDOPRral and 
SURSKHWLFFRQGHPQDWLRQRIKXPDQLW\¶VVHOI-estrangement, and came to argue that 
his account of the outcome of class struggle in socialism represented a prediction 
EDVHGRQDVFLHQWLILFDQDO\VLVRIKLVWRU\%XW0DU[LVP¶VMXGJHPHQWRQLWVHOILVEDVHG
on an erroneous perception of itself as engaged in a process of scientific 
extrapolation, when in fact it is engaged in a process of moral evaluation and 
prophecy. While prophecy and prediction both seek to identify and explain patterns 
in history, prophecy provides a general framework for the interpretation and 
evaluation of future events within the world view defined by a myth, and a particular 
prophecy may be taken to be confirmed by quite different outcomes ± unlike 
scientific prediction. Marxist predictions have not been borne out in practice and the 
fact that Marxism has not been abandoned despite the failure of these predictions 
undermines its claim to be a scientific theory. For MacIntyre, the reluctance of 
Marxists to accept that there is a mixture of error as well as truth in Marx indicates 
that  
Marxism is not simply an economic doctrine: it is a doctrine about the universe, and 
such doctrines are held with religious rather than scientific attitudes.70  
One consequence of the flexibility of interpretation associated with religious 
attitudes is that such doctrines cannot be falsified in the way that the failure of 
prediction may falsify a scientific hypothesis. Nevertheless, despite their resistance 
to falsification comprehensive metaphysical positions such as Marxism and 
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Christianity claim to be true.71 MacIntyre seeks to maintain a connection between 
these claims to truth and confirmation through historical events: 
Both Christianity and Marxism... claim truth as metaphysical systems rather than 
utility; and both vindicate that claim by laying themselves open to falsification on 
questions of fact.  The Marxist asserts materialism in metaphysics because it is only 
the insights of materialism that will enable him to change the world effectively.  
Consequently the claims of Marxist materialism are vindicated, if, and only if, the 
predictions of Marxist social theory are verified.  The achievements of Communist 
revolution are the test of Marxist metaphysics... the Christian claim rests on the fact of 
the Resurrection of Jesus. .. both Christianity and Marxism assert patterns in history 
by pointing to vindicating events.72 
At one level it is clearly true to argue that if one becomes a Marxist, for example, 
one accepts its vision of the achievement of a socialist end-state as a basis for 
action and that the realisation of that end-state will vindicate the metaphysical 
system.73 But the claim that both Marxism and Christianity can be vindicated by 
particular historical events ignores their power to shape the interpretation of such 
events. It is as if MacIntyre, faced with the problem of defining the nature of truth of 
such metaphysical positions, has fallen back on a vestigial falsificationism. But if a 
myth can interpret a range of different outcomes in ways that are consistent with its 
presuppositions, it will be able to deflect the challenge of events that are apparently 
inconsistent with its predictions.74 MacIntyre therefore fails to specify a basis on 
which one such rational metaphysics might demonstrate its superiority to another. 
As a result MI leaves unresolved the questions which are the main focus of this 
thesis: under what circumstances is it legitimate to hold that belief in a 
comprehensive metaphysical position is justified, and indeed, is the notion of 
justification applicable to such beliefs? 
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Anticipations of AV 
MacIntyre did not set out to provide an explicit account of the justification of a belief 
in a comprehensive metaphysical position in MI. But his exploration of the 
relationship between Christianity and Marxism begins to expose some of the 
important questions around such justification, and part of my argument is that the 
consideration of these quHVWLRQVSOD\VDFHQWUDOUROHLQWKHHYROXWLRQRI0DF,QW\UH¶V
PDWXUHSKLORVRSK\7KHFRQWLQXLW\EHWZHHQ0DF,QW\UH¶VHDUO\DQGhis later work is 
illustrated by the fact that MI embodies some important anticipations of that mature 
perspective. Both MI and AV are responses to the perceived failings of liberal 
Western culture, and in both books MacIntyre advocates a similar solution: the 
establishment of small communities which can provide an alternative to the 
mainstream culture. $VZHZLOOVHH0DF,QW\UH¶VDGvocacy of Marxism also led him 
to advocate a quasi-Aristotelian moral framework as an essential precondition of the 
overall coherence of such a philosophy,75 although he did not fully adopt an 
Aristotelian perspective until the 1970s.76 
However, the connection between MI and AV lies not only in the anticipation of 
themes that are more fully and more effectively explored in his later work, but also 
in the fact that MI raises a central problem that is only adequately addressed in 
0DF,QW\UH¶VPDWXUHZRUN That problem is the basis on which one might hold a 
philosophical perspective to be justified. MI was significantly revised and 
republished as Marxism and Christianity (henceforth MC) in 1968, and this version 
entered a second edition in 1995. When MacIntyre came to write an introduction to 
this third incarnation of MI he was able to look back on its first publication in 1953 
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and recognise that in MI he had identified but had been unable to adequately 
IRUPXODWHRUUHVROYHD³IXQGDPHQWDOSUREOHP.´0DF,QW\UHDVVHUWs that MI  
... embodies a conception of philosophy as a form of social practice embedded in and 
reflective upon other forms of social practice.77  
Such a conception of philosophy has four main characteristics according to 
MacIntyre. Firstly, philosophy should be concerned with understanding the rules 
and standards of justification that are embodied in the social practices under 
consideration - Marxism and Christianity in the case of MI. Secondly, it should be 
concerned with articulating the way in which participants in these practices 
understand or misunderstand these rules and standards. To take Marxism as an 
example, its adherents have systematically misinterpreted its nature by 
conceptualising it as a science, when in fact it more closely embodies the 
characteristics of a religion. Such misinterpretations may lead members of the 
community to make erroneous judgements about their own perspective and the 
truth and justification of their beliefs. Therefore the third characteristic of such an 
understanding of philosophy is that it is concerned with evaluating the extent to 
which the distorted interpretations of participants in these practices has led to a 
systematic misunderstanding of the nature of those practices, and of the goods that 
are being pursued through these practices.78  Philosophy therefore reveals the truth 
through the exposure of systematic error. But the views of the philosophical critic 
are not themselves immune to distortions caused by their own social and 
intellectual context, and the fourth requirement is that the philosopher should be 
able to demonstrate that their account has in fact  
«WUDQVFHQGHGZKDWHYHUOLPLWDWLRQVKDYHEHHQLPSRVHGE\KHURUKLVKLVWRULFDODQG
social circumstances, at least to a sufficient extent to represent truly the first three 
                                               
77
 Introduction to second edition of MC p.xvi. 
78
 Introduction to MC pp.xvi-xvii. 
28 
 
[tasks] and to show not just how things appear to be from this or that historical and 
social point of view, but how things are.79 
But how could the philosopher demonstrate that their own position is (happily) 
immune to the type of distortions that arise within other practices? If she is unable 
to demonstrate this, the critic would appear to have no clear grounds on which to 
claim to have exposed the truth, or on which she can show that her account is 
demonstrably superior to those of others. As MacIntyre puts it: 
How is it possible to identify in the case of other and rival theses and arguments a 
YDULHW\RIGLVWRUWLRQVDQGOLPLWDWLRQVGHULYLQJIURPWKHLUDXWKRU¶VKLVWRULFDODQGVRFLDO
FRQWH[WZKLOHDWWKHVDPHWLPHEHLQJDEOHWRH[KLELWRQH¶V own theses and arguments 
... as exempt from such distortion and limitation?80 
In raising this question MacIntyre has rediscovered a version of Cartesian doubt, in 
ZKLFKWKHIHDUWKDWRQH¶VEHOLHIVPD\EHGHOXVLRQVIRVWHUHGE\DQHYLOGHPRQLV
replaced by tKHIHDUWKDWRQHPD\EHHTXDOO\GHOXGHGLQRQH¶VEHOLHIVEHFDXVHRI
the distortions created by the historical and intellectual context within which each of 
us is embedded. 
When MacIntyre published a revised version of MI as the first edition of Marxism 
and Christianity in 1968 he had no answer to these questions. As a consequence 
he found himself unable to make any commitments to a comprehensive 
metaphysical perspective. 
Because I did not as yet know how to formulate this question adequately enough 
even to know where to look for an answer to it, I found myself distanced from 
identification with any substantive point of view. Whereas in 1953 I had...supposed it 
possible to be in some significant way both a Christian and a Marxist, I was by 1968 
able to be neither, while acknowledging in both standpoints a set of truths with which I 
did not know how to come to terms.81  
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This inability to identify with any substantive point of view precipitated the 
longstanding epistemological crisis82 that characterised MacIntyre¶VPLGGOHSHULRG a 
crisis which he was only able to resolve in his mature work. This crisis reflected the 
impact of three unresolved questions about the nature of justification that had first 
begun to emerge in MI. Firstly, there is the overall question of specifying the 
circumstances in which it is legitimate to believe in the ontological and other 
presuppositions of a comprehensive metaphysical system. Secondly, this question 
will also arise with respect to the justification of our moral beliefs, if such beliefs are 
logically related to our (unsubstantiated) ontological presuppositions. Thirdly, our 
social and cultural environment will tend to shape our views as to which beliefs can 
be legitimately held. But these cultural factors may change over time. As a result, 
beliefs that are held to be fully justified at one time may no longer be plausible, or 
even coherent, at a later time.  In the next three sections I am going to describe 
0DF,QW\UH¶VHDUO\DWWHPSWVWRDGGUHVVWKHVHquestions, beginning with his initial 
account of the justification of religious belief. 
1.4 Myth and Justification: The logical status of religious belief 
$VZHKDYHVHHQ0DF,QW\UH¶VDWWHPSWWRLQWHJUDWH0DU[LVPDQG&KULVWLDQLW\LQ0,
raised questions about the grounds for accepting the truth of a comprehensive 
metaphysical system. One example of such a system is the set of beliefs 
associated with the Christian faith,83 DQGLQWKH¶V0DFLQW\UHSXEOLVKHGVHYHUDO
works that are particularly relevant to the question of the grounds of such beliefs. In 
1955 MacIntyre jointly edited a collection of papers with Antony Flew (New Essays 
in Philosophical Theology),84 and publisKHGDSDSHURQ³9LVLRQV´LQWKDWERRN85 He 
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contributed an article to a second collection, Metaphysical Beliefs (1957), called 
³7KHORJLFDOVWDWXVRIUHOLJLRXVEHOLHI´KHQFHIRUWK/686  These two collections of 
papers were particularly influential in resurrecting general interest in metaphysical 
questions about the nature and justification of religious belief, and have proved to 
be of enduring interest.87 In 1959 he published a book which addressed Difficulties 
in Christian Belief (henceforth DCB). 88 I will consider each of these publications in 
turn. 
Visions 
³9LVLRQV´LVDEULHIDQGWUHQFKDQWGLVPLVVDORIWKHFODLPWKDWUHOLJLRXVH[SHULHQFHFDQ
MXVWLI\UHOLJLRXVEHOLHI0DF,QW\UH¶VDUJXPHQWLVDVIROORZV9LVLRQVDUHWKHEHVW
candidate for experiences that might justify religious beliefs. Therefore, if visions 
can be shown to fail in this role, one can demonstrate that no experiential 
justification for religious belief is possible, as any other experience that might be 
cited will provide weaker evidence.  He argues that visions cannot provide evidence 
IRUWKHH[LVWHQFHRI³LQYLVLEOHDQGVXSHUQDWXUDOEHLQJV´89 for three reasons: 
1. There can be no criterion that can be used to distinguish a veridical from a 
non-YHULGLFDOH[SHULHQFHRI³VHHLQJDQDQJHO´IRUH[DPSOe), as there are 
criteria that enable us to distinguish between having a hallucination of an 
elephant and the genuine experience of seeing an elephant in the zoo.90 
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Without such a criterion, religious experience cannot be distinguished from 
hallucination. 
2. There is no rule of inference that we can refer to in order to justify the claim 
that a vision is indicative of some higher reality. If we claim that the smell of 
smoke means that there is a fire, we can point to empirical evidence which 
justifies the maxim ³WKHUHLVQRVPRNHZLWKRXWILUH´7KLVLVQRWWKHFDVHZLWK
attempts to use visions to justify general assertions about the supernatural 
and transcendent.91 
3. 7KHDSSHDUDQFHRIDQDQJHOLQDYLVLRQZRXOGQRWDFWDVD³ZDUUDQWIRU
accepting any distinctively UHOLJLRXVXWWHUDQFHKHPLJKWPDNH´92 as there are 
no grounds for accepting his veracity, so the fact that the Angel claims to 
speak the word of God provides no basis for one to trust such an assertion. 
0DF,QW\UH¶VIXQGDPHQWDOSRLQWWKHUHIRUHLVLQHVVHQFHD reiteration of the Kantian 
principle that sensuous experiences cannot lead us beyond the world of 
experience.93 In particular MacIntyre points out that a religious experience is 
identified as such through the application of religious beliefs to experience and 
therefore cannot in itself act as a warrant for those beliefs.94 Indeed, in this respect 
KLVJHQHUDODUJXPHQWUHVRQDWHVZLWK*HRUJH/LQGEHFN¶VGLVPLVVDORIH[SHULHQWLDO-
expressive accounts of religion.95  
The Logical Status of Religious Belief 
0DF,QW\UH¶s arguments against experiential justifications of religious belief are not 
conclusive, and other philosophers have put forward robust accounts of the role that 
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experience may play in underpinning faith.96 However, the grounds for his rejection 
of the role of experience do not depend on the power of his critical arguments 
alone. In LS MacIntyre rejects the notion that religious language gains its meaning 
through its relationship to distinctive religious experiences,97  arguing that 
:LWWJHQVWHLQ¶VSULYDWHODQJuage argument had demonstrated that pre-linguistic 
experience can never be the determinant of meaning.98 Words do not get their 
meaning from labelling some private experience, but from their functions within the 
practices of particular cultural groups.99 As a result the characterisation of religious 
ODQJXDJHDVH[SUHVVLYHPLVLQWHUSUHWVLWVIXQFWLRQV0DF,QW\UH¶VLQWHQWLRQLQ/6LVWR
provide a more adequate account of those functions.  This approach is consistent 
ZLWKWKH¶VYLHZRISKLORVRSK\DVDGHVFULptive rather than prescriptive 
discipline, which should elucidate the way in which language is used, but which 
VKRXOGQRWVHHNWRUXOHRQWKHOHJLWLPDF\RIVXFKXVDJHRQWKHEDVLVRI³a priori 
VWDQGDUGVRIPHDQLQJIXOQHVV´100 
Words which are used in religiouVGLVFRXUVHVXFKDV³ORYH´RU³IDWKHU´RU³SHDFH´RU
³UHGHPSWLRQ´DOOKDYHDQRQ-problematic application in family and social life.101 For 
MacIntyre, religious language gains its meaning from the use of the same words in 
these familiar and non-problematic settings. However, the difference between 
religious and secular contexts of use indicates that such words cannot possess the 
same meaning when they are applied to God: 
What is said of God is ...familiar enough. God calls. God hears, God provides. But 
these verbs appear to lack the application which is their justification in non-religious 
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FRQWH[WVWKHQDPHµ*RG¶LVQRWXVHGWRUHIHUWRVRPHRQHZKRFDQEHVHHQDQG
KHDUGDVWKHQDPHµ$EUDKDP¶LVDQGZKHQGHVFULSWLYHYHUEVDUHXVHGWRVWDWHWKDW
God's call is heard, it is not ordinary hearing that is meant... if talk about God is not to 
be construed at its face value, how is it to be construed?102 
MacIntyre seeks to answer this question through a discussion of what he calls the 
³UHOLJLRXVDWWLWXGH´ZKLFKFRQVLVWVRIWZRPDLQHOHPHQWV)LUVWO\WKHWKHLVWLV
committed in some systematic way to the practice of worship, and secondly, 
although the belieYHUKROGVWKDW*RGLVVRJUHDWWKDW³QRWKLQJDGHTXDWHFDQEHVDLG
DERXWKLP´KHDOVRZLVKHVWRVD\³WKDW*RGDFWVLQWKHXQLYHUVH´DQGVHHNVWR
describe these actions.103 The first element in this framework enables MacIntyre to 
argue that the tension between the apophaticism required by the limits of language 
DQGWKHQHHGWRVSHDNRI*RG¶VZRUNVLVPDQDJHGLIQRWUHVROYHGLQWKHSUDFWLFHRI
worship by the use of a language that is largely vocative and gerundive.104 Worship 
is a practice which is largely addressed to God, and is aimed at encouraging certain 
responses to God, rather than aimed at constructing a set of true propositions about 
him. And this is a clue to the way in which philosophers have over-emphasised the 
propositional nature of belief, rather than its performative aspects. What is central to 
religious commitment is the process of learning how to worship, rather than the 
acquisition of certain beliefs about the object of worship: 
In worship we do not talk about God, but to him.  We are apt to envisage the relation 
between religious belief and worship in terms of an intellectualist conception of theory 
as prior to and directive of practice. Prof. Ryle has shown us how this conception is in 
general mistaken.  Knowing how to perform particular operations does not depend on 
knowing that particular theoretical principles are to be applied.  Similarly we are wrong 
to conceive of religious practice as the application of religious doctrine.  It is not just 
that as a matter of historical fact the practice of worship precedes the explicit 
formulation of belief, but that we can worship without being able to say clearly what 
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ZHEHOLHYHµ7KH&DWKROLFIDLWKLVWKLVµ7KDWZHZRUVKLS¶QRWWKDWZHEHOLHYH,Q
formulating doctrine we are trying to say what we do when we pray.105 
What God has done or said is sometimes described during worship, but such 
descriptions do not occur in the form of isolated assertions, demanding a decision 
DVWRWKHWUXWKRUIDOVLW\RIHDFKSURSRVLWLRQ7KH\DUHSUHVHQWHGDVSDUWRI³a total 
QDUUDWLRQLQZKLFKDZKROHQHVVRIYLVLRQLVSUHVHQWHG´106 MacIntyre characterises 
these narrations as myths, and develops the account of religious myth that he had 
first put forward in MI. We understand myths, he suggests, in precisely the same 
way that we understand other narratives such as novels or dramas. But unlike a 
novel, one has to either accept or reject a myth,107  because the function of myth is 
to guide us in our lives. The acceptance of a myth enables us to respond coherently 
to the central issues of human life because:  
$Q\JLYHQP\WKLQFRUSRUDWHVDQDWWLWXGHWR«>WKHFULWLFDOLVVXHVRIELUWKORYH
marriage, death and so on] and to accept a myth is to identify oneself with that 
attitude and so to make the myth directive of one's behaviour.  To accept a sufficiently 
comprehensive myth is to accept a whole way of living.108  
Acceptance of a myth establishes a framework for practice that is elucidated and 
supported by the stories it embodies. Such stories cannot be translated into an 
abstract set of ethical principles. Rather, myths provide guidance precisely at those 
points in experience where moral rules and principles break down - at points of 
crisis (for example) such as bereavement or, indeed, in the face of our own 
impending death. In accepting or rejecting a myth we accept or reject the way of life 
which is exemplified in the form and content of the story: 
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Generations of non-conformists found the shape of the moral life...  in 7KH3LOJULP¶V
Progress... in accepting or rejecting what Bunyan says... we accept or reject a whole 
way of living.109 
$VZHVKDOOVHHZKHQ,GHVFULEH*HRUJH/LQGEHFN¶VSRVLWLRQLQ&KDSWHU, there is 
much in LS that anticipates the perspective of postliberal theology. Both MacIntyre 
(in LS) and Lindbeck emphasise that the narratives that constitute a religion provide 
DQLQWHUSUHWDWLYHIUDPHZRUNZKLFKVKDSHVWKHLQGLYLGXDO¶VWKHRUHWLFDODQGSUDFWLFDO
engagement with the world. But are the stories that constitute religious myths true, 
and if so, what sense of truth is being applied?  
For MacIntyre the believer accepts that the Christian narratives are to be accepted 
as true stories about a being that exists and acts in the world. MacIntyre suggests 
WKDWWKLVSDUWLFXODUXVHRIP\WK³VWDQGVWKHUHIRUHLQQHHGRIMXVWLILFDWLRQ´110 He 
rejects at once the idea that religious beliefs are quasi-scientific hypotheses that 
can be demonstrated to be true or shown to be false,111 discarding the vestigial 
falsificationism that he seemed to express in MI. Religious beliefs are not 
hypotheses competing with other theories of the origin of the universe.112 Attempts 
to demonstrate the existence of God (for example) mistakenly interpret religion as a 
theory about the nature of reality, rather than a faith in which an initial act of trust is 
cenWUDO,I*RG¶VH[LVWHQFHZHUHGHPRQVWUDEOHZHZRXOGEHGHQLHGWKHRSSRUWXQLW\
of choosing to love him. 113 7KHDVVLPLODWLRQRIUHOLJLRQWRK\SRWKHVLV³LVDOLHQWRWKH
whole spirit of religious belief. Having made our decision, we adhere to belief 
unconditionDOO\´114   
Demonstration may be alien to religious faith, but this does not imply that a religious 
assertion will lack justification. The issue of justification is, however, internal to the 
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religious system rather than a matter of external justification. Religions, MacIntyre 
argues, have their own procedures  
... for deciding whether a given belief or practice is or is not authentic.  Each has a 
criterion by means of which orthodoxy is determined.  And in this sense a belief is 
justified in a particular religion by referring to that rule by means of which it is 
determined what is and what is not included in the religion.115 
The justification of religious practices and doctrines are analogous to the 
MXVWLILFDWLRQRIFODLPVDERXWWKHQDWXUHRIODZ7RDVNµZKDWis the justification of a 
FODLPWKDWVXFKDQGVXFKLVWKHODZ"¶LVWRDVNIRUHOXFLGDWLRQLQWHUPVRIWKH
established processes through which a sovereign state enacts legislation. Such 
criteria are the ultimate court of appeal, and as such cannot have, and do not stand 
in need of, any further logical justification.116 Such an ultimate criterion of 
authenticity also serves as the criterion of identity of a religion, in that what belongs 
to the religion is that which has been endorsed with reference to whatever 
constitutes the source of authority within the religion. 
Every religion therefore is defined by reference to what it accepts as an authoritative 
criterion in religious matters.  The acceptance or rejection of a religion is thus the 
acceptance or rejection of such an authority.117   
What defines a system of thought as a religion is the existence of a set of internal 
rules for determining what is and what is not doctrinally authentic, and an 
associated set of narratives that provides guidance as to how to one should live.  To 
accept a religion is to accept the authority of these internal criteria of authenticity 
and the associated narratives. This account provides MacIntyre with a general 
definition of a religion which is very similar to that put forward by George Lindbeck 
some thirty years later. Both authors identify religion with the acceptance of the 
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authority of a framework of belief rather than in terms of a specific type of content. 
As MacIntyre puts it 
«E\VD\LQJWKDWUHOLJLRQLVWREH«IRUPDOO\GHILQHd without reference to its content 
we allow for both theism and polytheism, religions of one God like Islam and of no 
God like primitive Buddhism.118 
Lindbeck also defines a religion in terms of its function in providing a framework for 
living rather than in terms of some specific type of propositional content, and this 
allows both authors to include forms of belief which are secular or non-theistic 
within their definitions.119 But however satisfactory such an account may be as a 
definition of a religion, it does not act as a basis for distinguishing between the 
claims of one religion over another or, indeed, provide any rationally arguable basis 
for choosing one religion over none. For MacIntyre in LS one can accept a religion 
in its own terms or one can reject it.120  A decision to submit to authority is central to 
the nature of religious belief,121 but to make such a commitment is a question of 
emotion rather than reason: 
To believe in God resembles not so much believing that something is the case as 
being engrossed by a passion: Kierkegaard compares the believer to a madman; he 
might equally have compared him to a lover.122 
Once one has embraced religion one can apply internal standards of justification, 
but the question of commitment appears to involve a criterionless choice. Each 
religion appears to act as a hermetically sealed self-justifying system. MacIntyre 
came to recognise this aspect of his position, and its defects. He rejected the view 
that the criteria for judging the factual basis of Christianity could be fundamentally 
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different from the criteria that are used in other aspects of life123 and came to see his 
position in LS as essentially empty: 
...Christianity, as I defend it here, becomes a belief which is in practice irrefutable at 
the cost of becoming a belief that is practically vacuous. Where the criteria for the 
truth of a position are laid down, so to speak, from within that position... it becomes 
impossible to differentiate a position for which one claims truth (in the ordinary sense) 
and a position which one merely entertains because of its aesthetic power.124 
MacIntyre concludes that his account of religion in this essay is inconsistent with 
Christian belief EHFDXVHWKHODWWHUFODLPVWUXWKLQWKLV³RUGLQDU\VHQVH´+RZHYHU
his negative conclusion should not disguise the fact that in LS he identifies many 
of the issues that he sought to resolve in creating his mature philosophy. In 
particular, the article ideQWLILHVEXWGRHVQRWUHVROYHWKHTXHVWLRQµ+RZLVLW
possible to have a non-vacuous account of justification where the criteria for 
justification are internal to the position to be justified"¶DQGLWLVSUHFLVHO\WKLV
question that is addressed by the notion of tradition-constituted rationality. 
Difficulties in Christian Belief 
MacIntyre returns to the question of the justification of belief in DCB. He asserts that 
religious belief cannot be compelled by deductive argument, because any deductive 
argument is valid solely in so far as its conclusion is already contained within its 
premises. Such an argument cannot, therefore, compel the acceptance of those 
premises.125 As a result such arguments have no power to convince the sceptic.  As 
he had argued in LS, attempts to justify belief in this way mistake the function of 
UHOLJLRXVIDLWKZKLFKUHTXLUHVDQDFWRIWUXVWWKDWZRXOGEHREYLDWHGLI*RG¶V
existence could be demonstrated.126  
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Some people undertake such an act of trust, other people do not. For the MacIntyre 
of DCB what determines whether such trust is forthcoming is the extent to which the 
adoption of such beliefs can render our experience of the world intelligible. 
However, MacIntyre suggests that we can understand this process of rendering our 
experience intelligible in at least two different ways. For some people, it may involve 
materialist scientific explanation; for others teleological explanation may be 
required. MacIntyre suggests that arguments such as the cosmological argument 
have force only for those people who are already committed to a religious 
perspective because they require a form of explanation that assumes that what the 
H[LVWHQFHRIWKLVZRUOG³UHTXLUHV«WREHLQDQ\ZD\LQWHOOLJLEOHLVDQHFHVVDU\
EHLQJ´127 
In contrast, the critic of such teleological arguments is likely to construe explanation 
in terms of the subsumption of phenomena under causal laws. Such explanations 
proceed by relating one set of natural phenomena to others and do not need to 
invoke some final supernatural cause. 128 Ultimately, any train of argument has to 
come back to some first principles and assumptions about the nature of explanation 
which are accepted by an individual without being justified by further inferential 
arguments. The difference between the Christian and the sceptic is not that one is 
breaching well established rational standards and making illegitimate assumptions 
while the other is arguing from well-founded principles, but that they are operating 
from incompatible sets of adopted first principles. The initial act of commitment to 
the preferred mode of explanation and to the system cannot be given a rational 
justification.  
0DF,QW\UH¶VSRVLWLRQLQ'&%VXJJHVWVWKDWbelief in a materialist and determinist 
viewpoint or a religious teleological perspective is a question of the extent to which 
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HDFKVXFFHHGVLQPDNLQJRQH¶VH[SHULHQFHRIWKHZRUOGLQWHOOLJLEOH%XWWKLVDSSHDUV
to justify belief by an appeal to contingent psychological facts about the individual. 
In a diverse society each of us will migrate towards forms of life that reinforce and 
are reinforced by our personal need for different forms of explanation. However, our 
acceptance of the viewpoints embodied in such forms of life will not be justifiable to 
those who do not share our predilection for one set of presuppositions rather than 
another. Ultimately, I will have to justify my higher level beliefs by reference to these 
presuppositions. These commitments form the foundations of our attempts to make 
sense of the world; they are not positions justifiable by further argument.129  As 
Wittgenstein said in Philosophical Investigations 
If I have exhausted the justifications I have reached bedrock, and my spade is turned. 
7KHQ,DPLQFOLQHGWRVD\µ7KLVLVVLPSO\ZKDW,GR¶130 
The problem with this Wittgensteinian position is that it would appear to lead to a 
form of relativism if one accepts that it is possible to have more than one conceptual 
scheme, each of which can be justified by reference to the form of life in which it is 
embodied.131  
In DCB MacIntyre argues that that there are at least two responses to this type of 
criticism. Firstly, one might evaluate the legitimacy of first principles by examining 
the type of consequences that flow from their adoption. This however, invites an 
accusation of circularity:  
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...are we not bound to judge and assess the consequences also by our first principles 
so that all our arguments will be logical boa-constrictors in which every attempt to 
escape leads only to being swallowed still further? 132 
MacIntyre suggests that this consequence can be avoided if we acknowledge that 
we have multiple sets of criteria by which we judge whether something is worthy of 
acceptance or not: 
We tend to have a number of groups of criteria which we match against each other. 
Our acceptance of the authority of Jesus Christ...is compounded of the way in which 
he meets the demands of our moral insight, the way in which he comes up to the 
standards which we believe a being worthy of worship must satisfy, and so on.133  
MacIntyre notes that the convergence of our moral insight with other criteria 
provides a rational basis for the act of trust in Christ, by disposing of some factors 
which might militate against such trust. This is not the same as demonstrating the 
rational legitimacy of an act of trust in Christ, as MacIntyre acknowledges, but he 
suggests that such complementarity underpins the coherence of faith by excluding 
inconsistencies between our religious commitments and our ethical 
presuppositions.  
 [These criteria] do provide some test, even if only a negative one: they do preserve a 
place for reasoning even in our choice of ultimate criteria.134  
This argument from the complementarity of our moral insight to our spiritual desires 
points to the relationship between our beliefs about human nature and our ethical 
beliefs. MacIntyre suggests that the complementarity of our spirituality and our 
ethical concerns rests in their relationship to the achievement of our ultimate 
happiness. The point of Christian worship and ethics lies in their relevance to the 
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pursuit of happiness for me and for other people.135 This, indeed, is the purpose of 
morality:  
«WKHSRLQWRIPRUDOLW\LVWKDWLIZHIROORZPRUDOUXOHVZHVKDOOJHWIRURXUVHOYHVDQG
others authentic happiness.136  
This link between ethics and happiness is also the basis for his justification of the 
cogency of adopting a Marxist perspective, as we will see in section 1.5. The 
difference between a religious person and the secular materialist may, therefore, lie 
in how each conceptualises happiness, and how each understands the shape of the 
moral life. For the Christian that shape culminates ultimately in a final union with 
God, and therefore God must be central to our morality in a way that is alien not 
only to a materialist ethic, but also to a Kantian account of moral imperatives as 
principles that exist independently of human needs and desires. From a Christian 
SHUVSHFWLYH³*RGPXVWSOD\DUROHEHFDXVHKHFUHDWHGRXUQDWXUHDQGKHDORQH
knows what in the end will make us KDSS\´137  
MacIntyre concludes from this argument not that the Kantian or secular moral 
perspectives are wrong, but that they represent alternative conceptions of ethics to 
the Christian understanding of morality. 
The implication of this argument, that there are alternative moralities, is important.  
Just as in religion there is no standpoint beyond both belief and unbelief, beyond all 
different types of belief, no neutral standpoint from which we can judge between 
Christianity and its alternatives, so in morality also we have no neutral standing 
ground between Christian morality and other moralities.138 
&UXGHO\SXWWKHRXWFRPHRI0DF,QW\UH¶VH[SORUDWLRQVRIWKHMXVWLILFDWLRQRIUHOLJLRXV
faith during the 1950s was that the answer to the question of religious belief 
GHSHQGHGRQRQH¶VSV\FKRORJLFDOPDNHXS,IWKHZRUOGFDQRQO\EHUHQGHUHG
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intelligible for you through a teleological perspective, if your moral sense required a 
hope of eternal happiness for its coherence, you should adopt religious faith. If you 
are content with a materialist model of explanation in terms of efficient causes and 
have no reason to found morality on an idea of eternal happiness as the ultimate 
telos, then one might legitimately adopt an atheist or agnostic stance. Once one 
had commitWHGRQHVHOIWRVXFKDSRVLWLRQRQHKDGREOLJDWLRQVWRHQVXUHWKDWRQH¶V
position was developed in ways that could be defended rationally, but the adoption 
RIRQH¶VVWDUWLQJSRLQWFRXOGQRWEHUDWLRQDOO\MXVWLILHG 
1.5 Marxism and Morality 
In LS MacIntyre appeared to embrace an interpretation of religious faith in which 
commitment depends on non-rational choice. Such a notion of religious 
commitment is paradoxically analogous to the liberal notion of moral autonomy that 
MacIntyre repudiates. It is also inconsistent with a Marxist understanding of the 
relationship between belief and historical and economic circumstances. What led 
him to this fideist position was the recognition that traditional attempts to justify 
religious faith were both incoherent and theologically unsound. But given 
0DF,QW\UH¶VDQDO\WLFULJRXUVXFKDILGHLVWSHUVSHFWLYHZDVLQKHUHQWO\XQVWDEOHDQG
by 1961 MacIntyre had stopped being a Christian. 
However, MacIntyre continued to be a Marxist and his concern with the nature of 
justification became focused on the legitimacy of Marxism and the cogency of its 
HWKLFDOSHUVSHFWLYH,Q³1RWHVIURPWKH0RUDO:LOGHUQHVVDQG´10:0DF,QW\UH
explored the ethical position of those who had rejected Communism in the 1950s 
after they had become aware of the excesses of Stalinism.  MacIntyre criticises 
these apostates for failing to justify their moral position, and his critique is 
accompanied by a statement of the characteristics that a metaphysical position 
must possess if it is to provide an adequate foundation for morality and human 
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development. These papers prefigure his attempt to defend an Aristotelian ethic in 
A Short History of Ethics (SHE), and the more developed position on the nature and 
foundations of ethics he articulates in AV.  
The critic of Stalinism advocates a particular ethical viewpoint, but, MacIntyre asks, 
what is the justification of this moral perspective? 
[The critics] repudiate Stalinist crimes in the name of moral principle; but the fragility 
of their appeal lies in the apparently arbitrary nature of that appeal. Whence come 
these standards by which Stalinism is judged and found wanting and why should they 
have authority over us?139 
In raising this question MacIntyre was seeking to illuminate the relationship between 
theoretical presuppositions about human nature and moral judgement, and to 
expose the fragility of every ethical perspective that has become detached from its 
theoretical moorings. Stalinism had dismissed questions of moral justification by 
claiming that the laws that govern historical development mean that human beings 
are simply participants in an inevitable historical process. Their actions are 
predetermined140 by the laws that underpin this process.141 What should be 
FRQVLGHUHGWREHULJKWLVVLPSO\WKDWZKLFK³Ls actually going to be the outcome of 
WKDWKLVWRULFDOGHYHORSPHQW´142 Our moral preferences are irrelevant to the 
judgement of history.  However, the critic of Stalinism passes an independent moral 
judgement on events in that history, on the basis of standards which reflect her 
autonomous moral perspective. What justifies these standards? 
This may seem to be a strange question to ask, because contemporary moral 
philosophy claims that moral standards are logically independent of matters of 
fact.143 One corollary of this claim is that moral standards cannot be justified on the 
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basis of reasoned argument from factual premises, but have to be adopted. As a 
result, systems of thought such as liberalism and existentialism project an image of 
the autonomous individual formulating their moral perspective by the exercise of 
³XQFRQGLWLRQDODQGDUELWUDU\FKRLFH´144 But such a position fails to give any 
satisfactory account of why one set of moral standards should have authority over 
us rather than any others. If this is the FDVHWKHQWKHDSRVWDWH¶VFRQGHPQDWLRQRI
Stalinism can only be the expression of her personal preferences, rather than the 
outcome of evaluation in accordance with principles which are binding on 
everyone.145  
MacIntyre argues that what is required to address this deficit is an alternative theory 
RIPRUDOLW\ZKLFKDYRLGVWKHULJLGLW\RI6WDOLQLVPEXWZKLFKQHYHUWKHOHVV³SURYLGH>V@
us with some conception of a EDVLVIRURXUPRUDOVWDQGDUGV´146 One can repudiate a 
Stalinist perspective, Macintyre argues, by presenting an accurate interpretation of 
0DU[¶VWKHRU\6WDOLQLVPRYHUHPSKDVLVHVWKHGHWHUPLQLQJSRZHURIKLVWRU\DWWKH
expense of denying the possibility of human freedom and control over events. 
Stalinism is correct in recognising that human freedom is always limited by the form 
of society in which the individual is embedded, but socialism offers the opportunity 
of liberating humanity from the determining forces of history.147 MacIntyre therefore 
rejects the mechanistic notion of historical development characteristic of 
Stalinism.148  
That liberation that Marx describes ... is a freeing of our relationships from the kind of 
determination and constraint hitherto exercised upon them.149  
And precisely because socialism is about human freedom, it is not something which 
FDQEHHVWDEOLVKHGWKURXJKWKHRSHUDWLRQRILPSHUVRQDOODZV0DU[LVW³SUHGLFWLRQ´LV
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not the claim that social development must happen, but an affirmation of the belief 
that human beings will choose to take the new step towards freedom that the 
emergence of socialism offers.150 This understanding of history, MacIntyre suggests, 
provides a basis for clarifying the authority of moral rules: 
...If we bring out as central to Marxism the kind of points which I have suggested, may 
this suggest a third alternatLYH>WR6WDOLQLVPDQGOLEHUDOLVP@«ZKLFKWUHDWVZKDW
emerges in history as a basis for our standards, without making the historical process 
sovereign or its progress automatic? In order to ask this question properly we ought to 
re-examine some of the traditional questions about human nature and morality. What 
is the relation between what I am, what I can be, and what I want to be and what I 
ought to be?151  
Providing an account of human nature leads MacIntyre to consider issues that are 
more fully addressed in AV. Understanding human action may involve the type of 
causal explanation that a physiologist may provide, or it may be require reference to 
human purposes and goals: a teleological explanation which links human behaviour 
to particular preferences and desires. It is this understanding of desire that enables 
us to make the behaviour of others intelligible to ourselves.152 Liberalism, however, 
divorces the meaning and authority of moral concepts from history and from the 
IDFWVRIKXPDQQDWXUH$VDUHVXOW³WKHµRXJKW¶RIPRUDOLW\LVXWWHUO\GLYRUFHGIURPWKH
µLV¶RIGHVLUH´153 In consequence Liberalism renders morality unintelligible as a 
motive for human action, because it assimilates ethical principles to the status of 
primitive taboos for whose force no explanation can be given, except that of 
authority within a particular community. 
For MacIntyre the link between morality and the fulfilment of human desires is 
central to the evolution and intelligibility of moral notions. Some behaviour can be 
understood in terms of desires interpreted as drives aimed at ensuring that out 
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basic animal needs are met, such as the response to hunger or fear. But MacIntyre 
argues that the desires that morality serves are not such crude psychological or 
physiological drives. Human reflexivity means that it is possible to make a 
distinction between what a person may want (in the short term) and what may 
benefit and meet their needs and interests in the longer term. Recognising and 
fulfilling these longer term desires is made possible through participation in 
community, and the role of morality is to shape our desires in ways which couple 
them to our longer term interests. Morality is, therefore, concerned with the 
transmutation of human desire into forms which realise human potentiality. 
0DF,QW\UHDVVHUWVWKDW³PRUDOLW\H[SUHVVHVWKHPRVWSHUPDQHQWDQGORQJ-run of 
KXPDQGHVLUHV´154, and points out that this connection is explicit in Aristotle and in 
the Bible, where the point of morality is to lead to our happiness, through the 
complete realisation of our human potential. The interpretation of the nature of that 
potential will be shaped by the history and distinctive conceptual resources of each 
FRPPXQLW\7KHSXUSRVHRIWKHFRPPXQLW\¶Vethical code is to shape human 
desires into forms which direct action towards the achievement of human potential 
as conceptualised by each community.  
MacIntyre argues that the understanding of the logical connection between socially 
transformed desire and morality has been lost today, because the erosion of 
religious belief and the search for a secular foundation to morality has disrupted the 
relationship between moral injunctions and a prior understanding of the potentiality 
of human nature, and has lHIWEHKLQGRQO\WKHLPSHUDWLYHV³GRWKLV´RU³do not do 
WKLV´.155  With the loss of an understanding of the connection between morality and 
the transformation of desire, human desire has become conceptualised in 
LQGLYLGXDOLVWWHUPV³ZKLFKWHQGVWRWKHZDURIDOODJDLQVWDOO´156 Paradoxically, this 
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Hobbesian outcome does not lend itself to individual freedom, because the self may 
become dominated and controlled by its unmoderated desires to the extent that it 
loses all autonomy,157 given that autonomy implies the ability to evaluate and 
choose between different goods. The individual who is driven by their immediate 
and selfish desires has no capacity to identify and select higher goods.  
The class structure of communities at different points in their history will lead them 
to conceptualise human potentiality in ways which reflect the interests of the 
dominant class, but MacIntyre argues that it is only by identifying our desires with 
the communal needs and desires of the social class of which we are part that we 
can come to an understanding of our true needs and identity.158   
For Marx the emergence of human nature is something to be comprehended only in 
terms of the history of class-struggle. Each age reveals a development in human 
potentiality which is specific to that form of social life.159 
But the forms of economic production that characterise each age also limit the 
extent to which human potential can be achieved.  Life under capitalism allows 
people to become conscious of the extent to which the expression of their potential 
is limited by these forms of production. As a result, it reveals the possibility of 
human beings re-appropriating that nature by creating alternative forms of 
production and patterns of social relationship. MacIntyre argues that this account 
closes the gap between morality and desire because the discovery of their 
deprivation under capitalism can enable people WR³GLVFRYHU« that what they want 
most is what they want in common with others... [and] that certain ways of sharing 
KXPDQOLIHDUHLQGHHGZKDWWKH\PRVWGHVLUH´160 This rediscovery of common desire 
allows WKHHPHUJHQFHRI³DQHZPRUDOVWDQGSRLQW´E\SURYLGLQJQHZDQVZHUVWRWKH
TXHVWLRQ³ZKDWGR,UHDOO\ZDQW"´which can lead to social change. In this process 
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the Marxist discovers her values, as opposed to the Liberal who merely invents 
them. 161  
I want to draw three conclusions from this discussion. Firstly, the account of 
morality that MacIntyre articulates through this notion of fulfilled desire (albeit 
satisfaction of desires that have been transmuted through participation in a 
community) is teleological without requiring the definition of some ultimate human 
good. The human telos is not a fixed end-point that can be known and defined once 
and for all time. Rather the understanding of this telos will be shaped by changing 
economic and social relationships, and by the changing conceptual resources that a 
community can use to understand human nature and community. In NMW 
MacIntyre argues that it is only when humanity is fully liberated from the 
consciousness-limiting conditions of particular modes of social and economic 
relationship that people can become aware of their true potentiality ± although one 
might equally say that it is only in this historical process of change that they have 
the opportunity to invent the concepts and practices that create different forms of 
human potentiality.  
7KHVHFRQGSRLQW,ZDQWWREULQJRXWLVWKDW0DF,QW\UH¶VSRVLWLRQLPSOLHVWKDW
different histories will shape different communities, conceptual resources and 
understandings of human potentiality, and will therefore shape different associated 
moralities. As a result, each ethical system will be coherently related to its 
community but distinct from the ethics characteristic of other societies who have 
H[SHULHQFHGDGLIIHUHQWKLVWRU\0DF,QW\UH¶VDFFRXQW of the evolution of human 
freedom in NMW is shaped by a Marxist interpretation of historical development as 
following a trajectory that is common to all societies.  But if Stalinist determinism is 
an error, as MacIntyre argues it is,162 societies may follow radically different histories 
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and as a result radically different ethics may emerge, together with radically 
divergent understandings of human nature2QHTXHVWLRQZKLFK0DF,QW\UH¶V
account leaves unanswered is the basis on which one such ethic might be judged 
superior to another. If he is unable to answer this question, his position is not an 
advance on the position of the liberal critic of Stalinism, EHFDXVH0DF,QW\UH¶V
position is equally open to the challenge that he is unable to offer a broader 
justification for his ethical preferences. 
My third point is UHODWHGWRWKHIDFWWKDW0DF,QW\UH¶VDFFRXQWRIthe emergent 
understanding of human nature and telos that develops through historical change, 
described in NMW, is conceptualised as a progressive movement in the direction of 
liberation and newly realised potentiality. But if one rejects Marxist historical 
determinism (as MacIntyre does) historical change is also potentially regressive. 
Some societies may develop and express an understanding of human potentiality 
which is not expressible in the concepts available to another culture, and develop 
social relationships that foster the achievement of that potential. But other cultures 
may lose the concepts that underpinned their notions of human potential and 
freedom in the process of social change, and as a result the social relationships 
which were directed towards the realisation of that potential may also vanish. 
Despite these changes, the words that once expressed these concepts may 
continue to be used in such a culture even though their original meanings have 
been forgotten. 
AV begins with an account of cultural amnesia in contemporary Western culture 
which MacIntyre argues has been created by the fragmentation of our 
understanding of the relationship between human nature, human telos and moral 
language. For the MacIntyre of AV we live in a time in which 
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...the language and the appearances of morality persist even though the integral 
substance of morality has to a large degree been fragmented and then in part 
destroyed.163 
How could such conceptual and ethical dislocation have occurred?  0DF,QW\UH¶V
early studies of secularisation and social change, and his analysis of the impact that 
these processes of cultural change have had on the understanding of morality in 
western culture, anticipates and illuminates the account of our conceptual amnesia 
he gives in AV, as I will show in the next section. 
1.6 Conceptual change, morality and religious belief 
Theism and Morality 
The secularism and individualism that marks the ideology of western capitalist 
societies underpins contradictory images of human nature. On the one hand the 
individual is conceived as autonomous and pre-formed, existing prior to any 
engagement in community. On the other hand the individual is also seen as 
³H[WUHPHO\PDOOHDEOH´164 shaped by social forces into a variety of different roles and 
masks. As a result the identification of a determinate human nature which exists 
independently of social interaction becomes problematic. In the 1960s MacIntyre 
argued that the contemporary image of human nature is painted with a conceptual 
palette that has been denuded by the corrosion of the conceptual scheme that had 
originally supported theism and a determinate moral code. During this decade 
MacIntyre produced two works which developed an interpretation of the relationship 
between social change and change in theoretical, religious and ethical beliefs, and 
which articulate an account of how this erosion of conceptual resources had taken 
place.165 These works provides the basis for his mature view that in our society 
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moral debate has been rendered irresolvable.by our forgetfulness of the original 
meaning of moral concepts, and by the loss from our conceptual resources of the 
theoretical moorings that had secured that original sense. 
In these works MacIntyre contrasts our contemporary culture with what he 
perceives to be the culture of pre-industrial Britain. MacIntyre visualises such a 
culture as characterised by fundamental agreement on a set of moral principles and 
a set of religious beliefs. These beliefs provide the basis for an integrated society, 
notwithstanding the economic and social differences between different classes.166 
MacIntyre claims that in such a culture morality and religion represent 
interdependent spheres of thought that together underpin social relationships and 
practices. Despite their interdependence in such a culture, MacIntyre denies that 
morality can be equated to a subset of religious beliefs, such as obedience to the 
ZLOORI*RGDVLQWKDWFDVHHWKLFDOFRQFHSWVZLOOEHUHGHILQHGWRPHDQ³ZKDW*RG
FRPPDQGV´ 167  As a result  
LQMXQFWLRQVVXFKDVµ'RWKLVEHFDXVH*RGFRPPDQGVLWDQGZKDWGod commands is 
ULJKWDQGREHGLHQFHWRKLVFRPPDQGVSURGXFHVFHUWDLQJRRGV¶FROODSVHLQWR
LQMXQFWLRQVLQZKLFKµ'RWKLVEHFDXVH*RGFRPPDQGVLW¶DUHEHLQJUHLWHUDWHGLQFHUWDLQ
disguised and misleading ways.168 
If ethical imperatives are identified with commands it becomes impossible to 
distinguish morality from the exercise of power.169 There must therefore be an 
independent set of moral criteria through which that culture can determine that 
*RG¶VFRPPDQGVDUHDSSURSULDWH170 These moral criteria relate to the role played by 
PRUDOLPSHUDWLYHVDQG*RG¶VFRPPDQGVin the realisation of an essential human 
QDWXUH7KHSRLQWRIFRQIRUPLW\WRWKHGLFWDWHVRIPRUDOLW\DQGRIREHGLHQFHWR*RG¶V
commands is that such submission leads to the fulfilment of human needs and 
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desires. What would destabilise such a culture is a lack of agreement about what 
constitutes human nature and its fulfilment, as this would lead to a failure to agree 
on the meaning of moral propositions within that culture, and this in turn would 
weaken any connection between such propositions and their fulfilment through 
adherence to religious beliefs and injunctions. The point of both moral and religious 
beliefs would be lost with the loss of their interconnection with the achievement of 
human happiness and potential. 
MacIntyre therefore argues that the coherence of such a culture depends on the 
universal acceptance of its moral principles and beliefs, an acceptance that will be 
reinforced by three cultural convictions. Firstly, by the belief that the commXQLW\¶V 
PRUDOFRGH³LVDWOHDVWDVZHOOMXVWLILHGDQGSUREDEO\EHWWHUMXVWLILHGWKDQDQ\>RWKHU@
SDUWLFXODUWKHRU\DERXWPRUDOLW\´171 Secondly that within the community what counts 
as ethical practice only varies marginally (at worst) from what is laid down in the 
moral code, so that there is consistency between belief and behaviour. And thirdly, 
that any suggestions that the moral code is mistaken are summarily dismissed, so 
that the nature and content of morality is not questioned. 172 Where there is a 
morality of this kind MacIntyre suggests that  
Theism furnishes an explanation for the authority and the fixed character of the rules, 
both by according them divine status and by providing grounds for the underlying 
belief in a single determinate human nature.  God created men with just those goals, 
wants and needs which a way of life embodying the given rules will enable them to 
achieve.  To the  natural morality of men theism adds rules concerned with man's 
supernatural end, and a set of beliefs and practices concerning guilt, repentance, and 
forgiveness to provide for moral, as well as religious, failure.  Theism and morality of 
this kind naturally and easily reinforce one another.173 
MacIntyre thus envisages a society in which the moral code is rendered intelligible 
by an underlying naturalistic conceptualisation of human needs and ends. Theism 
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complements this picture of morality by locating the origins of that nature in the 
actions of a wise and good creator. However, the justification of the moral code 
does not lie in the fact that God wills us to obey (although he does) but because it is 
the means by which we can achieve the ultimate end of beings of our nature. The 
point of morality lies in its relevance to our telos. Such beliefs about morality, 
human nature and God naturally support each other, and MacIntyre suggests that a 
loss of belief in one will destabilise belief in others.174  
The Impact of Social and Conceptual Change 
MacIntyre argues that prior to industrialisation British society was united by shared 
religious and ethical beliefs, notwithstanding the economic and cultural differences 
between different social groups.175 But the evolution of capitalism has resulted in 
this social unity being dissolved into a set of distinct classes each with its separate 
and fragmented understanding of the moral life. As a result: 
In our society the notion of moral authority is no longer a viable one. For the notion of 
authority can only find application in a community in areas of life in which there is an 
agreed way of doing things, according to accepted rules.176 
This is because unless there is general agreement on the rules that govern a 
practice, there can be no appeal to authority to resolve disputes.  This is true of 
games such as chess, but it is also true of ethical practices.177 In our society the 
practices and agreements that underpinned moral authority have broken down, with 
different groups and classes formulating notions of morality and authority in different 
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ways. As a result our culture is disunited. Enlightenment liberalism accommodates 
this diversity of perspective, but for MacIntyre it is not a solution to this problem: it is 
a symptom of our lack of moral direction.178  One corollary of this lack of consensus 
on morality is the emergence of a range of diverse views of human nature. 
MacIntyre argues that within our society the view has developed that there is 
not just a single determinate human nature; that human nature is intensely malleable; 
and that around the relatively unchanging biological core society and culture may 
weave very different patterns, resulting in widely varying wants, needs, and goals.  It 
is just because this belief is dominant now that no ultimate shared criteria can be 
invoked by which moral disputes may be resolved.  
[As a result] theism has lost the morality which it logically presupposed; and the lack 
of social contact between theism and contemporary morality is at least partly to be 
explained by the lack of connection between theistic beliefs and modern moral 
beliefs.179 
Social and conceptual change has rendered theism irrelevant to contemporary 
moral perspectives. But this lack of a coherent relationship between theism and 
morality means that for those who are not theists there is no longer a vocabulary in 
which they can ask and answer fundamental questions of meaning and purpose.180  
The development of secularism within Western Societies has resulted in the loss of 
a capacity to formulate questions about God, immortality, morality, freedom and the 
ends of human life in a coherent way.181 As he puts it in SMC: 
The consequence of this [process of secularisation] is that there remains no 
framework within which the religious questions can be systematically asked.  For 
different classes the loss of a religious framework proceeds in different ways... but for 
all there are left at last only fragments of a vocabulary in which to ask or to answer 
these questions.182  
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How has this conceptual erosion taken place? In RSA MacIntyre argues that theism 
faced two successive crises in entering the modern world.183 The first crisis of 
theism was created by the emergence of a falsificationist perspective which is 
characteristic of natural science. Falsifiability became a criterion of the significance 
of all forms of discourse and this created a crisis precisely because religious belief 
was held in a form which implied that it was irrefutable by any set of events: 
Theism was elaborated in the light of that pre-scientific culture where the anomalous 
and the exceptional are not permitted to falsify existing beliefs.184 
However, the emergence of falsifiability as a criterion of epistemic justification 
meant that theism had either to adopt a form in which it met that criterion of 
significance, or repudiate the relevance of that criterion to the special area of belief 
represented by religion. The first type of response required the reconstruction of 
theism into the form of a deist hypothesis which could be defended in the same way 
in which any scientific hypothesis might be defended. The second type of response 
required the adoption of a fideist interpretation of the nature of belief, and the 
refusal to engage in debate about religion in accordance with the standards of the 
secular world. 
What I have called the first crisis...of theism amounted, then, to a debate over 
whether theism should adopt the strategy of converting itself into deism or that of 
separating itself from the secular culture.185 
The second crisis arose in the 19th century out of the failure of this deist strategy. 
MacIntyre argued that the evolution of the critical standards of modern culture 
PHDQWWKDWUHIXWDELOLW\KDGEHFRPH³DQHFHVVDU\VWDQGDUGRIZDUUDQWDEOHEHOLHIDW
HYHU\SRLQW´186 At the same time belief in the deist God invented in the 17th and 18th 
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centuries, was eroded by the emergence of new kinds of scientific findings.187 These 
changes resulted in an acute crisis of faith in the 19th Century, which led to renewed 
attempts to construct a theological and communal space in which theistic 
commitments could be sustained. For MacIntyre, this second type of response has 
been characterised by 
a total rejection of the attempt to adapt theism to the climate of secular thought, and 
an endeavour to preserve a theistic enclave in both thought and life. Rationally, this 
takes the form of insisting on the idiosyncrasy of religious concepts and beliefs.188 
These responses were characteristic of a culture in which the question of belief or 
unbelief was of central importance. However, such responses have become 
increasingly irrelevant to a contemporary society in which the number of people who 
are either committed Christians or atheists is dwarfed by the numbers who are 
indifferent to both religion and its atheist alternative.  
Without the conceptual framework provided by an unquestioning acceptance of a 
received moral code, underpinned by a robust account of human nature, morality 
FDQRQO\EHXQGHUVWRRGLQWHUPVRI³DUELWUDU\ILDWVLPSRVHGRQXVH[WHUQDOO\´189 The 
growth in liberal individualism in moral thought,190 the impact of industrialisation and 
urbanisation, and the consequent disruption of communities and social 
relationships191  have resulted in a diversity of moral views and the development of 
the cultural assumption that  
rival moral views are essentially irreconcilable, that there are no shared criteria to 
which men may appeal in order to settle fundamental disputes.192 
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As a consequence of these social and conceptual changes, theism is looked upon 
DVDQ³DOLHQFXOW´193  Members of that cult may find their moral principles and 
religious beliefs mutually reinforcing, but their belief in the coherence and 
complementarity of these beliefs will appear incomprehensible to the non-theistic 
majority. But the loss of theistic conceptual resources in secular society has not 
been replaced by an alternative vocabulary which enables that society to address 
the issues of human purpose.  As a result that society still exhibits dependence on  
a strong vestigial Christianity, manifested whenever at times of birth, marriage, and 
death questions about meaning, purpose, and survival become inescapable.194 
However, this dependence on religion at times of ritual importance could not hide 
the fact that 
What our children are left with is on the one hand a vestigial Christian vocabulary of a 
muddled kind and on the other an absence of any alternative vocabulary in which to 
raise the kind of issues which it is necessary to raise if there is to be no mere 
assessment of means, but some kind of explicit agreement or disagreement about 
social and moral ends ... It is the product of the history of the whole of our society, 
and the whole of society shares the same fate.195 
Christianity has faltered in the face of urbanisation and the resultant processes of 
social and moral change. MacIntyre argues that two theological responses to these 
changes have become apparent in the modern world. On the one hand there has 
been a further retreat into fideism. At the other extreme an adoption of religious 
OLEHUDOLVPZKLFKKDVUHVXOWHGLQWKHORVVRI³DQ\GLVWLQFWLYHWKHRORJLFDOFRQWHQW´196 to 
belief, and which has created a religion whose formal content has become 
indistinguishable from atheism.197  But this secularisation of religion has left behind 
a lacuna in our moral life which is filled by a religiose return to Christianity at the 
major turning points of life because there is no coherent alternative: 
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The suggestion which I have made in these lectures, that we cannot do with 
Christianity in the modern world, but often cannot do without it entirely either, because 
we have no other vocabulary in which to raise certain kinds of questions, could be 
framed once more in terms of our inability to respond to the facts of death... This is 
one of the great cultural and social gaps in our lives, but it is quite clear that in face of 
this particular crisis Christians have been in the same difficulty as everyone else. 198 
Marxism and Christianity 
The denuded ability of mid-20th century Christianity to articulate a response to the 
reality of death, and its apparent transformation into a secular and arguably non-
theistic version of religion left people in Western societies with a fragmentary and 
inadequate means of articulating an understanding of their nature and destiny. 
Marxism had provided an alternative to this religious worldview because: 
[Marxism is] the only systematic doctrine in the modern world that has been able to 
translate...the hopes men once expressed, and could not but express in religious 
terms, into the secular project of understanding societies and expressions of human 
possibility and history as a means of liberating the present from the burdens of the 
past, and so constructing the future.199 
But the problem for MacIntyre was that, by the time he came to revise MI for its re-
publication as Marxism and Christianity in 1968, he held that neither Marxism nor 
Christianity could be accepted as true in any unproblematic sense. In MC MacIntyre 
suggests that Marxism has to be treated as 
... a doctrine that we cannot adhere to because there are truths which it cannot 
accommodate, yet also a doctrine we cannot entirely discard because it embodies 
WUXWKVLQVHSDUDEOHIURPWKHLUFRQQHFWLRQZLWK0DU[¶VJHQHUDOWKHRUHWLFDO
formulations.200 
For MacIntyre, both Marxism and Christianity embody truths not otherwise available 
to contemporary culture, but the difficulty with holding Marxism to be true as a 
description of social and economic development is that its predictions have been 
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falsified by historical events, notwithstanding the attempts by some adherents to 
modify its doctrines to accommodate such challenges.201 This process of 
modification had, for MacIntyre, destroyed the organic relationship between Marxist 
theory, Marxist prediction and Marxist moral imperatives and values. Once this 
organic connection is denied, there is no fundamental justification for adopting a 
Marxist perspective. 
Theory is precisely not a set of opinions which individuals may or may not happen to 
FKRRVHWRDGRSW%XWMXVWWKLVLVZKDW0DU[LVPKDVEHFRPHDVHWRI³YLHZV´ZKLFK
VWDQGLQQRNLQGRIRUJDQLFUHODWLRQVKLSWRDQLQGLYLGXDO¶VVRFLDOUROHRULGHQWLW\OHW
alone his real position in the class structure. And in becoming like this, Marxism has 
EHHQ³SUDFWLFHG´LQSUHFLVHO\WKHVDPHZD\DVWKDWLQZKLFKUHOLJLRQKDVEHHQ
SUDFWLFHG«DV«DSULYDWHWDOLVPDQLFDLGIRUWKHLQGLYLGXDO202 
Implications 
Whatever the merits of the schematised cultural history Macintyre sets out in SMC 
and RSA, he expresses a vision of a pre-modern society in which religion and 
morality reinforce each other so that neither is thrown into doubt. Such a society 
cannot be recreated in the modern world, even if this were considered desirable. 
And the desirability of such a return to a pre-modern culture is questionable, given 
the dependency of such a culture on the unquestioned authority of its culturally 
determined moral standards and practices. There may be widely differing cultures in 
which moral code and religious belief are mutually reinforcing, each society 
reflecting contrasting views of human nature and destiny.  On what basis would we 
choose between the merits of the beliefs embodied in such different cultures? 
0DF,QW\UH¶VVRFLRORJLFDOFODLPWKDWVXFKFXOWXUHVVXSSRUWDVWDEOHEHOLHIV\VWHP
does nothing to substantiate their conflicting claims to legitimacy. MacIntyre may 
have a personal preference for the moral certainty that characterises such a society 
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but this certainty is unlikely to be attractive to those who value individualism, without 
further argument.  
Christianity or Marxism might provide the foundations of such arguments, but if they 
are reduced to the status of beliefs which are arbitrarily adopted, they would also 
appear to lack any rational justification. They may provide an attractive and 
satisfying way of conceptualising the relationship between the individual and 
society, but the adoption or rejection of such a perspective would appear to depend 
on choices to which argument and justification are irrelevant. But this is not the end 
of the story. MacIntyre argues that those who entirely reject Marxism and 
Christianity tend to do so from a perspective which rules out of court not merely 
Marxist theory or Christian belief, but any definitive account of human nature, and 
any naturalistic account of ethical concepts based on a teleological understanding 
of that nature. This rejection of teleology will frustrate all attempts to provide a wider 
justification for a moral perspective:  
Not only are the moral attitudes of Marx, or the analysis of past history, or the 
predictions about the future abandoned; so is the possibility of any doctrine which 
connects moral attitudes, beliefs about the past, and beliefs in future possibility. The 
lynch pin of this rejection is the liberal belief that facts are one thing values another ± 
and that the two realms are logically independent of each other. This belief underpins 
the liberal rejection of Christianity as well as the liberal rejection of Marxism ... But for 
both Marxism and Christianity only the answer to questions about the character of 
QDWXUHDQGVRFLHW\FDQSURYLGHWKHEDVLVIRUDQDQVZHUWRWKHTXHVWLRQ³%XWKRZ
RXJKW,WROLYH"´)RUWKHQDWXre of the world is such that that in discovering the order of 
things I also discover my own nature and those ends which beings such as myself 
must pursue if we are not to be frustrated in certain predictable ways. Knowledge of 
nature and society is thus the principle determinant of action.203 
For MacIntyre, what is required for a coherent and convincing account of morality is 
a justification of the ontological presuppositions which underpin a set of beliefs 
about human nature, the nature of society, and the nature of the world in which they 
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are located. If I am able to discover the nature of that world I will also be able to 
discover my own nature and my telos. I will be able to make a justifiable distinction 
between the person that I am now and the person that I should strive to become in 
WKHIXWXUH0\GHVFULSWLRQVRIWKHVHIDFWVZLOOFORVHWKHORJLFDOJDSEHWZHHQ³LV´DQG
³RXJKW´EHFDXVHZKDW,RXJKWWRGRZLOOEHGHWHUPLQHGE\P\DFFRXQWRIP\QDWXUH
and its telos.  The creation of a rationally justified and widely accepted account of 
human nature will render moral arguments resolvable. But this way of 
reconstructing the intelligibility of moral discourse is convincing only if there is some 
essential human nature to be discovered, a question that MacIntyre eventually 
addressed first in AV and then (more successfully) in DRA, as we will see in 
Chapter 2.  
1.7 A Short History of Ethics  
0DF,QW\UH¶VDQDO\VLVRIWKHUHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQVRFLDOVWUXFWXUHWKHLVWLFEHOLHIDQG
morality suggests that confidence in the justification of a moral code will be a 
contingent feature of a particular form of society. Cultures in which all groups share 
the same ethical and religious presuppositions and principles will accept the 
authority of their moral framework. Other societies that are characterised by 
religious and ethical diversity, such as our own, will debate the justification of 
different moral perspectives, but will not be able to turn to shared criteria in order to 
resolve these debates. However, the theistic society that MacIntyre envisages in 
RSA and SMC does not possess criteria for determining the justification of a moral 
perspective that are superior to those available to our own culture. Rather, an 
unquestioned consensus over the truth of its moral judgements means that there is 
no need for such criteria to be formulated.  Once the question of the justification of 
these judgements is raised, the culture may discover that it lacks the resources 
needed to deal with such a challenge, precisely because its beliefs have previously 
been accepted without question. And once the battle to formulate justification 
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commences, the society will begin to engage in the same irresolvable debates that 
FKDUDFWHULVHRXURZQPRUDOGLVFRXUVH7KHLPSOLFDWLRQRI0DF,QW\UH¶VDFFRXQWRIWKH
interdependency of religious and ethical beliefs in RSA and SMC is that an ethical 
perspective cannot be justified on compelling rational grounds, but only in terms of 
its authority for a particular cultural group. If this is the case, we appear to be left 
with a position in which cultural conditioning, moral individualism or existential 
choice are the only grounds for adopting one morality rather than another. If moral 
concepts are shaped by culture and history, are there any grounds for holding one 
set to be superior to another? 
The relationship between social structure and the evolution of ethical concepts was 
explored in the most VLJQLILFDQWSXEOLFDWLRQRI0DF,QW\UH¶VILUVWSHULRGRI
philosophical development, A Short History of Ethics (1966).204 The argument of 
SHE can be summarised as follows. Analytic moral philosophy has conceptualised 
itself as exploring the significance of moral notions, as if such notions exist in some 
timeless transcendental realm of universal and invariable meaning. In this realm, it 
LVOHJLWLPDWHWRDQVZHUTXHVWLRQVVXFKDV³:KDWLVJRRG"´³:KDWLVWKHQDWXUHRID
PRUDOLPSHUDWLYH"´ZLWKRXWUHIHUHQFHWRWKH cultural context in which these terms are 
embedded. MacIntyre argues against this position by pointing out that moral 
concepts change as social life changes and develops. Moral concepts are 
embodied in and partly constitutive of forms of social life, and therefore 
understanding a moral concept is part of the process of understanding the society 
and historical milieu in which it is embedded - and vice versa.205 The history of ethics 
illustrates the way in which moral concepts change and evolve in response to social 
change and how in turn they influence that change. Moral concepts are not 
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therefore semantically independent of social and cultural facts, but nor are they 
logically entailed by any set of such facts. 
Analytic moral philosophy in the twentieth century had ignored the dependency of 
moral concepts on cultural context, but in doing so it created for itself the problem of 
giving a coherent account of moral discourse without reference to the facts of social 
life. As a result this type of moral philosophy was characterised by three main 
approaches which assumed that moral judgements must be logically independent of 
matters of fact. Intuitionist approaches claimed that the significance of moral 
concepts is derived from their capacity to act as names of simple non-natural 
qualities that defy further definition, as in the work of G.E. Moore.206 Emotivism, 
characterised particularly by the work of C.L. Stevenson, conceptualised moral 
concepts as expressing feelings of approval or disapproval and as enjoining the 
listener to share these responses.207 The prescriptivism of R.M. Hare argued that 
the essence of moral judgements lay in their formal structure as universally 
applicable imperatives (including being applicable to the person uttering the 
judgement). 208   
All three approaches denied that moral argument can be resolved by reference to 
WKHIDFWVRIVRFLDOOLIH7KHLQWXLWLRQLVW¶VFODLPWKDWHWKLFDOFRQFHSWVDUHWKHQDPHVRI
unanalysable moral qualities implies that rational argument is irrelevant in moral 
debate: one simply intuits what is good or right. Argument is equally irrelevant to 
emotivism: a moral judgement is the expression of a preference, combined with an 
encouragement to the listener to adopt the same attitude. Prescriptivism allows for 
moral argument, but only for arguments in which an evaluative major premise is 
already included in the set of premises from which the evaluative judgement is 
derived. Moral judgements, cannot, therefore, be derived from non-evaluative 
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premises. As a consequence, all three theories deny the possibility of 
demonstrating the truth of ethical judgements.209  
If evaluative judgements are logically independent of factual judgements, the 
adoption of particular evaluative premises cannot be justified except by reference to 
further evaluative premises. These fundamental evaluative premises must simply 
be adopted by the individual. Ultimately, therefore, intuitionism, emotivism and 
prescriptivism all lead to an individualism in which the sole source of ethical 
standards is the expressiRQRIDSHUVRQ¶VRZQDUELWUDU\PRUDOFKRLFH6XFK
individual choice is conceptualised as entirely free, undetermined by other non-
evaluative criteria, and implies a strong relativism with respect to ethical 
judgements. As a result, MacIntyre suggests that 20th century analytic moral 
SKLORVRSK\HQGVLQDSRVLWLRQZKLFKLVVLPLODUWRWKDWRI6DUWUH¶VH[LVWHQWLDOLVP210  
MacIntyre argues that what is required for rational argument and resolvable debate 
in any discourse is the capacity to determine which assertions are true and which 
are false, and ultimately this requires some accepted criterion for determining which 
statements embody correct judgements and which do not.211 For example, to ask 
WKHTXHVWLRQ³:KDWLVWKHJRRGIRUPDQ"´LQWKHZD\WKDW$ULVWRWOHDQG3lato asked 
that question, is to presuppose that there is some criterion against which such a 
good can be identified. If there is no such criterion then the question itself ceases to 
have a point, as there is no basis for choosing between competing answers. He 
acknowledges that it does not follow from this that there is such a criterion but the 
intelligibility of the question and the possibility of identifying such a criterion stand or 
fall together.212  
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In SHE MacIntyre argues that there have been societies (such as that of Homeric 
Greece) 213 in which evaluative concepts, expectations of social roles, and the ends 
presupposed in these roles are so organically linked that there is indeed a shared 
capacity to determine the truth of evaluative judgements, because such evaluation 
can be tightly linked to the performance of these roles. In this context what counts 
as a good man or a good woman is a matter of conformity to the rules implicit or 
explicit in moral language and the corresponding social structures.214 However, 
there may be considerable variation in evaluative standards between different 
cultures.  Different cultures that have adopted similar social practices, as is the case 
in mathematics, will have similar concepts of correct performance.  Such cultures 
will show consistency in their judgements of performance and truth in these shared 
areas of practice.  However, other, more complex, evaluative judgements may 
relate to evaluative criteria that are specific to the distinctive forms of social life 
which are unique to a particular culture. The intelligibility and justification of such 
judgements will depend on familiarity with that culture and its particular practices, 
and these judgements will not necessarily be comprehensible to an observer 
unfamiliar with these practices. To assert that someone is a good cricketer would 
appear to be nothing but an arbitrary expression of approval to someone from a 
culture which lacked the concept of games and the practices that surround them, for 
example.215  
On this interpretation of moral language, the intelligibility of a moral judgement 
depends on identifying the social practices with which those judgements are 
associated, and on understanding the criteria for appropriate performance 
associated with those practices. Such criteria may of course differ with respect to 
the different practices in question. As a result of this, MacIntyre suggests that the 
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idea that there could be a single criterion of truth for all moral questions is incorrect. 
Indeed, he suggests that this was a mistake made by both Plato and Aristotle: 
Both assume that if the chain of justifications which are constituted by answers to 
questions about the good for men is to be a chain of rational argument, there must be 
essentially only one such chain and there must be one essential point at which it 
reaches a final conclusion (the Form of the Good or eudaemonistic contemplation). 
This is of course a mistake.216  
The reason that this is a mistake is because what counts as the human good (for 
example) depends on the particular social structures and practices in which the 
question is raised, and their associated activities and ends. Arguments and 
judgements as to the human good will therefore differ from culture to culture. 
Particular social structures have different moralities, and each morality also carries 
with it a corresponding vision of human nature.217  
The problem with this formulation is that, once again, it is a position that is open to 
the challenge of relativism. If moral concepts vary in their meaning from culture to 
culture and can only be understood in terms of that cultural context, then there 
appears to be no set of ethical judgements that can be demonstrated to be logically 
and ethically superior to any other. We are always open to the challenge that we 
are simply promoting the values of a particular culture.  MacIntyre sought to deflect 
the charge of relativism by suggesting that the commonalities of human life mean 
that  
there are certain evaluative truths that cannot be escaped...In any human group some 
notions of truth and justice necessarily find some foothold. Moreover...in any human 
group it is almost inconceivable that certain qualities such as friendliness, courage 
and truthfulness will not be valued.218 
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The collaborative nature of human living, the need for language to be used 
consistently to be intelligible means that rule following has to be embedded in any 
human society. .But as he points out, this fact gives us no criteria for distinguishing 
between the very different concepts of justice and truth (for example) that may 
operate within disparate societies, linked to their different practices, rules and 
evaluative criteria. As a consequence the MacIntyre of SHE can sound very like any 
other relativist and individualist citizen of a western liberal society: 
Conceptual conflict is endemic in our situation because of the depth of our moral 
conflicts. Each of us therefore has to choose both with whom we wish to be morally 
bound and by what ends, rules, and virtues we wish to be guided...219 
MacIntyre evaluated the position he had adopted in the first edition of A Short 
History of Ethics in his Preface to the Second Edition220 which was published in 
2000. MacIntyre acknowledges that he may have inadvertently given the impression 
of relativism in the first edition and suggests that this impression related to his 
inability to reconcile two points. The point that led to the impression of relativism 
was his recognition that there is no external criterion by which one can justify a 
belief in the fundamental principles that underpin each ethical theory. However, the 
point which was not given sufficient weight is the fact that each theory also claims 
to be presenting a universal rational truth about the nature of moral judgement and 
obligation, and therefore has to be taken seriously with respect to the evaluation of 
that claim. However, if there is no universal criterion of justification that can be 
applied to each moral standpoint, the assessment of their claims to universal truth 
must be undertaken from the standpoint either of the standards of some competing 
viewpoint, or from the perspective of the internal standards of the tradition making 
the claim to universal validity. He suggests that it was his failure to articulate this 
point in the first edition that had led to the accusation that he was relativist: 
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What I had certainly been unable to do was to reconcile two positions, to each of 
which I was committed. The first was that which gave the appearance of relativism. 
Each fundamental standpoint in moral philosophy not only has its own mode of 
conceptualising and understanding the moral life, which gives expression to the 
claims of some actual or possible type of social order, but each has its own set of first 
principles, to which its adherents appeal to vindicate the claims of their own 
standpoint to universality and to rational superiority over its rivals. What I had failed to 
stress adequately was that it was indeed a claim to universality and to rational 
superiority - indeed a claim to possess the truth about the nature of morality-that had 
been advanced from the standpoint of each particular culture and each major moral 
philosophy. And what I had not therefore taken account of was that these 
philosophical attempts to present rationally justifiable universal claims to moral 
allegiance...had generated for each major moral philosophy its own particular 
difficulties and problems, difficulties and problems sometimes acknowledged, and 
sometimes not. The subsequent history of each such moral philosophy revealed the 
extent to which each possessed or lacked the resources necessary to become aware 
of and to resolve those difficulties and problems - each by its own particular 
standards. And by this standard the major claimants in modern moral philosophy 
seemed to me then and to me now to fail. 221  
This passage provides a summary of his mature philosophy, and it is perhaps 
misleading of him to claim that his position in SHE only gave the appearance of 
relativism, given that it was written before he had formulated that mature position. 
The MacIntyre of SHE is clearly relativist in the unproblematic sense of 
acknowledging that ethical frameworks and judgements vary from culture to culture 
and are relative to the conceptual resources and standards embedded in the social 
practices of each culture.   And if there is no generally (and legitimately) accepted 
criteria by which one which can assess the competing claims to universal truth and 
the internal standards used to justify these claims then one appears to be left with a 
more fundamental version of  relativism in which the norms that underpin judgement 
are alVRUHODWLYHWRHDFKFXOWXUH0DF,QW\UH¶VUHSXGLDWLRQRIUHODWLYLVPLQKLVPDWXUH
philosophy is based on his view  that one can hold both that there are no 
transcendent criteria of justification but that, nonetheless, one perspective can be 
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held to be superior to another on grounds that have more than tribal validity.  This 
thesis evaluates and seeks to strengthen that claim. 
1.8 Implications 
This chapter has reviewed a number of attempts made by the early MacIntyre to 
provide an account of how belief in a ³UDWLRQDOP\WK´PLJKWEHOHJLWLPDWHO\HPEUDFHG
DVDIUDPHZRUNIRUOLYLQJDJRRGOLIH0DF,QW\UH¶VDLPLQKLVHDUOLHVWSXEOLVKHGZRUN
(MI) was to respond to the anomie of a society fragmented by the growth of 
secularism, by re-creating a religious and political framework that could underpin a 
community in which human potential could be realised. Such a project required 
change to the contemporary understanding of human nature. The three (quasi-
Aristotelian) elements of that revised interpretation are human-nature-as-it-is-now, 
human-nature-as-it-would-be-if-perfected, and some account of how this change 
could be achieved. From a Marxist viewpoint, human-nature-as-it-is-now is a nature 
restricted and deformed by the political and economic relationships that 
characterise a capitalist society. From a Christian perspective it is a nature 
GHIRUPHGE\VLQZKLFKFDQRQO\EHJLQWRFKDQJHWKURXJK*RG¶VJUDFH 
In MI MacIntyre attempted to integrate these perspectives by reconceptualising 
Marxism as a deviant, materialist, form of Christianity that had smuggled the salvific 
capacity of Christian belief into the 20th Century. In doing this it made the vision of 
salvation available to a society which had otherwise lost the ability to understand 
itself in the radical, liberDWLRQLVWWHUPVRIHDUO\&KULVWLDQLW\0DF,QW\UH¶V
dissatisfaction with the ability of the established Churches to free themselves from 
their compromises with contemporary forms of social and political life led him to call 
for new forms of community which could embody Christian and Marxist ideals.  MI 
therefore presages some of the social diagnosis that is embedded in AV, and MI 
also calls for a solution similar to that proposed in the mature work, through the 
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establishment of new forms of community in which forgotten virtues could flourish 
once more. 
0DF,QW\UHGHVFULEHV&KULVWLDQLW\DQG0DU[LVPDV³UDWLRQDOP\WKV´+HDUJXHVWKDW
such myths are rational because they have formulated rigorous internal standards 
of argument and justification, but this leaves unanswered the question as to 
whether their founding presuppositions are themselves open to justification, and if 
so, in what way. His work on the nature of religious belief provides a window onto 
his attempts to address this question. MacIntyre, like George Lindbeck, was critical 
of liberal theologies and their attempts to establish the plausibility of belief by re-
defining the essence of the Christian religion in terms that were intended to be 
plausible to contemporary sensibilities.222 As we saw in Section 1.4 above, he also 
rejected arguments that attempted to justify religious belief on experiential grounds. 
He was equally sceptical of the deist strategy of seeking to ensure the conformity of 
religious belief to post-Enlightenment criteria of significance.223 He therefore 
rejected accounts of the justification of religious belief that relied on evidence that 
was external to the Christian belief system. In DCB he suggested that a gain in the 
LQWHOOLJLELOLW\RIDSHUVRQ¶VH[SHULHQFHRIWKHZRUOGDVDUHVXOWRIthe adoption of a 
religious belief system could be one ground for belief. However, whether such a 
gain occurred depended, he acknowledged, on the kind of person you happened to 
be,224 but this appears to point towards contingent facts about personality as 
comprising the most significant basis for religious conviction. 
The inability to offer cogent arguments to justify religious belief led MacIntyre to 
adopt a form of fideism in LS, in which the act of commitment to a religion has 
become a matter of passion rather than reason. MacIntyre, however, subsequently 
                                               
222
 See RSA p.25 ff. This theme is one which MacIntyre also explores in several other 
publications including SMC pp.IIDQG$0DF,QW\UH³*RGDQGWKH7KHRORJLDQV´LQAgainst 
the Self Images of the Age.  pp.12-26; (first published in Encounter September 1963). 
223
 See DCB pp.64-65 and Chapter 8. 
224
 DCB pp.80-81.
72 
 
rejected this account of the grounds of belief on the falsificationist basis that it 
rendered religion irrefutable by any set of events, and that any irrefutable belief 
system must be vacuous. However, when this rejection of fideism is linked to his 
prior rejection of the idea that there might be universal standards of justification, it 
suggests that the standards of justification to which one can appeal can only be 
internal to the belief system itself. But this observation then raises the question: 
µ+RZLVLWSRVVLEOHWRKDYHDQRQ-vacuous account of the justification of a position 
ZKHUHWKHFULWHULDIRUMXVWLILFDWLRQDUHLQWHUQDOWRWKDWSRVLWLRQ"¶ 
Similar difficulties around the question of justification arose in his discussion of 
Marxist beliefs, and in his discussion of the nature of ethics. The belief in a 
metaphysical perspective that is sufficiently robust to underpin a coherent account 
of the moral life appears to depend on the prior acceptance of presuppositions 
about the nature of the universe, human nature and telos that characterise 
particular cultures at particular points in their historical development. But the nature 
of these assumptions will embody and reflect the specific characteristics of that 
VRFLHW\¶VFXOWXUDODQGFRQFHSWXDOKLVWRU\$VDUHVXOWWKHUHZLOOEHPDQ\GLIIHUHQW
moralities each of which reflect different assumptions about the nature of the world 
and of human beings, and provide different accounts of the goals which that nature 
presupposes. Unless these ontological presuppositions can be held to be justified in 
some way -- or at least held to be superior to other rival notions ± the associated 
HWKLFDOSRVLWLRQZLOODSSHDUWREHDUELWUDULO\DGRSWHG$VDUHVXOW0DF,QW\UH¶V
position not only gives an impression of relativism but also leads to an image of the 
individual adopting their principles on a-rational grounds. Social, cultural and 
SV\FKRORJLFDOIDFWRUVVKDSHWKHLQGLYLGXDO¶VFKRLFHRIWKHLUHWKLFDOSHUVSHFWLYHEXW
ultimately that choice is as unjustifiable as the choice of a liberal individualist ethic 
or a Sartrean existentialism. 
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:KDW,KDYHVKRZQLQWKLVFKDSWHULVWKDW0DF,QW\UH¶VHDUO\GHYHORSPHQWFDQEH
understood in terms of the tension between two philosophical imperatives. The first 
imperative was to establish a comprehensive metaphysical position which could 
integrate an understanding of human nature, community, and ethics and underpin 
social action designed to promote the realisation of human potential. The second 
imperative was the need to provide a rational justification for such a position. His 
inability to provide such justification led him to temporarily embrace a form of 
fideism, but by the end of the 1960s he was unable to accept the relativism implicit 
in such a position. The incompatibility between these two imperatives reflected the 
fact that commitment to such comprehensive metaphysical positions could not meet 
the requirements of an Enlightenment concept of universal standards of rationality. 
What MacIntyre needed in order to resolve this problem was, firstly, a persuasive 
Aristotelian account of human nature and potentiality; and secondly, an alternative 
account of rationality to the dominant Enlightenment model.  MacIntyre sought to 
construct these alternatives in the works that embody his mature position, and 
these works are considered in the following Chapter. 
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Chapter 2 
0DF,QW\UH¶V0DWXUH3RVLWLRQ 
2.1 Overview 
$VQRWHGLQVHFWLRQDERYHWKHFRQVHTXHQFHRI0DF,QW\UH¶VLQDELOLW\WROHJLWLPLVH
belief in any comprehensive metaphysical position was that, by 1968, he had found 
himself incapable of identifying with any substantive religious, political or 
philosophical viewpoint.225 This profound uncertainty resulted in the period of painful 
self-reflection that MacIntyre described in his interview with Cogito.226 This re-
evaluation of his philosophical standpoint ultimately led to the construction of the 
mature position which he set out in his works from After Virtue RQZDUGV0DF,QW\UH¶V
personal lack of certitude reflected the broader uncertainties of a culture defined by 
two intellectual crises. The first crisis had been created by the irresolvable character 
of modern moral debate. The second crisis was created by the recognition that 
analytic philosophy had been unable to resolve the fundamental questions of 
ontology and epistemology.  
For MacIntyre, both crises had emerged from the collapse of the Christian theistic 
framework which had underpinned ethical discourse and the understanding of 
knowledge in pre-Enlightenment European thought. The ontological, 
epistemological and ethical certainties that had characterised this framework were 
challenged in post-medieval philosophy by the demand for rational justification. 
Enlightenment philosophy had sought to replace received beliefs with incorrigible 
foundations for both knowledge and ethics, but the failure of these Enlightenment 
projects had replaced certainty with doubt, and had encouraged an epistemological 
and ethical relativism that contemporary philosophy lacked the resources to 
repudiate.  
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Formulating a coherent and persuasive account of ethics in the cultural context 
defined by these crises required not only the construction of a renewed 
understanding of the foundations of morality; it also required a reconstruction of the 
notions of rational justification that characterise our culture. 227 The four major works 
RI0DF,QW\UH¶VPDWXUHSHULRGWKHUHIRUHFRQVWLWXWHDFRPSOH[PHGLWDWLRQDURXQG
three themes.  Firstly, the (re)construction of a coherent ethic which can underpin 
human flourishing and community. Secondly, the (re)construction of an account of 
human nature that can underpin such an ethical framework; and thirdly, the 
construction of an account of rational justification that can warrant belief in the 
presuppositions about human nature that give such an ethical position its 
coherence. 228   
These themes are each addressed in two or more of the main publications of his 
PDWXUHSHULRG$9DQG'5$VHWRXW0DF,QW\UH¶VVXEVWDQWLYHHWKLFDOSRVLWLRQDQG
together with WJWR and TRV, they also present his reconstruction of an 
Aristotelian account of human nature. AV and TRV provide an analysis of the crisis 
of rational justification, while WJWR in particular articulates his alternative to 
Enlightenment accounts of rationality. Given the complex interaction between these 
different works a wholly chronological exposition would be repetitive. Therefore, 
while this chapter seeks to maintain a historical perspective on the major works of 
0DF,QW\UH¶VPDWXUHSHULRG it also follows a thematic approach. 
Firstly, it provides an exposition of the nature of the twin crises of modernity that 
SUHFLSLWDWHG0DF,QW\UH¶VSHUVRQDOHSLVWHPRORJLFDOFULVLVGUDZLQJRQ$9DQG759
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(Section 2.2). Secondly, it provides a summary of his attempt to reinstate an 
Aristotelian ethics in AV (Section 2.3), and his revision and development of that 
account in DRA (Section 2.4).  The discussion of DRA evaluates the extent to which 
0DF,QW\UH¶VSRVLWLRQSURYLGHVDVXFFHVVIXOUHVSRQVHWRWKHPRUDOrelativism implicit 
in modern moral philosophy, and articulates his considered response to the second 
major theme identified above: the (re)construction of an account of human nature 
that can underpin an Aristotelian ethics.   
In promoting Aristotelianism and criticising alternative ethical systems, MacIntyre is 
utilising some implicit account of the superiority of one philosophical position to 
another. This account is adumbrated in AV and made explicit in WJWR, and 
Section 2.5 provides an analysis of this alternative account of superiority and 
MXVWLILFDWLRQ6HFWLRQVXPPDULVHVWKHRYHUDOODUFKLWHFWXUHRI0DF,QW\UH¶VILQDO
position, and identifies some unresolved issues, which will be addressed in the rest 
of this thesis. 
2.2 Two Crises of Contemporary Thought 
The Crisis of Moral Debate 
In AV MacIntyre develops arguments which are similar to those first put forward by 
Elizabeth Anscombe in a seminal paper published in 1958, whose influence 
MacIntyre has acknowledged.229 In this paper Anscombe argues, inter alia, that 
the concepts of obligation, and duty - moral obligation and moral duty, that is to say - 
and of what is morally right and wrong, and of the moral sense of "ought," ought to be 
jettisoned [from our ethical vocabulary] if this is psychologically possible; because 
they are survivals, or derivatives from survivals, from an earlier conception of ethics 
which no longer generally survives, and are only harmful without it.230 
Anscombe argues that our ethical concepts have changed their meaning over 
the centuries, while the words used to express these concepts have remained 
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emphasis original. 
77 
 
unchanged.231 Some elements of our ethical language have evolved within an 
Aristotelian/Thomist framework, such as discourse about virtue and natural law. 
However, the language of virtues which derives from such a framework is only 
intelligible on the basis of an understanding of human nature and its telos that 
has almost disappeared from contemporary Western culture. And once the 
concepts that underpin that linguistic framework have been modified or 
discarded, the bones and sinews that connected the Aristotelian elements of our 
moral vocabulary have vanished. Similarly, the erosion of a law conception of 
HWKLFVKDVOHIWFRQFHSWVVXFKDV³RXJKW´LVRODWHGIURPWKHFRQFHSWXDOIUDPHZRUN
which originally gave them their point.232  
Anscombe argues that one consequence of this disintegration of conceptual 
coherence is that modern moral philosophy is built around conceptual problems 
which would be dissolved if ethicists understood the historical context within 
which our ethical language has evolved. She contends that there is a need to 
rehabilitate an Aristotelian ethic in order to overcome the malaise of 
FRQWHPSRUDU\HWKLFDOWKHRU\,IVXFKUHKDELOLWDWLRQLVWREHVXFFHVVIXO$ULVWRWOH¶V
ethical concepts would need to be reinterpreted within the conceptual resources 
available to modernity. Anscombe suggests that this requires the construction of 
an adequate contemporary philosophy of psychology233 in order to address the 
huge gap, at present unfillable as far as we are concerned, which needs to be filled by 
an account of human nature, human action, the type of characteristic a virtue is, and 
DERYHDOO>DQDFFRXQW@RIKXPDQIORXULVKLQJ´234 
In AV MacIntyre develops and extends the philosophical agenda Anscombe had 
identified.235 0DF,QW\UHHODERUDWHVRQ$QVFRPEH¶VSRVLWLRQWRDUJXHWKDW
                                               
231
 AV p.10. 
232
 Anscombe p.5. 
233
 Anscombe p.15. 
234
 Anscombe p.18. 
78 
 
contemporary ethical debates reflect two incompatible characteristics. Firstly, 
different moral perspectives are characterised by conceptual 
incommensurability. As a result, each moral perspective is able to proffer 
arguments which proceed logically from its specific premises, but the premises 
which underpin different perspectives  
...are such that we possess no rational way of weighing the claims of one as against 
another. For each premise employs some quite different normative or evaluative 
concept from the others, so that the claims made upon us are of quite different 
kinds.236 
7KXVSUHPLVHVZKLFKDUHFRQVWUXFWHGLQWHUPVRIVRPHQRWLRQRI³ULJKWV´DVWKH
fundamental moral concept, for example, cannot be expressed in terms of a set 
RIVWDWHPHQWVDERXW³VXFFHVVDQGVXUYLYDO´237 and nor can they be translated 
into propositions couched in other moral concepts (such as justice, freedom or 
innocence) without change in meaning. Our adopted premises may justify our 
moral arguments, but these premises are not in themselves justifiable with 
respect to some broader criterion of validation which has been established 
within our society: 
From our rival conclusions we can argue back to our rival premises, but when we do 
arrive at our premises argument ceases and the invocation of one premise against 
another becomes a matter of pure assertion and counter-assertion.238 
But if I am unable to offer good reasons for the adoption of my premises to 
others then we seem to be unable to demonstrate the rational superiority of one 
starting point over another, and it must appear that our selection of fundamental 
principles is the product of a non-rational decision or act of the will.239 On this 
account, substantive moral positions occupy the same logical space as religious 
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belief occupied in LS.240 Once a set of beliefs has been adopted, rational 
argument becomes possible, but rational argument cannot precede commitment 
to the presuppositions of an ethical position. 
MacIntyre identifies a second, conflicting, characteristic of modern moral 
debates. Such debates appear to presuppose the existence of universal and 
impersonal moral imperatives to which participants can appeal to support their 
argument, notwithstanding the incommensurability of their conflicting ethical 
perspectives. Thus in claiming that x is under an obligation to do Y, I am not 
simply asserting that I want her to do Y, as I may do if I am in a position of 
authority over her, but I am asserting that she is subject to some binding 
requirement that is independent of my will. Therefore our discourse both asserts 
the existence of universal and impersonal criteria of moral obligation, at the 
same time as that discourse emphasises the arbitrary nature of the choice of 
underlying principles.241 There is therefore an aspiration towards rational moral 
discourse within our culture, although our theoretical beliefs militate against the 
justification of these aspirations.242 
The difficulties which MacIntyre identifies are rooted in social, cultural and 
conceptual change,243 but these changes have largely gone unnoticed.  As a 
result, we have arrived at a point in our cultural history which is characterised by 
dysfunctional ethical discourse and inconclusive moral debate.244 The difficulties 
that characterise contemporary moral discourse reflect the fact that we have 
passed from an earlier culture in which the language of morals and the 
conceptual framework that underpinned that language formed an ordered 
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whole, to a culture in which there is a disordered and partial relationship 
between moral concepts and our ethical language and argument. We assume 
that irresolvable ethical debate will be characteristic of any culture,245 and fail to 
recognise that this characteristic is a contingent feature of our particular social 
and conceptual history.  
MacIntyre identifies emotivism as the form of moral philosophy that best 
represents the malaise of western culture in the 20th century. Expressionist and 
emotivist accounts of moral language seek to assimilate moral judgements to 
the expression of personal preferences or emotive responses. But such 
positions fail to take seriously the rational element that underpins moral 
discourse, evidenced by the fact that we seek to argue to a conclusive 
resolution of competing ethical judgements by offering (what we consider to be) 
good reasons for our evaluations.  Expressivist accounts of ethics do not appear 
to allow for such reasons to play a role in moral judgement, and they do not 
therefore allow for a distinction between manipulative and non-manipulative 
social relations.246 2QFHWKHMXVWLILFDWLRQRIDQHWKLFDOSHUVSHFWLYHLVUHGXFHGWR³,
SUHIHU;VRGR;´WKHUHLVQRORQJHUDQDSSHDOWRVWDQGDUGVRIMXGJHPHQWWKDW
DUHLQGHSHQGHQWRIWKHLQGLYLGXDO¶Vwill, and persuasion simply involves seeking 
conformity to those preferences. Emotivism reduces ethical argument to a 
³FODVKRIDQWDJRQLVWLFZLOOV´247  
Emotivism is, therefore, a close relative of Nietzchean genealogy,248 and for 
MacIntyre both emotivism and 1LHW]VFKH¶VSKLORVRSK\UHSUHVHQWWKHRXWFRPHRI
WKH(QOLJKWHQPHQW¶VIDLOXUHWRHVWDEOLVKDQREMHFWLYHDQGJHQHUDOO\DFFHSWHG
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justification for ethics and morality.249 MacIntyre argues that the collapse of this 
ambition had led to the assumption that the foundations of morality must rest on 
personal preference and individual choice alone. Emotivism avoids the problem 
of justifying ethical judgments by re-defining ethics in terms of attitudes and 
desires. However, in doing so it rules out the possibility of the rational resolution 
of moral argument through reference to some shared beliefs about the nature of 
the world and the nature of humanity. More generally, the emotivist intuitionist 
and consequentialist accounts of ethics that characterise modern moral 
philosophy are unable to demonstrate the truth of their fundamental premises, 
and therefore they neither able to create a shared basis for moral argument, nor 
repudiate the claims of moral relativism. 
The Crisis of Rational Justification 
In our culture the type of fundamental ontological beliefs that might afford a 
resolution of moral argument are as contested as our competing ethical 
perspectives, and this has left the theoretical foundations of our ethical 
judgements unclear, as we saw in the discussion of MI and NMW in Chapter 1. 
The crisis that characterises modern ethical discourse runs parallel to a second, 
epistemological, crisis of modernity. MacIntyre describes this crisis in the 
following terms: 
...  what the progress of analytic philosophy has succeeded in establishing is that 
there are no grounds for belief in universal necessary principles - outside purely 
formal enquiries - except relative to some set of assumptions. Cartesian first 
principles, Kantian a priori truths, and even the ghosts of these notions that haunted 
empiricism for so long have all been expelled from philosophy.250  
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 MacIntyre develops his argument by quoting David Lewis. Lewis had asserted 
WKDWRXUµLQWXLWLRQV¶DUHVLPSO\RSLQLRQVRXUSKLORVRSKLFDOWKHRULHVDUHWKH
same..."251  If this is the case, then there cannot be a final resolution to 
arguments about fundamental philosophical presuppositions, except in a few 
cases where the position put forward is so incoherent as to be unintelligible. 
MacIntyre continues: 
...analytic philosophy... can never establish the rational acceptability of any particular 
position in cases where each of the alternative rival positions is available in sufficient 
range and scope and the adherents of each are willing to pay the price necessary to 
secure coherence and consistency.252 
As a result, ethical and epistemological debates will be characterised by the fact 
that none of the sides engaged can demonstrate the final superiority of their 
position over that of others. This situation reflects the failure of the second 
Enlightenment project, that of finding universal and rational justifications for all 
elements of knowledge. 
MacIntyre developed his analysis of the crisis of Enlightenment epistemology in 
the third of his four major mature works, Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry 
7597KLVZRUNZDVEDVHGRQ0DF,QW\UH¶VFRQWULEXWLRQWRWKHDQQXDO*LIIRUG
lecture series on natural theology, which he delivered in 1988, the year that 
WJWR was published. These books are complementary responses to the crisis 
of rational justification he identified in AV, and TRV also provides an illuminating 
account of the nature of the assumptions that underpin the Enlightenment notion 
of justification.   
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The Gifford lecture series had been endowed by Adam, Lord Gifford in 1885,253 
and MacIntyre argues that the endowment of these lectures reflected a view of 
universal knowledge as a comprehensive and universally accepted framework 
into which all aspects of science, natural theology and ethics could be 
incorporated. Gifford and his contemporaries visualised the structure and 
content of the 9th edition of the Encyclopaedia Britannica as a demonstration of 
progress towards this ideal.254 The foundation stone of this project was the belief 
LQD³XQLWDU\FRQFHSWRIUDWLRQDOLW\DQGRIWKHUDWLRQDOPLQG´ZKLFKZRXOGSURYLGH
the basis for agreement both on data and on the interpretation of data so that 
any disputes about truth were ultimately decidable.255 This unity was to be 
achieved through the application of the methods of science to all branches of 
knowledge, including theology.256 Ultimately, therefore, there was to be no 
separation between objective scientific knowledge and religious belief. All 
knowledge would be unified under more and more comprehensive laws which 
would eventually embrace everything under natural theology.257 But a hundred 
and more years later the ambitions of Encyclopaedia are no longer plausible to 
the contemporary sensibility. 
)RU0DF,QW\UHZKDWGLYLGHVRXUFXOWXUHIURP/RUG*LIIRUG¶VLVWKUHHIROG)LUVWO\
the Encyclopaedists assumed that there was a single conception of rationality, 
while we have alternative and conflicting conceptions of rationality. Secondly, 
they saw knowledge as an ordered whole, while we see many different types of 
enquiry and interpretations of knowledge, so the very idea of an ordered whole 
is brought into question. Thirdly, where they saw inevitable progress in 
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knowledge we see the history of knowledge as marked by the sort of ruptures 
and discontinuities identified by Kuhn (for example),258 who argued that the 
history of science is characterised by revolutions which replace one dominant 
mode of understanding a discipline with another, alternative, paradigm.259 
These ideas are now the commonplaces of postmodernity. For MacIntyre, the 
inadequacy of the epistemological and ethical foundations of the Enlightenment 
project was illustrated by the failure of the attempts by figures such as Hume, 
Kant and Kierkegaard (among others) to articulate rational foundations for 
ethics.260 This ethical project was finally undermined by Nietzsche, who 
recognised that there was no final objective and independent Archimedean point 
from which one could demonstrate objective truth. For Nietzsche,  
ZKDWUHPDLQVIL[HGDQGELQGLQJDERXWWUXWKDQGNQRZOHGJHDQGGXW\DQGULJKW«LVan 
unrecognised motivation serving an unacknowledged purpose.261 
What is real for Nietzsche is the way in which human beings manipulate the 
concepts of truth and right in order to serve their purpose, through what he 
FKDUDFWHULVHGDVWKH³ZLOO-to-SRZHU´262  
SRZHKDYHPDWFKHGDJDLQVWHDFKRWKHUWZRDQWDJRQLVWLFYLHZV7KHHQF\FORSDHGLVW¶V
conception is of a single framework within which knowledge is discriminated from 
mere belief, progress towards knowledge is mapped, and truth is understood as the 
relationshiSRIRXUNQRZOHGJHWRWKHZRUOGWKURXJKWKHDSSOLFDWLRQRI«WKHUXOHVRI
rationality as such. Nietzsche, as a genealogist, takes there to be a multiplicity of 
perspectives within each of which truth-from-a-point-of-view may be asserted, but no 
truth-as-such, an empty notion, about the world, an equally empty notion.263 
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Neither relativism/perspectivism nor encyclopaedic optimism with respect to the 
possibility of universal knowledge is acceptable to Macintyre. His philosophy 
seeks to construct an alternative account of rationality and justified belief, that is 
neither dependent on the assumption that there are universal standards of 
justification and knowledge (as in Encyclopaedia), nor vulnerable to the 
challenge of a genealogical relativism. 
The disintegration of the concepts of knowledge, order, and rationality that 
characterised the Encyclopaedic ideal have already been exemplified in 
0DFLQW\UH¶VHDUO\IDLOXUHVWRFRQVWUXFWVRPHDFFRXQWRIWKHMXVWLILFDWLRQRID
comprehensive ontological and/or ethical position, as reviewed in Chapter One. 
Neither the easy fideism of LS with respect to religion, nor the falsificationism 
expressed in MI, nor the apparent relativism of SHE provided an answer to the 
issues he had sought to address in NMW. If a version of Aristotelianism is 
necessary to the construction of a robust account of the origin and justification 
of our moral principles, how can one reinstate an Aristotelian understanding of 
ethics in the contemporary world? After Virtue seeks to provide an answer to 
this TXHVWLRQE\VHWWLQJRXWDQDFFRXQWRIKXPDQQDWXUHDQGRI$ULVWRWOH¶V
teleology that might be plausible in the modern world. 
2.3 After Virtue 
The Aristotelian Ethical Framework 
MacIntyre argues in both NMW and AV that the Enlightenment ethical project was 
doomed because it had attempted to find justifications for moral concepts after they 
had become detached from the Aristotelian perspective in which they had originally 
been formulated. Such an Aristotelian perspective includes three main elements. 
Firstly, it presupposes that there is an overall good to which human life is or should 
86 
 
EHGLUHFWHG,WLVWKHUHDOLVDWLRQRIWKDWJRRG³LQDFRPSOHWHOLIH´ZKLFKDFWVDVWKH
telos of human existence. 264  Aristotle identifies this good with human flourishing or 
happiness.265 Secondly an Aristotelian perspective requires a distinction between 
human nature as it is prior to the process of moral development which is necessary 
for the realisation of that good, and human nature as it is when transformed through 
the acquisition of the virtues.266 Thirdly it describes the characteristics or virtues 
which have to be acquired if that good is to be realised.267 Within this Aristotelian 
framework, such virtues are not simply a means to an end that might be achieved 
through some other form of action. Their possession in large part constitutes the 
achievement of the telos of a human life. MacIntyre expresses this in AV when he 
says 
«WKHH[HUFLVHRIWKHYLUWXHV LVQRW«DPHDQVWRWKHHQGRIWKHJRRGIRUPDQ)RU
what constitutes the good for man is a complete human life lived at its best, and the 
exercise of the virtues is a necessary and central part of such a life, not a mere 
preparatory exercise to secure such a life.268 
MacIntyre argues that this Aristotelian schema was elaborated but not discarded 
when it was incorporated into the pre-modern Christian worldview. For Aristotle, the 
human telos had to be achieved within this world by the realisation of our 
potentiality as rational beings.269 Within the Christian framework the realisation of 
WKDWWHORVKDGWREHXQGHUSLQQHGE\WKHWUDQVIRUPLQJSRZHURI*RG¶VJUDFHDQGWKH
acquisition of the virtues necessary to obey the natural law. As a result of this 
elaboration, moral injunctions came to have a dual meaning, both as the means 
through which human potentiality could be achieved and as expressions of divine 
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law. In addition, the Christian perspective added a further level to the understanding 
of the virtues: 
The table of virtues and vices has to be amended and added to and a concept of sin 
is added to the Aristotelian concept of error. The law of God requires a new kind of 
respect and awe. The true end of man can no longer be completely achieved in this 
world, but only in another.270 
  
Within this Christianised framework, ethical assertions have a threefold function. 
They act as factual assertions about what is required for the achievement of human 
potentiality, statements about what the divine law is held to be, and injunctions that 
specify what ought to be done. Such assertions are not therefore logically 
LQGHSHQGHQWRIDVVHUWRULFSURSRVLWLRQVLQVKDUSFRQWUDVWWRWKHGLYRUFHRI³RXJKW´
IURP³LV´FODLPHGE\th Century analytic moral philosophy. Their prescriptive and 
evaluative content follows from their function as descriptions of what is required to 
realise human telos. 
The contemporary claim that one cannot derive ethical conclusions from any set of 
factual premises symbolises the rift between a pre-modern and a modern 
understanding of ethics. MacIntyre contends that the roots of this claim lies in a 
change in the understanding of the nature of reason. In the medieval world the 
divine law was considered to be discoverable by human reason as well as being 
embodied in revealed religion. A combination of reason and revealed religion 
WKHUHIRUHSURYLGHGDWOHDVWDOLPLWHGXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIKXPDQLW\¶VWUXHHQG
0DF,QW\UHDUJXHVWKDWWKHHPHUJHQFHRI³3URWHVWDQWLVPDQG-DQVHQLVW
&DWKROLFLVP´271 in the Enlightenment resulted in the construction of an account of 
UHDVRQDVEHLQJVRGDPDJHGE\VLQWKDWLWFDQGLVFHUQ³no genuine comprehension 
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RIPDQ¶VWUXHHQG´272 This pessimistic assessment of the capacity of reason 
resonated with the Enlightenment rejection of Aristotelian scholasticism to render 
the idea of the possibility of knowledge of an essential human nature related to a 
human telos implausible. Human reason became conceptualised as purely 
«FDOFXODWLYHLWFDQGLVFHUQWUXWKVRIIDFWDQGPDWKHPDWLFDOUHODWLRQVEXWQRWKLQJ
more. In the realm of practice therefore it can speak only of means. About ends it 
must be silent.273 
As a result of this change in the understanding of reason, human telos has been 
conceived as unknowable, and without the concept of a telos moral argument has 
been rendered irresolvable. Nietzsche had correctly diagnosed the intellectual 
bankruptcy of modern moral theory,274 but his dismissal of the intelligibility of ethical 
discourse is justified if and only if the rejection of Aristotle is justified.275 If a return to 
a teleological viewpoint is possible then moral discourse can be made coherent 
DJDLQ$VDUHVXOW³WKHNH\TXHVWLRQEHFRPHV>V@FDQ$ULVWRWOH¶VHWKLFVRU
VRPHWKLQJYHU\OLNHLWDIWHUDOOEHYLQGLFDWHG"´276 MacIntyre continues  
... if a premodern view of morals and politics is to be vindicated against modernity, it 
will be in something like Aristotelian terms or not at all.277 
0DF,QW\UH¶VDWWHPSWDWYLQGLFDWLRQLQYROYHVWKHUHFRQVWUXFWLRQRIDFRQFHSWXDO
framework that addresses the incoherence of contemporary moral discourse, and 
which can provide the scaffold for the formation of societies that can foster 
individual and communal realisation. MacIntyre is not seeking to provide a proof of 
WKHIXQGDPHQWDOHOHPHQWVRI$ULVWRWOH¶VSKLORVRSK\LQGRing this. His earlier studies 
had convinced him that conclusive demonstration was not possible, except in a very 
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small number of cases.278 Where conclusive demonstration is not possible (and this 
applies to politics and ethics), vindication and refutation have to be interpreted 
within a historical framework. One position is vindicated over another at some 
particular point in time when it can provide a more coherent and comprehensive 
account of the relevant facts than the opposing position, and when it is able to 
provide arguments against the opposing position to which that position has no 
rejoinder. Whether a position has been vindicated or refuted has to be judged in 
accordance with the standards of justification that apply at the time the question is 
raised. However, these standards may change over time, and additional information 
relevant to the evaluation of a position may also become available. A position such 
as Aristotelianism, which has been held to be refuted, may be reinstated if it is 
demonstrated that the initial arguments used to discredit the position no longer have 
IRUFH0DFLQW\UH¶VWDVNLVQRWWRSURYHWKDW$ULVWRWOHZDVFRUUHFWEXWWRVKRZWKDWD
number of the conceptual problems that vitiate contemporary ethics can be resolved 
if an Aristotelian framework is adopted; that there are no conclusive arguments to 
repudiate such a framework; and that the adoption of this framework can then 
provide the basis for communities that are more effective in realising human 
potential than their contemporary rivals.  
MacIntyre identifies three key issues which would have to be addressed if this 
REMHFWLYHZDVWREHDFKLHYHGHDFKRIZKLFKSDUDOOHOVDQHOHPHQWLQ$QVFRPEH¶V
analysis of the challenges facing modern moral philosophy.   Firstly, he would need 
to provide a teleological account of human identity.279 Secondly, MacIntyre would 
need to provide an account of the virtues which clarifies their relationship to 
contemporary social life.280 Thirdly, he would need to construct a contemporary 
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account of human telos WKDWDYRLGVWKUHHGLIILFXOWLHVLQ$ULVWRWOH¶VSRVLWLRQ$ULVWRWOH¶V
teleology is based on the principle that 
HYHU\DFWLYLW\HYHU\HQTXLU\HYHU\SUDFWLFHDLPVDWVRPHJRRGIRUE\µWKHJRRG¶
RUµDJRRG¶ZHPHDQWKDWDWZKLFKKXPDQEHLQJVcharacteristically aim.281 
 
Aristotle assumes that the biological essence of living organisms endows each 
being with an overall good or telos towards which their actions and development are 
XOWLPDWHO\GLUHFWHG7KLVIXQGDPHQWDOSULQFLSOHRI$ULVWRWOH¶Vethics is unacceptable 
WRWKH0DF,QW\UHRI$9ZKRUHMHFWHGLWDVH[HPSOLI\LQJ³$ULVWRWOH¶VPHWDSK\VLFDO
ELRORJ\´282 MacIntyre therefore needed to provide an alternative way of 
incorporating teleology into our understanding of human life. He also needed to 
oYHUFRPH$ULVWRWOH¶VQDUURZLGHQWLILFDWLRQRIWKHSROLVDVWKHRQO\VRFLDOVHWWLQJLQ
which human flourishing can be achieved.283 7KLUGO\0DF,QW\UH¶VUHYLVHGDFFRXQWRI
DQ$ULVWRWHOLDQHWKLFVKDGWRDYRLG$ULVWRWOH¶VGHQLDOWKDWWKHUHFDQEHLUUHVROYDEOH
conflicts between different goods, and allow for the possibility of conflict between 
the different goals towards which human behaviour may be orientated, if it were to 
be plausible to a modern sensibility.284  
Reinstating Teleology 
The Enlightenment rejection of teleological explanation has fostered an 
understanding of human behaviour in materialist terms, characterised by the pre-
suppositions of empiricism and the methodology of the natural sciences. It has, 
therefore, been accompanied by a shift in the understanding of causation, from a 
model of explanation in terms of final causes to one in terms of efficient causes.285 
Within such an explanatory framework, the "facts" of human behaviour have to be 
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detached from the intentional states of the individual including their values, goals 
and ends.  
 
)DFWVEHFRPHYDOXHIUHHµLV¶EHFRPHVDVWUDQJHUWRµRXJKW¶DQGH[SODQDWLRQDVZHOO
DVHYDOXDWLRQFKDQJHVLWVFKDUDFWHUDVDUHVXOWRIWKLVGLYRUFHEHWZHHQµLV¶DQG
µRXJKW¶286 
 
In line with this changed understanding of explanation, Willard Quine had claimed 
that the scientific explanation of human behaviour must involve specifying genuinely 
XQLYHUVDOODZVLQZKLFKFRQFHSWVVXFKDV³LQWHQWLRQVSXUSRVHVDQGUHDVRQVIRU
DFWLRQ´287 are excluded from the explanatory vocabulary. 0DF,QW\UHLQYHUWV4XLQH¶V
position to argue that  
LWIROORZVIURP4XLQH¶VSRVLWLRQWKDWLILWSURYHGLPSRVVLEOHWRHOLPLQDWHUHIHUHQFHVWR
such items as beliefs and enjoyments and fears from our understanding of human 
behaviour, that understanding could not take the form which Quine considers the form 
of human science, namely embodiment in law like generalisations.288    
On an Aristotelian model of human behaviour these intentional terms are essential 
elements in the explanans RIDQ\DFWLRQ0DF,QW\UH¶VVWUDWegy is to demonstrate that 
the concept of an action necessarily involves reference to such intentional states, 
and that attempts to reduce the explanation of behaviour to the level of Quinean 
causal laws and descriptions of bio-physical processes (for example) denudes the 
concept of a person of any significance. His approach builds on the position that he 
had argued in many of his papers on philosophical psychology in the 1950s and 
60s.289 
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In AV MacIntyre firstly argues persuasively that the characterisation of an action 
can never be completed by reducing it to a set of descriptions that specify physical 
movements and identify their biophysical origins. This is because the same physical 
movement can embody many different types of action. The same motion of the 
hand might be a welcome or a dismissal, an insult or a gesture of friendship 
depending on the conventions that define the social context and on the intentions of 
the actor. What identifies and explains a physical movement as an action is its 
relationship WRWKHDFWRU¶VSHUVRQDOKLVWRU\DQGWRWKHVRFLDOVHWWLQJLQZKLFKWKH
action takes place.  A single physical activity (such as digging in the garden) may 
have multiple correct characterisations as an action depending on the level of 
narrative explanation drawn upon to render the behaviour intelligible. I may dig the 
soil with a spade in order to please my partner who is concerned that a lack of 
activity is detrimental to my health, or because it is part of my preparation for spring 
planting, or both and more. Each of these descriptions relates the pattern of 
physical movement to some social institution or practice which renders my 
behaviour intelligible by providing an explanatory context: the institutions of 
marriage and domestic life, the practice of gardening and the annual cycle of the 
garden, for example.290 
Secondly, a Quinean mechanistic approach to the explanation of human behaviour 
erodes the distinction between voluntary action and involuntary movement. A blink 
of an eye requires only a causal explanation, because it is involuntary. A deliberate 
wink, however, has to be rendered intelligible as an action by explaining what the 
actor was trying to achieve by performing the movement. The difference between 
the involuntary blink and the voluntary wink is that the latter is open to evaluation, 
while the former is not. It does not make sense to talk about successful or 
unsuccessful or good or bad blinks (although they may be fortunate or unfortunate); 
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EXWLWGRHVPDNHVHQVHWRHYDOXDWHWKHDFWRU¶VEHKDYLRXr in relation to a voluntary 
action. Did the actor achieve what she intended? Were her intentions appropriate or 
inappropriate? Should she be praised or criticised for having chosen to act in this 
way?291 If a physical movement can be fully explained without reference to an 
DFWRU¶VLQWHQWLRQVWKHQLWFDQQRWEHVXEMHFWWRPRUDOHYDOXDWLRQ7KLVLV0DF,QW\UH¶V
third objection to Quinean reductionism. The possibility of moral censure, aesthetic 
criticism, and legal action is predicated on a teleological understanding of human 
EHKDYLRXUDQGDGLVWLQFWLRQEHWZHHQYROXQWDU\DQGLQYROXQWDU\DFWLRQWKDW4XLQH¶V
reductivism would eradicate. We can be held accountable for our actions in a way 
that would be entirely inappropriate for involuntary movements. It is this notion of 
accountability that is central to the intelligibility of our framework for moral 
evaluation and, as MacIntyre points out, it is central to our understanding of what it 
is to be a human being. 
Human beings can be held to account for that of which they are the authors; other 
beings cannot.  To identify an occurrence as an action is in the paradigmatic 
instances to identify it under a type of description which enables us to see that 
RFFXUUHQFHDVIORZLQJLQWHOOLJLEO\IURPDKXPDQDJHQW¶VLQWHQWLRQVPRtives, passions 
and purposes.  It is therefore to understand an action as something to which someone 
is accountable, about which it is always appropriate to ask the agent for an intelligible 
account.292 
To abandon teleological explanation would be to abandon the basis on which we 
recognise a person as an agent capable of recognising their needs and wants and 
WDNLQJDFWLRQWRPHHWWKRVHQHHGVDQGZDQWV0DF,QW\UH¶VIRXUWKREMHFWLRQWR
Quinean reductionism is that it would eliminate the concepts we use in order to 
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understand moral choice. Our interpretation of decision making reflects our 
unconscious adherence to an Aristotelian model of practical reasoning. We render 
RWKHUSHRSOH¶VDFWLRQVLQWHOOLJLEOHE\FRQQHFWLQJWKHPWRWKHZD\LQZKLFKWKDW
person interprets their desires, assesses how these desires might be met, and 
selects some course of action aimed at securing the desired end. Each element of 
WKLVGHVFULSWLRQKDVWREHSURYLGHGLIWKHSHUVRQ¶VGHFLVLRQLVWREHUHQGHUHGIXOO\
intelligible. If a person performs an action, but it is claimed that they did not desire 
the object of that action, and/or that their chosen course was irrelevant to the 
achievement of their goals, we would demand further clarification. Were they acting 
under constraint? Was there a hidden goal? Until the response meets the 
FRQGLWLRQVLPSOLHGE\$ULVWRWOH¶VDQDO\VLVRISUDFWLFDOUHDVRQLQJWKHLUDFWLRQUHPDLQV
unintelligible. MacIntyre comments: 
Aristotle's account of the practical syllogism can be considered as providing a 
statement of necessary conditions for intelligible human action and as doing so in a 
way that must hold for any recognizably human culture.293 
Interpreting practical reasoning in this way assumes that human action can only be 
understood in intentional terms, as goal directed. Teleology therefore provides the 
basis on which we distinguish human beings and advanced animals from other 
types of being. As a result, the concepts that we use to understand other people are 
irreducibly teleological.  
0DF,QW\UH¶VDUJXPHQWVWKHUefore, demonstrate that teleological explanation is 
ineliminable from the conceptual scheme that underpins our social lives (although 
this does not rule out the possibility of constructing other conceptual schemes which 
exclude teleological explanation). In achieving this outcome he partly addresses 
$QVFRPEH¶VGHPDQGIRUDSKLORVRSK\RISV\FKRORJ\WKDWZLOOXQGHUSLQDQDFFRXQWRI
moral reasoning. However, the reinstatement of an Aristotelian ethical system 
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requires two further steps. Firstly, he has to provide an account of the virtues which 
is convincing in a contemporary context. Secondly, he has to demonstrate that it is 
coherent to postulate an overall telos of human life, without reliance on the 
metaphysical account of human nature and telos that he had rejected. 
Practices and the Nature of Virtue 
$ULVWRWOH¶VDFFRXQWRISUDFWLFDOUHDVRQLQJSUHVXSSRVHVWKDWDQDJHQWFDQFRUUHFWO\
understand their needs and will be able to select the course of action that best 
meets those needs, but it also allows for the possibility that a person may be 
mistaken with respect to what is a good and what is not. This implies that one can 
make a distinction between what an agent may take to be a good and what is a 
genuine good is for that person.294 This capacity to distinguish between real and 
apparent goods is a precondition of an ethical life and the central virtue for Aristotle 
LVWKHUHIRUH³SKURQHVLV± WKHFDSDFLW\IRUULJKWMXGJHPHQWRU³SUDFWLFDOZLVGRP´295 
The development of this capacity for judgment depends on a process of education 
in which individuals learn to discriminate between genuine and apparent goods. The 
judgement of a person who has been through such a process of formation will differ 
from that of someone who has had more limited opportunities for moral 
development. As a result, the individual who has developed the capacities to 
recognise and pursue different (and, in some sense, higher) goods will not 
conceptualise their needs and wants in the same way as an individual whose 
culture and upbringing does not afford such opportunities for development.  
The morally developed individual will acquire the practical reasoning skills to 
discriminate between different types of good, and to direct their actions towards the 
acquisition of those goods which bring longer term benefits.  Such a capacity will 
GHYHORSWKURXJKDSHUVRQ¶VVRFLDOLVDWLRQLQWRWKHPRUDOIUDPHZRUNHQGRUVHGE\WKHLU
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community. This framework will enable the individual to classify and articulate their 
goals and needs, to recognise what is held to be genuinely good by that community, 
and develop the characteristics needed to pursue and achieve those goods ± the 
virtues. But how are the virtues to be defined given the competing accounts of the 
concept of virtue that MacIntyre traces from Homer onwards?296  
According to MacIntyre, a virtue in the Homeric epics is identified with excellence at 
some distinctive activity that is important to social life. For example, we may refer to 
someone in Homeric terms as having virtue as a warrior or as a story teller or as a 
counsellor. To possess a virtue is to possess the capacity to be successful in 
undertaking a social role, and the nature of the virtue cannot be defined 
independently of that role. And, MacIntyre argues, one thing that remains constant 
in the subsequent transmutations of the concept of virtue is that a virtue always 
requires some background feature of social life for its expression.297  MacIntyre 
generalises from this observation to argue that the concept of a social practice is 
fundamental to the conception of a virtue. MacIntyre suggests that in  
this notion of a particular type of practice as providing the arena in which the virtues 
are exhibited and in terms of which they are to receive their primary, if incomplete, 
definition is crucial to the whole enterprise of identifying a core concept of the 
virtues.298 
7KLVLVDQLPSRUWDQWVWHSLQ0DF,QW\UH¶VDUJXPHQWZKLFKLVGHVLJQHGWRSURYLGHDQ
account of virtue ethics in which the concepts of virtue and telos are shaped by 
social structure rather than biology (a position which he revised in DRA - see 
section 2.4 below). He defines a practice as: 
... any coherent and complex form of socially established cooperative form of human 
activity through which goods internal to that form of activity are realised in the course 
of trying to achieve those standards of excellence, which are appropriate to, and 
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partially definitive of, that form of activity, with the result that human powers to 
achieve excellence, and human conceptions of the ends and goods involved, are 
systematically extended.299  
This definition implies a teleological understanding of human behaviour, as it 
presupposes that practices develop in order to enable human beings to invent and 
pursue certain goals. As a result, practices shape new and distinct social roles. 
Thus, the need to provide people with shelter from the elements shapes the social 
role of the builder, and the practice of building will foster the development of 
VWDQGDUGVZKLFKXQGHUSLQWKHMXGJHPHQWDVWRZKHWKHUWKHEXLOGHU¶VUROHKDVEeen 
executed well or badly. Such standards therefore provide the basis for the 
evaluation of the performance of the role defined by the practice. The development 
and elaboration of these standards will specify new areas of potential achievement 
for human beings, and the builder who meets those standards will not only achieve 
goods which pre-exist the practice (such as securing the safety of individuals who 
require shelter). She will also obtain goods which could only be achieved through 
conformity to the standards developed within the practice (such as standards of 
architectural excellence), and which are, therefore, internal to it.  Such internal 
JRRGVDUHDFTXLUHGRQO\WKURXJKWKHLQGLYLGXDO¶VFRQWULEXWLRQWRWKHDFKLHYHPHQWRI
the telos of the practice. 
MacIntyre illustrates his conception of internal goods with reference to the game of 
chess.  We may play chess simply in order to enjoy some external goods that 
accrue to us through participation, as a child might do if she was rewarded for 
playing the game with an adult.300  However, particularly as her skill in the game (or 
virtue as a chess player) develops and her understanding of the objectives of the 
game becomes clearer, the child would gain satisfaction from achieving the internal 
objectives of the game. In developing her skills she would also be acquiring 
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excellence of a form which would not be possible unless this practice had been 
established, and the practice therefore acts to extend the understanding of what it is 
possible for a human being to achieve. These internal goods cannot be understood 
by someone who lives in a culture which does not possess the practice of chess, 
EHFDXVHWKHH[FHOOHQWRU³YLUWXH´RIDFKHVVPDVWHUFDQQRWEHGHILQHGRUXQGHUVWRRG
without reference to the constitutive rules of the game.301 
To acquire excellence in a practice requires one to submit to the authority of the 
rules that govern that practice and to the standards of performance that have 
evolved over its history, because such rules and standards are constitutive of 
participation in that particular practice. If I do not accept the authority of those rules 
and standards I am not participating in the practice, although I may be pretending to 
do so.302  Moreover, it is only by submitting to the authority of the constitutive rules 
and accumulated lore of a practice that I can develop the skills required to meet the 
standards that govern the activities. Through the development of such skills I may 
also ultimately be capable of performance that transcends and extends those 
standards, thereby contributing to the development of the practice as a whole.  For 
VRPHRQHWRDFKLHYHH[FHOOHQFHLQDSUDFWLFHH[WHQGVWKHFRPPXQLW\¶V
understanding of what achievements are possible and thereby benefits everyone in 
that community.303   
The concept of internal goods enables MacIntyre to provisionally define the nature 
of virtue as follows, although he recognises that this definition requires extension 
and modification:  
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A virtue is an acquired human quality the possession and exercise of which tends to 
enable us to achieve those goods which are internal to practices, and the lack of 
which effectively prevents us from achieving any such goods.304 
The acquisition of virtue so defined therefore requires membership of a community 
which has established social practices, with clear standards of achievement with 
respect to these practices. However, the acquisition of virtue defined in this way 
does not require a particular form of social organisation, such as the polis, for its 
expression.  Any community which is sufficiently complex to allow different practices 
and social roles to emerge will provide opportunities for an individual to participate 
in practices, and thereby to develop the virtues necessary to realise the internal 
goods characteristic of those practices.  
It would be misleading to interpret MacIntyre as arguing that each practice has 
associated with it a unique virtue, as this would imply that an individual cannot 
acquire all virtues without participating in all practices. There is a distinction implicit 
in AV between virtue as a specific skill associated with a particular practice and the 
more general virtues that participation in a range of practices imbues. My skill in 
chess will be different from my skill as a carpenter.  But in both cases my 
submission to the rules of a practice and  the authority and requirements of other 
practitioners means that my participation in a practice has to be characterised by 
the virtues of justice, trust, truthfulness and courage (among others).305 Thus while 
the internal goods achieved by participation and the associated skills will be 
identified in terms of the aims of the practice, the virtues that may be acquired by 
participation may have a more general relevance to all social participation. 
MacIntyre holds that these general virtues and the relationships that they underpin 
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... are genuine excellences, are virtues in the light of which we have to characterise 
RXUVHOYHVDQGRWKHUVZKDWHYHURXUSULYDWHPRUDOVWDQGSRLQWRURXUVRFLHW\¶VSDUWLFXODU
codes may be.306 
MacIntyre suggests that his initial account of the virtues in terms of practices is 
teleological; it relates virtues to the characteristics of social life; and it allows for 
conflict between different goods.  In this he suggests it addresses the difficulties 
that he had identified with respect to Aristotle's account.307  He has constructed a 
notion of human virtues that is independent of the idea of the polis,308 his account of 
human nature is teleological without relying on an Aristotelian metaphysical biology, 
and he has provided an account of the virtues in which the failure of individuals to 
achieve their good is not simply the product of some character defect, but can arise 
from the conflict between the incompatible goods that are embodied in different 
social practices.309  
However, MacIntyre acknowledges that there are also certain limitations to his 
account of virtue in terms of the nature of a practice.  There are too many practices 
and therefore too many actual and potential conflicts between goods to enable us to 
give a coherent account of the overall shape of a life and its telos.  The claims of 
one practice may conflict with those of another,310  DQG³ZLWKRXWDQRYHUULGLQJ
conception of the overall telos of a whole life, conceived as a unity, our concept of 
FHUWDLQLQGLYLGXDOYLUWXHVKDVWRUHPDLQSDUWLDODQGLQFRPSOHWH´311 And there is at 
least one virtue which, MacIntyre argues, cannot be defined without reference to the 
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FRQFHSWRIDZKROHKXPDQOLIHWKDWRI³LQWHJULW\RUFRQVWDQF\´WKHGHGLFDWLRQRID
life towards a single end.312  
In addition to the limitations that MacIntyre identifies in his account of virtues and 
practices, it is also worth raising here a question about whether social practices and 
what they achieve always produce outcomes that are good. As we shall see in the 
next section, it is arguable that some practices may produce evil outcomes. If this is 
the case defining virtue in terms of excellence within a practice does not provide an 
adequate criterion of moral worth, as we would have to distinguish between those 
practices in which internal goods are produced, from those practices which create 
wrongs. But to discuss this at this stage is to get ahead of the story, and to 
anticipate a discussion that will take place in Section 2.4. Suffice it to say that the 
concept of a virtue specified in the way that MacIntyre defines it gets us part of the 
way towards an account of the good life - but only part, at best.  
In order to complete his account of the good life MacIntyre seeks to establish three 
further theses. Firstly, he attempts to establish that it is legitimate to speak of the 
unity of a human life, because such a unity is a precondition both for the 
exhibition of the virtues as longstanding dispositions to act in certain ways and 
for the coherence of the assertion that a human life may have a single 
overriding purpose. Secondly, he argues that the pursuit of such a telos is not 
sustainable by an isolated individual but requires a community which can 
support that individual in conceptualising and pursuing their good. Thirdly, such 
DFRPPXQLW\LVRQO\DEOHWRVXVWDLQWKHLQGLYLGXDO¶VSXUVXLWRIWKHJRRGLILWV
practices embody some developing (albeit limited) understanding of that good 
and of the virtues. Such an understanding will have developed over the history 
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of the community and will come to embody a tradition of enquiry into the nature 
of the good.  
The nature of the human telos 
MacIntyre argues that the contemporary understanding of human action results in 
a Humean view of a human life as a concatenation of discrete actions with no 
overriding connection between each of those events.313  From this perspective the 
unity of a life becomes invisible. This atomistic concept of the person leaves no 
place for the virtues because virtues are continuing dispositions which will be 
exhibited in a range of situations over a long period of time. It might be argued that 
criteria of personal identity in terms of physical and psychological continuity can 
underpin a concept of the unity of a life that is sufficient to enable someone to 
ascribe dispositions to the same person over time. However, constructing an 
account of personal identity in terms of spatio-temporal continuity tells us nothing 
about the way in which that individual understands the psychological and 
biographical identity of themselves and others. This requires a complementary 
notion of personal identity, conceived in terms of how an individual constructs the 
XQLW\RIWKHLURZQOLIHDQGKRZLQWXUQWKH\FRQFHLYHRIWKHXQLW\RIRWKHUSHRSOH¶V
livHV0DF,QW\UHDUJXHVWKDWZHXQGHUVWDQGRXURZQDQGRWKHUSHRSOH¶VOLYHVE\
constructing a story around them. The concept of a unitary self that underpins the 
concept of the virtues in AV is  
the concept of a self, whose unity resides in the unity of a narrative, which links birth 
to life to death as narrative beginning to middle to end.314 
MacIntyre observes that our actions have a fundamentally historical character315, 
EHFDXVHZHKDYHWRXQGHUVWDQGRXURZQDQGRWKHUSHRSOH¶VDFWLRQVE\HPEHGGLQJ
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them in the context of a life story that (implicitly at least) has a narrative form.316 Our 
lives may be unpredictable, but as a result of this narrative structure they have  
... a certain teleological character.  We live out our lives... in the light of certain 
conceptions of a possible shared future.  There is no present which is not informed by 
some image of some future, and an image of the future always presents itself in the 
form of a telos - or of a variety of ends or goals - towards which we are either moving 
or failing to move in the present.317   
0DF,QW\UH¶VDFFRXQWWKHUHIRUHFRPELQHVWZRQRWLRQVRISHUVRQDOLGHQWLW\WKH
physical and psychological continuity that is required to correctly ascribe 
dispositions to a person and the idea of personal identity as the ascription of a 
narrative unity to our own lives and the lives of others, in which we understand 
those lives as imbued with a teleological order, directed towards some end. This 
underpins his notion of an overall telos. He asks:  
In what does the unity of an individual life consist?  The answer is that its unity is the 
XQLW\RIDQDUUDWLYHHPERGLHGLQDVLQJOHOLIH7RDVNµZKDWLVWKHJRRGIRUPH"¶LVWR
DVNKRZEHVW,PLJKWOLYHRXWWKDWXQLW\DQGEULQJLWWRFRPSOHWLRQ7RDVNµZKDWLVWKH
JRRGIRUPDQ"¶ is to ask what all answers to the former question must have in 
common.318 
MacIntyre suggests that it is the systematic asking of these questions throughout 
life that can provide that personal history with its overall identity: its unity is the unity 
of a narrative quest.319 %XWWKLVIRUPXODWLRQLPPHGLDWHO\UDLVHVWKHTXHVWLRQµDTXHVW
IRUZKDW"¶0DF,QW\UHVXJJHVWVWKDWZHPXVWKDYHVRPHJHQHUDOLGHDRIWKHRYHUDOO
good that we are seeking, and it is our developing understanding of that good 
throughout our life, that will enable us to prioritise all the other specific goods which 
are associated with the different social practices in which we are engaged. This 
developing appreciation of the good therefore underpins the virtue of phronesis.  
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I want to pause here for a moment to consider what these arguments of MacIntyre 
GHPRQVWUDWH)LUVWO\LWLVFOHDUO\QRWWKHFDVHWKDWFRQFHLYLQJRQH¶VOLIHDVD
narrative unity directed towards some notion of the good is a logical necessity. It is 
perfectly (logically) possible for someone to live on a day to day basis and never 
consider whether their life constitutes some overall unity or whether it has an overall 
JRDO,QGHHGWKLVLVWKHLPDJHRIPRGHUQOLIHWKDWHPHUJHVIURP0DFLQW\UH¶VFULWLTXH
of liberal individualism.320 1RULV0DF,QW\UH¶VFRQWHQWLRQDQHPSLULFDOK\SRWKHVLVWR
be tested by psychological tests to measure the degree to which individuals and 
SRSXODWLRQVFRQFHLYHRIWKHLUOLYHVDVDXQLW\0DFLQW\UH¶VDUJXPHQWVDUHLQHVVHQFH
moral arguments that are intended to persuade the reader that one cannot render 
RQH¶VOLIHIXOO\LQWHOOLJLEOHDQGZRUWKZKLOHZLWKRXWFRQVLGHULQJLWLQWHUPVRIDQRYHUDOO
unity, and to conceive of that unity in terms of some overall purpose that we are 
seeking to realise. Incorporating the Aristotelian notion of an overall telos into our 
conceptual armoury enables one to make sense of the language of morals, and to 
direct our actions towards some overall purpose.  
He is therefore, seeking to equip the contemporary reader with the conceptual 
resources necessary to understand and live a good life. However, in our 
contemporary culture, the abandonment of an Aristotelian perspective means that 
WKHUHLVOLWWOHFXOWXUDOHQGRUVHPHQWIRUFRQFHLYLQJRIRQH¶VOLIHLQWKHZD\WKDW
MacIntyre suggests is necessary if virtue ethics is to be revived. What is required to 
make a life lived in pursuit of some ultimate telos an option for the contemporary 
person is a community that embodies the understanding of that life as a unity, and 
which provides  its members with the practical and conceptual support necessary 
for them to make progress in the task of understanding and realising such a telos.  
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The role of community 
If an individual is to be able to consistently conceive of their life in terms of a unity 
directed towards the achievement of some telos they will require the support of 
others to maintain a focus on their developing understanding of the good, and on 
the dHYHORSPHQWRIWKHYLUWXHVUHTXLUHGWRDFKLHYHWKDWJRRG0DF,QW\UH¶VDFFRXQW
therefore extends the concept of virtue beyond the characteristics of the individual, 
to the social virtues necessary to create and sustain the type of community which 
can support the individual in their pursuit of the good:  
The virtues therefore are to be understood as those dispositions which will not only 
sustain practices and enable us to achieve the goods internal to practices, but which 
will also sustain us in the relevant kind of quest for the good, by enabling us to 
overcome the harms, dangers, temptations and distractions which we encounter, and 
which will furnish us with increasing self-knowledge and increasing knowledge of the 
good.  The catalogue of the virtues will therefore include the virtues required to 
sustain the kind of households and the kind of political communities in which men and 
women can seek for the good together and the virtues necessary for philosophical 
enquiry about the character of the good.  We have then arrived at a provisional 
conclusion about the good life for man: the good life for man is the life spent in 
seeking for the good life for man, and the virtues necessary for the seeking are those 
which will enable us to understand what more and what else the good life for man 
is.321 
It might be argued that defining the good in this way is so vague as to be entirely 
unsatisfactory, but it is not MacIntyre who needs to provide a more adequate 
definition. This is the philosophical task of the community that espouses some 
notion of a human good, and it is the task of that community to progressively 
construct an adequate definition of that good and develop those practices which will 
enable its members to pursue the good life. This does not mean that all 
communities will define the good in the same way. But it does imply that the 
conceptual scheme that such a community uses to underpin its understanding of 
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the moral life will be incomplete and therefore not entirely intelligible without some 
interpretation of the nature of the good. The debates and arguments through which 
a community constructs such an understanding of the good lead to the development 
of a tradition, and it is through her participation in such a tradition that an individual 
can be sustained in her pursuit of the good.  
Participation in a Tradition 
An individual has no control over the social position and community into which she 
is born and in which she develops, and in whose practices she participates. But this 
community and these practices have a history and this history constitutes a 
particular tradition or set of traditions. As a result of her participation in these 
SUDFWLFHVWKHLQGLYLGXDOZLOOEHFRPH³RQHRIWKHEHDUHUVRIDWUDGLWLRQ´322 As a bearer 
she will not merely act as a passive recipient of the practices and beliefs transmitted 
through the tradition, she will also play a part in shaping these practices. She will 
engage in a more or less limited way in debates about the fundamental aims of the 
tradition, which defines the good towards which it is directed. She will learn the 
history of the debate, and help shape its future, because such debates continue 
through generations. In participating in the practices endorsed by the tradition she 
will both seek to achieve the goods that are internal to the practice, and also 
contribute to the pursuit of the overall good of the tradition of which it is a part. The 
practice is both illuminated by and illuminates the history of that tradition and points 
towards its future. 
...practices always have histories and ... at any given moment what a practice is 
depends on a mode of understanding it that has been transmitted often through many 
generations.323 
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Traditions therefore support and embody practices, and these practices make 
possible the virtues. The virtues fostered by these practices serve to strengthen the 
tradition and preserve it from decay, 
The virtues find their point and purpose not only in sustaining the form of an individual 
life ... but also in sustaining those traditions which provide both practices and 
individual lives with their necessary historical context.324 
Without participants exhibiting the virtues that are necessary for the preservation of 
the integrity of social life, such as truthfulness, justice and courage, the practices of 
a tradition and the tradition itself will wither away. Thus virtues, practices and 
traditions are mutually inter-dependent and provide the resources required for the 
coherent pursuit of the good life.   
The Virtues in Contemporary Life 
The good life envisaged by Macintyre has at its heart the idea of the individual who 
is engaged in the practices endorsed by their tradition and is thereby contributing to 
a communal pursuit of the good.  This image has only limited relevance to 
contemporary life. Industrialisation has meant that  
Where the notion of engagement in a practice was once socially central, the notion of 
aesthetic consumption ... is [now central], at least for the majority. 325 
Instead of participating in practices, we are now more likely to observe the actions 
of others rather than to become actors ourselves, except in relatively restricted 
environments. This is both a consequence of and also reinforces the fragmentation 
RIWKHLQGLYLGXDO¶VOLIH326  
In a community which exemplifies an Aristotelian ethic, the virtues are those 
dispositions which enable the citizen to contribute to the pursuit of a communally 
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defined good. In a society which has lost such a communal notion of the good, 
people are considered to naturally pursue their self-interest and the nature and 
status of the virtues becomes problematic.327 In the emergence of the modern world 
a coherent account of individual virtues was lost, and this loss was also 
accompanied by a simplification of the concept into a single unitary concept of 
³YLUWXH´7KHVHSURcesses combined to make virtue ethics apparently incoherent 
and encouraged the shift to intuitionism, moral rationalism and ultimately to 
emotivism. The change in the understanding of virtue led to a situation in which  
«WKHUHDUHQRORQJHUDQ\FOHDUFULWeria [by which one could identify what was to 
count as a virtue].  It is unsurprising that the adherents of virtue began to look for 
another basis for moral belief and that various forms of moral rationalism and 
intuitionism reappear.328 
The individualism of the 18th century led philosophers to see community as simply 
the forum in which individual goals are pursued, and to exclude from their 
understanding of society any view of community as creating a shared vision of the 
good for humanity that is independent of individual interests.329 However, this 
understanding of community has not entirely disappeared. The tradition of the 
virtues has continued into the contemporary world, but in an attenuated form. 
MacIntyre points out that  
in the conceptual melange of moral thought and practice today, fragments from the 
tradition -- virtue concepts for the most part -- are still found alongside 
characteristically modern and individualist concepts such as those of rights or utility.  
But the tradition also survives in a much less fragmented, much less distorted form in 
the lives of certain communities. 
Such communities are, however, small and marginalised and MacIntyre concludes 
that the range of disparate moral concepts means that moral consensus is not 
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possible today.330 The result has been the growth of moral individualism on the one 
hand and Nietzschean genealogy on the other.  MacIntyre believes that his 
arguments have shown that this individualist concept of the self-sufficient moral 
authority is incoherent.331   
For if the conception of a good has to be expounded in terms of such notions as those 
of a practice, of the narrative unity of a human life and of a moral tradition, then 
goods, and with them the only grounds for the authority of laws and virtues, can only 
be discovered by entering into those relationships which constitute communities 
whose central bond is a shared vision of and understanding of goods.332 
This observation undermines moral individualism. If the conceptualisation and 
understanding of morality is dependent on participation in a community which is 
engaged in constructing and realising a notion of the human good, then the 
LQGLYLGXDOLVWZKRFKRRVHVKHURZQ³PRUDOLW\´HIIHFWLYHO\LVRODWHVKHUVHOIIURPWKH
possibility of realising such a good. The notion of the Sartrean individualist who can 
establish his or her own morality from a perspective of unconditioned choice is 
incoherent, because the individualist severs herself from the social relationships, 
practices and standards that are essential to the creation of the virtues.333 Such a 
SHUVRQ¶VVHOI-isolation denies to her the resources necessary to formulate an 
understanding of the moral life. Moreover, such social engagement is essential to 
the fulfilment of even the most basic human needs at many points in our lives (a 
point which MacIntyre develops further in DRA - see Section 2.4). Our 
understanding of what can count as a moral viewpoint has to be framed and shaped 
by our prior commitment to a community and its social practices.334 The 
genealogical critic articulates an effective reductio ad absurdum of liberal moral 
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LQGLYLGXDOLVPEXWVXFKFULWLFLVPVKDYHQRSRZHUWRXQGHUPLQH0DF,QW\UH¶VDFFRXQW
of virtue ethics.  
&KDOOHQJHVWR0DF,QW\UH¶VSRVLWLRQLQ$9 
MacIntyre argues that individualist perspectives are manifestations of, and 
responses to, the disordered ethical vocabulary characteristic of the modern world. 
This observation reinforces his claim that a return to an Aristotelian tradition is a 
plausible way of regaining a coherent conceptual framework to underpin our 
morality. However, his position is open to two major challenges, each of which is 
related to either the crisis of rational justification or the crisis of moral debate that I 
identified at the beginning of this chapter. The first challenge is that MaF,QW\UH¶V
advocacy of an Aristotelian perspective is simply the expression of a personal 
preference, because his repudiation of Enlightenment standards of justification 
means that he cannot offer any compelling arguments to the individual who does 
not sharHKLVHQWKXVLDVPIRUYLUWXHHWKLFV0DF,QW\UH¶VDUJXPHQWVDUHFRQVWUXFWHG
from within the Aristotelian tradition itself, and his assessment of the validity of 
these arguments presupposes an understanding of the nature of rationality and 
justification that is derived from that tradition.  These standards of justification 
cannot therefore legitimate the decision to commit oneself to that tradition, because 
these standards can only be acquired through that commitment. Without some 
account of the nature of rationality that can replace the Enlightenment account, 
MacIntyre has no way of repudiating the critic who does not share his judgement of 
the cogency of the different arguments. And if this is the case he has no way of 
repudiating the claim that his rejection of Enlightenment standards of rational 
justification licenses epistemological relativism. His response to this challenge has 
to be to construct an alternative account of rational justification to replace the 
Enlightenment model. As he points out  
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My negaWLYHDQGSRVLWLYHHYDOXDWLRQVRISDUWLFXODUDUJXPHQWV«SUHVXSSRVHD
systematic, although here unstated, account of rationality. 
It is this account ± to be given to a subsequent book ± ZKLFK,VKDOOKRSHWRGHSOR\«
against those whose criticisms of my central thesis rests chiefly on an incompatible 
evaluation of the arguments.335 
This subsequent book was to be WJWR, and a purely chronological account of his 
work would move on to consider the account of rationality and justification that he 
sets out in that work. However, to move directly to WJWR would leave incomplete 
my account of 0DF,QW\UH¶VGHYHORSPHQWRIDQ$ULVWRWHOLDQHWKLFVWKDWPLJKWEH
persuasive to the modern world. Completing that account will also provide a 
response to the second challenge, which is related to the crisis of moral debate. It is 
DUJXDEOHWKDW0DF,QW\UH¶VDccount of virtue ethics endorses moral relativism: the 
view that what counts as right or wrong is culturally determined.  His account of the 
virtues is dependent on his account of practices.  If one community endorses 
practices that another community considers to be evil and identify as virtues 
characteristics that the second community would consider to be vices, how can 
moral argument proceed to resolve the underlying disputes about good and evil, 
virtue and vice? If MacIntyre is unable to construct arguments to show that the 
position adopted by one community is superior to another, his Aristotelianism would 
appear to allow an unacceptable relativism in terms of what may be judged to be 
good or evil.  
In AV he had sought to repudiate a biologically based interpretation of human telos. 
In Dependent Rational Animals (DRA ± first published 1999) he reverses his 
position and seeks to reinstate such a biological account of human telos. This 
represents a significant strengthening and development of his moral philosophy, 
EHFDXVHWKLVELRORJLFDOO\EDVHGDFFRXQWRIWHORVFRPSOHWHV0DFLQW\UH¶VDFFRXQWRI
virtue ethics and strengthens his position against the claim of moral relativism. It is, 
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WKHUHIRUHKHOSIXOWRGLVFXVV'5$WRFRPSOHWHDQDFFRXQWRI0DFLQW\UH¶V$ULVWRtelian 
ethics before considering the extent to which he provides an effective alternative to 
Enlightenment standards of rationality.  
2.4 Dependent Rational Animals  
Limitations of AV 
0DF,QW\UH¶VREMHFWLYHLQ$9LVWRUHFRQVWUXFWDQ$ULVWRWHOLDQFRQFHSWXDO scheme 
which he believes can remedy the incoherence of our contemporary understanding 
of ethics. His arguments do not present this scheme as demonstrably true, but as a 
way of conceptualising the human condition which can render our moral experience 
more intelligible. Macintyre also seeks to show that Aristotelianism is superior in 
coherence to the rivals represented by contemporary moral philosophy, but this 
does not demonstrate that it would be impossible for some alternative conceptual 
scheme to make our understanding of morality equally or more coherent. As he 
acknowledges in both AV and DRA, he is arguing his case from a committed 
Aristotelian perspective and his standards of justification are derived from this prior 
commitment.336 Someone who does not share that commitment will not be 
compelled to accept the Aristotelian standards of superiority and justification that he 
applies and may argue that his position is simply the expression of his own personal 
SUHIHUHQFHV7KXV0DF,QW\UH¶VDSSHDOWRWKHDOOHJed superiority of the Aristotelian 
moral tradition cuts no ice for critics such as Robert Wachbroit, because, as 
Wachbroit points out, such a claim would simply be rejected by the adherent of a 
different ethical tradition.337 +RZHYHU0DF,QW\UH¶VDFFRXQWRIrationality in WJWR is 
intended to respond to this type of challenge, and I consider this response in 
Section 2.5 and Chapter 4. 
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The problem I have described above reflects a form of epistemological relativism in 
which what is cast into doubt is the justification of the standards by which we seek 
to demonstrate the superiority of one theoretical position to another. What I want to 
address in this section is a different, although related, problem that arises from his 
position in AV, which leaves him open to the criticism that his version of Aristotelian 
ethics legitimates moral UHODWLYLVP0DF,QW\UH¶VDFFRXQWRIVXFKDQHWKLFLQ$9
represents the human telos as a concept constructed by human beings and their 
communities, through their culturally distinctive practices, rather than something 
that is determined by our biological nature, as Aristotle had asserted. But without 
the anchor of a biologically determined human nature that shapes the human telos, 
LWLVDUJXDEOHWKDW0DF,QW\UH¶VYHUVLRQRI$ULVWRWHOLDQLVm in AV allows far too much 
variability to the interpretation of his core ethical concepts.  The conceptual 
elements of an Aristotelian ethical schema may simply act as variables that can be 
fulfilled in diverse and conflicting ways by different cultures.  
This issue can be illustrated by the fact that some practices that are approved in 
one culture may be considered to be morally wrong in another, even though both 
cultures might embody an Aristotelian understanding of ethics.  MacIntyre links the 
concept of virtue to the internal goods that can be realised through social practices, 
and he acknowledges in AV that it is possible in principle for some practices to be 
evil, although he reserves judgement as to whether this is ever actually the case.338 
This would appear to leave his version of Aristotelianism open to the claim that it 
endorses moral relativism, because the personal characteristics required to realise 
WKHLQWHUQDO³JRRGV´RIWKDWSUDFWLFHZRXOGEHFRQVLGHUHGDYLUWXHE\WKHFXOWXUHWKDW
approves thHSUDFWLFHDOWKRXJKWKLV³YLUWXH´PD\EHMXGJHGWREHDYLFHE\RWKHU
cultures. This is a point that Wachbroit makes in his perceptive review of the first 
edition of AV, where he argues that the appeal to practices as the basis on which 
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virtue can be defined must lead to such relativism339 unless there is some basis on 
which one can judge the moral status of different practices. The underlying difficulty 
KHUHLVWKDWLQRUGHUWRMXGJHDSUDFWLFHRUDVVRFLDWHG³YLUWXH´DVHYLORQHUHTXLUHV
some criterion of value that is external to the practice itself, and independent of the 
standards of the culture that approves that practice.  
MacIntyre argued in the Postscript to the second edition of AV that such criticisms 
fail to take into account the fact that his account of the virtues has three stages, only 
the first of which is the provisional definition of a virtue in terms of a capacity to 
achieve the internal goods of a practice. Whether such a capacity is in fact a virtue 
depends on its relationship to two further stages of the moral life which are defined 
as:  
«WKHQRWLRQVRIWKHJRRGRIDZKROHKXPDQOLIHDQGRIDQRQ-JRLQJWUDGLWLRQ«QR
human quality can be accounted a virtue unless it satisfies the conditions specified at 
each of the three stages.340  
This observation however does not resolve the problem of moral relativism because 
there can be rival traditions of the virtues341 and rival conceptualisations of the good 
life embodied in such traditions. The cultures that embody such traditions may also 
embody practices and institutions which would be judged evil within our 
contemporary Western culture - a culture characterised by the philosophy of the 
Nazis, or a society built on slavery and the subjugation of women, for example. On 
0DF,QW\UH¶VDUJXPHQWVLQ$9VXFK cultures might still embody some understanding 
of the human telos, and might sustain and develop this understanding within its 
tradition and institutions, teaching its citizens habits which we would view with 
UHSXJQDQFH,ZDQWWRVD\³ULJKWO\YLHZZLWKUHSXJQDQFH´EXW0DF,QW\UH¶VDFFRXQW
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of ethics in AV does not provide any culturally independent account of the nature of 
³ULJKW´WKDWFDQIRUPWKHEDVLVRIWKLVHYDOXDWLRQ 
7KHFODLPWKDW0DF,QW\UH¶VSRVLWLRQLQHIIHFWHQGRUVHVPRUDOUHODWLYLVPLVD
challeQJHWRLWVLQWHUQDOFRKHUHQFH$VLQLWLDOO\IRUPXODWHGLQ$90DF,QW\UH¶V
account does not provide a sufficiently developed account of the nature of the 
human telos to set boundaries around what might be counted as a virtue. His notion 
of a narrative unity of a human life leaves open the question of the genre within 
which such a unity can be constructed, and how the quest for a telos may be 
shaped by that construction. My argument in this section is that these difficulties are 
DFRQVHTXHQFHRI0DF,QW\UH¶VLnitial repudiation of a biologically based account of 
telos and that this deficit is addressed in DRA. DRA therefore represents the 
completion of his construction of a coherent contemporary Aristotelianism. As a 
result, this section also articulates the importance of DRA to an assessment of 
0DF,QW\UH¶VRYHUDOOSRVLWLRQDQLPSRUWDQFHZKLFKKDVQRWDOZD\VEHHQ
acknowledged. For example, as I noted in Section 1.1 above, Christopher Lutz 
appears to reject the overall significance of DRA in his otherwise excellent book 
Tradition in the Ethics of Alasdair MacIntyre. He does not mention DRA in the body 
RIWKHWH[WDQGLQWKH³3UHIDFHWRWKH3DSHUEDFN(GLWLRQ´KHFRPPHQWVWKDW
³Dependent Rational Animals does not seem to address the metaphysical issues of 
truth, teleology, and natural law directly and for this reason it does not appear in the 
DUJXPHQW´RIKLVERRN342 This disregards the fact that DRA addresses some 
IXQGDPHQWDOGHILFLWVLQ0DF,QW\UH¶VPRUDOSKLORVRSK\DQGWKHUHE\KHOSVGHIHQG
0DFLQW\UH¶VSRVLWLRQDJainst the charge that it endorses moral relativism - an issue 
WKDWLQIDFWIRUPVRQHRI/XW]¶VFHQWUDOFRQFHUQV 
What the charge of moral relativism puts into question is whether there are any 
logical or other constraints which restrict what can be counted as virtues. Wachbroit 
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has argued that the virtues can be considered as particular character traits which 
are approved by different cultures. However one culture may approve of some 
characteristics as virtues which are considered to be vices in another society.343 An 
acceptance of such relativism ZRXOGXQGHUPLQH0DF,QW\UH¶VDLP, which is to 
establish a version of Aristotelian ethics in which there is a single coherent account 
of telos and virtue. For MacIntyre the possession of the virtues in large part 
constitutes the achievement of the human telos, and if the virtues vary from culture 
to culture then so does human telos. If this relativism of the virtues were accepted 
then his attempt to use Aristotelianism to overcome the contemporary incoherence 
of moral debate would fail. However, if the nature of the virtues and telos can be 
anchored in biological aspects of human nature that are independent of culture, the 
nature of flourishing and the virtues that constitute such flourishing will possess 
characteristics that must be evidenced in all cultures. Consequently, this will define 
some constraints on what may be counted as a virtue and specify some of the 
virtues which must characterise any viable community. This in turn would provide a 
basis for moral dialogue. Specifying the nature of these constraints is the task 
MacIntyre undertakes in DRA. 
The importance of dependence 
By the time he came to write DRA MacIntyre had recognised the need to reconsider 
his earlier rejection of a biologically based account of human telos.   
 I now judge that I was in error in supposing an ethics independent of biology to be 
possible... for two distinct, but related reasons.  The first is that no account of the 
goods, rules and virtues that are definitive of our moral life can be adequate that does 
not explain... how that form of life is possible to beings who are biologically 
constituted as we are, by providing us with an account of our development towards 
and into that form of life. That development has as its starting point our initial animal 
condition. Secondly, a failure to understand that condition and the light thrown upon it 
by a comparison between humans and members of other intelligent animal species 
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will obscure crucial features of that development. One such failure...is the [lack of 
attention given to the] nature and extent of human vulnerability and disability.344  
 
DRA emphasises the way in which our dependence on others shapes the nature of 
community.  We require care and sustenance as babies and children and when we 
are ill or disabled through age or infirmity. We also have to offer care to others who 
require support. The relationships that govern our communal life must, therefore, be 
grounded in the facts of our mutual interdependence and vulnerability, although our 
culture appears to ignore the facts of this biological determined dependency in its 
consideration of ethical issues. MacIntyre therefore raises the question of what 
would happen if  
we were to treat the facts of vulnerability and affliction and the related facts of 
dependence as central to the human condition?345  
 
He identifies three tasks that must be addressed in the consideration of this 
question. Firstly, he argues that the failure to acknowledge the significance of our 
vulnerability is accompanied by a failure to recognise that this vulnerability is a 
product of the nature that we share with other animals. It is therefore necessary to 
give an account of virtue that takes account of that animality. Secondly, we are born 
as animals and remain animals throughout our lives, but as we grow we develop 
into creatures that are capable of practical reasoning and moral choice.  It is 
therefore important to consider the neglected question of the relationship between 
our animal nature and the development of practical reason. The neglect of this 
question has been encouraged by those philosophers who have posited a radical 
disjunction between human nature and animal nature because 
philosophical theories about what it is that distinguishes members of our species from 
other animal species... may seem to provide grounds for the belief that our rationality 
as thinking beings is somehow independent of our animality.346 
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MacIntyre challenges this assumption and argues that our reasoning has to be 
understood as related to the needs determined by our animal nature, albeit a nature 
that is transformed through our social development. The third task is to clarify the 
relationship between our animal dependency and the nature and functions of 
community. The needs that spring from our biological nature define our telos and 
through this shape the form of our social life: 
It is only because human beings have an end towards which they are directed by 
reason of their specific nature, that practices, traditions and the like are able to 
function as they do.347  
 
The virtues and human telos  
MacIntyre argues in DRA that the virtues that we must develop if we are to become 
independent practical reasoners are one and the same virtues as those that are 
required to respond to vulnerability in ourselves and others.  That is, they are  
The distinctive virtues of dependent rational animals, whose dependence, rationality 
and animality have to be understood in relationship to each other.348 
(DFKRIWKHWKUHHWHUPV³GHSHQGHQW´³UDWLRQDO´DQGDQLPDO´KDVWREHJLYHQGXH
weight if we are to conceive of human nature appropriately. And because they are 
interdependent, our rationality cannot be understood without reference to these 
other characteristics. This observation enables MacIntyre to argue persuasively that 
our rationality is continuous with the rationality exhibited by other higher animals. If 
this is the case, then it must be possible to apply the concepts we use to elucidate 
human action to other animals, and much of the book is devoted to justifying  
... the ascription of beliefs, thoughts, feelings, reasons for action, and concept 
acquisition and possession [to intelligent animals].349 
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MacIntyre puts forward convincing arguments with respect to the thesis that higher 
animals have such capacities,350 and argues that the sophisticated conceptual and 
collaborative capacities of human beings grow from the less sophisticated 
capacities that we share with other animals. He concludes that: 
... adult human activity and belief are best understood as developing out of, and are 
still in part dependent upon, modes of belief and activity that we share with some 
other species of intelligent animal... and that the activities and beliefs of members of 
those species need to be understood as in important respects approaching the 
condition of language-users.351 
At birth our engagement with the world is a wholly animal engagement, and this is 
only modified, distilled and refined through the processes of socialisation which lead 
to the development of language and our ability to participate in community. Our 
language capacity transforms human nature, but this transformation is a 
modification of our animal nature and not a replacement of it.352 
MacIntyre defines the telos of all animal species in Aristotelian terms, as flourishing, 
and argues that the nature of the human telos can be revealed by an examination of 
what counts as flourishing in other species, because the concept of flourishing has 
the same sense whether it is applied to an animal or a human being.  This does not 
mean that what it is to flourish is exactly the same for each species, but  
what a plant or animal needs is what it needs to flourish qua member of its particular 
species.  And what it needs to flourish is to develop the distinctive powers that it 
possesses qua member of that species.353  
The ability to flourish will require an ability to identify and pursue those goods which 
promote the development and exercise of an animal's distinctive powers, and the 
capacity to flourish therefore needs to be underpinned by processes of practical 
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reasoning. Human beings share similar pre-linguistic reasons for action to those 
possessed by other animals (hunger, thirst, a need for protection for example), and 
these reasons for action are essential precursors for the development of human and 
animal practical rationality.  However, the development of our linguistic capacities 
means that a human being can evaluate the desirability of different goods, and the 
acquisition of this capacity means that we can reflect on and pass judgement on our 
reasons for action in a way that is not shared by other animals.354 Through our 
social development we can learn to identify those goods that should be valued for 
WKHLURZQVDNHDQGZKLFKFDQSURYLGHWKHEDVLVIRUMXGJHPHQWV³DERXWKRZLWLVEHVW
for an individual or a community to order the goods in theLUOLYHV´355 The 
development of this reflective capacity underpins a transition from the pre-ethical 
pursuit of the goods required for flourishing that characterises animal behaviour, to 
the ability of individuals to order these goods hierarchically and form notions of what 
might constitute some overall good for humanity. It is this understanding of the 
relative merit of different goods and of an overall telos that guides practical decision 
making. This transition to reflexive awareness makes the formulation of an explicit 
moral code possible, but the origins of such a morality remains rooted in its 
relevance to meeting needs that emanate from our animal nature. 
The nature of practical reasoning 
The capacity for reflexive practical reasoning is essential to the pursuit of human 
telos because what will count as flourishing for a human being will vary from 
situation to situation,  and what is required to promote such flourishing is a 
developed capacity to select the action that maximises the general good within that 
situation, balancing both individual and communal interests. Thus defining the 
nature of human telos is not a question of identifying a set of individual or 
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community characteristics which represent individual perfection and social utopia, 
but of identifying a set of reasoning capacities which enable individuals and their 
communities to select the correct path among conflicting goods. MacIntyre suggests 
that  
... if we want to understand how it is good for humans to live, we need to know what it 
is to be excellent as an independent practical reasoner, that is, what the virtues of 
independent practical reasoning are.356   
MacIntyre argues that the virtues of practical rationality can only be acquired by 
participation in a community which is characterised by patterns of giving and 
receiving. These patterns reflect the fact that at certain points in our lives we are 
both dependent on others and that at other points we will also provide the source of 
care to those who are in need. We first experience such patterns of care as 
children, but these patterns continue throughout our lives.357 As our autonomy 
develops, we become increasingly capable of fulfilling our own desires. However, 
our developing rationality means that we learn to stand back from our immediate 
desires to consider what our longer term good really requires, and learn to make 
rational choices between realistically imagined alternative.358 In this process we are 
also modifying what we desire away from the objects that may provide immediate 
gratification into a desire for what is really good.359 What must underpin this process 
are the virtues: 
...the qualities that a child must develop, first to redirect and transform her or his 
desires, and subsequently to direct them consistently towards the goods of the 
different stages of her or his life... are the intellectual and moral virtues.  It is because 
failure to acquire those virtues makes it impossible for us to achieve this transition 
that the virtues have the place and function that they do in human life.360   
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This transformation of desire is not simply the development of self-control. Rather it 
is a process of redirecting our desires towards the good so that we no longer desire 
what is inappropriate. Someone who acquires the virtue of temperance will not need 
to resist a desire for excessive food and drink, because their desire has become a 
desire for moderation.361  Moral development is therefore a process of personal 
transformation in which we learn to stand back from our immediate impulses, so 
that  
the child moves beyond its initial animal state of having reasons for acting in this way 
rather than that towards its specifically human state of being able to evaluate those 
reasons, to revise them or to abandon them and to replace them with others.362 
MacIntyre argues that we become effective practical reasoners through our 
participation in a set of relationships in which we are given and receive nurture. 
These relationships continue from our birth to our death, reflecting our animal 
nature and needs and they also form the foundations of our moral education. 
Throughout our lives we are in debt to those people who provide care for us, and in 
turn we respond to those who need care from us. And because we may have to 
give care to people other than those from whom we receive care, we cannot 
respond to others through strict reciprocity by calculating what is due and delivering 
this and no more, but must be prepared to give freely.363   
Human beings are therefore embedded in communities in which networks of 
uncalculating care-receiving and care-giving are central. The serial patterns of 
dependency and nurture embedded in these networks are a constitutive element of 
human flourishing, and therefore of the human good: 
If I am to flourish to the full extent that is possible for a human being, then my whole 
life has to be of a certain kind, one in which I not only engage in and achieve some 
measure of success in the activities of an independent practical reasoner, but also 
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receive and have a reasonable expectation of receiving the attentive care needed 
when I am very young, old and ill, or injured.  So each of us achieves our good only if 
and in so far as others make our good their good by helping us through periods of 
disability to become ourselves the kind of human being -- through acquisition and 
exercise of the virtues - who makes the good of others her or his good.364   
The human telos is not therefore secured through the pursuit of my own personal 
flourishing alone but through both an unselfish commitment to the flourishing of 
others, and through contributing to the formation and maintenance of a community 
which responds to the needs of people who are temporarily or permanently unable 
to meet their own needs. In this process analytic abilities are developed so that 
practical reasoning becomes focussed on achieving a good that integrates both 
individual and communal needs and goals. As a result, the individual finds her 
"place within a network of givers and receivers in which the achievement of [her] 
individual good is understood to be inseparable from the achievement of the 
common good".365 This fusion of the individual good and the common good is 
QHFHVVDU\WRRXUIORXULVKLQJDQGDVDUHVXOWWKHFRQFHSWRI³IORXULVKLQJ´IRUKXPDQ
beings has to incorporate and acknowledge a response to our mutual 
dependence.366 
This acknowledgement shapes the form of a moral life. If I am to act justly (for 
H[DPSOH,PXVWQRWRQO\UHVSRQGLQDFFRUGDQFHZLWKDQRWKHUSHUVRQ¶VGHVHUW,
must go beyond the requirements of distributive justice and respond with immediate 
concern to the needs of others: 
 WKDWLQGLYLGXDO>ZKRUHVSRQGVDSSURSULDWHO\WRDQRWKHU¶VQHHG@DWRQFHDFWV
liberally, from the beneficence of charity, justly, and out of taking pity ... what the 
virtues require from us are characteristically types of action that are at once just, 
generous, beneficent, and done from pity.  The education of dispositions to perform 
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just this type of act is what is needed to sustain relationships of uncalculated giving 
and graceful receiving.367 
Aristotle emphasised the importance of the virtues that underpin independence.368 
These remain important, but MacIntyre argues that we also need to develop a 
complementary set of virtues, which he describes as "the virtues of acknowledged 
dependence".369 The central virWXHRIDFNQRZOHGJHGGHSHQGHQFHLVWKDWRI³MXVW-
JHQHURVLW\´DQGLQYROYHVDQLQGLYLGXDODFTXLULQJWKHGLVSRVLWLRQWRUHVSRQG
appropriately to the mutual patterns of obligation which characterise a society in 
which people at different points in their lives will be both care providers and care 
receivers. The development of this virtue enables the possessor to respond to those 
who require help to meet their needs, and to accept support when their own needs 
have to be met.370 Developing such dispositions requires the development of a 
capacity for affection and regard for others as the basis of our actions of just 
generosity.371  We may act from duty, but the primary driver of acts of just-
generosity are our affections, just as what drives a response to someone in pain is 
not a sense of duty but our pity - and more generally our consciousness of and 
response to a shared humanity.372 :HQHHGWKHYLUWXHRI³SLW\´RUmisericordia"373 to 
HQVXUHWKDWWKHUHVSRQVHVZHJLYHDUHSURSRUWLRQDWHWRWKHH[WHQWRIWKHSHUVRQ¶V
need, rather than determined by the extent of our obligation to that individual. The 
grounds for this response are our identification and empathy with the person in 
need.374 
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The reunification of the concepts of telos, practice and virtue with an account of a 
biologically shaped human nature enables Macintyre to reaffirm some of the 
principles defined by his early commitment to socialism. He argues that the type of 
society which can embody the virtues of acknowledged dependence has to embody 
two principles enunciated by Karl Marx.  
%HWZHHQLQGHSHQGHQWSUDFWLFDOUHDVRQHUVWKHQRUPVZLOOKDYHWRVDWLVI\0DU[¶V
formula for justice in a socialist society, according to which what each receives is 
proportionate to what each contributes.  Between those capable of giving and those 
who are most dependent and in most need of receiving - children, the old, the 
disabled -- the norms will have to satisfy a revised version of Marx's formula for 
MXVWLFHLQD&RPPXQLVWVRFLHW\µIURPHDFKDFFRUGLQJWRKHURUKLVDELOLW\WRHDFKVR
fDUDVLVSRVVLEOHDFFRUGLQJWRKHURUKLVQHHGV¶375 
In such a society even the most disabled are contributors to the common good, by 
illustrating what it is for someone to be wholly dependent on others, a state in which 
we began our lives, and a state to which we may return if illness or severe disability 
affect us.   
The justification of moral judgements 
How would the type of community which MacIntyre envisages justify ethical 
judgements? MacIntyre argues that in becoming independent practical reasoners 
we have to overcome a number of obstacles to self-understanding: for example our 
limited knowledge and capacity for self-delusion -- and the key to overcoming these 
obstacles is openness to being questioned by others.376  In responding to such 
questioning we try to make ourselves intelligible to others by disclosing just enough 
of our personal history to provide a context which makes action understandable, 
and which explains how we could have come to the type of judgements that 
underpin that action. In doing this we also make ourselves intelligible to ourselves.  
Indeed, as MacIntyre points out, the questioning to which we respond is often "how 
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on earth could you do that?"  He argues that the only adequate answer will be an 
account of the good at which we aimed, or an account of our mistaken judgements 
with respect to that good.377 In such dialogue, MacIntyre argues that we have to 
become accountable to others, to treat ourselves as duty bound when challenged to 
truthfully answer the question as to nature of the good we were pursuing in our 
actions.378 Thus within a flourishing community there will be reasons that are 
accepted as being sufficient and final justifications for the actions taken by an 
individual. Such justifications are not arbitrary; they are endorsed by the standards 
of justification that have emerged within that community. But are the standards of 
MXVWLILFDWLRQWKDWHPHUJHZLWKLQDFRPPXQLW\DQ\PRUHWKDQDVHWRI³VKDUHG
SUHMXGLFHV´E\ZKLFKWKDWFRPPXQLW\P\IHOORZFLWL]HQVDQGP\VHOIDUHJRYHUQHG" 
MacIntyre argues that by participating in such a community we are not only 
committed to the pursuit of the goods that are endorsed by the community but we 
are also accepting a set of commitments to other members of that community as a 
consequence of our mutual dependency. This commitment appears to render 
impractical my consistent adoption of an ironic and distanced critique of the bases 
of obligation in the community, while I remain a member of that community: 
«ERWKWKHPRUDODQGSROLWLFDOUHODWLRQVKLSVWKDWDUHUHTXLUHGIRUWKHDFKLHYHPHQWRI
the common good involve commitments that are in some respects unconditional not 
only to a certain range of goods, but also to those particular others together with 
whom we attempt to achieve that common good.  Those commitments seem to 
preclude us from putting seriously in question that practical understanding of goods, 
virtues, rules, and relationships which is presupposed by our commitments and which 
we share with many of those same others.  For to assume the standpoint of the 
serious questioner seems to involve standing aside from, separating ourselves from, 
prior commitments.379  
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It is easy to misunderstand MacIntyre at this point. These commitments do not 
require unquestioning commitment to every expectation of the community. One may 
critically respond to some aspecWRIWKHFRPPXQLW\¶VHWKLFVDQGSULRULWLHV,QGHHG
as we shall see in the discussion of WJWR, MacIntyre argues that critical debate 
and challenge is the driver of all development within a tradition. But the standards of 
argument and justification I employ in engaging in such argument are those that I 
have learned as a member of the community. If I bring into question the legitimacy 
of the fundamental commitments that constitute the identity of that community, I am 
both employing and undermining these standards, and in doing this I have denuded 
myself of the resources required for coherent moral dialogue. A corollary of this 
observation is that critical rational enquiry cannot be undertaken alone; it is 
essentially a communal and collaborative activity: 
Rational enquiry about my practical beliefs, relationships and commitments is ... not 
something that I undertake by attempting to separate myself from the whole set of my 
beliefs, relationships, and commitments and to view them from some external 
standpoint.  It is something that we undertake from within our shared mode of 
practice.380 
The process of such rational enquiry involves looking collaboratively at the 
strongest objections to this or that belief or concept. Such enquiries may lead us to 
revise our specific judgements and the standards which underpin these judgments, 
but MacIntyre argues that it would be a mistake to infer that anything can be 
reasonably and justly put in question. In particular, I cannot participate in a shared 
process of enquiry if at the same time I challenge and reject the ties of mutual 
obligation that forge my participation in the community.   Participation in a 
community requires a response to the dependency of others and recognition of my 
own dependency, which together lead to an understanding of an overall good which 
is not confined to the satisfaction of my immediate desires. The achievement of 
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such a good also requires the acquisition of the virtues required to subordinate my 
personal desires to communal values. This process of moral development 
underpins the legitimacy of practical reasoning: 
...  there can be a chain of sound justificatory reasoning that runs from the nature of 
the human good to the need for the virtues and from what the virtues require to 
answers to the particular question of what action should be performed... And the 
soundness or otherwise of that chain of reasoning is what makes it practically rational 
or irrational to act in this way or that.381   
If I do not possess these virtues, I will not appreciate the force of the pattern of 
practical reasoning used to justify particular forms of action. The ironic stance of 
someone such as Nietzsche indicates a failure of moral learning and a failure to 
acquire the virtues that are required for the effective evaluation of moral argument. 
While moral action may be justified by practical reasoning, the grounds for our 
actions are not normally patterns of inference. What we respond to as a reason for 
action depends in large part on the virtues that we have acquired and our response 
to need does not normally require arguments and formal justification.  If I have 
failed to acquire the virtue of just-generosity I will not be moved to respond to the 
plight of a person who is in dire need. The person who asks for rational justification 
of the claim that she should help a person in extremis exhibits not only their failure 
to learn the nature of the commitments required by membership of a mutually 
dependent community, but also their failure to acquire the virtues that make the 
response to need an immediate response rather than the outcome of a process of 
justificatory argument.382  
0DF,QW\UH¶VDFKLHYHPHQWLQ'5$ 
In AV there is no biologically determined human nature which defines what counts 
as the ultimate good for a human being. In that book the quest for a telos becomes 
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in itself the telos of human existence. The argument of DRA changes the 
parameters of MacInt\UH¶VSRVLWLRQE\PDNLQJDQHWKLFVRIWKHYLUWXHVQHFHVVDULO\
associated with our dependency, and defines our telos in terms of flourishing as a 
member of an animal species. However, such flourishing is not defined in terms of 
any particular state of being, but rather in terms of a capacity for appropriate moral 
judgement, and an appropriately nuanced response to our needs and to the needs 
RIRWKHUV7KLVPDNHVWKHSRVVHVVLRQRIWKHYLUWXHRI³MXVW-JHQHURVLW\´DQHVVHQWLDO
element of our moral life if our needs and the needs of others are to be consistently 
met. The particular ways in which that virtue and other virtues are expressed will, 
however, be shaped by the nature of the community and culture in which the 
individual is embedded. Expressing the virtue of just-generosity will take a different 
form in the community formed by a religious order than it would within the day to 
day life of an extended family or a fishing community. There will however be family 
resemblances (in the Wittgensteinian sense) which make all these different actions 
expressions of that virtue.  The virtue of an excellent practical reasoner is the 
capacity to make appropriate judgements as to what particular action is an 
expression of virtue in each particular social context. 
The claiPWKDW0DF,QW\UH¶V$ULVWRWHOLDQLVPLPSOLFLWO\HQGRUVHVPRUDOUHODWLYLVPZDV
premised on the view that variability in practices and cultural expectations would 
result in different and incompatible virtues being endorsed by different communities. 
DRA formulates a version of Aristotelianism which avoids this criticism by making 
the virtues of just-generosity and effective practical reasoning central to the 
achievement of human flourishing. This does not mean that communities will come 
to precisely the same judgement as to what actions are required to promote 
flourishing: this will depend on the distinctive context of the practices and 
institutions that exist in that specific community. However, the judgements made by 
an effective practical reasoner have to remain anchored and explicable in terms of a 
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coherent response to human dependency, rationality and animality, and the limits of 
the ability to construct a coherent justification of action in these terms set 
boundaries around what can be considered to be an ethical action. 
As a result of these arguments, MacIntyre has defined significant limits to what 
might count as a coherent ethical position within an Aristotelian perspective.  Any 
community that is capable of ensuring human survival and development would need 
to exhibit uncalculating care-giving to (at least some classes of) vulnerable people 
and would tend to approve of and foster the disposition towards just-generosity 
towards such individuals. Certain types of justification for action will become 
culturally accepted as a consequence of the endorsement of this characteristic, and 
one would anticipate that those who have acquired the virtue of practical reasoning 
in such communities would respond to need without requiring some deductive chain 
of practical reasoning. Those who participated in the community would benefit from 
the patterns of mutual care that had emerged and might be accused of 
inconsistency if they sought to question the legitimacy of these obligations at the 
same time as they received such benefits. But how far does this take us? 
It would certainly be the case that there would be similarities between different 
cultures in terms of what actions are approved as good and those which are 
considered wrong. But one can also imagine societies (such as Nazi Germany) 
where classes of individual are excluded from the status of citizens and can not only 
be denied care but can be killed by the state. Patterns of mutual obligation and 
uncalculating care may exist among those whom such a society considers to be 
persons, but these features may be coupled with a morally repugnant denial of 
humanity and human rights to other groups of people by the dominant classes. It is 
beyond the scope of this thesis to do more than suggest the direction in which one 
could construct an argument to show that such societies are morally corrupt from a 
0DF,QW\UHDQSHUVSHFWLYH,ZRXOGVXJJHVWKRZHYHUWKDWRQHFRXOGXVH0DF,QW\UH¶V
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conceptualisation in DRA of human nature in terms of dependency and animality to 
show that such communities are illegitimately narrowing the concept of a person. 
This would serve to show that from a MacIntyrean perspective such societies do not 
have to be held to be justified by their own moral framework (as would be the case 
if moral relativism proved unavoidable) but, that they can be legitimately 
condemned as corrupt.  
The argument here is an argument about the definition of what counts as a human 
DQLPDODQG0DF,QW\UH¶VJHQHUDODUJXPHQWLVZULWWHQIURPDGHFODUHG$ULVWRWHOLDQ
perspective. Within this framework it provides a coherent and persuasive account of 
the place that just-JHQHURVLW\PXVWSOD\LQFRPPXQDOOLIH,I0DF,QW\UH¶VYHUVLRQRI
Aristotelianism in DRA is correct, then it also provides a much more coherent and 
effective account of the nature of the telos and virtues than that provided by his 
position in AV, and, I have suggested, it provides a coherent basis for a repudiation 
of the criticism that his position endorses moral relativism. However, the facts of 
human need and dependency to which MacIntyre appeals in constructing his 
argument might also be accommodated in terms of alternative ethical frameworks - 
such as consequentialism, for example.  
DRA argues from Aristotelian premises about human nature and telos to 
Aristotelian conclusions,383 and by anchoring those assumptions in human biology it 
HQKDQFHVWKHRYHUDOOORJLFDOFRKHUHQFHRI0DF,QW\UH¶VSRVLWLRQ1HYHUWKHOHVVKLV
approach may appear to be question begging, because it takes for granted the 
superiority of Aristotelianism to other philosophical positions, a point that MacIntyre 
acknowledges. He argues that this aspect of his work is inevitable: because in 
philosophy  
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There is no presuppositionless point of departure. What vindicates this or that starting 
point is what comes next, the enquiry thus generated and its outcome in the 
achievement of some particular kind of understanding of some subject matter.384  
'5$KDVVKRZQWKDW0DF,QW\UH¶VHWKLFVFDQEHGHYHORSHGWRHQDEOHLWWRUHVLVWWKH
accusation that it endorses moral relativism, but can the initial adoption of the 
SUHVXSSRVLWLRQVRIVXFKDQ$ULVWRWHOLDQSRVLWLRQEHMXVWLILHG"'RHV0DF,QW\UH¶VFODLP
WKDWWKHRXWFRPHVRIHQTXLU\³ZKDWFRPHVQH[W´FDQDFWWRYLQGLFDWHWKH
presuppositions that underpin a tradition provide the basis for an effective rebuttal 
of epistemological relativism? This is the question that MacIntyre explored in 
WJWR. 
2.5 Tradition, Rationality and Relativism 
The need for an account of superiority 
0DF,QW\UH¶VDUJXPHQWVVXJJHVWWKDWDWHOHRORJLFDOXQGHUVWDQGLQJRf human 
behaviour is central to the coherence of our inherited conceptual scheme, and his 
Aristotelian ethics are strengthened by his development of a biologically based 
account of human nature and human telos in DRA. However, his arguments do not 
show that it would be impossible in principle to formulate alternative conceptual 
schemes that could provide a coherent non-teleological account of human nature, 
perhaps drawing entirely on causal and materialist concepts. And even if teleology 
is ineliminable froPRXUODQJXDJH0DF,QW\UH¶VDUJXPHQWVGRQRWGHPRQVWUDWHWKDW
human beings must share the same goals or that they share some single over±
arching end to which other ends are subordinate. Nor does his argument rule out 
the possibility that alternative ethical traditions could address the issues raised by 
our animal dependency as effectively as Aristotelianism.  Utilitarian principles, for 
example, would have some plausibility as a basis for arguing that the recognition of 
mutual dependence and the need for action in accordance with the principle of just-
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generosity are essential components of any society which might effectively promote 
the greatest happiness of the greatest number.  
The absence of arguments intended to prove the truth of Aristotelianism is not a 
IDLOXUHRUDQRPLVVLRQRQ0DF,QW\UH¶VSDUW,WUHIOHFWVKLVDVVHVVPHQWRIRXU
intellectual condition. There is no consensus on ethical beliefs and their associated 
accounts of human nature within our culture. We live in a world in which there are 
multiple, conflicting epistemological and ethical traditions and anti-traditions,385 and, 
LQGHHGLWLVRXUFXOWXUH¶VLQDELOLW\WRUHVROYHWKHFRQIOLFWVEHWZHHQWKHVHGLIIHUHQW
traditions that undermines the Enlightenment belief in unitary and universally 
acceptable standards of rationality. The history of Enlightenment and post-
Enlightenment thought is marked by the construction of multiple accounts of the 
nature of reason, none of which have been able to command consensus.386 
Nonetheless, the argument of AV is not only that a quasi-Aristotelian account of 
ethics is implicit in our language and conceptual frameworks, but also that it can be 
defended as superior to the alternatives. Indeed, without an account of how one 
tradition might demonstrate its superiority to otKHUV0DF,QW\UH¶VSRVLWLRQLQ$9
would become simply an expression of his personal preference for an Aristotelian 
ethic. This would be to adopt his ethical perspective on non-rational grounds, and 
this choice would exemplify the type of liberal individualist approach to ethical 
commitment that MacIntyre repudiates. His overall position therefore requires the 
construction of a general account of how it is possible for one tradition to 
demonstrate its superiority to another, so that he can repudiate the claim that his 
philosophy is simply an example of contemporary liberalism in action, and that in 
practice his position endorses both ethical and epistemological relativism. MacIntyre 
noted the importance of this challenge In the Postscript to the second edition of 
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AV.387  His arguments in WJWR are intended to show that it is possible for one 
tradition to demonstrate its rational superiority to other traditions without recourse to 
the claim that there are universal principles of justification which can be used by an 
individual to evaluate the legitimacy of different traditions, in advance of making a 
commitment to one tradition or another. 
The Rationality of Traditions 
In WJWR MacIntyre argues that the demand for the identification of universal 
standards of rational justification is self-defeating, because it is only by committing 
oneself to a particular tradition that it is possible to come to any reasoned view as to 
the merits of one tradition over another: 
... it is an illusion to suppose that there is some neutral standing ground, some locus 
for rationality as such, which can afford rational resources sufficient for enquiry 
independent of all traditions.  Those who have maintained otherwise either have 
covertly been adopting the standpoint of a tradition... or else have simply been in 
error.  The person outside all traditions lacks sufficient rational resources for enquiry 
and a fortiori for enquiry into what tradition is to be rationally preferred.  He or she has 
no adequate relevant means of rational evaluation and hence can come to no well-
grounded conclusion, including the conclusion that no tradition can vindicate itself 
against any other...388 
The person who tries to construct some tradition-independent claim to justified 
belief has to rely on some set of universally demonstrable propositions in order to 
construct their position. Logical principles such as the law of non-contradiction meet 
this requirement, but the concepts embodied in such principles are not rich enough 
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to provide the basis for substantive theories in either ontology or ethics. First 
principles that are substantive enough to initiate fruitful enquiry always have to 
include additional premises which include beliefs about the nature of the world and 
about the nature of humanity whose truth cannot be known prior to the 
commencement of that enquiry.389 The justification of such a process of enquiry 
cannot, therefore, lie in the pre-existing justification of its elementary beliefs, but 
rather in the dialectical elaboration of its assumptions, principles of investigation 
and substantive claims over time, and the demonstration of their consistency with 
unfolding experience. In this process, questions will arise as to whether conflicting 
formulations of its position are correct or incorrect, more or less justified. The 
standards which guide such judgements are created within the process of debate 
that characterises the development of the tradition. It is these standards of 
justification and accepted modes of argument that constitute the emergent 
rationality of a tradition. The Enlightenment project has, therefore, obscured from 
view the role that has to be played by the concept of a tradition in underpinning a 
proper understanding of rationality:390 
What the Enlightenment made us for the most part blind to ... is ... a conception of 
rational enquiry as embodied in a tradition, a conception according to which the 
standards of rational justification themselves emerge from and are part of a history in 
which they are vindicated by the way in which they transcend the limitations of and 
provide remedies for the defects of their predecessors.391 
The question of whether a substantive ethical, epistemological or faith position is 
justified therefore depends on the application of standards of justification which are 
formulated within the tradition itself, a claim that MacIntyre had first adumbrated in 
LS.392  But if a tradition need only justify its position in accordance with its own 
internally constructed standards, has it not rendered itself immune to falsification, 
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and therefore become vacuous as a claim to truth, a criticism that  MacIntyre had 
directed at his own account of the justification of Christianity when he published the 
second edition of LS in 1970?393  If his mature position is to defend itself against the 
claim that it is as vacuous as his original defence of Christianity, MacIntyre needs to 
show that a tradition may become demonstrably false, even though it establishes its 
own standards of truth and justification. MacIntyre argues this point through his 
account of the development of a tradition. 
The evolution of a tradition 
Tradition based enquiry is rooted in the unreflective acceptance of beliefs by a 
particular community at some specific point in time:   
Every such form of enquiry begins in and from some condition of purely historical 
contingency, from the beliefs, institutions, and practices of some particular community 
which constitute a given.394 
Initially these beliefs may be unquestioned, but this situation cannot continue 
indefinitely, because every society changes and develops, and in this process 
received beliefs will come under challenge. Founding texts may be shown to be 
susceptible to multiple interpretations; inconsistencies in the system of beliefs may 
become apparent; external events may engender new questions and may expose a 
lack of resources within the tradition to answer these questions. The community 
may also come into contact with some previously unknown tradition through 
migration or invasion and this may result in challenges to established belief and 
expose the community to new concepts.395 How communities respond to these 
challenges: 
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...will depend not only on what stock of reasons and questioning and reasoning 
abilities they already possess but also upon their inventiveness. And these in turn will 
determine the possible range of outcomes in the rejection, the emendation, and 
reformulation of beliefs, the revaluation of authorities, the reinterpretation of texts, the 
emergence of new forms of authority, and the production of new texts.396 
7KHFRPPXQLW\¶VUHFRJQLWLRQRILQWHUQDOLQFRQVLVWHQFLHVRULWVH[SRVXUHWRH[WHUQDO
challenges will result in a nascent tradition reaching a second, self-conscious, stage 
in which inadequacies in the formulation of its central beliefs and principles will have 
been identified, but not yet remedied. This awareness of defects will initiate a third 
stage in the development of a living tradition, in which the identification of 
inadequacies in its position leads to the reformulation of certain beliefs. When this 
third stage has been completed members of the tradition will be in a position to 
contrast their new formulations of belief with the old formulations, which will now be 
perceived as inadequate and therefore false. This represents a gain in knowledge, 
through a dialectical process in which specific aspects of the beliefs embodied in a 
tradition are brought into question by particular challenges or events. The 
awareness of this gain and the recognition of new challenges will generate 
continuing processes of enquiry and development. This process of enquiry will 
produce new formulations of beliefs which are superior to their predecessors in the 
specific and limited sense that these revised formulations are no longer vulnerable 
to the same criticisms. These formulations therefore do not represent some set of 
propositions that have been demonstrated to be unchallengeable, although some 
assertions may claim to express such eternal truths (and in principle may ultimately 
be found to deserve such a status). Any statement of belief is worthy of 
endorsement in so far as its formulation has successfully resisted the specific 
challenges that have been identified so far, but no such formulation can guarantee 
that it will not have to be modified or abandoned in the light of some new and 
unanticipated challenge:  
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... from the standpoint of tradition-constituted and tradition-constitutive enquiry, what a 
particular doctrine claims is always a matter of how precisely it was in fact advanced, 
of the linguistic particularities of its formulation, of what in that time and place had to 
be denied if it was to be asserted, of what was at that time and place presupposed by 
its assertion, and so on. Nor does it follow that claims to timeless truths are not being 
made.  It is rather that such claims are being made for doctrines whose formulation is 
itself time-bound and that the concept of timelessness is itself a concept with a 
history, one which in certain types of context is not at all the same concept that it is in 
others.397   
Justification involves dealing with the immediate threats to specific formulations of 
belief. Some formulations of belief will be peripheral to the central concerns of the 
tradition but others will be part of a set of interrelated beliefs that are held to be the 
core elements of the tradition. In Aristotelianism, for example, the belief that there is 
a good towards which human live should be directed, and that the acquisition of the 
virtues is a precondition of the achievement of such a good, are examples of such 
core elements. The clarification, elaboration and justification of these central 
presuppositions of the tradition will become a central topic of enquiry for a tradition 
that has become self-conscious in the face of challenge. These presuppositions will 
need to be formulated in a way which enables them to repudiate such challenges if 
they are to be considered  justified, but the form that such justification will take is 
not independent of the success of the tradition as a whole in making progress in its 
DUHDVRIHQTXLU\:KDWMXVWLILHVWKH³ILUVWSULQFLSOHV´RIWKHWKHRU\LVWKHZKROH
structure of the theory of which they are a part, and in particular  
...the rational superiority of that particular structure to all previous attempts within that 
particular tradition to formulate such theories and principles; it is not a matter of those 
first principles being acceptable to all rational persons whatsoever.398 
This implies that a community that is developing a tradition of enquiry will be 
engaged in a process of theory construction which meets two requirements. The 
first is that the theory should consist of a set of statements which are coherent in 
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the sense of forming an internally consistent system. The second requirement is 
that the system as a whole must be defensible against internal and external 
challenge: 
It is the success or failure of the theory as a whole in meeting objections posed either 
from its own or rival points of view which vindicates or fails to vindicate.399 
This does not mean that the theory will be invulnerable to every challenge: only that 
it is robust enough to repel the challenges that have been identified so far - or, 
where challenges remain unresolved, that no more coherent alternative is available.  
What counts as knowledge is that position which to date has withstood all attempts 
to repudiate it, as assessed in accordance with the standards of adequacy that 
have emerged in the development of the tradition. 
&DQDWUDGLWLRQ¶VFODLPWRNQRZOHGJHEHFKDOOHQJHG" 
Such an account of the progress of rational belief invites the criticism that it 
identifies truth with what is merely held to be knowledge by some specific social 
group. The evolution of tradition-specific standards of rational justification enables a 
community to construct ever more developed statements of its position in response 
to specific objections, but this process does not enable the community to 
demonstrate that they have established truths that transcend the limits of their 
WUDGLWLRQ0DF,QW\UHHPSKDVLVHVWKDW³3URJUHVVLQUDWLRQDOLW\LVDFKLHYHGRQO\IURPD
SRLQWRIYLHZ´ 400  and this formulation suggests that one may only be able to speak 
of truth-from-a-particular-perspective, rather than of an objective truth that is 
independent of all perspectives 
 ,QGLVFXVVLQJ3ODWR¶VPRGHORIHQTXLU\0DF,QW\UHQRWHVWKDWRQHRIWKHNH\LVVXHV
for epistemology is the possibility of maintaining a substantive distinction between 
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what is the case and what appears to be the case to some group or individual.401 
Identifying progress in rationality with progress from a particular viewpoint faces 
MacIntyre with the criticism that he has eroded this Platonic distinction, leaving 
room only for the notion of truth-from-a-particular-viewpoint and has eliminated a 
notion of objective truth that exists independently of the specific perspectives of 
particular traditions. This issue can be described in terms of the distinction between 
warranted assertability and ontological models of truth. On the warranted 
assertability account the legitimate assertion of truth is primarily a matter of the 
internal relationships between the statement asserted and the standards of 
justification appropriate to that type of assertion.402 There is no conception of truth-
in-itself which enables us to transcend the framework of our web of concepts and 
standards and achieve a perspective from which these beliefs can be evaluated:  
For on this view we can have no criterion of truth beyond the best warrants that we 
can offer for our assertions...So the concepts of truth and reality are defined internally 
to our scheme of concepts and beliefs.403 
%XWZKRDUHWKH³ZH´ZKRGHILQHthese concepts of truth and falsity? MacIntyre 
suggests that an underlying assumption of such a warranted assertability model of 
truth is that there is  
one and only one overall community of enquiry, sharing substantially one and the 
same set of concepts and beliefs.  But what if there appears a second community 
whose tradition and procedures of enquiry are structured in terms of different, largely 
incompatible and largely incommensurable concepts and beliefs, defining warranted 
assertability and truth in terms internal to its scheme of concepts and beliefs?.404 
The assumption that our world consists of a single community, inhabiting a single 
conceptual framework is false. We exist in a world in which there are different 
traditions of enquiry each reflecting incompatible presuppositions and possessing 
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distinctive methodologies of rational justification. MacIntyre argues that interaction 
can occur between these different communities at the points where their different 
traditions happen to overlap in terms of theLUEHOLHIVLPDJHVDQGWH[WV´405 Where 
this is the case, members of one tradition would ignore the arguments and 
contentions of another tradition only at the risk of ignoring substantive grounds for 
re-evaluating their own conclusions and beliefs.406  
But if separate traditions each formulate their own distinctive presuppositions and 
standards of rational justification how can such interaction take place? MacIntyre 
identifies two major barriers to achieving effective engagement and interaction 
between different traditions. Firstly, the beliefs expressed in different traditions may 
reflect incommensurable concepts, so that there is no way of constructing an 
account of the position characteristic of one tradition which could be seen as 
conceptually coherent from the perspective of the second tradition. As a result, their 
contentions will be untranslatable and un-interpretable by the other tradition. 
Secondly, there may be sufficient shared semantic resources for assertions to be 
rendered comprehensible in each tradition, but the meaning of these assertions will 
reflects the different presuppositions of each tradition, so that there is no neutral 
way of characterising the points of contention in a way that allows for the possibility 
of conclusive debate. MacIntyre contends that such patterns of inconclusive 
argument are typical of contemporary moral debate.407 
0DF,QW\UH¶VSRVLWLRQRQWUDQVODWDELOLW\DQGLQFRPPHQVXUDELOLW\KDVEHHQDIRFXVRI
considerable debate,408 and I will consider this issue further in the following section. 
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$WWKLVSRLQW,ZDQWWRIRFXVRQ0DF,QW\UH¶VDQDO\VLVRIWKHVHFRQGEDUULHUWKHODFN
of any common means of characterising the matters under dispute. MacIntyre 
summarises this difficulty as follows: 
When two rival large-scale intellectual traditions confront one another, a central 
feature of the problem of deciding between their claims is characteristically that there 
is no neutral way of characterising either the subject matter about which they give 
rival accounts or the standards by which their claims are to be evaluated.  Each 
standpoint has its own account of truth and knowledge, its own mode of 
characterising the relevant subject matter.  And the attempt to discover a neutral, 
independent set of standards or mode of characterising data which is both such as 
must be acceptable to all rational persons and is sufficient to determine the truth on 
the matters about which the two traditions are at variance has generally, and perhaps 
universally, proved to be a search for a chimera.  How then can genuine controversy 
proceed?409  
MacIntyre answers his question by identifying two stages to the progress of a 
controversy between traditions. In the first stage, each tradition may set out the 
contentions of the alternative tradition in its own terms, and sets out the reasons 
why it considers these contentions to be inadequate, perhaps conceding the value 
of the alternative position on some marginal issues.  A second stage may be 
reached if the first tradition realises that it cannot make some progress on its core 
problems in accordance with its own standards of achievement, and looks to the 
second tradition to provide some resources to assist it in resolving these issues.410 If 
the tradition is able to make use of the resources potentially made available by the 
alternative tradition, it will be necessary to move beyond the concept of truth that 
has evolved within that tradition and to give some consideration to the alternative 
standards of truth and justification that characterise the opposing tradition.  
But both the first and the second tradition will be able to claim warranted 
assertability for their own set of beliefs in accordance with their own standards, and 
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this creates a dilemma. Either each tradition allows that the other tradition meets 
the requirement of warranted assertability within its own frame of reference, thereby 
conceding that there is no absolute claim to truth that "can be attached to the 
IXQGDPHQWDOMXGJHPHQWVXQGHUSLQQLQJWKHLUPRGHRIHQTXLU\´RUWKH\PXVWPDNHD
claim of truth of a kind which appeals beyond their own particular scheme of 
concepts and beliefs, to something external to that scheme."411  To adopt the 
second option is to recognise that each tradition asserts that something is true of a 
reality that is tradition-transcendent, and thereby makes a claim for ontological truth.  
But if the assertions of each tradition genuinely conflict with each other, both sets of 
assertions cannot be true. And this observation indicates that both traditions are 
open to challenge in two ways. Firstly, the beliefs of tradition T1 may contradict the 
substantive beliefs of the second tradition, T2, and challenge that community to re-
evaluate these beliefs. The consequence of this re-evaluation may be that the 
community that embraces tradition T2 either constructs additional justifications of its 
own position which deal to its own satisfaction with the challenge of T1, or it may 
decide that such a defence is not possible and come to modify or reject some of its 
original beliefs. Secondly, if the beliefs that are rendered doubtful in this process 
have previously been justified by the standards that have emerged in the tradition, 
the adequacy of these standards themselves will also be brought into question. 
Thus, the idea that traditions can be self-insulating, self-sustaining systems of 
thought founders on the fact that traditions do not exist in isolation, but are part of 
an intellectual ecology in which they may interact with rival systems of thought. In 
this process they may be forced to recognise that what they hold to be true is 
unsubstantiated and that their methods of rational justification are inadequate. And 
in this process the most fundamental presuppositions and founding principles of the 
tradition may be brought into question, as it falls into an epistemological crisis. 
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Epistemological crisis 
MacIntyre introduced the notion of epistemological crisis (EC) in a paper first 
published in 1977.412   According to MacIntyre, an EC arises when the conceptual 
scheme through which we interpret our experience of the world no longer appears 
adequate to the evidence before us. As a result, we can no longer believe that our 
presuppositions, beliefs and expectations lead us to interpret reality correctly. Such 
crises may arise both for an individual and also for particular cultures or traditions, 
and, indeed, the crisis experienced by an individual may be an expression of a 
broader crisis within a tradition of enquiry.413 An EC may, therefore, involve an 
irresolvable philosophical problem, but it may also arise in everyday experience, 
when someone is suddenly faced with the collapse of her assumptions about 
herself or her relationships.  
The events that might precipitate such an individual EC are many and varied. A 
person who regards themselves as a valued member of a company is suddenly 
fired; another person is betrayed by a longstanding lover who they have trusted 
implicitly on the basis of what they believed to be excellent reasons; a third person 
might be accused of a crime and is then abandoned by those friends she believed 
would support her. What is brought into question by these examples is not only 
ZKDWRQHKDGFRPHWREHOLHYHEXWDOVRWKHLQGLYLGXDO¶VFRQILGHQFHLQWKHSURFHVVHV
through which they had come to accept that their belief was justified. MacIntyre 
refers to these patterns of interpretation and evaluation of evidence as 
³VFKHPDWD´414  
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For the person faced with an EC the collapse of their confidence in the way in which 
they interpret their experience and make judgements about what is the case means 
that the predicted relationship between evidence and belief no longer holds. The 
challenge to the legitimacy of the conceptual scheme through which the individual 
had previously interpreted her experience may force that person to reassess and 
reconstruct her preconceptions. In this process she may be faced with competing 
ways of interpreting what is happening around her, with no clear basis on which she 
can choose which is correct.415 As a result, the familiar distinction between the world 
as it seems to us; and the world as it actually is will become a central concern of the 
individual faced by an EC.416   
0DF,QW\UH¶VLQLWLDOH[DPSOHVDQGP\DGGLWLRQVWRWKHVHH[DPSOHVFHQWUHRQRXU
interpretation of the intentions, emotions and beliefs of other people ± in 
philosophical terms, our knowledge of other minds. MacIntyre argues that the basis 
for our interpretation of other minds is our capacity to construct a narrative which 
links that interpretation to preceding events and which enables us to predict future 
events and actions. The collapse of this narrative explanatory framework 
precipitates the EC, and the resolution of this sort of personal EC involves  
«WKHFRQVWUXFWLRQRIDQHZQDUUDWLYHZKLFKHQDEOHVWKHDJHQWWRXQGHUVWDQGERWK
how he or she could intelligibly have held his or her original beliefs, and how he or 
she could have been so dramatically misled by them.417 
MacIntyre argues that the narratives through which we begin our attempts to order 
our experience are the stories we learn in childhood. These provide us with a 
template for the process of understanding the relationships between people. Such 
stories may be fairy stories or myths, but as we grow and learn these stories will be 
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UHSODFHGE\PRUHVRSKLVWLFDWHGDFFRXQWVRIWKHLQGLYLGXDO¶VSODFHLQWKHZRUOG 418 
The ways in which we render our experience intelligible therefore share similar 
origins to those of traditions of enquiry, which also, we recall, begin in myth. And in 
the same way that children acquire more adequate explanatory narratives through 
education, traditions make progress towards a more robust understanding of their 
subject matter through the discovery of deficits in their previous accounts, and the 
construction of more adequate and sophisticated explanatory narratives which also 
account for the inadequacies and failings of the previous narratives.  
An individual faced with an EC has to construct new schemata which both explain 
the new facts in a satisfactory way and explain how the previous schemata the 
person had developed had led to a false interpretation. The individual faced with an 
EC must question their epistemic competence and if necessary reconstruct the 
standards that underpin her judgements. This challenge also arises when a tradition 
is faced by an EC. Failure to make progress may make the tradition aware that it 
lacks the resources required to address its core concerns. At this stage it may 
require conceptual innovation to establish new methods of enquiry and new 
standards by which the tradition can make judgements about what is and is not the 
case.419 Such innovation must rewrite the history of the tradition from a new 
perspective which shows the reasons for its earlier vicissitudes and for its failure to 
resolve internal debates.  
Tradition, Change and Identity 
However, rewriting the history of the tradition is not the same as abandoning that 
tradition. There has to be continuity between the identity of the tradition as it was 
prior to the crisis and the identity of the newly reconstituted tradition as it has 
become after the crisis. I may be utterly changed following a personal EC, but I can 
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only know that I am utterly changed because I recognise that I am also the same 
person as I was before. There is a similar issue of change and identity that arises in 
relation to the transformation of a tradition. A community engaged in a scientific 
enquiry (for example) may come to recognise that the theories and methodology 
that it has constructed are entirely inadequate to resolve the problems that have 
emerged in the process of enquiry. What is required is the construction of an 
alternative theory which resolves these problems in a particular way. 
«>$@VXFFHVVIXOWKHRU\«HQDEOHVXVWRXQGHUVWDQGLWVSUHGHFHVVRUVLQDQHZO\
LQWHOOLJLEOHZD\,W«HQDEOHVXVWRXQGHUVWDQGSUHFLVHO\ZK\LWVSUHGHFHVVRUVKDYHWR
be rejected or modified and also why, without and before its illumination, past theory 
could have remained credible. It introduces new standards for evaluating the past.  It 
recasts the narrative which constitutes the continuous reconstruction of the scientific 
tradition.420 
This recasting of the narrative allows the tradition to manage the tension between 
continuity and change. MacIntyre criticises Thomas Kuhn for failing to acknowledge 
the degree to which continuity is sustained through the process of paradigm 
change, and, therefore, for failing to give an accurate account of the nature of 
scientific revolutions. Kuhn claimed that  
The transition from a paradigm in crisis to a new one from which a new tradition can 
HPHUJHLVIDUIURPDFXPXODWLYHSURFHVV«5DWKHULWLVDUHFRQVWUXFWLRQRIWKHILHOG
from new fundamentals, a reconstruction that FKDQJHVVRPHRIWKHILHOG¶VPRVW
elementary generalisations as well as many of the paradigm methods.421 
0DF,QW\UHDUJXHVWKDW.XKQ¶VDFFRXQWRISDUDGLJPFKDQJHIDLOVWRJLYHDQDFFRXQW
of the nature of rationality that underpins the move from the first perspective to the 
second. That rationality is embodied in the construction of a historical narrative 
which enables the participants to understand the problems associated with the 
preceding paradigm in a new way and which therefore renders intelligible the 
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change of perspective associated with the new model of explanation.422 The 
continuity of the tradition in the process of such change is not guaranteed, but if it 
survives the EC that continuity is embodied in the continuation of the guiding aim of 
the enquiry and a capacity to understand its history as constituting a significant 
whole:  
What is carried over from one paradigm to another are epistemological ideals and a 
correlative understanding of what constitutes the progress of a single intellectual 
OLIH«.XKQand Feyerabend recount the history of epistemological crises  as 
moments of almost total discontinuity without noticing the historical continuity that 
makes their own intelligible narratives possible.423 
In WJWR MacIntyre formalises these points into a statement of three conditions 
that must be met if the response to an EC is to be effective. Firstly, the solution 
must resolve the problems which have proved previously irresolvable in the tradition 
³LQDV\VWHPDWLFDQGFRKHUHQWZD\´424. Secondly it must explain what it was that 
previously rendered the tradition incapable of solving these problems; and thirdly, 
the first two tasks must be carried out in a way which demonstrates continuity with 
the previous elements of the tradition. The theory that is constructed in order to 
resolve the crisis will require some form of conceptual change and elaboration, as 
otherwise it would not escape from the limitations which the tradition previously 
faced.  "Imaginative conceptual innovation will have had to occur."425 MacIntyre 
continues: 
To have passed through an epistemological crisis successfully enables the adherents 
of a tradition of enquiry to rewrite its history in a more insightful way.  And such a 
history of a particular tradition provides not only a way of identifying continuities in 
virtue of which that tradition of enquiry has survived and flourished as one and the 
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same tradition, but also of identifying more accurately that structure of justification 
which underpins whatever claims to truth are made within it.426 
Response to Relativism and Perspectivism 
When an individual (or a tradition) makes an effective response to an EC she (or it) 
will also become more conscious of the limitations of the human capacity for 
knowledge. The individual will be sensitised to the fact that the criteria they use to 
distinguish truth from falsity may prove unreliable.427 While new criteria will have 
been formulated which address the deficits of the previous schemata, the individual 
will become conscious that these revised schemata may also prove inadequate in 
future: 
The agent has come to understand how the criteria of truth and understanding must 
be re-formulated. He has had to become epistemologically self-conscious and ... he 
may have come to acknowledge two conclusions: the first is that his new forms of 
understanding may themselves in turn come to be put in question at any time; the 
second is that, because in such crises the criteria of truth, intelligibility and rationality 
may always themselves be put in question ... we are never in a position to claim that 
we now possess the truth or know we are fully rational.428 
Further challenges may arise and it is always possible that we will be unable to 
maintain the coherence of our revised schemata in the future. Such observations 
may give rise to extreme scepticism with respect to the possibility of knowledge. 
One response to such sceptical challenge is to commence the search for 
unassailable criteria of truth that had characterised Cartesian epistemology. But the 
failure of such projects may lead to the type of epistemological crisis which affected 
MacIntyre in the 1960s, and which undermined his ability to adopt any substantive 
SKLORVRSKLFDOSHUVSHFWLYHDWWKDWWLPH$QRWKHUUHVSRQVHWRWKHVFHSWLF¶VFKDOOHQJH
is to adopt the type of fideism MacIntyre appeared to advocate in LS. But the 
mature MacIntyre repudiates such fideism because it excludes the epistemological 
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openness that is necessary for genuine enquiry ± for, he suggests, only a 
³GHJHQHUDWHWUDGLWLRQ´ZLOOFRQVWUXFWWKHW\SHRIHSLVWHPRORgical defences that will 
prevent it from ever being brought into question.429  
For MacIntyre, an awareness of the possibility of falsification and of the limitations 
of human intellectual capacity is a pre-requisite for any legitimate (albeit provisional) 
claim to knowledge. Such openness to challenge is a sign of a sophisticated 
rationality which acknowledges the historical limitations of any claim to justification, 
but does not allow such an awareness to inhibit the pursuit of truth.  Such openness 
demands that the individual and tradition expose their beliefs and theories to the 
tests of experience and internal debate, and listen to the voices of rival traditions.  
The degenerate tradition can preserve its presuppositions and safeguard its 
conceptual scheme by evading such challenges, but in doing so it denies to itself a 
distinction between seems and is, and simply assimilates truth to warranted 
assertability. The epistemological openness of a living tradition rests on recognition 
of the limitations of human knowledge. Such recognition does not exclude the 
adoption of the goal of achieving a comprehensive understanding of all aspects of 
the world as a telos of enquiry, but it also acknowledges that this telos will never be 
fully realisable. 
The implications of these points enable MacIntyre to deal with the relativist 
challenge, to his own satisfaction at least.430 The standards of rationality that 
emerge within a particular tradition cannot deliver an understanding of a final and 
absolute truth, but progress can be made in human knowledge because we can 
discover that some beliefs are demonstrably false, while others are (provisionally) 
defensible as true. In the process of dealing with challenges to these beliefs, we 
can construct a series of statements of a position, each of which is demonstrably 
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superior to the previous statement in specific respects. But while a tradition can 
make progress in accordance with its own standards of rational justification, this 
process also contains within it the seed of a traditiRQ¶VXOWLPDWHIDOVLILDELOLW\)RUD
tradition may reach a point where its progress is halted. At that stage it may need to 
call on the insights, beliefs and arguments of another tradition to enable it to move 
forward.431 In doing this it may be forced to recognise the superiority of the insights 
offered by that alien tradition to its original beliefs. This awareness will reinforce the 
recognition that warranted assertability is not a sufficient criterion of ontological 
truth, and that the insights of the alien tradition are closer to disclosing the nature of 
reality than its own original formulations.  
What the explanation afforded from within the alien tradition will have disclosed is a 
lack of correspondence between the dominant beliefs of their own tradition and the 
reality disclosed by the most successful explanation, and it may well be the only 
successful explanation which they have been able to discover.  Hence the claim to 
truth for what had hitherto been their own beliefs has been defeated. 432 
The relativist accusation rests on the presupposition that any substantive 
philosophical position can defend its claims to truth by reference to its own 
standards of rationality and justification.433 But this assumption is undermined by 
0DF,QW\UH¶VDFFRXQWRItradition constituted rationality, because it shows that a 
tradition may discover that its own standards of justification are inadequate, and 
WKDWLWVSUHYLRXVFODLPVWRWUXWKKDYHWREHUHYLVHGRUDEDQGRQHG$WUDGLWLRQ¶V
claims to knowledge and truth can therefore be defeated and this is the possibility 
which the relativist challenge had failed to envisage.434  
7KHSHUVSHFWLYLVWSRVLWLRQEXLOGVRQUHODWLYLVPE\DUJXLQJWKDWWKHPHDQLQJRI³WUXWK´
should be modified so that the different worldviews advocated by different traditions 
can be seen to represent complementary attempts to express aspects of an 
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infinitely complex ultimate truth. Contradictions between different formulations 
reflect the limitations of human semantics, rather than genuine conflict between 
ontological commitments. The perspectivist therefore does not see any difficulty in 
accepting that the viewpoints of many different traditions can all be legitimate, and 
in holding that each may be adopted when this is appropriate. Macintyre argues that 
this perspectivist claim fails to recognise that the power to make rational 
judgements about truth and falsity requires commitment to a particular tradition: 
7KHSHUVSHFWLYLVW«IDLOVWRUHFRJQL]HKRZLQWHJUDOWKHFRQFHSWLRQRIWUXWKLVWR
tradition-constituted forms of enquiry.  It is this which leads perspectivists to suppose 
one could temporarily adopt the standpoint of a tradition and then exchange it for 
another... but genuinely to adopt the standpoint of a tradition thereby commits one to 
its view of what is true and false and, in so committing one, prohibits one from 
DGRSWLQJDQ\ULYDOVWDQGSRLQW«435 
One can only make progress in distinguishing between truth and falsity by fully 
committing oneself to the enquiry embodied in one particular tradition, and rejecting 
other perspectives. The perspectivist therefore excludes herself from genuine 
engagement in the pursuit of knowledge. MacIntyre continues: 
«7KHPXOWLSOLFLW\RIWUDGLWLRQVGRHVQRWDIIRUGDPXOWLSOLFLW\RISHUVSHFWLYHVDPRQJ
which we can move, but a multiplicity of antagonistic commitments, between which 
only conflict, rational or non-rational, is possible.436 
+RZPLJKWDUHODWLYLVWRUSHUVSHFWLYLVWUHVSRQGWR0DF,QW\UH¶VDUJXPHQWV"7KH\
might suggest that MacIntyre is correct in asserting that the adherents of a tradition 
may abandon their epistemic commitments in response to an unresolved 
epistemological crisis, but deny that this fact undermines a relativist position. The 
fact that a tradition lacks the resources to deal with a set of challenges at one point 
in time does not imply that an adequate response to those challenges is impossible. 
Its adherents may have been mistaken in giving up their beliefs.  An apparently 
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defeated tradition may be resurrected, as MacIntyre is seeking to revive the 
moribund Aristotelian tradition. If traditions do not die but only go into abeyance, 
and can flourish again when circumstances change, is there any position which 
cannot, in principle, be sustained? And if, as MacIntyre claims, all positions can be 
sustained "where ... the adherents of each are willing to pay the price necessary to 
VHFXUHFRKHUHQFHDQGFRQVLVWHQF\´437 can his position be clearly differentiated from 
that of the relativist?   
MacIntyre argues that commitment to a tradition is necessary for epistemic progress 
because it is not possible to judge the claims of rival traditions from a tradition-
neutral perspective, and on this latter point the relativist and perspectivist are in 
agreement with him. However, each of the protagonists draws a different conclusion 
from this thesis. The relativist takes it as indicating that there is no justification for 
adopting one tradition based perspective rather than another. The perspectivist 
takes this claim as a basis for accepting the legitimacy of all perspectives. 
MacIntyre takes this fact as demanding a commitment to a specific tradition as a 
precondition of constructing workable notions of enquiry, truth and knowledge. All 
three accept that the enlightenment notion of tradition-independent truth sets a 
standard for knowledge which is unachievable. MacIntyre, however, concludes that 
this standard must be abandoned and replaced with standards of truth and 
justification that flow from commitment to a particular tradition. The relativist and the 
perspectivist have abandoned enquiry and the pursuit of ultimate truth in response 
to their recognition that the human intellect cannot meet these Enlightenment 
standards of knowledge. For MacIntyre, in contrast, continuing enquiry is the only 
rational response to this recognition. Such continuing investigation is only possible 
within a tradition of enquiry, and every legitimate tradition therefore must open itself 
to uncertainty, challenge and to the possibility that it will be falsified in the future.  
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These general observations about the limited ability of human intellect to formulate 
WUXWKPXVWDOVRDSSO\WR0DF,QW\UH¶VRZQSHUVSHFWLYH7KHUHLVQRDEVROXWHDQG
LUUHIXWDEOHMXVWLILFDWLRQIRUDQ\RI0DF,QW\UH¶VPDMRUWKHRUHWLFDOFODLPVLQKLVPDWXUH
work ± for that, he says, is the nature of the beast: any complex theoretical position 
and substantive approach to enquiry may prove to be mistaken as its history 
unfolds.  MacIntyre claims that his account is superior to Enlightenment accounts of 
knowledge and ethics because it explains the failure of this rival account to resolve 
its epistemological crises, and therefore his account demonstrates its superiority in 
DFFRUGDQFHZLWKWKHVWDQGDUGVHVWDEOLVKHGZLWKLQ0DF,QW\UH¶VRZQSRVLWLRQ$QG
this, according to MacIntyre, is the only basis on which any philosophical position 
FDQVKRZLWVHOIWREHVXSHULRUWRDQRWKHU'HFLGLQJZKHWKHU0DF,QW\UH¶VFODLPFDQ
be accepted will depend on an evaluation of his mature position. In this process of 
evaluation I will identify some weaknesses LQ0DF,QW\UH¶VDFFRXQWZKLFKPXVWEH
addressed if his claim to have constructed a superior account of rationality is to be 
sustained.  
0DF,QW\UH¶VUHODWLRQVKLSWRWKH(QOLJKWHQPHQW 
Overview 
In WJWR MacIntyre renders the decline of Aristotelianism intelligible by placing its 
history in the context of other philosophical and social changes. However, as a 
result of these changes contemporary social conditions are not those under which 
DQ$ULVWRWHOLDQXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIHWKLFVFRXOGWKULYH0DF,QW\UH¶VDFFRunt of our 
cultural history emphasises that the growth of industrialisation and individualism has 
fragmented traditional forms of community. As a result, the belief that there are 
FRPPXQDOJRRGVZKLFKVKRXOGVKDSHWKHLQGLYLGXDO¶VXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIWKHLURwn 
needs and objectives and underpin ethical reasoning, has been eroded. Social life 
has been reduced to a forum in which individual goals are pursued, and the idea of 
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a good for man that is shaped by communal practices has been excised from our 
ethical vocabulary.438 Moral change has fostered the development of a society in 
which religious belief has become an isolated element of private experience, rather 
than the integrative framework within which all aspects of individual and social life 
must be understood. As a result it has become virtually impossible for us to think 
about goods except in terms of the various private interests of individuals, each of 
which is related to an independent aspect of their existence. Notwithstanding this, 
our cultural self-perception is one of progress in knowledge, and growth in ethical 
sophistication and tolerance.  In AV MacIntyre attempted to pierce that cultural 
complacency by presenting contemporary society as a culture sleepwalking through 
two epistemological crises: a crisis of ethical theory and moral guidance, and a 
crisis of rational justification.  MacIntyre offered an alternative vision of ethical 
renewal, through the establishment of communities in which it might be possible to 
rediscover the nature of the human telos, and in which small groups of people might 
recreate the life of the virtues, by rediscovering the Aristotelian tradition.  
WJWR seeks to place this project in a broader theoretical framework in which the 
notion of tradition, and the rationalities associated with traditions, are central. The 
viability of such traditions can be tested by epistemological crises. The resolution of 
such a crisis requires conceptual innovation to address the unresolved problems, 
and this innovation will enhance the resourcefulness of the tradition, while 
maintaining continuity with its original elements of belief.439 Although MacIntyre 
never makes this point explicit, his mature work acts as a demonstration of his 
thesis as well as an exposition of his theory.  He not only offers a diagnosis of the 
ethical and epistemological crises of modernity in terms of the post-medieval 
abandonment of a Thomistic Aristotelianism, he also offers modernity a set of 
concepts drawn from Aristotle and Aquinas as a remedy to the disease.  Whether 
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one finds his position convincing depends, firstly, on whether one finds his narrative 
to be a plausible interpretation of the history of our culture and its current condition; 
secondly on whether one is convinced by his diagnosis of the impact of that culture 
on the human condition; and, thirdly, whether his theoretical constructs of the 
concepts of tradition, tradition constituted rationality and epistemological crisis 
provide a defensible framework for analysis and action.  
Evaluation 
0DF,QW\UH¶VPDWXUHposition has provoked a considerable amount of controversy.  
Four important areas of criticism emerge in the secondary literature. Firstly, a 
QXPEHURIDXWKRUVKDYHFULWLFLVHGWKHDFFXUDF\RI0DFLQW\UH¶VKLVWRULFDODQDO\VLV440 
and his interpretation of the work of some of the philosophers who are central to his 
account, thereby bringing into question the plausibility of his historical narrative441 
and his analysis of our contemporary situation.442 A second line of attack is 
exemplified by criticisms of MacIntyre¶VDFFRXQWRISHUVRQDOLGHQWLW\IRUIDLOLQJWR
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Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, London and New York, Routledge, 1998, Electronic Version 
1.0 [Visited 30 June 2008), available at: http://www.rep.routledge.com/article/R045;]. Some 
examples of this type of criticism can be found in Annette A. Baier, ³0DF,QW\UHRQ+XPH´, 
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0DF,QW\UH´, in Mark C. Murphy (ed.), Alasdair MacIntyre. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
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recognise that personhood is prior to and independent of community.443 This aspect 
of the debate appears to illustrate the clash of incommensurable traditions, as the 
critics seek to defend a liberal political perspective from what they perceive to be an 
LOOHJLWLPDWH³FRPPXQLWDULDQ´FULWLTXH444 WKHUHE\FKDOOHQJLQJ0DF,QW\UH¶VHYDOXDWLRQ
of the impact of contemporary culture on human potentiality. Thirdly, there is a 
GHEDWHDERXWWKHUHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQ0DF,QW\UH¶s position and Enlightenment 
SDWWHUQVRIWKRXJKW2QHVHWRIFULWLFVKDYHTXHVWLRQHGWKHOHJLWLPDF\RI0DFLQW\UH¶V
rejection of Enlightenment epistemology and ethics, and queried whether his 
alternative project is not, in fact, simply an extension of Enlightenment patterns of 
thought,445 while a second group of critics have argued the converse position, that 
his rejection of Enlightenment principles is genuine, but that it commits him to 
relativism.446 Fourthly, there have been a set of debates around the coherence of 
0DF,QW\UH¶VWKHRUHWLFDOSHUVSHFWLYHDGGUHVVLQJWKHTXHVWLRQVRILQFRPPHQVXUDELOLW\
and translatability,447 the nature of a tradition448 and the meaning and legitimacy of 
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the associated notion of tradition constituted rationality.449 The first line of criticism 
TXHVWLRQVWKHDFFXUDF\RI0DF,QW\UH¶VUHFRQVWUXFWLRQRIWKHKLVWRULFDOURRWVRIWKH
contemporary crises of Enlightenment thought. This is a significant test of his 
SHUVSHFWLYHJLYHQ0DF,QW\UH¶VKLVWRULFLVWDSSURDFK7KHGHEDWHRQWKHQDWXUHRI
personal identity is more narrowly focused, but illustrates the opposition between a 
liberal individualist view of the relationship between individual and society, and the 
alternative perspective which sees communal practices as constitutive of that 
identit\,WWKHUHIRUHV\PEROLVHVDQLPSRUWDQWFKDOOHQJHWR0DF,QW\UH¶VFULWLTXHRI
liberal individualism.  
The third and fourth areas of criticism represent more fundamental objections to the 
FRKHUHQFHDQGOHJLWLPDF\RI0DF,QW\UH¶VSURMHFWDVDZKROHDQGWKHVHwill form the 
IRFXVRIP\HYDOXDWLRQ,ZLOODGGUHVVWKHTXHVWLRQRI0DF,QW\UH¶VUHODWLRQVKLSWR
(QOLJKWHQPHQWWKRXJKWLQWKLVVHFWLRQDQG,ZLOOHYDOXDWH0DF,QW\UH¶VWKHRUHWLFDO
constructs in Chapter 4, drawing on my exposition of Lindbeck in Chapter 3.   In this 
VHFWLRQ,ZLOODGGUHVVWKUHHPDLQLVVXHV)LUVWO\LV0DF,QW\UH¶VSKLORVRSK\DJHQXLQH
alternative to Enlightenment thought or is it simply an unacknowledged variant of 
that epistemology? The resolution of this issue requires consideration of a second 
TXHVWLRQZKLFKLVZKHWKHU0DF,QW\UH¶VDFFRXQWRIWUDGLWLRQVDVPXWXDOO\
incommensurable and untranslatable is defensible.  Thirdly I will consider the 
TXHVWLRQRI0DF,QW\UH¶VDOOHJHGUHODWLYLVP 
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MacIntyre and the Enlightenment 
Some authors have arJXHG0DF,QW\UH¶VH[SOLFLWUHMHFWLRQRI(QOLJKWHQPHQW
epistemology disguises the fact that he implicitly imports elements of Enlightenment 
universal epistemological criteria into his position. This type of challenge can be 
illustrated by reference to papers by A.J. Roque and A. Allen. Roque argues that 
0DF,QW\UH¶VFODLPWKDWLWLVSRVVLEOHWRXQGHUVWDQGDQRWKHUWUDGLWLRQWKURXJKOHDUQLQJ
LWDVD³VHFRQGILUVW-ODQJXDJH´450 LPSOLHVWKDWKXPDQEHLQJVPXVWKDYHD³FRJQLWLYH
IDFXOW\´ZKLFKSURYLGHVWKHPZLWKVXFKD learning capacity.451 She contends that this 
innate capacity 
... is nothing other than a variation of the Enlightenment view which MacIntyre rejects, 
that there is in humans a faculty of "common sense" which provides a universal and 
therefore neutral, context- and tradition-free, court to which we can appeal and which 
can provide the justification for claims of rationality... MacIntyre has simply substituted 
³DELOLW\WRDFTXLUHDVHFRQGILUVWODQJXDJH´IRUWKH(QOLJKWHQPHQW¶V³FRPPRQ
VHQVH´452 
 
5RTXH¶VFriticism appears to rest on either a trivial observation or a mistaken claim 
DERXWWKHLPSOLFDWLRQVRI0DF,QW\UH¶VSRVLWLRQ7KHILUVWLQWHUSUHWDWLRQLVWKDWVKHLV
saying no more than that a person must have certain cognitive capacities in order to 
learn two or more languages. This is clearly correct, but the possession of such 
capacities says nothing about the nature of these languages or whether the cultures 
that use them embody different forms of rationality.  The alternative interpretation is 
that she is asserting that the existence of a capacity for learning language implies 
that all languages must share some common characteristics and that these 
common characteristics imply the existence of a universal form of rationality. But it 
does not follow from the fact that a person can learn two different languages (or 
traditions) that these languages are commensurable and translatable and must 
embody common standards of evaluation.  
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0DF,QW\UHKDVUHVSRQGHGWR5RTXH¶VFULWLFLVPE\VXJJHVWLQJWKDWthe idea of such a 
specific language-learning cognitive capacity is absurd.453  He acknowledges that 
any language qua language must have certain features in common with other 
languages, and that any practice which can be understood to be a form of rationality 
requires conformity to the laws of logic.454 However, these are necessary rather 
than sufficient conditions for the existence of translatability, commensurability and 
compatible processes of rational evaluation. These points do not undermine 
0DF,QW\UH¶VFRQWHQWLRQWKDWtraditions may conceptualise issues in ways that are 
incommensurable with each other, and may have incompatible standards for 
judging truth and falsity. 
Allen puts forward a similar but more sophisticated line of criticism to that of 
Roque.455 Allen claims tKDW0DF,QW\UH¶VDFFRXQWRIWKHHYROXWLRQRIDWUDGLWLRQLQ
effect establishes a universal standard of rationality to which all traditions must 
adhere, and that this implies that MacIntyre is unconsciously adhering to 
Enlightenment concepts of rationality. Allen interprets MacIntyre as claiming that the 
HYROXWLRQRIDWUDGLWLRQSURFHHGVYLDDSURFHVVRI³GHWHUPLQDWHQHJDWLRQ´456 through 
which members of a tradition only modify a 
few select tenets [at any one time]...leaving a core of beliefs untouched. In the 
process of following this rational method, members of traditions may not negate all of 
their basic beliefs at any one time; they may only negate a determinate number of 
them.457 
 
 He suggests that MacIntyre sees this as a dialectical procedure common to all 
WUDGLWLRQVWKURXJKZKLFKPHPEHUVRIWKHWUDGLWLRQDUULYHDWWKHWUXWK0DFLQW\UH¶V
claim that one can only be rational through membership of a tradition therefore 
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implies that all rational people must follow the principle of determinate negation. He 
continues: 
This sounds familiar because it is a description of the same kind of universalist 
standpoint which MacIntyre criticized Enlightenment thinkers for espousing. The view 
WKDW0DF,QW\UHHVSRXVHVLVLWVHOIRQHLQZKLFKµtruth is guaranteed by rational method 
and rational method appeals to principles undeniable by any fully reflective rational 
person¶&OHDUO\WKHQ0DF,QW\UH¶VDFFRXQWRIWKHUDWLRQDOLW\RIWUDGLWLRQVHQWDLOVDQ
implicit appeal to precisely those kinds of Enlightenment standards that he claims to 
reject.458  
 
$OOHQ¶VDUJXPHQWDSSHDUVWRDVVXPHWKDW0DF,QW\UHLVHVWDEOLVKLQJDGHRQWRORJLFDO
criterion of rationality to which all traditions must conform if they are to be 
considered rational. But MacIntyre would claim that he is describing what happens 
in the history of tradition, rather than prescribing standards to which all traditions 
must conform. The similarities in the evolution of different traditions will be 
underpinned by shared principles of argument (the laws of logic). However, such 
principles are necessary but not sufficient conditions to justify claims to rationality 
(See TRV p.172 and 3RV p 326 for example). Each tradition will incorporate 
additional presuppositions and standards into its processes for evaluation and 
justification which will shape its rationality of the tradition into forms which are 
incompatible with those of other traditions. 
$OOHQ¶V³SULQFLSOHRIGHWHUPLQDWHQHJDWLRQ´SRLQWVWRWKHIDFWWKDWPHPEHUVKLSRID
tradition involves adherence to a specific set of beliefs and engagement in culturally 
endorsed practices.  A tradition cannot maintain its identity if all of its precepts are 
questioned or rejected at the same time, although during its history every element 
of its beliefs may be subject to challenge and modification at  different times. The 
FRQVHUYDWLYHQDWXUHRI$OOHQ¶VSULQFLSOHRIGHWHUPLQDWHQHJDWLRQUHIOHFWVWKHIDFWWKDW
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if all members were to reject every tenet the tradition would no longer exist. There 
must be elements of continuity in the beliefs and practices of any tradition if that 
WUDGLWLRQLVWRPDLQWDLQLWVLGHQWLW\RYHUWLPH/LQGEHFN¶VH[SORUDWLRQRIWKHLGHQWLW\RI
the Christian tradition in ND points to the role played by the regulative functions of 
doctrine in shaping the identity and stability of Christian traditions, and in Chapter 
4.3 I will apply this idea more generally to the question of the identity of a tradition.  
7KHDUJXPHQWVE\5RTXHDQG$OOHQGRQRWGHPRQVWUDWHWKDW0DF,QW\UH¶VSRVLWLRQ
endorses the Enlightenment belief in universal standards of rational justification. 
7KHUHDUHKRZHYHUWZRHOHPHQWVRI0DF,QW\UH¶VSRVLWLRQWKDWPLJKWVXSSRUWWKH
contention that he is espousing Enlightenment universalism. The first is his 
assertion that any tradition must adhere to the laws of logic in constructing 
VWDQGDUGVRIUDWLRQDOLW\WKHVHFRQGDQGPRUHLPSRUWDQWIHDWXUHLV0DF,QW\UH¶V
claim that only a degenerate tradition would allow itself to construct the type of 
epistemological defences which would prevent its beliefs being put into question.459 
This implies that a living tradition must meet a standard of epistemological 
openness if it is to be considered a rational form of enquiry,460 and this does specify 
a universal standard to which all traditions must conform qua traditions of enquiry. 
These universalist elements are however, balanced by two other elements of his 
account of rationality. These are, firstly, the claim that each tradition will develop 
unique concepts in its attempts to articulate its central concerns; and that, as a 
result at least some of its assertions will be untranslatable into the concepts 
available to rival traditions. Secondly, there is the claim that each tradition will have 
formulated distinctive standards of justification that reflect its conceptual 
development, its history of challenge and conflict resolution, and the nature of its 
enquiry. Even if assertions made in one tradition may be translated into the 
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conceptual scheme of the other, these distinctive standards of justification may lead 
to incompatible judgements of truth and falsity. 
0DF,QW\UH¶VDFFRXQWRIWUDGLWLRQFRQVWLWXWHGUDWLRQDOLW\LVWKHUHIRUHDK\EULGSRVLWLRQ
which combines two elements of Enlightenment universalism (logical consistency 
and the principle of epistemological openness) with two elements that are tradition 
specific (incommensurability and incompatible standards of justification). If these 
tradition-specific elements do not exist, and all traditions can be shown to be 
PXWXDOO\WUDQVODWDEOHDQGFRPPHQVXUDEOH0DF,QW\UH¶VSRVLWLRQZRXOGFROODSVHLQWR
a version of Enlightenment universalism.   I will argue in the next sub-section that 
0DF,QW\UH¶VFODLPVIRUWKHXQWUDQVODWDELOLW\RIGLIIerent traditions are vulnerable to 
challenge.  However, I will also argue that the claim that traditions have different 
standards of justification is not vulnerable in this way, and that if this is the case, his 
claim that some traditions have distinct and incommensurable standards of 
rationality can be sustained. 
Incommensurability and translatability 
The claim that different traditions form incommensurable systems of thought is 
FHQWUDOWR0DF,QW\UH¶VUHSXGLDWLRQRI(QOLJKWHQPHQWQRWLRQVRINQRZOHGJHWUXWh and 
justification. If (at least some of) the concepts that can be used within one tradition 
cannot be translated into the concepts of another tradition, the two traditions will be 
³WZRUDGLFDOO\GLIIHUHQW«FRQFHSWXDOVFKHPHV´DQGZLOOQRWEHPXWXDOO\
interpretable.461 As a result a tradition will embody a distinct set of concepts, 
practices and beliefs which are not equivalent to the concepts, practices and beliefs 
of a rival tradition and which cannot, therefore be translated into the concepts 
available within that tradition.462 Such incommensurable traditions could only be 
learned as one learns a new language, and only through this process of immersion 
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could one learn that the concepts used in the new tradition are incompatible with 
WKHFRQFHSWVXVHGLQRQH¶s original tradition. Incommensurability therefore can only 
EHUHFRJQLVHGE\³VRPHRQHZKRLQKDELWVERWKFRQFHSWXDOVFKHPHVZKRNQRZV
DQGLVDEOHWRXWWHUWKHLGLRPIURPZLWKLQZKRKDVEHFRPH«DQDWLYHVSHDNHURI
WZRILUVWODQJXDJHV´463 Conversely, if incommensurable conceptual schemes do not 
H[LVW0DF,QW\UH¶VFULWLTXHRIWKH(QOLJKWHQPHQWZRXOGEHVXEMHFWWRFKDOOHQJH,IDOO
conceptual schemes are commensurable then assertions464 made in one tradition 
could be fully translated into the idioms of another tradition without loss of meaning.  
However, even if all traditions were mutually translatable, this would not guarantee 
agreement on the truth status of assertions made in one tradition unless each 
tradition had identical criteria for testing the truth or falsity of such assertions.  
There are therefore two questions which need to be addressed in testing whether 
0DF,QW\UH¶VSRVLWLRQSURYLGHVDJHQXLQHDOWHUQDWLYHWR(QOLJKWHQPHQWHSLVWHPRORJ\
Firstly, there is the question of whether incommensurable conceptual schemes can 
ever be rendered mutually interpretable. Secondly, there is the question as to 
whether this mutual interpretability also implies common standards of rational 
HYDOXDWLRQ,IWKHDQVZHUWRERWKTXHVWLRQVLV³\HV´WKHFRPELQDWLRQRIXQLYHUVDO
translatability and consensus concerning judgements of truth and falsehood would 
make the Encyclopaedic aim of identifying and connecting all aspects of knowledge 
into a single interdependent network a realistic possibility, and the ambitions of the 
Enlightenment could be revived.  
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The notion that it is possible to have separate, incommensurable and therefore 
mutually untranslatable, conceptual schemes has been criticised, most famously by 
Donald Davidson.465 This controversy still continues,466 and it would be beyond the 
scope of this thesis (and the abilities of its author) to seek to finally resolve this 
GHEDWH+RZHYHUGHIHQGLQJWKHFRKHUHQFHRI0DF,QW\UH¶VSRVLWLRQGRHVQRWUHTXLUH
the complete resolution of the question as to whether fully incommensurable 
conceptual schemes can exist or not, because MacIntyre is primarily concerned 
with limited or partial incommensurability and untranslatability in relation to some 
specific elements of tradition. Davidson does not reject the possibility of this type of 
incommensurability and MacIntyre himself suggests that his position and that of 
'DYLGVRQDUHDWOHDVWSRWHQWLDOO\UHFRQFLODEOH+HFRPPHQWVWKDW'DYLGVRQ¶V
perspective 
«FDQEHLQWHUSUHWHGDVVD\LQJQRPRUHWKDQZRXOGEHFRQFHGHG«E\DQ\RQHWKDW
there will always be something in common between any two languages or any two 
sets of thoughts. But he has sometimes at least been understood to be asserting 
claims incompatible with the account which I have given.467 
'DYLGVRQ¶VVHPLQDODUWLFOHLVFRQFHUQHGSULPDULO\ZLth the possibility of conceptual 
schemes that have no shared elements. He contends that if such schemes existed, 
we would be unable to recognise the supposed rival conceptual framework as a 
means of communication or as a way of understanding reality. This is because we 
cannot interpret an alien language as a form of communication unless we can 
assume that the speaker is generally asserting what she believes to be true (the 
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principle of charity),468  DQGWKDWWKHVSHDNHU¶VMXGJHPHQWVDERXWZKDWLVWKHFDVH
will generally match our own. There will therefore be consistency in the type of 
judgements that are held to be true notwithstanding the use of different languages.  
This implies that all intelligent beings live in the same reality, and have to be 
assumed to be asserting a similar set of judgements about that shared reality. The 
process of communication has to begin by mapping elements of the set of true 
assertions in each language against each other. This assumption would enable one 
WRHVWDEOLVK³DV\VWHPDWLF correlation of sentences held true with sentences held 
WUXH´469 in each language.  Davidson does not deny the possibility of conceptual 
differences and disagreements about truth arising between the groups who use 
these different languages, but such differences and disagreements presuppose a 
background of general agreement with respect to what is held to be true. It is only 
WKHEDFNJURXQGRIVKDUHGXQGHUVWDQGLQJDERXWZKDWLVWUXHWKDW³PDNH>V@
PHDQLQJIXOGLVDJUHHPHQWSRVVLEOH´470 
MacIntyre may or may not believe that it is possible to have completely independent 
(and thereby incommunicable) conceptual schemes. But this is not the type of 
incommensurability with which he is primarily concerned in his arguments about 
tradition. His incommensurable rival traditions exist in human societies in which 
different groups may hold disparate belief systems, but these groups will also share 
many conceptual elements with the other social groups with whom they interact. At 
worst, therefore, he is concerned with conceptual worlds in which some elements, 
but not all, may be incommensurable with others. As a result, MacIntyre allows that 
traditions may interact, either because some person or persons has been 
sufficiently immersed in the conceptual schemes of different traditions to compare 
their different perspectives; or because different traditions share an overlapping 
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stock of texts, images and beliefs which provides a basis for communication. In this 
latter case, the similarities may enable each tradition to recognise and consider 
their differences.471 MacIntyre is therefore concerned with only partial 
incommensurability and untranslatability. 
'DYLGVRQFRQVLGHUVWKHLVVXHRISDUWLDOXQWUDQVODWDELOLW\DQGVXJJHVWVWKDW³ZH
improve the clarity and bite of declarations of difference, whether of scheme or of 
opinion, by enlarging the basis of shared (translatable) language or of shared 
RSLQLRQ´472 'DYLGVRQ¶VSRLQWKHUHLVWKDWZKHUHGLIIHUHQFHVDULVHWKH\PD\EH
treated as either differences of belief as to what is the case (disputes about truth) or 
differences in the conceptual resources used to interpret reality (a clash of 
incommensurable perspectives). In some circumstances we may understand such 
differences of perspective as arising from the use of the different and incompatible 
concepts embodied in each tradition, in which case the task of understanding may 
involve constructing new concepts to express the insights of the alien tradition 
within the language of our own tradition. But once conceptual innovation has 
enabled the insights of that alien tradition to be expressed, we may still disagree 
with what the alien tradition holds to be true, because other elements of our belief 
system lead us to judge the truth or falsity of what is asserted by the rival tradition in 
a different way. This point can be exemplified by drawing on a thought experiment 
constructed by Jeffrey Stout. 
Stout appears to share similar views on partial incommensurability to Davidson and 
MacIntyre, despite the claim by some critics that his views on this issue are 
opposed to those of MacIntyre.473 6WRXW¶VDFFRXQWRIWUDQVODWDELOLW\LQEthics after 
Babel LVFRQVLVWHQWZLWKDQGDGGVGHWDLOWR0DF,QW\UH¶VGHVFULSWLRQRIWKHSURFHVVRI
understanding an alien tradition. Stout imagines two isolated communities who 
                                               
471
 WJWR p.350. 
472
 Davidson p.19. 
473
 For example, see Stephen Fowl "Could Horace talk with tKH+HEUHZV"´. 
168 
 
come into contact with each other and seek to understand their respective moral 
frameworks; the Corleones (who emphasise the virtues of purity, honour and 
revenge) and the Modernists who possess a Kantian deontological concept of 
morality. Stout stipulates that neither side possess the concepts and vocabulary 
that would enable them to express the moral insights of their rivals when they first 
interact. Consider the following quotation: 
In our example, the Modernists cannot, by stipulation express most of the 
propositions of Corleone moral discourse in Modernese. That means they cannot do 
so now. But the Modernists may end their cultural isolation and send out their own 
ethnographers to study the Corleones. In time, ethnographers from Modernity can 
learn the moral language of the Corleones as Corleone children do ± from the ground 
up. That option is always open when initial efforts at direct translation fail. 474 
 
The reference to learning the language in the same way as Corleone children 
PLUURUV0DF,QW\UH¶Vunderstanding of the process required to grasp an 
incommensurable conceptual system.  Both Stout and MacIntyre acknowledge that 
there can be issues of incommensurability and untranslatability but suggest that a 
dialogue can take place between different traditions through individuals being 
socialised into the second tradition. The judgements made in an alien tradition may 
ultimately be made communicable to the adherents of another through the field 
reports of anthropologists providing a discursive account of the practices and forms 
of life that underpin the concepts used in the first tradition, and through the creation 
of new hermeneutic resources within the second tradition.475 However, as 
'DYLGVRQ¶VFRPPHQWDERXWLQWHUSUHWLQJGLVDJUHHPHQWDVeither incommensurability 
of concepts or disputes about truth suggests, what was initially a question of 
incommensurability may subsequently develop into a conflict of judgements of truth, 
because the process of conceptual development which overcomes 
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incommensurability does not necessarily lead to agreement.  Stout makes a similar 
point in the following way:  
,WGRHVQ¶WIROORZWKDWXQGHUVWDQGLQJDQRWKHUFXOWXUH¶VPRUDOODQJXDJHQHFHVVLWDWHV
adopting the moral beliefs held by its members. ..If I can imitate Corleone 
moralizing...predict what Corleones will say about new cases, make sense of their 
past behaviour by ascribing beliefs and desires that fit in nicely with  my translations 
of their moral sentences...then I understand their moral language. I might still refuse 
to join in when they moralize. I might vigorously dissent from their beliefs about 
women and strangers. Their claims about the necessity of vengeance might never 
influence my moral reasoning.476 
What has occurred in the process of hermeneutic innovation necessary to facilitate 
understanding is a shift from conceptual incommensurability to a disagreement 
about the legitimacy of the concepts which have now been introduced into the first 
WUDGLWLRQ,FRQFOXGHIURPWKHVHREVHUYDWLRQVWKDW0DF,QW\UH¶VDFFRXQWRI
incommensurability and untranslatability is consistent with both Davidson and Stout. 
But while all three authors allow that conceptual innovation may ultimately facilitate 
FRPPXQLFDWLRQEHWZHHQDOLHQWUDGLWLRQV6WRXW¶VH[DPSOHVKRZVWKDWWKLVGRHVQRW
imply that these traditions will adopt common processes for determining what is true 
or false. Each tradition may apply its own standards of justification to assessing the 
truth of assertions couched in these concepts and may make incompatible 
judgements of truth and falsity, legitimacy and illegitimacy even where (limited) 
conceptual incommensurability has been overcome by hermeneutic innovation. 
Each tradition will not be bound by the alternative rational processes used to 
construct such judgements that are applied by the alien tradition. Overcoming 
limited incommensurability would not lead to consensus on universally applicable 
standards of justification across different traditions. As a result, the conditions 
required for the revival of the Enlightenment project have not been met, and 
0DF,QW\UH¶VFULWLTXHRIWKH(QOLJKWHQPHQWFDQEHVXVWDLQHG 
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This discussion brings us back to another, unresolved, problem. The 
presuppositions which underpin the Modernist and Corleone traditions are too 
disparate to allow for consensus on moral judgement. Conceptual change may 
enable us to understand an alien view, but we may refuse to allow any legitimacy to 
such views. We may understand these views, but only as the strange and 
unjustified perspective of an alien tribe.  But is this rejection of the alien view any 
more than an expression of our own specific tribal prejudices? Can we provide 
cogent reasons for declaring one ethical tradition to be superior to another? If we 
cannot do this, are we not once again left without a response to the challenge that 
0DF,QW\UH¶VSRVLWLRQLVUHODWLYLVW" Is there a rational basis for committing to one 
tradition rather than another? 
Relativism and Tradition constituted Rationality 
The second strand of criticism that arises from the question of MDF,QW\UH¶V
relationship to the Enlightenment accepts that his denial of Enlightenment 
standards of justification is genuine, but claims that, as a result, he is committed to 
a form of relativism.  )XOOHUIRUH[DPSOHDUJXHVWKDW0DF,QW\UH¶VFODLPWKDWWKH 
success of a tradition has to be judged in accordance with the internal criteria of 
adequacy formulated by the tradition appears to lead to a form of fideism, in that the 
acceptance of these criteria is a matter of submission to the authority of the 
tradition, rather than a matter of rational justification.477 Neil Ormerod also 
H[SUHVVHVDQ[LHW\DWWKHDSSDUHQWILGHLVPLPSOLFLWLQ0DFLQW\UH¶VSRVLWLRQ478 while 
Norman Dahl criticises MacIntyre for having no basis on which to choose between 
two equally successful traditions, thereby opening the door to a different form of 
relativism.479 &KULVWLDQ(DUO\ZHOFRPHVWKLVILGHLVWLFDVSHFWRI0DF,QW\UH¶VZRUNDV
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warranting the acceptance of the primacy of authority in matters of religious belief.480 
+RZHYHU(DUO\¶VSHUVSHFtive leaves unresolved the question of how one is to 
decide between competing authorities.481   
-RKQ0LOEDQNLVSHUKDSVWKHPRVWLQWHUHVWLQJFULWLFRI0DF,QW\UH¶VDOOHJHGUHODWLYLVP
SDUWLFXODUO\DVKH³GRHVQRWILQG>0DF,QW\UH@sufficiently relativistic or KLVWRULFLVW´ 482  
In Theology and Social Theory Milbank criticises MacIntyre for his over-reliance on 
a philosophical and dialectical approach to understanding argument, justification 
and reason and argues for the superiority of a theological perspective. He contrasts 
0DF,QW\UH¶VUHOLDQFHRQSKLORVRSKLFDODUJXPHQWZLWKWKHUKHWRULFDODQGSHUVXDVLYH
character of the warrants for the fundamental beliefs of Christianity.483  As a 
philosopher MacIntyre is committed to constructing a position which can be 
defended WKURXJKORJLFDODUJXPHQWEXW0LOEDQNVXJJHVWVWKDW0DF,QW\UH¶V
philosophical commitment leads him to ignore what can only be dealt with 
theologically in belief. As a consequence, this leaves him unable to address the 
basis for faith and Milbank comments WKDW³DWWKHSKLORVRSKLFOHYHODQDLURIQRQ-
FRPPLWPHQWKRYHUVRYHU0DF,QW\UH¶VZRUNDQLPSOLFDWLRQHYHQRIWKHLQHYLWDEOH
OLEHUDOLVPRISKLORVRSK\LWVHOI´484  For Milbank philosophy cannot help with the 
fundamental business of belief and commitment. It can assist only with the business 
of working out the implications of a commitment once this has been made. Logical 
argument can only begin once one has accepted some basic presuppositions on 
different grounds. 
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Logical argument therefore applies only within and not between different 
GLVFRXUVHV0LOEDQN³ZDQWVWRLQVLVWDJDLQVW0DF,QW\UHWKDWDWWKHOHYHORI
µREMHFWLYH¶UHDVRQLQJRQHLVRQO\WDONLQJDERXWWKHLQQHUFRQVLVWHQF\RIDGLVFRXUVH
RUSUDFWLFH´485 0LOEDQN¶VFRPPHQWVSRLQWWRWKHEHOLHIWKDWWKHFRUH principles and 
assumptions of a tradition are inherited rather than proven, and their adoption is not 
therefore the consequence of a process of dialectical argument, but a prelude to it: 
our fundamental beliefs are convictions rather than conclusions. This observation 
raises issues about the nature of religious and philosophical conviction and 
commitment, and the relationship between the two. Milbank summarises the 
contrast between the approaches as follows: 
$WHQVLRQDULVHVKHUHEHWZHHQ0DF,QW\UH¶VµSKLORVRSKLF¶SHUVSHFWLYHRQ&KULVWLDQLW\RQ
the one hand, which concedes the rhetorical, persuasive character of its fundamental 
texts, practices and credal beliefs, but then treats these only from the point of view of 
testing their validity by a universal method (dialectics), and, on the other hand, a 
WKHRORJLFDOSHUVSHFWLYH«ZKLFKVSHDNVLQPRGHVEH\RQGWKHSRLQWZKHUHGLDOHFWLFV
leaves off, namely in terms of the imaginative explication of texts, practices and 
beliefs.486  
Thomas Clark adopts a similar perspective to that of Milbank when he argues that: 
«UDWLRQDOLW\RSHUDWHVZLWKLQDQDOUHDG\JLYHQV\VWHPRIDVVXPSWLRQVDQGPRWLYHV
and ... even our conception of rationality itself is relative to a particular context. We 
will never be able, finally, to rationally justify our most basic values or fundamental 
beliefs about how the world is. These values and beliefs constitute the context within 
which our version of rationality works.487  
 
Clark suggests (following Rorty) that the collapse of correspondence theories of 
truth and the recognition that there is no theory neutral access to an independent 
world imply that we only ever represent reality from a particular perspective. He 
continues:  
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there is no point outside our view of the world from which to evaluate that vLHZ¶VWUXWK
knowledge is always a representation of reality from within a particular perspective. 
Although we exist and participate in ultimate reality, we cannot know this reality 
objectively in the sense once hoped for. We cannot assume the detached vantage 
SRLQWRIZKDWSKLORVRSKHU7KRPDV1DJHOFDOOVµWKHYLHZIURPQRZKHUH¶488 
 
0DF,QW\UHZRXOGFHUWDLQO\UHMHFWWKHSHUVSHFWLYLVPWKDWXQGHUOLHV&ODUN¶V
contentions, but he would do so without invoking a correspondence theory of truth 
and would argue as vehePHQWO\WKDWWKHUHLVQR³GHWDFKHGYDQWDJHSRLQW´IURP
which one can survey reality: 
There is no standing ground, no place for enquiry, no way to engage in the practices 
of advancing, evaluating and rejecting reasoned argument apart from that which is 
provided by some tradition or another.489 
 
0DF,QW\UHZRXOGDOVRDFFHSW0LOEDQN¶VFRQWHQWLRQWKDWWKHIXQGDPHQWDOEHOLHIVRID
tradition are not accepted on the basis of demonstrative argument, and that 
rationality is internal to a tradition. I would suggest, however, that both those critics 
ZKRFODLPWKDW0DF,QW\UHLVRULQ0LOEDQN¶VFDVHWKDWKHVKRXOGEHDUHODWLYLVW
and those critics who assimilate his position to the Enlightenment project fail to fully 
acknowledge the extent to which MacIntyre is developing an alternative account of 
WKHQDWXUHRIMXVWLILFDWLRQWRWKH(QOLJKWHQPHQWPRGHO0DF,QW\UH¶VK\EULGPRGHORI
rationality has both universal and tradition specific elements. The tradition-specific 
elements shape the conceptualisation of reality and judgements of truth and falsity, 
and if these features are considered in isolation, they appear to point in the direction 
of relativism. They are balanced, however, by the universal elements which act as 
potential tests of the overall coherence and viability of the system of thought 
represented by that tradition. Participation in a tradition of enquiry requires one to 
become convinced of its basic presuppositions through initial processes of 
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socialisation, persuasion, and rhetoric rather than through demonstrative proofs. 
But the beliefs so acquired may then be tested in terms of their logical coherence, 
their consistency with the standards of rationality that have emerged within that 
tradition, and by their ability to withstand the challenges generated by the tUDGLWLRQ¶V
epistemological openness. The ability of a tradition to maintain its coherence in 
response to these challenges is a measure of its superiority to traditions that are 
unable to overcome epistemological crises created by such challenges. 
In Chapter 4 I will argue that a tradition of enquiry can be identified with the type of 
comprehensive metaphysical viewpoint with which MacIntyre was concerned in his 
early publications. If this is the case, and MacIntyre has been successful in 
articulating an account of the superiority of one such tradition to another which 
clarifies how a person may become rationally justified in accepting the central 
tenets of a tradition, he has also provided a general account of the justification of a 
belief in a comprehensive metaphysical perspective, and will have addressed the 
issue of commitment to such a perspective that he had struggled to resolve in his 
early period. But before we can arrive at this point in the argument, it is necessary 
to become clearer about the nature of tradition constituted rationality and 
epistemological crisis, and this means that I must also consider the question of the 
nature of a tradition.   
In exploring these issues, I will also show that clarity with regards to the nature and 
LGHQWLW\RIDWUDGLWLRQLVWKHNH\VWRQHWRDQHIIHFWLYHHYDOXDWLRQRI0DF,QW\UH¶VPDWXUH
position. In constructing an account of the nature of tradition I will draw on the work 
of the theologian George A. Lindbeck in his book The Nature of Doctrine. This 
account will also enable me to construct a more comprehensive account of tradition 
constituted rationality and help to clarify the circumstances in which an 
HSLVWHPRORJLFDOFULVLVPD\DULVH:KLOH/LQGEHFN¶VZRUNKHOSVWRVWUHQJWKHQ
MDF,QW\UH¶VSRVLWLRQP\DQDO\VLVZLOODOVRKHOSWRFODULI\DQGVWUHQJWKHQ/LQGEHFN¶V
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SRVLWLRQE\LQFRUSRUDWLQJ0DF,QW\UH¶VFRQFHSWRIWUDGLWLRQFRQVWLWXWHGUDWLRQDOLW\LQWR
his account of superiority in matters of religion - a step which Lindbeck himself 
DGYRFDWHGLQKLV³$IWHUZRUG´WRWKHth Anniversary Edition of ND.490 This process 
of cross-IHUWLOLVDWLRQZLOODOVRVWUHQJWKHQERWK/LQGEHFN¶VDQG0DF,QW\UH¶VSRVLWLRQ
against accusations of relativism or fideism. The first step in addressing these 
LVVXHVLVWRVNHWFKWKHEDFNJURXQGWR/LQGEHFN¶VZRUNDQGSURYLGHDVXPPDU\of 
his cultural-linguistic (CL) model of religion and regulative account of the nature of 
doctrine. This is the focus of Chapter 3.
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Chapter 3 
Lindbeck and the Identity of the Christian Tradition 
 
3.1 Lindbeck, Ecumenism and Doctrine 
Lindbeck and Ecumenism 
George Lindbeck is a Lutheran and Emeritus Professor of theology at Yale 
8QLYHUVLW\+LVOLIH¶VZRUNKDVEHHQGULYHQE\DGHVLUHWRRYHUFRPHWKHGLIIHUHQFHV
between churches that have divided the Christian tradition. He was born in 1923 
and his early years were spent in China,491 which meant that he had contact with a 
range of religious and cultural groups. He has suggested that this early engagement 
with diversity helped to shape his theological development492  and his later interest 
in ecumenism. 493 This interest was also stimulated by the fact that, despite his 
3URWHVWDQWEHOLHIVKLVHDUO\WHDFKLQJDQGUHVHDUFKZDV³PRVWO\UHODWHGWRWKHSDVW
DQGSUHVHQWRI5RPDQ&DWKROLFWKRXJKW´494 His work on medieval philosophy meant 
that he was particularly well suited to act as an observer at the Second Vatican 
Council on behalf of the World Lutheran Federation, a role he undertook between 
1962 and 1965, living in Rome for much of this period.495 He eventually became the 
Pitkin Professor of Historical Theology at Yale, retiring from this post in1993.496  
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/LQGEHFN¶VH[SHULHQFHVDW9DWLFDQ,,OHGKLPWRVHHHFXPHQLVPLQWHUPVRIWKHWDVN
of healing the divisions that separate the Roman Catholic Church from the 
Protestant churches in general and the Lutheran community in particular. He has 
pursued this aim by fostering an understanding of Protestantism as a reform 
movement within the wider Catholic Church: 
My ecumenical concerns have been tilted in a Catholic direction...I came to think that 
Lutheranism should try to become what it started out to be, a reform movement within 
the Catholic Church of the West. By such a strategy it can best contribute to the goal 
of wider Christian unity. This goal and strategy have guided almost all my work since 
then.497 
/LQGEHFN¶VHFXPHQLFDOZRUNFDQ therefore be seen as a contribution to the 
reunification of a divided Christian tradition. The goal of ecumenism, as Lindbeck 
FDPHWRXQGHUVWDQGLWGXULQJKLVVWXGLHVLQWKH3DULVRI³ZDVDYLVLEO\XQLWHG
FKXUFK´ZKLFKZRXOGDULVHWKURXJKWKHDFWLRQ of the Holy Spirit in enabling churches 
to move in the direction of a shared understanding of the faith. This deeper unity 
would allow each church to maintain its own distinctive identity. Unity would be 
achieved  
LQ*RG¶VRZQWLPHE\PHDQVODUJHO\KLGGHQ but [in ways] that can be pointed to by 
such words as convergence, rapprochement and integration. Each of the uniting 
bodies would have to change profoundly in order to enter into full communion, but 
they could do this, it was believed, without rejecting what is essential to their own 
identities.498 
+RZORQJVXFKDSURFHVVZRXOGWDNHDQGZKHWKHULW³ZRXOGEHVXFFHVVIXOSULRUWR
WKHHVFKDWRQ*RGRQO\NQHZ´499 but it would lead to a genuinely united church, 
albeit one rich in diversity. The precondition of the W\SHRI³FRQYHUJHQFH
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HFXPHQLVP´500 that Lindbeck has advocated is a trans-denominational unity that can 
develop around a common understanding of the principles of identity and 
DXWKHQWLFLW\ZLWKLQWKH&KULVWLDQWUDGLWLRQDQ³DJUHHPHQWRQZKHUHDQGKRZWKH
apRVWROLFWUDGLWLRQLVWREHORFDWHGDQGUHWULHYHG´501 Ecumenism therefore requires a 
deepening of the way in which the identity of the Christian tradition is understood, 
DQGDVDUHVXOW/LQGEHFN¶VZRUNSURYLGHVDQRSSRUWXQLW\WRH[DPLQHDQDSSURDFKWR
the understanding of the nature and identity of tradition which complements the 
work of Alasdair MacIntyre. 
The Criteriological Problem 
Divisions within the Christian tradition can be seen to reflect a lack of shared and 
agreed criteria for determining what should count as authentic elements of that 
tradition. Lindbeck explored what might be required to overcome this barrier to unity 
LQDOHFWXUHRQ³,QIDOOLELOLW\´WKDWKHJDYHLQ502 and his account is an important 
precursor to the position he was to set out in ND some 12 years later. Lindbeck 
observes that the teaching office of the Catholic Church forms the source of 
authority which binds that Church into a single body. Lindbeck argues that one 
ZHDNQHVVRIWKHSURWHVWDQWFKXUFKHVLVWKDWWKH\ODFNVXFKD³YLsible centre of 
XQLW\´503 However, the authority of the teaching office is supported by the dogma of 
infallibility; and while the purpose of this dogma is to provide a criterion of 
authenticity that can secure the continued coherence and identity of the Christian 
tradition, in practice it has become a focus of disunity and a barrier to integration - 
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as Pope Paul VI had recognised.504 The dogma has, therefore, become a contested 
doctrine in its existing form, even within the Catholic Church itself.505  
,Q³,QIDOOLELOLW\´/LQGEHFNDUJXHVWKDWWKHDSSDUHQWO\FRQWUDGLFWRU\SRVLWLRQVDGRSWHG
by Protestant and Roman Catholic churches with respect to this dogma may 
ultimately be reconcilable, because the terms used by each in the interpretation of 
this doctrine are almost certainly conceptualised differently within Protestant and 
Roman Catholic thought506 (although he does not underestimate the difficulties 
associated with such a task). Moreover, the interpretation of the terms that 
constitute this doctrine may vary in different historical and religious contexts, so that 
positions that were clearly contradictory at one time in one environment may 
become reconcilable when that context has changed.507 The issue of compatibility 
may therefore turn on the nature of the historical context in which doctrinal 
differences arise, and which shapes the interpretation of those doctrines at that 
point in time.508   
/LQGEHFNFRQWHQGVLQ³,QIDOOLELOLW\´WKDWFRQIOLFWEHWZHHQGRFWULQDOIRUPXODWLRQVVKRXOG
not necessarily be identified with fundamental religious differences because 
doctrines are, in any case, always partial and incomplete attempts to express the 
fundamental religious truths that underpin the complexity of the life of faith: 
... One must always remember that the faith affirmations, the real and primary 
dogmas of the community, are only very partially expressed in official definitions.  The 
fundamental affirmations cannot be captured in isolated propositions because they 
are functioning parts of the organically unified language systems and correlated forms 
of life in which the faith of a religious community is basically articulated.  Not even the 
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most elaborate network of de fide formulae can begin to exhaust the rich complexities 
of the primary dogmas.509 
A limited set of propositions cannot embody the potential for development 
HQFDSVXODWHGLQ³WKHSULPDU\GRJPDV´DQGLWZLOODOZD\VEHSRVVLEOHWRHODERUDWH
their significance further. Given this openness to development and interpretation, 
how are the authentic truths of Christianity to be recognised? In a review of a 
collection of papers edited by John Hick in 1979 (The Myth of the God Incarnate) 
/LQGEHFNGHVFULEHVWKLVDVWKH³FULWHULRORJLFDOSUREOHP´DQGSURIIHUVDVROXWLRQLQ
terms of the primacy of a process of interpretation that depends on the framework 
defined by biblical narrative: 
:KDWLVLJQRUHG>LQ+LFN¶VERRN@LVWKHFULWLFDOFULWHULRORJLFDOSUREOHP)URPZKHUH
does one get, not the concepts for describing, but the norms for identifying God, for 
defining the divine, for evaluating religious experience? Are these derived from within 
the world of biblical narrative (understood as culminating in the stories about Jesus), 
or from some other religious, intellectual, or cultural framework or language game? If 
the former, then some form of postmodern "orthodoxy" is the only alternative: the 
&KULVWLDQ*RGLVGHILQHGE\WKH&KULVWLDQVWRU\%XWWKLV>+LFN¶V@ERRNWDNHVWKHODWWHU
option. It tacitly seems to adopt the old liberal assumption that enlightened reason 
and conscience have access to independent or transcendent criteria which enable 
them to pick and choose what is of highest value from within the various religious 
traditions.510 
7KLVUHVSRQVHWR+LFNUHIOHFWV/LQGEHFN¶VIXQGDPHQWDOHSLVWHPRORJLFDOSHUVSHFWLYH
Lindbeck, like MacIntyre, repudiates the modernist assumption that one can 
adjudicate between different comprehensive frameworks of belief through an appeal 
to some transcendent criterion of validity that is external to all frameworks.511  But if 
one cannot do this, the criteria by which one determines the validity of religious 
perspectives will have to be found within the religious framework itself, and for 
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Lindbeck the source of such criteria must rest within the scriptural canon. However, 
the meaning of these scriptural narratives needs to be interpreted, and there is, 
therefore, a need for a common hermeneutic approach which enables the meaning 
of these stories to be interpreted correctly.  Lindbeck later argued that such a 
methodology is embodied in the principles which underpinned what he calls 
³FODVVLFDOELEOLFDOKHUPHQHXWLFV´,QWKLVDSSURDFK 
... the Bible as interpreted within the Christian mainstream purports to provide a totally 
comprehensive framework, a universal perspective, within which everything can be 
properly construed and outside of which nothing can be equally well understood. 512 
The Bible provides the framework in which a community can understand its 
changing environment. The application of Scripture to the changing contexts in 
which communities find themselves is guided by the institutions, history and 
practices of those communities. Text, history and church form an inseparable whole 
ZKLFKLQWHUSUHWHDFKRWKHUDQGIRUPWKHFRPPXQLW\¶VUHVRXUFHVIRULQWHUSUHWLQJWKH
world. This interpretative capacity forms the basis for the sustained development of 
communities whose identity can be maintained over millennia.513 /LQGEHFN¶VERRN
The Nature of Doctrine (ND), represents a sustained discussion of the nature of a 
UHOLJLRQDVVXFKDQ³LQWHUSUHWDWLYHPHGLXP´514 In so far as some elements of a 
religion are comparable to a MacIntyrean tradition of enquiry (particularly its 
theological articulation), this discussion can also shed light on the identity of 
traditions; on the role played by doctrines (conceived as rules of assertion, 
expression and practice) as constitutive elements in such traditions; on the nature 
of tradition-constituted rationality; and on the nature of epistemological crisis. 
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3.2 The Nature of Doctrine  
In ND Lindbeck suggests that doctrinal teachings differentiate churches from each 
other and define the boundaries between different communities of belief. Lindbeck 
asserts that: 
Church doctrines are communally authoritative teachings regarding beliefs and 
practices that are considered essential to the identity or welfare of the group in 
question.  They may be formally stated or informally operative, but in any case they 
indicate what constitutes faithful adherence to a community.515 
A member who rejects the communally authoritative doctrines of a religious 
community will ultimately alienate herself from that community. Statements of 
doctrine therefore serve to articulate the identity of a religious community and its 
PHPEHUVDQGDUWLFXODWHWKHFRPPXQLW\¶VPRVWLPPHGLDWHO\LPSRUWDQWDQGGHILQLQJ
commitments, both for the benefit of its adherents and in response to those who 
might challenge its views. In fulfilling this function doctrines identify a set of required 
beliefs and practices that should be shared by all members of the community. 
Lindbeck takes the existence of such a core set of distinctive beliefs or practices as 
a minimum requirement for the existence of a distinct religious community: 
A religious body cannot exist as a recognizably distinctive collectivity unless it has 
some beliefs and/or practices by which it can be identified.516 
Doctrinal statements may therefore serve to define the points of identity and 
difference between separate religious communities, at times when those differences 
need to be formally expressed. As a result of these identity-forming functions, 
differences in doctrine would appear to signal the existence of significant barriers to 
Christian unity, unless one community or another is prepared to abandon some of 
the doctrines which have served to define its identity as a distinct group. However, 
Lindbeck points out that the history of ecumenicism shows that differences between 
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religious communities can sometimes be resolved, without either side having to 
abandon its beliefs and capitulate to the perspective of the other community.517  
There is, therefore, a dissonance between the theoretical presentation of doctrinal 
division and its allegedly church-dividing consequences, and the ecumenical reality 
ZLWKZKLFK/LQGEHFNKDGHQJDJHG/LQGEHFN¶VJRYHUQLQJDVVXPSWLRQLVWKDWWKis 
dissonance has arisen because theology has embraced mistaken interpretations of 
the nature of doctrine, and that these interpretations have arisen in turn from the 
adoption of mistaken theories with respect to the nature of religion. These theories 
cannRWDFFRXQWDGHTXDWHO\IRUWKHVWUDQJHLQWHUWZLQLQJRI³YDULDELOLW\DQGLQYDULDELOLW\
LQPDWWHUVRIIDLWK´ 518 that a study of ecumenical relationships reveals. Lindbeck 
therefore seeks to diagnose the faults of the dominant models of religion, and to 
construct a more effective model.  
/LQGEHFN¶V&ULWLFLVPRI&RQWHPSRUDU\0RGHOVRI5HOLJLRQ 
Lindbeck suggests that contemporary theories of religion predominantly take two 
PDLQIRUPV)LUVWO\³FRJQLWLYH-SURSRVLWLRQDO´&3WKHRULHVRIUHOLJLRQFRQWHQGWKDW
religious beliefs and statements of doctrine should be interpreted in primarily 
propositional terms, as assertions about the nature of a spiritual reality.519 Secondly, 
³H[SHULHQWLDO-H[SUHVVLYH´((WKHRULHVWUHDWUHOLJLRXVVWDWHPHQWVDVSULPDULO\
symbolic expressions of what would otherwise be inexpressible religious 
experiences.520 He also identifies a third  class of theories that seek to reconcile the 
opposition between cognitive-propositional and experiential-expressive 
LQWHUSUHWDWLRQVE\FRPELQLQJWKHPLQWR³Wwo-GLPHQVLRQDO´LQWHUSUHWDWLRQVRIWKH
nature of religion,521 thereby acknowledging that religious assertions have both 
propositional and expressive functions. However, Lindbeck devotes little attention to 
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such theories, seeing them as combining the perspectives and the defects of both 
CP and EE accounts. It is therefore legitimate for this discussion to focus on his 
criticism of CP and EE models.522 
Lindbeck argues that the CP theory has difficulty in explaining the possibility of 
ecumenical reconciliation where the doctrines of different communities conflict, 
because, if doctrinal statements express propositions about the nature of a spiritual 
reality, differences between doctrines must indicate fundamental disagreements 
about ontological commitments. And if this is the case, the resolution of doctrinal 
conflict would appear to require one community to abandon some of its identity-
defining beliefs about reality, should it concede that the apparently contradictory 
doctrines of another community are true:523  
For a propositionalist, if a doctrine is once true, it is always true, and if it is once false, 
it is always false... Agreement can only be reached if one or both sides abandon their 
earlier positions.524 
Experiential-expressive interpretations of religious beliefs, on the other hand, treat 
religious statements as symbolic expressions of spiritual experiences that are 
common to all people. Religious doctrines act to symbolise, express or evoke such 
experiences. Variability in the terminology in which these common experiences are 
expressed should not act as a barrier to ecumenism, because such linguistic 
differences do not reflect fundamental differences in the nature of the religious 
experience that underpins all religious belief. If doctrinal statements act as symbols, 
differences in their formulation:  
...  are not crucial for religious agreement or disagreement, because these are 
constituted by harmony or conflict in the underlying feelings, attitudes, existential 
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orientations or practices, rather than by what happens on the level of symbolic 
(including doctrinal) objectifications525 
On this interpretation of the nature of religious language and doctrine, differences in 
religious belief are obliterated in the melting-pot of religious experience. Any degree 
of variation in doctrinal formulation appears to be consistent with an underlying unity 
of religious experience. On the EE model 
There is ... at least the logical possibility that a Buddhist and a Christian might have 
basically the same faith, although expressed very differently.526 
However, an experiential interpretation of the beliefs of religious communities would 
appear to be inconsistent with the way in which religious groups articulate their own 
identity. The differences between themselves and other communities are expressed 
in terms of (apparently) conflicting accounts of the nature of ultimate reality.527 
Lindbeck suggests that the consequences of the failure of both CP and EE models 
of religion to account for variability (on a CP interpretation) and identity (on an EE 
interpretation) may encourage a relativist or perspectivist interpretation of the claims 
to religious truth which characterise the identities of different religions.528  
Ecumenical progress exhibits a combination of invariability (in that adherents of one 
religion continue to hold to the truth of their doctrines) and also variability (in that 
expressions of belief that at one time appeared irreconcilable can now be 
interpreted in ways that allow for their harmonisation).529 Lindbeck argues that the 
failure of the CP and EE models of religion to explain this type of phenomena 
reflects their underlying adherence to an Enlightenment epistemology. CP models 
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of religion assume that religious language and religious assertions gain their 
meaning and truth by corresponding to aspects of some transcendent reality. 
+RZHYHUVXFKDQLQWHUSUHWDWLRQRIPHDQLQJZDVUHQGHUHGSUREOHPDWLFE\.DQW¶V
philosophy, which identified the boundaries of propositional significance and 
knowability with the limits represented by the structure and contents of human 
experience. If religious assertions allegedly gain their significance by referring to 
some reality that transcends such experience their meaningfulness is brought into 
question. EE models of religion have sought to respond to this Kantian challenge by 
re-interpreting the function of religious discourse in terms of an expression of 
universal spiritual experiences. 530 Different religious doctrines, practices and 
languages are simply different ways of articulating the nature and implications of 
such experiences.531  By linking religious discourse to human experience in this way 
the EE model ensures that its interpretation of the nature of religious assertion and 
language meets the Kantian criterion of significance. Despite their apparent 
opposition to each other, therefore, CP and EE models of religion can both be 
interpreted as responses to a single Enlightenment account of the nature and limits 
of meaning and truth. 
3.3 Religion as an Interpretative Medium 
,Q/LQGEHFN¶VVFKHPDWLFDFFRXQW((DQG&3LQWHUSUHWDWLRQVof religion reduce the 
nature of religious belief to one particular aspect of religion -- to propositional 
significance on the one hand or to the expression of religious experience on the 
other. Lindbeck argues that each model is based on an inadequate understanding 
of religious language and practice, and as a result the accounts of doctrine that 
have emerged from these perspectives are equally inadequate.  Each theory lacks 
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the conceptual resources required to solve their difficulties. From a MacIntyrean 
perspective what is required to overcome these problems is a creative process of 
conceptual innovation which will not only resolve the specific difficulties but also 
explain why these difficulties have arisen. 532  
Conceptual innovation is an explicit feature RI/LQGEHFN¶VDSSURDFKDQGKLVDQDO\VLV
of the nature of intractable intellectual problems could easily be expressed in the 
vocabulary of epistemological crisis. Lindbeck writes that in theology (as in other 
disciplines) 
Anomalies accumulate, old categories fail, and with luck or skill ... new concepts are 
found that better serve to account for the data. If they are not found, the 
consequences can be intellectually and religiously traumatic.533  
In order to overcome the inadequacy of the existing conceptualisations of religion, 
Lindbeck seeks to construct concepts that explain how the propositional and 
experiential functions of religious language reified by the CP and EE models are 
URRWHGLQWKHIRUPVRIOLIHRIUHOLJLRXVFRPPXQLWLHV/LQGEHFN¶VDSSURDFKWUHats the 
central features of a religion as akin to languages and their associated cultures and 
forms of life.534 /LQGEHFNUHIHUVWRWKLVDOWHUQDWLYHPRGHORIUHOLJLRQDV³FXOWXUDO-
OLQJXLVWLF´DQGODEHOVWKHXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIGRFWULQHWKDWHPHUJHVIURPWKLVPRdel as 
DµUHJXODWLYH¶RUµUXOH¶WKHRU\´535 2QWKH&/PRGHODUHOLJLRQLV³DQLQWHUSUHWDWLYH
VFKHPH´536 that provides the community that embraces it with a set of resources for 
interpreting and understanding both the external world and the world of inner 
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experience, and defines a set of practices associated with the conduct of the 
religion. It also provides a cultural framework for shaping the personal qualities and 
behaviour of members of the community in approved ways. It therefore provides a 
total framework for the interpretation, understanding and governance of all aspects 
of the life of a community:  
... a religion may be viewed as a kind of cultural and/or linguistic framework or 
medium that shapes the entirety of life and thought.  It functions somewhat like a 
Kantian a priori, although in this case the a priori is a set of required skills that could 
be different.  It is not primarily an array of beliefs about the true and the good 
(although it may involve these), or a symbolism expressive of basic attitudes, feelings, 
or sentiments (though these will be generated).  Rather, it is similar to an idiom that 
makes possible the description of realities, the formulation of beliefs, and the 
experiencing of inner attitudes, feelings, and sentiments.  Like a culture or language, 
it is a communal phenomenon that shapes the subjectivities of individuals rather than 
being primarily a manifestation of those subjectivities.537  
$VVXFKD³.DQWLDQDSULRUL´DUHOLJLRQSURYLGHVERWKWKHUHVRXUFHVWKURXJKZKLFK
propositions about the nature of spiritual reality can be asserted, and also the 
means through which spiritual and other experiences can be articulated. Lindbeck 
argues that the relationship between religion and experience is not "unilateral but 
dialectical". In this LQWHUDFWLRQKRZHYHULWLV³UHOLJLRXVDQGFXOWXUDOIDFWRUVWKDW
FDQEHYLHZHGDVWKHOHDGLQJSDUWQHUV´538 The CL model: 
...reverses the relation of the inner and the outer.  Instead of deriving external 
features of religion from inner experience, it is the inner experiences which are viewed 
as derivative.539   
Religious experience is constituted through the cultural and linguistic forms of the 
religion.540 Because experience can only be classified through the medium of 
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language, the source of religious concepts cannot be prior experience.541  Lindbeck 
therefore challenges the notion that there is an inner experience of God common to 
all human beings which provides the fundamental basis for the development of 
religions.542  Rather, he views religions as idioms for dealing with whatever is most 
important in human life.543  
/LQGEHFN¶V&/PRGHOVXJJHVWVWKDWEHFRPLQJVRFLDOLVHGLQWRDUHOLJLRQLQYROYHVD
process of assimilation to a new culture in which one must learn a new language 
and forms of behaviour, and become initiated into social practices whose purpose 
may not be apparent at the beginning of the process. Through this process of 
socialisation, the initiate develops the conceptual resources and practice skills 
necessary to reinterpret the world within the semiotic framework provided by the 
religion, and to conceptualise their inner experience in spiritual terms.  
In thus inverting the relation of the internal and external dimensions of religion, 
linguistic and cultural approaches resemble cognitivist theories for which external (i.e., 
propositionally statable) beliefs are primary, but without the intellectualism of the 
latter.  A comprehensive scheme or story used to structure all dimensions of 
existence is not primarily a set of propositions to be believed, but is rather the medium 
in which one moves, a set of skills that one employs in living one's life.544 
Although Lindbeck does not make this point explicitly, his theory does not simply 
replace CP, EE or two-dimensional theories of religion by showing that they are 
false and should be discarded. Rather, it explains how the propositional and 
experiential functions that they identify with the essence of religion have arisen 
through the way in which a religion functions as an interpretative medium.545 EE and 
CP accounts of religion mistakenly privilege the ways in which the interpretative 
                                               
541
 ND pp.37-39. 
542
 ND pp.39-40. 
543
 ND p.40. 
544
 ND p.35. 
545
 Nancey Murphy and James Wm. McClendon Jr. make a similar point in their paper 
³'LVWLQJXLVKLQJPRGHUQDQGSRVWPRGHUQWKHRORJLHV´Modern Theology, 1989, 5:3, pp.191-
214; p.206. 
190 
 
framework formed by a religion can both determine the way in which reality is 
described and the way in which experience is expressed, and mistakenly identify 
the essence of the religion with these subsidiary functions.  
Lindbeck argues that CP and EE models also lead to mistaken emphases in the 
interpretation of Scripture, treating these texts as either attempts to formulate 
philosophical propositions about the nature of ultimate reality, or as attempts to 
exemplify or give symbolic expression to universal spiritual experiences. On a CL 
account of religion, in contrast, the originating narratives of the religion are 
conceptualised as a set of stories which provide the initiating and continuing 
resources through which a community can interpret the meaning of its forms of life 
and its history in terms of moral and religious truths.546 The CL model therefore not 
only provides a means of overcoming the limitations of these alternative models, but 
also explains why the difficulties associated with the alternative models have arisen. 
/LQGEHFN¶VFRQFHSWXDOLQQRYDWLRQWKHUHIRUHH[HPSOLILHV0DF,QW\UH¶VDFFRXQWRIZKDW
is needed in order to resolve an epistemological crisis.547 
As an IM, religions must engage with the wider cultural and social environments in 
ZKLFKWKHFRPPXQLW\¶VUHOLJLRXVVRFLDOOLIHLVHPEHGGHG0HPEHUVRIWKHFRPPXQLW\
must make sense of this environment in ways that are consistent with the narratives 
that form the abiding core of the religion.548 These narratives provide the 
appropriately skilled adherent with a set of resources for interpreting their beliefs 
and experiences, constituted by a framework of ontological and ethical 
presuppositions - and, (within the Abrahamic religions at least), an overall narrative 
of the trajectory of the creation and the trajectory of a human life. As a result, 
Lindbeck argues that changes in religious belief do not proceed from new spiritual 
experiences or from the epistemological evaluation of religious truth claims, but 
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from the interaction of a community and its religious convictions with their changing 
social and intellectual environment. As a consequence, the nature of the 
propositional truth-claims which are legitimately made within the religious 
framework will also change:  
The first-order truth claims of a religion change in so far as these arise from the 
application of the interpretive scheme to the shifting worlds that human beings inhabit.  
What is taken to be reality is in large part socially constructed and consequently alters 
in the course of time.  The universe of the ancient Near East was very different from 
that of Greek philosophy, and both are dissimilar from the modern cosmos.  
Inevitably, the Christianised versions of these various world pictures are far from 
identical.  When different worlds with their distinct definitions of the good and the real, 
the divine and human, are re-described within one and the same framework of Biblical 
narrative, they continue to remain different worlds.549 
On the basis of this model, religious propositions are constructed through the 
application of the central narratives of the religion to the varying cultural materials 
available to a community at different times in its history, and as a result of this 
interaction, new propositions may be formulated and earlier formulations may come 
to be held as false because of changes in the intellectual and cultural context. For 
example, doctrines that assert the immortality of the soul may be considered 
implausible today because mind-body dualism is now seen as logically 
incoherent.550 Propositional theories of religion struggle to accommodate such 
changes in what can be held to be true (although Lindbeck points out that more 
sophisticated versions of propositionalism can deal with such changes by 
distinguishing between the central proposition asserted and the form of words which 
are used to convey that assertion551). However, on a cultural-linguistic model what 
remains constant and invariable in the religion is not some immutable set of 
propositions, but the underlying rules to which different formulations of the same 
core beliefs conform.  To assert the immortality of the soul is one way of asserting 
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the promise of eternal life that is central to the Christian religion. Other ways of 
formulating propositions may still embody this central promise, without relying on a 
doubtful metaphysical dualism. Faithfulness requires adherence to the rule through 
which such propositions are generated, rather than through a conviction of the truth 
of any particular formulation.   
3.4 Doctrine, Rules and Identity 
Lindbeck argues that the interaction between a religious community and its 
environment is governed by processes of interpretation that are embodied in the 
FRPPXQLW\¶VEHOLHIVDQGpractices. The interpretative practices, capacities and skills 
that guide this interaction are rule governed, even where these rules are not 
explicitly formulated.552 Lindbeck argues that religious doctrines embody some of 
the rules that govern these practices. The formation of explicit doctrines is driven by 
the need for a community to define its core beliefs and maintain its continued 
identity against external or internal challenge, and such doctrines are therefore 
occasioned responses to conflict. 553  These origins in internecine and external 
controversy shape what formal doctrines do and do not embody: 
...insofar as official doctrines are the products of conflict, there are two important 
consequences: first, they must be understood in terms of what they oppose (it is 
usually much easier to specify what they deny than what they affirm); and, second, 
the official doctrines of a community may poorly reflect the most important and 
abiding orientations or beliefs, either because some of the latter may never have been 
seriously challenged (and therefore never officially defined) or because points that are 
under most circumstances trivial may on occasion become matters of life and 
death.554 
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The occasioned nature of official doctrines means that only some of the rules that 
govern the practices of the religious community will be explicitly formulated. Formal 
doctrines will be defined only at those points where challenge has so threatened the 
cohesion and identity of the community that a definitive ruling has had to be given 
RQSDUWLFXODUDVSHFWVRIWKHFRPPXQLW\¶VIDLWK0DQ\RWKHr rules will not be formally 
articulated, but will be implicit in the accepted practices of the community, and the 
standards of performance associated with those practices. Both formal and informal 
doctrines will act as the source of authority and identity within a religious 
community. Together they will define the requirements that have to be met if 
someone is to be considered a member of that community in good standing. Such 
rules define what is required or permissible within that community and therefore 
define what it is for that community to exist as a collectivity distinct from other 
religious (and indeed non-religious) collectivities.555 
Doctrines, therefore, encapsulate the standards of assertion, expressions of 
experience and practice that should be observed by members of the religious 
community. However, the rule qua rule is not a proposition asserting the existence 
of some spiritual reality, nor does it express some religious experience or embody a 
practice. Rather, the role of doctrines is regulatory. In assertion, for example, 
Doctrines regulate truth claims by excluding some and permitting others, the logic of 
their communally authoritative use hinders or prevents them from specifying positively 
what is to be affirmed.556   
7KXVRQ/LQGEHFN¶VDFFRXQWGRFWULQHVDUHSULPDULO\³FRPPXQDOO\DXWKRULWDWLYHUXOHV
RIGLVFRXUVHDWWLWXGHDQGDFWLRQ´557 The truth of the statements which describe 
such doctrines has to be determined by reference to human cultural institutions, 
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EHWZHHQ/LQGEHFN¶VSRVLWLRQDQGWKDWRI0DF,QW\UHPD\UHIOHFWWKLVPXWXDOLQIOXHQFHDPRQJ
others. 
555
 ND p.74. 
556
 ND p.19. 
557
 ND p.18. 
194 
 
rather than to religious experiences or spiritual realities. Interpreted in this way, 
such rules are not first order propositions making ontological or knowledge claims, 
but second order assertions which make intra-systematic truth claims, as Lindbeck 
asserts.558 On this regulative model, doctrines can be conceived as conditional 
VWDWHPHQWVRIWKHIRUP³LI\RXZLVKWREHDJRRGPHPEHURIWKLVFRPPXQLW\WKHQ
you must assert a, b and c, and/or engage in practices such as x, y and z, and 
UHIUDLQIURPDVVHUWLQJSUDFWLVLQJ´6XFKUXOHVZRXOGQRWDVsert propositions a, b 
DQGFGLUHFWO\DQGWKHUHIRUHZRXOGQRWDVVHUWWKHVHSURSRVLWLRQV³SRVLWLYHO\´WRXVH
/LQGEHFN¶VZRUGQRUZRXOGWKH\SURYLGHDWKHRORJLFDOLQWHUSUHWDWLRQRIWKHWHUPV
used in constructing the statement of doctrine. Such rules of assertion specify 
rather than interpret those propositions that can be asserted as true if an individual 
or group are to meet requirements for community membership. As descriptions of 
standards that apply to particular human communities in particular environments, 
doctrines may be binding at one time and in some circumstances, but in other times 
and in different circumstances they may not be binding. 
Lindbeck does not claim that statements of doctrine cannot be used propositionally 
or expressively, but holds that where doctrines are used as first order propositions 
or symbols they are not functioning as doctrines per se. 
What is innovative about the present proposal is that this [regulative function] 
becomes the only job that doctrines do in their role as church teachings.559 
Thus if we adopt an anthropological perspective with respect to a religious 
community we would find occasions on which a statement of doctrine is used 
regulatively, and occasions when it is used propositionally or expressively, but it is 
the regulative role alone that represents its doctrinal function for Lindbeck.560 This is 
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not only because this function is logically prior to the application of the rule to make 
specific assertions or symbolise experience, but also because treating the assertive 
function as primary would fail to clarify and resolve the conflicts that act as a barrier 
to ecumenism.  
Treating the regulative function of doctrine as central helps to explain why 
propositional variability should not automatically be a major barrier to Christian 
unity. Such variability would not necessarily affect the underlying identity of the 
religious community for Lindbeck, because a religion should not be identified with 
any particular set of propositions. It is an interpretative framework built upon the 
narrative resources defined by the Biblical stories.561 The doctrines defined by a 
community shape the vocabulary and rules of grammar that can be applied to this 
narrative core and to the practices that govern other aspects of its life at any one 
time. As a result of the interaction between the secular and the sacred, the 
language within which the divine is described will change as worldviews change but 
in Christianity the underlying story of passion and resurrection and the basic rules 
for the application of this story remain the same.562 
Theological and religious transformations that lead to relativistic denials of an abiding 
identity (when one assumes constancy must be propositional, or symbolic, or 
experiential) can be seen, if one adopts rule theory, as the fusion of a self-identical 
story with the new worlds within which it is told and retold.563 
Lindbeck points out that this type of constancy is characteristic of different natural 
languages, cultures and other religions, and does not require any supernatural 
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explanation. He argues that attempting to identify what is constant in a religion with 
either propositions or experiences is doomed to failure because how both 
experiences and propositions are expressed will vary, depending on the cultural 
world in which they are formulated, and the different articulations of knowledge 
within which they may be presented.   
The experiences generated by religion are on this view just as variable as its 
propositionally statable descriptions of the world and of God.  This contrasts with an 
expressivist model, which locates what is religiously normative and abiding in the 
depths of the inner self.  Such a model may suggest that the experience of love, for 
example, identifies what is truly Christian, but for rule theory, it is the Christian story 
which alone is able to identify what for Christians is true love.564 
:KDWLVLQYDULDEOHDVIDUDV/LQGEHFNLVFRQFHUQHGLV³WKHIUDPHZRUNDQGWKH
medium within which Christians know and experience".565 
 When put this way, it seems almost self-evident that the permanence and unity of 
doctrines, despite changing and diverse formulation, is more easily accounted for if 
they are taken to resemble grammatical rules rather than propositions or expressive 
symbols (though, as we have noted, the same sentences in which the rules are stated 
may function in these other ways also).566 
3.5 The Permanence of Belief 
2QHFKDOOHQJHWKDWQHHGVWREHFRQVLGHUHGLQUHODWLRQWR/LQGEHFN¶VWKHRU\RI
religion is whether his account of the nature of doctrine gives such scope to 
variability as to erode any significant degree of permanence from religious belief, 
because it identifies religion with a set of variably interpreted narratives and a 
(changing) interpretative framework. The stability of the faith would require that not 
only the narratives but also some elements of the interpretative framework should 
be fixed and unchangLQJ2Q/LQGEHFN¶VDFFRXQWWKHLQWHUSUHWDWLYHIUDPHZRUNLV
defined by doctrinal rules, in part at least. There must, therefore, be some doctrines 
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that identify and express these invariant components of that framework. Lindbeck 
acknowledges that, while some doctrines may be temporary and reversible, others 
must be considered to be permanent and irreversible rules that are essential 
components of the Christian faith.567 But what then is the criterion for distinguishing 
between the permanent and the impermanent? This is, of course, a version of the 
criteriological question I described at the beginning of this chapter.  
Some doctrines are clearly behavioural and ethical directives, and their status as 
rules is, therefore, non-controversial. Lindbeck refers to WKHVHDV³SUDFWLFDO
GRFWULQHV´6RPHSUDFWLFDOGRFWULQHVVXFKDVWKH³ODZRIORYH´DUHKHVXJJHVWV
³XQFRQGLWLRQDOO\QHFHVVDU\´HOHPHQWVRIWKHIDLWK³DV>IRUH[DPSOH@WKHUHDUHQR
circumstances in which Christians are not commanded to love God or neighERXU´
Such injunctions apply irrespective of changes in circumstances. Other rules are 
³FRQGLWLRQDOO\HVVHQWLDO´DQGPD\QRORQJHUDSSO\LQFKDQJHGFLUFXPVWDQFHVDQG
into this category Lindbeck places the injunction that Christians should not 
participate in war (for example).  All unconditionally necessary rules are permanent, 
but some conditionally necessary rules may also become permanent, because they 
will remain in force while the conditions which require them remain, and if these 
conditions are permanent features of the environment then the doctrine will equally 
be permanent.568 /LQGEHFNSODFHVWKHFKXUFK¶VPRGHUQRSSRVLWLRQWRVODYHU\LQWR
this category.569  
This taxonomy allows for the development of practical doctrines (since a new 
conditional doctrine may emerge when changing circumstances demand it), and 
equally allows for debate as to whether any particular doctrine is necessary and 
permanent. Agreement that a practical doctrine is conditionally necessary allows for 
the possibility of changed circumstances rendering such a doctrine redundant, and 
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therefore allows for the prospect of conciliation between churches who (because of 
different circumstances) espouse apparently conflicting conditional practical 
doctrines. Does this taxonomy apply to doctrines that govern the formulation of 
assertoric propositions with ontological import? Lindbeck suggests that it does: 
[assertoric doctrines] also can be viewed as unconditionally or irreversibly necessary, 
as permanent or temporary, as reversible or irreversibOH+LVWRULFDOO\WKH$SRVWOH¶V
creed and the ancient Trinitarian and Christological confessions of faith of Nicaea and 
Chalcedon have been treated as unconditionally and permanently essential. A 
doctrine such as the immortality of the soul, in contrast, could perhaps be classified 
as conditional, temporary, and reversible.570 
As we have seen, the immortality of the soul is a conditional doctrine because it 
expresses the promise of eternal life in terms of a Hellenistic division of body and 
soul. It may, therefore be necessary to assert this proposition as a truth whenever 
such concepts are used in order to express Christian truths, but not when such 
dualism is rejected and an alternative vocabulary is employed.  The regulative 
element of such a doctrine arises because it requires certain forms of assertion in 
one particular conceptual context. However, this regulative aspect reflects the 
requirements of another doctrine which is unconditionally necessary: the promise of 
eternal life. The doctrine of the immortality of the soul may be a specific, conditional 
and temporary formulation of this more fundamental and permanent doctrine.  
However, the unconditionally necessary doctrine of eternal life appears to express a 
rule of assertion that could also be expressed in propositional terms. Doctrines that 
enjoin such beliefs arguably have a dual function as model or exemplar propositions 
which act both as assertions of the truth of a particular belief and specify some of 
the boundaries of legitimate forms of expression. If a doctrine is considered as an 
exemplar proposition then it is either true and irreversible or false.571 /LQGEHFN¶V
                                               
570
 ND p.86. 
571
 7KLVLVWKHYDOLGSRLQWPDGHE\/HH%DUUHWW¶VSDSHUFLWHGHDUOLHULQWKLVVHFWLRQ³7KHRORJ\
DVJUDPPDUUHJXODWLYHSULQFLSOHVRUSDUDGLJPVDQGSUDFWLFHV´ p.171. 
199 
 
DVVHUWLRQWKDWWKHRUHWLFDOGRFWULQHVFDQ³SHUKDSVEHFODVVLILHG´LQWKHVDPHZD\DV
a practical doctrine, begs the question as to whether theoretical doctrines embody 
an irreducible propositional function, as well as regulating assertion. Lindbeck does 
not offer any conclusive arguments to establish their status as rules, other than a 
historical one (in terms of the alleged priority of the regulative function when these 
doctrinal statements were first formulated).572  
In proposing the regulative theory, Lindbeck is proffering a choice with respect to 
the interpretation of the status of theoretical doctrines: one can either treat 
theoretical doctrines as rules or one can choose to interpret them as propositions. 
+HDFNQRZOHGJHVWKDW³DVRSKLVWLFDWHGSURSRVLWLRQDOLVP´FDQGLVWLQJXLVKEHWZHHQD
particular formulation of a proposition (which may be recognised as in error) and the 
underlying meaning (which may be permanent and unchanging, and indeed of such 
profundity so that the full meaning of a doctrine remains inexpressible). But if one 
accepts a propositional interpretation one is presumably accepting that acceptance 
of the doctrine requires an ontological commitment, and one is then in danger of 
reaching the impasse he identified in relation to CP models in general: conflict over 
the formulation of doctrines represents conflict over ontological commitments. The 
attraction of the regulative model is that it does not require, as a condition of 
faithfulness, a commitment to particular (and potentially ecumenically unhelpful) 
interpretations of the assertions that flow from these rules. 
The issue [of the distinction between regulative and propositional interpretations of 
doctrine] is a narrow one. Rule theory does not prohibit speculation on the possible 
correspondence of the Trinitarian pattern of Christian language to the metaphysical 
structure of the Godhead, but simply says that these are not doctrinally necessary 
and cannot be binding ... ontological interpretations of the Trinity do not, or should 
not, be made communally normative for the way in which Christians live and think.573 
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 /LQGEHFN¶VFRQFHSWXDOLQQRYDWLRQWKHUHIRUHFDQEHVHHQDVUHTXLUing an 
interpretation of conformity to the Christian faith as conformity to the requirements 
of all unconditionally and conditionally necessary doctrines, interpreted as rules of 
behaviour, expression and assertion. It does not require an acceptance of particular 
interpretations of the ontological truth of the propositions that flow from these 
requirements as a condition of orthodoxy and community membership. As a result, 
disagreement about the ontological implications of the doctrine of eternal life (for 
example) would not act as a barrier to a deeper unity embodied in the regulative 
functions of the rules (or propositions) that form the permanent elements of the 
Christian faith.  
7KHZHDNQHVVRI/LQGEHFN¶VSRVLWLRQKHUHLVWZRIROG)LUVWO\LWGRHVQRWRIIer a clear 
criterion for distinguishing between temporary, unconditionally necessary and 
conditionally necessary doctrines, or between permanent and reversible doctrines.  
In Section 4.3 I suggest that the emergence of an epistemological crisis may 
provide an empirical test as to which doctrines might be considered permanent and 
irreversible, but there appears to be no a priori basis on which one might distinguish 
such decisions in advance of an anthropological investigation of their role within a 
particular community.  Secondly, the cultural-linguistic interpretation of religion is 
offered as a model which offers certain benefits if it is adopted, but which is not 
ontologically true in all respects. Practical doctrines are clearly rules, but theoretical 
doctrines are at best hybrid formulations which embody both regulative and 
SURSRVLWLRQDOHOHPHQWV/LQGEHFN¶VPRGHOLVSUDJPDWLFDOO\KHOSIXOLQIRVWHULQJ
ecumenism574  but it cannot be defended as a definitively correct account of the 
nature of religion, doctrine and Christian identity.  
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This deficit is an inevitable consequence of the fact that Lindbeck is seeking to 
construct a model. Models are modes of interpretation, ways of identifying and 
constructing patterns that make sense of disparate phenomena. Indeed, William 
Placher claims that Christian theology is always engaged in constructing such 
interpretative patterns.575 However, the creation of one particular interpretation does 
not exclude the possibility of other plausible patterns being constructed from the 
same set of phenomena.  A model is an interpretation which selects out and favours 
some limited set of elements of a complex whole. Such a model may embody 
elements of truth, but it will not fully encapsulate the nature of the complex reality 
from which it is drawn, and at times an interpretation must be discarded and 
UHSODFHGE\GLIIHUHQWPRGHOVWKDWHPERG\RWKHUHOHPHQWVRIWKHWUXWK0DF,QW\UH¶V
notion of a tradition is also a model, a way of constructing an explanatory pattern in 
a highly complex socLDODQGLQWHOOHFWXDOKLVWRU\1HLWKHU/LQGEHFN¶VFXOWXUDOOLQJXLVWLF
PRGHORIUHOLJLRQQRU0DF,QW\UH¶VDFFRXQWRIDWUDGLWLRQRIHQTXLU\LVDEOHWRFODLPWR
represent some unchallengeable truth about the nature of a religion or a tradition, 
because each represents the outcome of a selective process of interpretation. But 
bringing the CL model of religion and the MacIntyrean model of a tradition of 
enquiry into dialogue will enable me to strengthen the coherence of these models in 
particular ways. My intentiRQLVWRXVH/LQGEHFN¶VQRWLRQRIUHOLJLRQDVDQ
interpretative medium as a way of illuminating the nature of a MacIntyrean tradition 
of enquiry. But before doing this it is necessary to issue some notes of caution with 
respect to the limitations of LindbeFN¶VPRGHO7KHVHFDXWLRQDU\QRWHVUHODWHWRWKH
PHWDSKRULFDOQDWXUHRI/LQGEHFN¶VDFFRXQWRIUHOLJLRQDQGGRFWULQHKLVDVVXPSWLRQV
DERXWWKHQDWXUHRIFXOWXUHDQGWKHDSSOLFDELOLW\RIKLVPRGHOWR0DF,QW\UH¶V
position. 
 
                                               
575
 William Placher, Unapologetic Theology: A Christian Voice in a Pluralistic Conversation. 
Louisville: Westminster/John Knox Press, 1989; p.126. 
202 
 
3.6 Some limitations of Lindbeck¶VPRGHO 
/LQGEHFN¶VDFFRXQWRIWKHQDWXUHRIUHOLJLRQLVFRQVWUXFWHGWKURXJKPHWDSKRUDQG
metaphors can distort as well as illuminate.576 Two sets of metaphors are 
SDUWLFXODUO\LPSRUWDQWLQ/LQGEHFN¶VDFFRXQWHDFKFRUUHVSRQGLQJWRRQHRIWKHWHUPV
³OLQJXLVWLF´DQG³FXOWXUDO´)LUVWO\DVHWRIPHWDSKRUVJURZIURPWKHLGHDWKDWD
religion is like a language, both because it provides the conceptual resources that 
underpin interpretation, and because participation in the religion involves adherence 
to an underlying set of syntactic and semantic rules defined and exemplified in 
religious doctrines. The second set of images grows from the idea that a religion is 
like a culture into which adherents are socialised.   
Both sets of images present a picture of an adheUHQW¶VXQGHUVWDQGLQJDQG
interpretation of the world as shaped by the cultural and linguistic resources 
provided by the religion. This process is described as essentially unidirectional, 
flowing from the religion to the adherent and the world, rather than from the 
adherent or the world to the religion. It is not that religious beliefs change as secular 
ZRUOGYLHZVGHYHORSDQGFKDQJH5DWKHU³FKDQJLQJZRUOGYLHZVDUHUHLQWHUSUHWHGE\
RQHDQGWKHVDPHUHOLJLRQ´577 For Lindbeck, what is core to the identity of the 
religion are the rules that govern these interpretative processes, so that each 
Christian interpretation of new and alien worlds reflects the same underlying 
principles.578  And this analogy with a language provides Lindbeck with an account 
of the continuing identity of a religion, because the syntactic and semantic rules 
which embody these underlying principles provide the continuity that enables it to 
remain essentially unchanged despite successive changes in the environment with 
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which it engages. Thus, the religion will retain its underlying identity even if the 
content of the propositions that are asserted by the community change or the way in 
which that community conceptualises religious experience becomes radically 
different. 
To the degree that religions are like languages they can obviously remain the same 
amid vast transformations of affirmation and experience.579 
But, one has to ask, to what degree are religions like languages in this respect? 
Here Lindbeck is pushing his analogy beyond reasonable limits.  A natural language 
can be used to create fictions and scientific prose, philosophy and nonsense verse, 
the theory of relativity and )LQQHJDQ¶V:DNH. There are no built in rules which 
define the semantic limits of such innovation and experimentation. As an 
interpretative medium a language can respond with unlimited flexibility to new and 
contradictory thoughts and experiences. The principle of identity of a language is 
not, therefore, linked to anything that limits what can be legitimately asserted. But 
not all assertions or ways of characterising experience will be legitimate if one 
wishes to remain faithful to the narrative core of a religion. The linguistic analogy 
exhibits one function of the nature of a religion, but this analogy should not blind us 
to the differences. The rules which constitute the religion frame what can be 
legitimately asserted, frame how experiences can be described and define what 
practices should be pursued. It therefore shapes what counts as legitimate 
interpretation and behaviour in a religious community far more thoroughly than a 
natural language shapes what counts as legitimate interpretation and behaviour 
among users of a natural language. 
7KHGLIIHUHQFHVEHWZHHQDUHOLJLRQDQGDODQJXDJHDUHDGGUHVVHGLQ/LQGEHFN¶V
second metaphor, which compares a religion to a culture that shapes its adherents 
in particular ways.  But here again the comparison can be misleading. The norms 
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that shape the behaviour of the faithful can be interpreted in terms of cultural rules, 
but such rules do not determine the behaviour of members of the community in a 
linear fashion.  Within the religious community there will be debate and conflict 
around the content and legitimacy of the quasi-syntactic and quasi-semantic rules 
that govern the religious form of life, and these debates will shape the nature and 
interpretation of these cultural rules. But although Lindbeck acknowledges that the 
relationship between religion and experience is dialectical, in practice he tends to 
write as if the direction is XQLODWHUDO$UHOLJLRQ³VKDSHVWKHVXEMHFWLYLWLHVRI
LQGLYLGXDOVUDWKHUWKDQEHLQJSULPDULO\DPDQLIHVWDWLRQRIWKRVHVXEMHFWLYLWLHV´580 He 
acknowledges the looseness of this mode of expression,581 but suggests that the 
most appropriate way of understanding the CL model is in terms of a reversal of the 
relationship between inner and outer. This emphasis reinforces an image of culture 
as the static determinant of experience,582 and this provides evidence for those 
critics such as Kathryn Tanner, who see Lindbeck as failing to fully acknowledge 
the internal dynamism of a culture, and the complementarity of its relationship to the 
external environment.583  ,QWKLVUHVSHFW/LQGEHFN¶VFXOWXUDO-linguistic account of 
religion shares some of the limitations of classical anthropological theory.  
Tanner points out that the classical anthropological notion of culture assumes a 
form of social determinism which regulates human nature and shapes the actions of 
the members of particular cultural groups.584 On this model the ideal type of a 
culture is an autonomous community which has a clearly defined boundary and is 
insulated from external influences. Differences are suppressed within each culture 
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by rules which define the appropriate behaviour of members, and the anthropologist 
assumes that consensus is the norm when she describes the culture.585 The norms 
that govern the behaviour of participants are interpreted as the constitutive rules of 
the culture.  
Tanner criticises this model for failing to recognise the diversity present within any 
culture. The model identifies the constitutive rules by privileging the discourse of 
some influential individuals in the community who are accepted as authoritative 
sources of information with respect to these rules, thereby confusing the 
acceptance of authority and power with the empirical description of norms that 
underpin the behavioural regularities of the group. Anthropology reifies these rules 
into the constitutive principles of a culture, and conveys an idealised impression of a 
community which is conflict free. But any culture will contain conflicts and debates 
over what count as legitimate and illegitimate expressions of the rules ± and, 
indeed, will be the forum of conflict over what these rules are or should be. As a 
result these norms will be subject to challenge, debate and change within a culture 
without that culture ceasing to exist.586 Successful communities develop processes 
for managing these conflicts and maintaining a stable consensus within which 
conflict can be identified and addressed. But this implies that the elements which 
form the self-identity of the culture may also evolve through these processes of 
conflict. Hence cultures are not fixed and unchanging: the historical process of 
debate, conflict and negotiation that has given rise to the current uneasy consensus 
will continue, and as a result the components of that consensus may change in the 
future.587  
7DQQHU¶VDUJXPHQWVVXJJHVWWKDWFDXWLRQVKRXOGEHH[HUFLVHGLQXVLQJWKHFRQFHSW
of culture in either philosophy or theolog\7KH³FXOWXUH´RIDFRPPXQLW\LVDVRFLDO
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construction that is defined through its description in anthropological discourse, 
rather than the name of a fixed object that quietly awaits our discovery. The 
descriptions of cultures which are the outcome of ethnographic research should, 
therefore, be seen as products of processes of interpretation which are contestable 
and subjective, rather than objective and factual. Nonetheless, the concepts of 
culture and cultural rules are helpful ways of understanding the interactions 
between people and who identify themselves as members of a single community.   
,QVHHNLQJWRDSSO\/LQGEHFN¶VDFFRXQWRIWKHQDWXUHRIUHOLJLRQDQGGRFWULQHWR
0DF,QW\UH¶VDFFRXQWRIWUDGLWLRQ,ZLOOVHHNWREDODQFHDQXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIFXOWure 
as a force which shapes individuals and their perceptions, with an account of the 
way in which that culture is shaped by processes of internal debate and conflict 
RYHULWVSXUSRVHDQGLGHQWLW\,ZLOOEHDVVLVWHGLQWKLVE\WKHIDFWWKDW0DF,QW\UH¶V
account of tradition is very sensitive to the delicate balance between consensus and 
conflict in a tradition,588 and this element of his work will also help me to strengthen 
/LQGEHFN¶VDFFRXQW 
A religion and a tradition of enquiry are not identical and a further challenge to my 
approach is the claim that faith communities and traditions of enquiry are too 
GLVVLPLODUIRUWKHDSSOLFDWLRQRI/LQGEHFN¶VPRGHOWR0DF,QW\UHWREHDUIUXLW
However, Lindbeck offers a definition of religion which is so broad as to embrace 
forms of belief that would not normally be identified as examples of religious faith. 
7KXVLQWKH³$IWHUZRUG´WR1'/LQGEHFNQRWHVWKDWKLVGHILQLWLRQRIUHOLJLRQDV
³FRPSUHKHQVLYHLQWHUSUHWLYHVFKHPHV´PHDQVWKDW 
Much that is religious in ordinary usage is excluded by this definition, and much that is 
not religious is included. Belief in supernatural beings ... is not religious unless one 
seeks to organise all of life, all beliefs and behaviour, around one or more of these 
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entities. Analogously, denial of the supernatural, what is usually called secularism, is 
religious when this denial is of all-embracing importance.589 
On this definition the nature of a religion lies in its capacity to form the interpretative 
centre of a life so that all aspects of reality, experience and action can be 
accommodated within its framework. A belief in the truth of any particular spiritual or 
ontological commitments is not its defining characteristic, although its use within a 
community may require such ontological commitments by members of that 
community. In acting as such an interpretative or hermeneutic framework a religion, 
like a tradition of enquiry into the nature of the good, may succeed or fail to interpret 
external concepts and events effectively, and may be successful or unsuccessful in 
shaping the lives of its adherents in ways that embody a plausible understanding of 
WKHJRRGOLIH7KHUHLVWKHUHIRUHDSULPDIDFLHEDVLVIRUFRPSDULQJ/LQGEHFN¶V
DFFRXQWRIUHOLJLRQWR0DF,QW\UH¶VDFFRXQWRIDWUDGLWLRQRIHQTXLU\. But can this 
SURFHVVVWUHQJWKHQ/LQGEHFN¶VPRGHO" 
0DF,QW\UH¶VUHOHYDQFHWR/LQGEHFN 
The question of Superiority  
$VZHVDZLQ6HFWLRQ/LQGEHFN¶VFXOWXUDO-linguistic model of religion has been 
developed in response to the need to explain the coexistence of variability and 
LQYDULDELOLW\RIEHOLHILQWKHKLVWRU\RIWKH&KULVWLDQIDLWK/LQGEHFN¶VDQVZHUWRWKLV
question of variability and invariability is twofold. Firstly, for Lindbeck there is an 
unchanging core to the religion in the original narratives which led to the 
establishment and evolution of the belief system. Secondly, the evolution of that 
system involves a response to internal and external challenges which leads to the 
construction of formal statements of doctrine, which specify what it is legitimate to 
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assert and what practices it is appropriate to pursue.590  0DQ\RIWKHFRPPXQLW\¶V
beliefs will however never be formalised and the formal doctrines will form only part 
of the regulative system of the community, which will also include many informal 
doctrines.  Lindbeck argues that some of these formal and informal doctrines are 
unconditionally permanent. These doctrines can be seen as forming the non-
negotiable core of the Christian religion, although there will be considerable debate 
around which doctrines might form that core, and, indeed, about the interpretation 
of the significance of these doctrines.  
The resolution of such debates depends on the ability to establish and agree some 
criteria which can be used to establish the superiority or truth of one perspective 
RYHUDQRWKHU/LQGEHFN¶V³QRQWKHRORJLFDO´591 account of religion relies on a quasi-
sociological and uncommitted perspective which does not need to resolve such 
TXHVWLRQVRIWUXWKRUVXSHULRULW\%XWDVD&KULVWLDQDQGDWKHRORJLDQ/LQGEHFN¶V
book is not simply a contribution to religious studies; it is the prolegomena to his 
attempt to establish a new postliberal method for theology, a topic to which he turns 
in the final chapter of ND. To be of interest and use to believers, Lindbeck 
recognises that his account must also be consistent with the way in which believers 
conceptualise their religion, and here the analogy with a language places his 
account at a disadvantage. While one language or culture does not seem to be 
superior to another, some religions claim such superiority over other faiths, and, 
indeed, may claim to be unsurpassably true. As Lindbeck points out, a 
nontheological theory does not need to demonstrate the superiority of one religion 
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over another ± but it at least needs to explain the meaning of such claims and show 
that such claims are coherent.592  
This requirement is particularly problematic for a cultural±linguistic account of 
religion, as according to the theory, religions qua interpretative mediums can 
interpret any set of events, challenges or theories within their framework. As 
Lindbeck says with respect to Christianity 
A scriptural world is ...able to absorb the universe.  It supplies the interpretive 
framework within which believers seek to live their lives and understand reality.593   
If any religion can accommodate any set of events then it would appear to be 
immune from falsification. But a corollary of this is that it will also be unable to 
demonstrate its claims to superiority with respect to other religions, because rival 
religions will be equally able to absorb apparently contrary events into their own 
frameworks. LindbeFN¶VJHQHUDOHSLVWHPRORJLFDOSHUVSHFWLYHLVRQHWKDWKHVKDUHV
with MacIntyre, and for both thinkers it appears to militate against constructing any 
immediately clear and straightforward answer to the question of superiority: 
there is no higher neutral staQGSRLQWIURPZKLFKWRDGMXGLFDWH>HDFKUHOLJLRQ¶V@
competing perceptions of what is factual and/or anomalous.  Comprehensive outlooks 
on religion, not to mention religions themselves, are not susceptible to decisive 
confirmation or disconfirmation.594 
Each interpretative medium is unique to a particular religion and helps to define the 
characteristics of a particular cultural group. Each interpretative medium may 
develop different notions of truth and justification.  Mutual incommensurability 
means that there may be no basis for judging between their competing claims. 
Indeed Lindbeck suggests that attempts to incorporate elements of one religion into 
the conceptual framework of another religion will result in nonsense, frustrating the 
attempt to evaluate one religion from the perspective of another: 
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In short, the cultural-linguistic approach is open to the possibility that different 
religions and/or philosophies may have incommensurable notions of truth, of 
experience, and of categorial adequacy, and therefore also of what it would mean for 
VRPHWKLQJWREHPRVWLPSRUWDQWLH³*RG8QOLNHRWKHUSHUVSHFWLYHVWKLV
approach proposes no common framework such as that supplied by the 
propositionalist concept of truth or the expressivist concept of experience within which 
to compare religions.  Thus when affirmations or ideas from categorially different 
religious or philosophical frameworks are introduced into a given religious outlook, 
these are either simply babbling or else, like mathematical formulas employed in a 
poetic text, they have vastly different functions and meanings than they had in their 
original settings.595 
Despite these difficulties, Lindbeck attempts to provide an account of superiority in 
religious contexts, developing his account in terms of the notions of categorial 
adequacy and performative truth. The problem which Lindbeck is addressing in 
developing these concepts is similar to the issues that MacIntyre addresses in 
attempting to construct an account of the superiority of one tradition of enquiry to 
another, and their accounts can help to support and clarify each other, as I will 
show in the following chapter. 
There are important parallels between the question of inter-religious superiority and 
intra-religious superiority. Lindbeck also seeks to clarify criteria for determining 
whether one position is superior to another when differences arise within the 
Christian community. He constructs the notion of intratextuality in order to provide 
such a criterion and I will discuss this in more detail in Chapter 4.6. The concept of 
³LQWUDWH[WXDOLW\´LVGHILQHGLQFRQWUDVWWRWKH³H[WUDWH[WXDO´UHVRXUFHVWKDW&3DQG((
theories rely upon for the validation of religious belief.  
[Extratextual method] locates religious meaning outside the text or semiotic system 
either in the objective realities to which it refers or in the experiences it symbolises, 
whereas for cultural-linguists the meaning is immanent ...Thus the proper way to 
determine what God signifies, for example, is by examining how the word operates 
                                               
595
 ND p.49. 
211 
 
within a religion and thereby shapes reality and experience...It is in this sense that 
theological description in the cultural-linguistic mode is intrasemiotic or intratextual.596 
The difficulty that Lindbeck is attempting to resolve with the notion of intratextuality 
as a theological method is a further version of the criteriological problem I described 
HDUOLHU,IDUHOLJLRQLVDEOHWR³DEVRUEWKHXQLYHUVH´LWFDQQRWUHO\RQH[WHUQDO
extratextual, resources to adjudicate between competing perspectives within the 
community. It must rely on the internal semiotic resources available to that 
community, through the interpretation of its seminal texts and narratives. But how is 
it possible to decide between conflicting interpretations of these texts? Here again, 
0DF,QW\UH¶VZRUNZLOOSURYHKHOSIXOLQFODULI\LQJDQGH[WHQGLQJ/LQGEHFN¶VDFFRXQWRI
intratextuality as a criterion for the resolution of disputes. Moreover, precisely the 
same issue of a lack of extra-textual resources relevant to determining the question 
of superiority arises in inter-religious and inter-denominational contexts. If each 
religion is capable of absorbing the universe within its framework then external 
evidence of confirmation or disconfirmation will not be available. My argument is 
that the resolution or non-resolution of the tensions which arise within the internal 
processes of absorption and interpretation form the basis for judgements of 
superiority in both intra- and inter-UHOLJLRXVFRQWH[WVDQGWKDW0DF,QW\UH¶VQRWLRQVRI
tradition-constituted rationality and epistemological crisis will be relevant to 
clarifying the nature of such processes. 
A third issue in relation to superiority arises in relation to theory choice in theology 
DQGZLWKLQRWKHUGLVFLSOLQHV/LQGEHFN¶VDGYRFDF\Rf a regulative account of 
doctrine appears to involve a process of persuasive definition, in which the 
propositional and expressive functions of doctrine are relegated to non-doctrinal 
status, at least in part for ecumenical reasons. However, such an approach is not 
VLPSO\SUDJPDWLFLWDOVRUHIOHFWV/LQGEHFN¶VLQWHUSUHWDWLRQRIWKHQDWXUHRIWKHRU\
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and epistemic progress. The construction of knowledge depends less on the 
deployment of successful argument and demonstrative proof or disproof than on a 
question of the pragmatic adoption and abandonment of particular perspectives, 
because they do or do not prove fruitful in tackling particular problems: 
... theories are abandoned not so much because they are refuted... but because they 
are unfruitful for new or different questions.597 
If theories are abandoned because they are no longer fruitful in addressing the new 
set of questions that have arisen, does that mean that theories should also be 
adopted for such pragmatic reasons?598 This may be inevitable if there is no theory-
transcendent criterion of justification, and, indeed, Lindbeck argues that different 
theological approaches, like interpretative media, define their own criteria of 
legitimacy and justification: 
The problem, as we have noted in earlier chapters, is that each type of theology is 
embedded in a conceptual framework so comprehensive that it shapes its own criteria 
of adequacy.599 
If this is the case, there will be an element of pragmatism in any theory selection. It 
is however, important to give an account of how such theory selection would be 
legitimate if the position is not to be seen as inviting the challenge that it is relativist 
or fideist. Lindbeck is concerned to repudiate these challenges. He is particularly 
conscious of the way in which intratextuality appears to portray belief systems as 
hermetically sealed self-justifying universes: 
First, intratextuality seems wholly relativistic: it turns religions, so one can argue, into 
self-enclosed and incommensurable intellectual ghettoes. Associated with this, in the 
second place, is the fideistic dilemma: it appears that choice between religions is 
purely arbitrary, a matter of blind faith.600 
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And again:  
...if intratextuality implies relativism and fideism the cost for most religious traditions is 
much too high ... [and] this conclusion... is antithetical to what most religions, whether 
interpreted in liberal, preliberal, or postliberal fashion, have affirmed.601 
The essence of this challenge is the claim that once one has abandoned 
Enlightenment models of justification the choice of any belief system must be 
arbitrary, because the only alternative to rational proof is fideism. As a result the 
rejection of such Enlightenment standards will, it is claimed, lead to an inexorable 
slide into relativism. LiQGEHFN¶VUHVSRQVHWRWKLVYLHZSRLQWLVEULHIEXWSRLQWV
towards the need for an alternative account of rationality if the challenge is to be 
overcome. Lindbeck argues that 
The issue is not whether there are universal norms of reasonableness, but whether 
these can be formulated in some neutral, framework independent language. 
Increasing awareness of how standards of rationality vary from field to field and age 
to age makes the discovery of such a language more and more unlikely and the 
possibility of foundational disciplines doubtful. Yet this does not reduce the choice 
between different frameworks to whim or chance.602 
/LQGEHFNVXJJHVWVLQWHUPVWKDWHFKR0DFLQW\UH¶VSRVLWLRQWKDWDOWKRXJK³GHILQLWLYH
UHIXWDWLRQ´PD\EHLPSRVVLEOHWKHUHDUHVWLOOUDWLRQDO constraints on what can be 
KHOGWREHWUXHHYHQWKRXJK³WKHVHFRQVWUDLQWVDUHWRRIOH[LEOHDQGLQIRUPDOWREH
VSHOOHGRXW´603 Lindbeck argues that while religious and theological positions cannot 
be decisively refuted or confirmed  
«>WKH\@FDQQHYHUWKHOHss be tested and argued about in various ways, and these 
tests and arguments in the long run make the difference.604 
0DF,QW\UH¶VDFFRXQWRIWUDGLWLRQFRQVWLWXWHGUDWLRQDOLW\FDQIOHVKRXWWKHEULHIDFFRXQW
given by Lindbeck and help to clarify how religious and theological positions can be 
                                               
601
 ND p.130. 
602
 ND p.130. 
603
 ND p.131. 
604
 ND p.131. 
214 
 
VXEMHFWWRVXFKWHVWLQJ,QWKHQH[WFKDSWHU,DPJRLQJWREULQJ/LQGEHFN¶VDQG
0DF,QW\UH¶VZRUNLQWRGLDORJXHLQRUGHUWRVKRZWKDW/LQGEHFN¶VSRVLWLRQFDQEH
developed into a more robust form if it is expressed in MacIntyrean terms. And like 
the relationship between a religion and the world that it interprets, this will be a two-
ZD\SURFHVV/LQGEHFN¶VQRWLRQVRIUHOLJLRQDVDQLQWHUSUHWDWLYHPHGLXPDQGKLV
regulative account of doctrine will also amplify and strengthen MaF,QW\UH¶VDFFRXQWV
of rationality and tradition.  
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Chapter 4 
Lindbeck and MacIntyre as Complementary Thinkers 
 
4.1 Introduction  
7KLVFKDSWHUGUDZVRQWKHSUHYLRXVGLVFXVVLRQWRVKRZWKDW0DF,QW\UH¶VDQG
/LQGEHFN¶VSRVLWLRQVDUHcomplementary, and that combining their positions can 
deepen an understanding of the nature of knowledge, of rationality, and of the 
superiority of one tradition to its rivals. This overall objective will be addressed by 
arguing a number of interconnected points. I will argue: 
1. 7KDWWKHFRPPRQHOHPHQWVRI/LQGEHFN¶VDQG0DF,QW\UH¶VWKHRULHVFDQ
EHGHVFULEHGLQWHUPVRIZKDW,FDOOD³KHUPHQHXWLFIUDPHZRUN´6HFWLRQ
4.2).  
2. 7KDW0DF,QW\UH¶VFHQWUDOFRQFHSWRIWUDGLWLRQFDQEHJLYHQJUHDWHU
specificity and empiULFDODSSOLFDWLRQE\LQWHUSUHWLQJWKH³IXQGDPHQWDO
DJUHHPHQWV´WKDW0DF,QW\UHFODLPVFRQVWLWXWHVXFKDWUDGLWLRQLQWHUPVRI
/LQGEHFN¶VFRQFHSWRIRSHUDWLYHGRFWULQHV6HFWLRQ 
3. That this interpretation of the nature of a tradition illuminates the concepts 
of incommensurability and tradition constituted rationality, and that it 
enables one to define more precisely the circumstances in which an 
epistemological crisis may arise (Section 4.4).  
4. 7KDW/LQGEHFN¶VDFFRXQWRIWKH&/PRGHOGRHVQRWSURYLGHDFRKHrent 
basis for judgements with respect to the superiority of one religious 
position to another, either in relation to inter- or intra-religious 
disagreements  (Sections 4.5-4.6), and that this failure leaves his position 
vulnerable to the challenge that it is relativist (Section 4.6).  
5. 7KDW/LQGEHFN¶VSRVLWLRQFDQEHVWUHQJWKHQHGE\WKHLQFRUSRUDWLRQRI
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0DF,QW\UH¶VDFFRXQWVRIWUDGLWLRQ-constituted rationality and 
epistemological crisis (Section 4.7). 
The final section of this chapter concludes the thesis. It briefly summarises what 
KDVEHHQDFKLHYHGDQGWKHQWXUQVWRWKHTXHVWLRQRIZKHWKHU0DF,QW\UH¶VDQG
/LQGEHFN¶VSRVLWLRQVDUHFRUUHFWO\GHVFULEHGDVUHODWLYLVW,WH[SOLFLWO\DGGUHVVHV
the question that has been under consideration throughout this thesis, as to 
ZKHWKHU0DF,QW\UH¶VWKHRU\SURYLGHVDQDGHTXDWHDFFRXQWRIWKHMXVWLILFDWLRQRI
belief in a comprehensive metaphysical system, and considers the extent to 
ZKLFK0DF,QW\UH¶VDFFRXQWLVRISUDFWLFDOUHOHYDQFHWRWKHLQGLYLGXDOZKRLV
considering whether to commit themselves to a particular tradition (Section 4.8). 
4.2 Lindbeck, MacIntyre and the notion of a hermeneutic framework 
 
7KHUHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQ0DF,QW\UH¶VDQG/LQGEHFN¶VWKRXJKW 
 
7KHUHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQ/LQGEHFN¶VDQG0DF,QW\UH¶VWKRXJKWKDs been 
acknowledged in the secondary literature. Both men are seen as complementary 
figures in a broader philosophical and theological reaction to the principles of 
modernity,605  and some parallels between their perspectives have been noted.  
For example, DHQQLV'R\OHKDVFRPPHQWHGRQWKHGHJUHHWRZKLFK0DF,QW\UH¶V
DFFRXQWRIFRPPXQLW\DQGWUDGLWLRQUHVRQDWHVZLWK/LQGEHFN¶VHFFOHVLRORJ\DQG
ZLWKWKHODWWHU¶VHPSKDVLVRQWKHPDLQWHQDQFHRID&KULVWLDQFXOWXUHLQD
pluralistic society.606  Victoria Harrison has drawn on both MacIntyre and 
Lindbeck to explore the issues arising from the decline of scriptural knowledge 
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within Christian communities,607 ZKLOH1LFKRODV+HDO\KDVH[DPLQHG/LQGEHFN¶V
DQG0DF,QW\UH¶VXVHRIWKHFRQFHSWRISUDFWLFHVLQRUGHUWRFULWLFLVHand 
VWUHQJWKHQWKHXVHRIWKLVQRWLRQLQWKHFRQVWUXFWLRQRIZKDWKHFDOOVWKH³QHZ
HFFOHVLRORJ\´608  'HDQ6PLWKKDVXVHG0DF,QW\UH¶VZRUNWRDUJXHWKDW
Evangelical and Liberal Christians occupy incommensurable traditions, and has 
XVHG/LQGEHFN¶VDFFRXQWRI CP and EE models of religion to suggest that each 
group have embraced incompatible epistemological assumptions.609   
There are, however, deeper synergies in their positions than has been generally 
recognised. This lack of recognition may be a consequence of the fact that 
Lindbeck and Macintyre have pursued separate academic disciplines and areas 
of enquiry during their distinguished careers.  As I have argued, the underlying 
XQLW\RI0DF,QW\UH¶VLQYHVWLJDWLRQVFDQEHXQGHUVWRRGLQWHUPVRIWKHTXHVWLRQRI
the justification of belief in a comprehensive metaphysical position.  In contrast, 
Lindbeck has been primarily concerned with the apparently unrelated question of 
the unity of the Christian faith. But each of them has become profoundly 
dissatisfied with the contemporary self-perception and theoretical approaches of 
their disciplines and both have come to see these disciplines as incapable of 
resolving the concerns they had identified. As a result both authors have 
constructed an alternative theoretical viewpoint which has enabled them to 
reconceptualise their respective problem areas, and this process of 
reconstruction has generated significant similarities in their positions.   
Some of these similarities have arisen because each has worked in the same 
cultural milieu and have been exposed to similar influences. Both have been 
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influenced by philosophers such as Wittgenstein610 and each has been engaged 
by ideas drawn from social anthropology and sociological research.611 However, 
there is a deeper unity to their positions than the accidental similarities that can 
arise from engagement in a shared cultural environment. Both see their 
perspectives as deeply influenced by the theology and philosophy of Thomas 
Aquinas.612 Both reject the Enlightenment assumption that there must be some 
universal criterion by which genuine knowledge and truth can be distinguished 
IURPIRRO¶VJROG613  and both have sought to construct accounts of the nature of 
knowledge and belief which places emphasis on communal processes of 
interpretation underpinned by the conceptual resources of a tradition. 
0DF,QW\UH¶VDFFRXQWRIDWUDGLWLRQRIHQTXLU\VKLIWVWKHTXHVWLRQRIMXVWLILFDWLRQ
away from a notion of knowledge, conceived as the possession of a fixed stock 
of demonstrably true propositions, to a focus on the legitimacy of the processes 
of enquiry which underpin the development of the theoretical perspective that 
constitutes the telos of that tradition. The legitimac\RIWKHWUDGLWLRQ¶VFODLPVWR
knowledge rests on its sustained capacity to resolve the successive challenges 
to its coherence as a system of belief that arise throughout its history. Successful 
attempts to address these difficulties through the process of enquiry will generate 
FORVHUEXWQHYHUSHUIHFWH[SUHVVLRQVRIWKHFXOWXUH¶VXQGHUO\LQJEHOLHIVEXW
there is no guarantee that the tradition will be able to resolve all the problems 
that emerge during its history.  
Lindbeck also rejects the identification of the legitimacy of belief with the 
possession of a fixed stock of demonstrably true propositions. For Lindbeck, 
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what makes a religion a potential source of truth is its construction of semiotic 
categories which can be made to correspond to aspects of reality. The 
construction of these categories, together with rules for their application to the 
ZRUOGDQGWRH[SHULHQFHFUHDWHVDFRPPXQLW\¶VFDSDFLW\WRDVVHUWERWKWUXHDQG
false propositions.614 The way in which these concepts are applied will vary over 
time as a consequence of changes in the conceptual resources available to a 
particular culture. As a result of changes to this external conceptual environment, 
assertions that can be held to be propositionally true at time A may no longer be 
sustainable as true at a later time B. But such variability does not affect the 
underlying continuity and legitimacy of the fundamental presuppositions of the 
belief system and the rules for their application to the world. What is permanent 
LQ0DF,QW\UH¶VQRWLRQRIWUDGLWLRQDQG/LQGEHFN¶VFXOWXUDO-linguistic model of 
religion is the nature of the underlying concepts which embody the fundamental 
(albeit initially unelaborated) ontological presuppositions of the 
tradition/Interpretative medium, and the rules for their application to the 
interpretation of the world. It is these rules that form the centre of identity of the 
tradition/interpretative medium.  
Lindbeck acknowledges the links between his cultural-linguistic model and 
0DF,QW\UH¶VQRWLRQRIWUDGLWLRQRIHQTXLU\615 and has suggested that his position 
PLJKWEHVWUHQJWKHQHGLI0DF,QW\UH¶VDFFRXQWRIWUDGLWLRQFRQVWLWXWHGUDWLRQDOLW\
were to be incorporated into his account of superiority.616 One can illustrate the 
EHQHILWVRILQWHJUDWLQJHOHPHQWVRI/LQGEHFN¶VDQG0DF,QW\UH¶VZRUNE\
FRQVLGHULQJ$GRQLV9LGX¶VFULWLFLVPVRIERWKWKLQNHUVVidu is concerned that the 
priority given to the conceptual scheme in shaping belief in postliberal accounts 
of religion results in a failure to give any clear account of the relationship of that 
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 /LQGEHFN³)RUHZRUGWRWKH*HUPDQHGLWLRQRIThe Nature of Doctrine´LQ/LQGEHFNThe 
Church in a Postliberal Age, p.199. 
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conceptual scheme to a reality that exists independently of the community.617 As 
a result Vidu suggests that postliberal theology has undermined theological 
realism,618  and criticises Lindbeck for what he describes as his inability to 
reconcile the ontological priority of God with the epistemological priority of 
language and culture.619 In contrast, Vidu challenges MacIntyre because of his 
alleged over-reliance on rational dialectics and philosophical demonstration, and 
a consequent failure to acknowledge the centrality of rhetoric in determining 
commitment to a particular belief system, whether religious or secular.620 9LGX¶V
objective in criticising Lindbeck is to strengthen ontological commitments in 
postliberal theology, but he does not recognise the extent to which this objective 
LVVKDUHGE\/LQGEHFNQRUGRHVKHUHFRJQLVHWKHH[WHQWWRZKLFK0DF,QW\UH¶V
philosophy can provide the resources required to address his concerns about the 
anti-UHDOLVWLPSOLFDWLRQVRI/LQGEHFN¶VSRVLWLRQ 
$FKLHYLQJ9LGX¶VUHDOLVWREMHFWLYHUHTXLUHVWKHHVWDEOLVKPHQWRIDUREXVWEDVLVIRU
identifying whether one conceptual scheme is superior or inferior to its rivals with 
respect to the ability to encapsulate what is real. I will demonstrate that by 
integratLQJVRPHHOHPHQWVRI/LQGEHFN¶VDQG0DF,QW\UH¶VDFFRXQWVLWLVSRVVLEOH
to develop a plausible critical realist perspective which allows for judgements of 
superiority, although an implication of this position is that final knowledge of 
ontological truth has still to be determined eschatologically.  This approach builds 
on a point made by David Fergusson, who observed that postliberal theology 
PLJKWEHQHILWIURPWKHDGGLWLRQRIVRPH0DF,QW\UHDQLQVLJKWVEHFDXVH³7KH
greater emphasis on realism, conversation, and partial translatability in 
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0DF,QW\UHPD\«HQKDQFHDVSHFWVRI/LQGEHFNLDQSRVWOLEHUDOLVP´621 My 
contention is that MacIntyrean philosophy can equally benefit from the 
application of some insights drawn from postliberal theology, and that this 
process PD\DOVRKHOSWRDGGUHVVVRPHRI9LGX¶VDQG0LOEDQN¶VFULWLFLVPVRI
MacIntyre.   
Hermeneutic Frameworks 
,DPJRLQJWRUHIHUWRWKHFRPPRQHOHPHQWVRI/LQGEHFN¶VDFFRXQWRIWKHQDWXUH
RIUHOLJLRQDQG0DF,QW\UH¶VQRWLRQRIDWUDGLWLRQRIHQTXLU\DVGHILQLQJwhat I will 
FDOOD³KHUPHQHXWLFIUDPHZRUN´+),ZLOOGHILQHD+)DVDVHWRIUHVRXUFHVIRU
interpreting aspects of experience and the world and for guiding action, so that 
both the interpretation of the world and individual and communal activities are 
rendered intelligible and consistent with the fundamental presuppositions of the 
tradition (or interpretative medium). These resources consist of four elements, 
although not all traditions or IMs will exhibit all of these characteristics: 
1. A set of conceptual categories which are taken to reflect aspects of reality 
DQGZKRVHDEDQGRQPHQWZRXOGFRQVWLWXWHDUHMHFWLRQRIWKHWUDGLWLRQ¶V
fundamental presuppositions.  
2.  A set of rules of assertion which determine (in part) what it is legitimate 
and illegitimate to assert with respect to those categories if one is a 
participant in the tradition. 
3. These conceptual categories and rules of assertion will underpin 
interpretative processes which seek to ensure that dissonant events and 
alien perspectives are rendered consistent with the fundamental 
assumptions of the tradition. Attempts to explain apparent inconsistencies 
will drive processes of theoretical (or doctrinal) development in order to 
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reconcile belief and experience. Where such reconciliation is not 
possible, such inconsistencies may generate an epistemological crisis. 
4. In so far as a tradition or interpretative medium underpins a mode of life, 
it will also generate a set of rules that require or guide action, both by 
directing participation in specific practices and by expressing general 
rules of conduct to shape practical reasoning. These rules will be implicit 
in the conduct of members of the tradition and may not be explicitly 
formulated. They can be recognised as rules because when they are 
specified they will render intelligible the behaviour of those people who 
participate in (some specific aspects of) the tradition/IM. 
  
Point 1 above follows from the fact that any religion or tradition begins from some 
particular set of narratives or beliefs about the nature of the world and the nature 
of humanity, and these beliefs form an element of the identity of the tradition. 
These narratives or beliefs are taken to express or embody some fundamental 
aspects of reality which cannot be denied if one is to remain a member of the 
believing community. No one can remain an Aristotelian if they reject the notion 
that there is a telos towards which human life should be directed. Nor could a 
person remain a Christian if they rejected the significance of Christ and his 
redemptive role in the world. But what it means to believe these things may be 
subject to intense debate.622  This process of debate and the consequent 
elaboration of the fundamental beliefs generated through this process may 
generate rules of assertion. These rules may determine what it is legitimate to 
assert, by specifying certain formulations that are held to be consistent with the 
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key presuppositions of the tradition; and they may also identify what cannot be 
asserted, by specifying assertions that are held to be inconsistent with the 
fundamental assumptions of that tradition (Point 2 above). In retaining and 
elaborating these beliefs, adherents must also respond to the challenge of 
interpreting events that are apparently inconsistent with the assumptions of the 
tradition in ways which sustain the logical coherence of that tradition. The critical 
task is to render the dissonant event intelligible within the framework of beliefs 
that constitute enduring elements of the tradition.623  Some of these challenges 
may be resolved through processes of interpretation (Point 3). Such processes 
FDQEHLOOXVWUDWHGE\0DF,QW\UH¶VWUHDWPHQWRIWKHSUREOHPRIHYLOLQ'LIILFXOWLHVLQ
Christian Belief (DCB). 
In DCB MacIntyre argues that there is an apparent inconsistency between the 
set of beliefs about God that are taken to constitute Christian faith, and the reality 
of pain and suffering, and asserts that this inconsistency threatens the 
intelligibility of Christian belief.624 MacIntyre attempts to resolve this tension by 
arguing WKDWWKHUHLVQRFRQWUDGLFWLRQEHWZHHQDVVHUWLQJ³HYHU\WKLQJKDSSHQVE\
WKHZLOORI*RG´DQG³HYLOGRHVQRWKDSSHQE\WKHZLOORI*RG´625 MacIntyre points 
out that the first proposition can be interpreted as incorporating the belief that 
God created people free and able to act in accordance with their own will. He 
cannot, therefore, be held to be the author of the pain and suffering arising from 
WKHLUDFWLRQV:KDWHYHUWKHPHULWVRI0DF,QW\UH¶VDUJXPHQW626 his strategy can be 
described as the construction of an interpretation of the nature and origin of evil 
ZKLFKHQDEOHVRQHWRH[SODLQHYLOHYHQWVLQDZD\WKDWLVFRQVLVWHQWZLWK*RG¶V
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goodness and omnipotence. His argument seeks to specify that a particular type 
of interpretation should be applied to particular events, so that the mutual 
consistency of different (and apparently incompatible) assertions can be 
secured. This is a specific example of a general process of argument and debate 
which may take place in any tradition, and which may therefore progressively 
generate more and more elaborate rules for interpretation and assertion which 
are designed to secure the coherence of the system. These processes of 
interpretation enable the tradition or interpretative medium to incorporate 
apparently contradictory elements within its framework and thereby protect itself 
from falsification. But there are limits to such processes, and when these limits 
are reached a crisis may emerge. This process is discussed further in Section 
4.4. 
The fourth element of a hermeneutic framework consists of rules of conduct. As 
ZHVDZLQ&KDSWHU$ULVWRWOH¶VDFFRXQWRISUDFWLFDOUHDVRQLQJHPSKDVLVHVWKDW
there is a process of interpretation involved in selecting any action. We have to 
be able to recognise those goods that we should seek; identify the means by 
which those goods can be achieved; and select a course of action which is likely 
to secure those preferred goods. Learning to identify appropriate goods may 
require engagement with the different practices required by the tradition, (which 
may embody goods in their own right); and will also involve internalising rules 
that guide practical reasoning so that we may choose the appropriate action to 
secure the required goods. Where an action is undertaken in accordance with a 
rule, it can be rendered intelligible partly by specifying the rule that is being 
applied, But to fully understand the action involves showing how both the action 
and the rules that govern it are related to the pattern of beliefs, social roles and 
practices that conVWLWXWHWKHFRPPXQLW\DV0DF,QW\UH¶VDQDO\VLVRIWKH
philosophy of action has shown (see Chapter 2.3). To render activities such as 
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prayer fully intelligible is to link them to a widening framework of other practices 
and beliefs with which they are interdependent. The attempt to articulate the 
significance and justification of this interdependent network of beliefs, rules of 
assertion and practice, and processes of interpretation, drives the development 
of the hermeneutic framework. 
The characteristics I have specified as constituting a hermeneutic framework are 
QRWRQO\LQWHQGHGWRLGHQWLI\VRPHRIWKHFRPPRQHOHPHQWVVKDUHGE\/LQGEHFN¶V
QRWLRQRIDUHOLJLRQDVDQLQWHUSUHWDWLYHPHGLXPDQG0DF,QW\UH¶VFRQFHSWRID
tradition of enquiry, they are also intended to characterise what I referred to as a 
comprehensive metaphysical position in Chapter 1.1. I defined such a position as 
³DVHWRIRQWRORJLFDODQGHWKLFDOSUHVXSSRVLWLRQVZKLFKDUHWDNHQWRHQFRPSDVV
and explain the nature of the universe of which our species is a part, and which 
SURYLGHDIUDPHZRUNIRUKXPDQSUDFWLFDOUHDVRQLQJDQGDFWLRQ´7KHIRXU
elements of hermeneutic framework identified above are consistent with this 
definition, and the concept therefore enables me to draw on different elements of 
0DF,QW\UH¶VDQG/LQGEHFN¶VWKHRULHVLQRUGHUWRLGHQWLI\DQGDGGUHVVDQXPEHURI
areas that require clarification in their work.  
Interaction between hermeneutic frameworks 
The notion of a hermeneutic framework can be used in order to illuminate some 
of the points MacIntyre makes when discussing the interaction between different 
traditions. A hermeneutic framework consists of a set of conceptual categories 
which are taken to reflect or express aspects of reality. Questions of justification 
and interpretation will be addressed in the evolution of the framework and will 
establish precedents for what can and cannot be asserted.  Through this process 
of evolution, a hermeneutic framework will establish its own standards of validity 
and argumentative adequacy. As a result, there will be no basis on which a 
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person who has not become immersed in such a framework can assess the 
grounds of belief in that framework. Becoming convinced of the truth of a religion 
(for example), considered as a hermeneutic framework, cannot, therefore, be a 
matter of rational persuasion by universally acceptable arguments, because the 
force of an argument depends on the acceptance of shared presuppositions that 
can only be acquired through socialisation into the culture of that religion. As 
Lindbeck says: 
... the logic of coming to believe, because it is like that of learning a language, has 
little room for argument, but once one has learnt to speak the language of faith, 
argument becomes possible.627 
For both Lindbeck and MacIntyre, therefore, a tradition or religion represent 
potentially independent intellectual universes that may be separated from each 
other by incommensurable and untranslatable concepts, and exhibit distinct 
standards of justification and argument. But as we saw in Chapter 2.6, the partial 
incommensurability of alien traditions can be overcome by processes of 
immersion and enculturation. MacIntyre holds that it is possible to describe the 
SUHVXSSRVLWLRQVRIDWOHDVWVRPHDOLHQWUDGLWLRQVIURPWKHSHUVSHFWLYHRIRQH¶s 
own tradition. This involves adopting a perspective comparable to that of an 
anthropologist who engages with an alien culture as best she can by immersing 
herself in that culture (learning it as a second first language) but then 
reconstructs its insights as far as this is possible within the language and 
perspectives of her own culture.  Such a process may require hermeneutic 
innovation, as Stout has pointed out.628 Lindbeck also adopts such an 
anthropological perspective to explain how it is possible to articulate an 
understanding of an alien religion. For Lindbeck, understanding a religion 
involves mapping the way in which a community interprets and renders 
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LQWHOOLJLEOHWKHZRUOGLQZKLFKLWILQGVLWVHOIDSURFHVVKHGHVFULEHVDV³WKLFN
GHVFULSWLRQ´IROOowing Ryle and Geertz.629 There are limits to the extent that such 
translation is possible and these limits are set by conceptual incommensurability. 
However, the possibility of at least partial translatability means that a 
hermeneutic framework is not impermeable: it will interact with the wider cultural 
and intellectual environment in which it is set. 
The problem of superiority 
While an anthropological approach can be used to illustrate the relationships 
between different traditions and IMs, it treats them as cultural products and is not 
concerned with the evaluation of their claims to superiority over other 
hermeneutic frameworks. However, when the anthropological perspective shifts 
to a theological or philosophical viewpoint it is the question of which framework is 
superior or inferior that comes to the fore.  One natural way to conceptualise the 
superiority of one HF to another is in terms of the claim that one position is 
rationally justified while rival positions are not. However, both MacIntyre and 
Lindbeck argue that standards of justification are internal to an HF, and if the 
standards of different HFs are incommensurable there will be no generally 
accepted set of standards to enable one to determine which of their claims to 
justification is correct. Once again this raises our central question: how can one 
judge one tradition, one religion, one interpretative medium to be superior to 
                                               
629
 1'S³7KLFNGHVFULSWLRQ´LVDWHUPZKLFK5\OHXVHVWRGLVWLQJXLVKEHWZHHQWKH
PRVWEDVLFOHYHORIGHVFULSWLRQRIDPRYHPHQWLQSK\VLFDOWHUPV³WKLQGHVFULSWLRQ´DQG
WKH³WKLFNGHVFULSWLRQ´RIDQDFWLRQLQWHUPVZKLFKUHODWHLWWRWKHPXOWLSOHOHYHOVRIFXOWXUDO
context which are required to fully characterise the action in its various levels of meaning 
(see Gilbert Ryle: ³7KHWhinking of thoughts: what is 'Le Penseur' doing?´Reprinted from 
'University Lectures' 1968, no.18 
http://lucy.ukc.ac.uk/CSACSIA/Vol14/Papers/ryle_1.html accessed 28 May 2013). Geertz 
extends this notion of thick description to the comprehensive characterisation of  the 
semiotic elements of a culture which render the activities of its participants intelligible 
6HH&OLIIRUG*HHUW]³7KLFNGHVFULSWLRQWRZDUGDQLQWHUSUHWDWLYHWKHRU\RIFXOWXUH´LQKLV
The Interpretation of Culture (New York: Basic Books, 2000 Edition; first published 1973) 
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S5). Ethnography is therefore a hermeneutic process. 
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another? 
Both MacIntyre and Lindbeck balance the view that traditions/IMs set their own 
standards of consistency and justification (and therefore of rationality) with what I 
FDOOHGD³SULQFLSOHRIHSLVWHPRORJLFDORSHQQHVV´3(2 630 This principle is a 
manifestation of the fact that both a religion and a tradition of enquiry qua 
hermeneutic frameworks have to engage with and interpret other perspectives 
and events in accordance with their own presuppositions. HFs are distinct from 
their environment, but have to engage with that environment in ways that 
challenge the HF and drive its development. As a result, HFs may interact with 
each other, and this openness to the cultural environment provides some basis 
for the development of a concept of superiority that transcends the boundaries of 
one particular tradition. In the final section I argue that this account of superiority 
and inferiority can provide an effective defence against accusations of fideism or 
relativism.  
However, in order to create such a robust defence it is necessary to address 
VRPHGHILFLWVLQHDFKRI0DF,QW\UHDQG/LQGEHFN¶VSRVLWLRQV0DF,QW\UH¶VFHQWUDO
concepWLV³WUDGLWLRQ´EXWKLVDFFRXQWRIWKLVFRQFHSWODFNVSUHFLVLRQ,QWKH
following section I argue that the notion of a hermeneutic framework can be used 
to give greater empirical specificity to the concept of a tradition. One test of the 
adequacy of a tradition or interpretative framework is its ability to overcome 
epistemological crises. This clarification of the concept will also enable me to 
explore the circumstances in which an epistemological crisis may arise, and this 
will also help me to address the question of superiority. 
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4.3 Operative Doctrines and the Identity of a Tradition 
A number of writers have argued that MacIntyre fails to offer a satisfactory 
account of the concept of a tradition,631 while others have questioned whether 
MacIntyre uses the concept in a consistent fashion. Allen comments that: 
it is not entirely clear what he [MacIntyre] even means by this crucial concept, 
since he never gives a unified account of it; instead, his conception of a tradition 
must be pieced together from remarks and arguments which are scattered 
throughout his three books on moral and political theory.632 
$OOHQJRHVRQWRDUJXHWKDW0DF,QW\UH¶VDFFRXQWRIWKHUHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQ
tradition and rationality is LQFRQVLVWHQWDQGFRQIXVHG7KHYLHZWKDW0DF,QW\UH¶V
account is inconsistent is reinforced by Jean Porter, who observes that the 
concept of a tradition in TRV and WJWR is significantly different from the 
concept described in AV.633  These comments suggest thDW³WUDGLWLRQ´LQ
0DF,QW\UH¶VZULWLQJLVDIOXLGDQGSRWHQWLDOO\DPELJXRXVFRQFHSWZKLFKGRHVQRW
easily lend itself to definition.  This lack of clear definition is partly methodological 
in origin, as Julia Annas points out.  She notes that MacIntyre does not seek to 
define the nature of a tradition in WJWR but rather attempts to show that nature 
through his examples.634  $QQDV¶REVHUYDWLRQLVVXSSRUWHGE\0DF,QW\UH¶VRZQ
comment about definition in WJWR:    
Finally, it is crucial that the concept of tradition-constituted and tradition-
constitutive rational enquiry cannot be elucidated apart from its exemplifications, 
something which I take to be true of all concepts...635 
This comment suggests that I might be making an illegitimate move in seeking to 
provide a more general theoretical account of the nature of a tradition. But 
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without a satisfactory definition of a tradition one cannot unambiguously identify 
discrete traditions. Is Aristotelian ethics a discrete philosophical tradition, for 
example, or should it be seen as one element in a broader Western tradition of 
moral philosophy? Are Augustine and Aquinas founders of discrete traditions in 
philosophical theology or do they each represent different facets of a single 
developing tradition represented by Christian theology as a whole? And if one 
cannot adequately identify distinct traditions, how can one answer such 
questions as whether different traditions are or are not mutually 
incommensurable and untranslatable? 
$VWKHVHTXHVWLRQVLOOXVWUDWHWKHWHUP³WUDGLWLRQ´KDVH[WUHPHO\IX]]\ERXQGDULHV
in general discourse, and it is largely a matter of choice (and argumentative 
convenience) whether I treat Thomist and Augustinian theologies (for example) 
as independent traditions or as related elements in a broader tradition. But in 
0DFLQW\UH¶VSKLORVRSK\WKHZRUG³WUDGLWLRQ´WDNHVRQDPRUHOLPLWHGDQGWHFKQLFDO
meaning. Different traditions are (we are told) independent, incommensurable 
and untranslatable and driven by their own characteristic rationality. Challenges 
to the fundamental presuppositions of these traditions may result in 
epistemological crises in which the identity of the tradition and the identity of its 
adherents are threatened. The concept of tradition is, therefore, at the heart of 
0DF,QW\UH¶VDFFRunt of rational justification. However, unless one can clearly 
LGHQWLI\GLIIHUHQWWUDGLWLRQVLWZLOOQRWEHSRVVLEOHWRDSSO\0DF,QW\UH¶VWKHRU\WRWKH
real world nor to test out whether different traditions possess the characteristics 
he describes.   
It is therefore necessary to try to give some general account of the nature of a 
0DF,QW\UHDQWUDGLWLRQ7KLVDSSURDFKLVVXSSRUWHGE\0DF,QW\UH¶VRZQSUDFWLFH
Notwithstanding his claim that concepts can only be exemplified, MacIntyre 
himself makes some general observations about the nature and origins of 
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tradition in his writings, as Adonis Vidu has pointed out.636 While these comments 
are not sufficiently specific to enable one to unambiguously distinguish one 
tradition from another, they do provide a legitimate starting point for an attempt to 
provide a general account of the nature of a tradition. In AV MacIntyre 
characterises a tradition in the following way: 
A living tradition then is an historically extended, socially embodied argument and 
an argument precisely in part about the goods which constitute that tradition.  
Within a tradition the pursuit of goods extends through generations, sometimes 
through many generations.  Here the individual's search for his or her good is 
generally and characteristically conducted within a context defined by those 
traditions of which the individual's life is a part.637 
 
This definition is expanded in WJWR into the following statement: 
A tradition is an argument extended through time in which certain fundamental 
agreements are defined and redefined in terms of two kinds of conflict: those with 
critics and enemies external to the tradition who reject all or at least key parts of 
those fundamental agreements, and those internal, interpretative debates through 
which the meaning and rationale of the fundamental agreements come to be 
expressed and by whose progress tradition is constituted.  Such internal debates 
may on occasion destroy what had been the basis of common fundamental 
agreement, so that either a tradition divides into two or more warring components, 
whose adherents are transformed into external critics of each other's positions, or 
else the tradition loses all coherence and fails to survive.  It can also happen that 
two traditions, hitherto independent and even antagonistic, can come to recognize 
certain possibilities of fundamental agreement and reconstitute themselves as a 
single, more complex debate.638 
Taking these two attempts at definition together we can identify five key 
IHDWXUHVRI0DF,QW\UH¶VDFFRXQWRIDWUDGLWLRQ.  
1. A tradition is a form of social life that is characterised by a single 
extended argument which maintains its identity throughout the life of the 
tradition. It is a debate around the meaning, practical relevance and truth 
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of a set of inter-related theses. This debate requires continued 
engagement over time by successive participants who recognise that 
they are engaged in a discussion which has a certain history and which 
remains the same debate at different times, notwithstanding changes in 
language and the development or abandonment of certain subsidiary 
elements of the central contentions of the tradition.  
2. $WUDGLWLRQLVWKHUHIRUHDQDUJXPHQWWKDWLV³KLVWRULFDOO\H[WHQGHG´DQG
(as the second definition indicates) the argument is constituted and 
ERXQGHGE\³FHUWDLQIXQGDPHQWDODJUHHPHQWV´ZKLFKWKHSDUWLHVGRQRW
(normally) bring into question.  
3. The focus of this historically extended argument is twofold: firstly it relates 
WRWKH³JRRGVZKLFKFRQVWLWXWHWKHWUDGLWLRQ´VHFRQGO\LWUHODWHVWRWKH
SDUWLFLSDQWV¶LQGLYLGXDODQGFRPPXQDOVHDUFKIRUWKHJRRGRIWKHLURZQOLIH
in the context of the traditions (plural in the AV definition) in which they 
participate. 
4. The development of the tradition is driven by internal and external conflict 
and leads to a continuing process of definition and redefinition of the 
fundamental agreements about goods that characterise the tradition. 
5. Internal debate can result in the adherents of a tradition dividing into 
antagonistic groups (potentially creating a number of competing 
traditions); equally it is possible for different traditions to recognise 
sufficient common ground for them to reconstitute themselves as a single 
integrated debate and therefore become an amalgamated tradition. 
The WJWR definition in particular places an emphasis on the intellectual 
dimensions of participation within a tradition. But most people would not 
FRQFHLYHRIWKHPVHOYHVDVHQJDJLQJLQD³KLVWRULFDOO\H[WHQGHGDUJXPHQW´DQG
this intellectualisation of the identity of a tradition raises a problem in 
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understanding a tradition as a mode of living in which all people can participate. 
0DF,QW\UH¶VDFFRXQW sometimes appears to point towards an understanding of 
traditions as intellectual perspectives which are most at home in the environment 
RIWKHGHSDUWPHQWDOVHPLQDU,QGHHG0DF,QW\UH¶VGLVFXVVLRQRIWKHLPSRUWDQFHRI
the structure and curriculum of the University639 may also reinforce a perception 
of a tradition as primarily an academic perspective. However, neither a religion 
nor an ethical system is intrinsically a topic of intellectual debate or academic 
study. As the AV definition emphasises, they are modes of living which are 
embraced by successive generations, and which are underpinned by faith in the 
case of a religion and by a particular understanding of the nature of the moral life 
in the case of an ethical tradition.  
There is, therefore, a potentiaOWHQVLRQEHWZHHQ0DF,QW\UH¶VDFFRXQWVRID
tradition as a theoretical inquiry into the nature of the good (for example), and his 
understanding of ethics as embodied in practice rather than theory. While it 
would take detailed exegesis to demonstrate this, ,VXVSHFWWKDW$OOHQ¶VDQG
3RUWHU¶VFRPPHQWVZLWKUHVSHFWWRWKHDSSDUHQWLQFRQVLVWHQF\RI0DF,QW\UH¶V
account of tradition relate to the fact that the term is used to refer to two closely 
related but distinct cultural phenomena. The differences between the accounts of 
tradition in AV and WJWR/TRV noted by Porter can be explained by the fact that 
in AV MacIntyre is writing of tradition as a form of life characterised by 
engagement in social practices, while in the later books it is tradition conceived 
as the second order articulation of the theoretical rationale of such forms of life 
WKDWLVKLVIRFXV0DF,QW\UH¶VWKHRUHWLFDODFFRXQWRIWUDGLWLRQ-as-enquiry in WJWR 
and TRV bears the same relationship to his account of tradition-as-a-mode-of-
living in AV as the second-order activity of theology bears to a religion.   
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7KHUHFRJQLWLRQRIWKHGXDOIXQFWLRQVRIWKHZRUG³WUDGLWLRQ´LQ0DF,QW\UH¶VZRUN
provides a partial explanation of the apparent inconsistency of his accounts, but 
0DF,QW\UH¶VH[SRVLWLRQVWLOOOHaves a lack of definition about three further 
HOHPHQWVRIWKHFRQFHSW)LUVWO\LWLVXQFOHDUZKDWFRQVWLWXWHVWKH³IXQGDPHQWDO
DJUHHPHQWV´WKDWFKDUDFWHULVHDWUDGLWLRQ6HFRQGO\WKHUHLVDFRQVHTXHQWODFN
of clarity about what it means for someone to enter into such agreements to 
become a member of a tradition. For many people membership of a tradition will 
be characterised by participation in its characteristic social structures rather than 
engagement in its intellectual debates. Indeed as MacIntyre acknowledges, 
many people who are engaged in a tradition may have no awareness of their 
intellectual environment as a distinct tradition at all.640 There is therefore a need 
to clarify how such a person can be counted as a member of a tradition. Thirdly, 
without a more precise understanding of the nature of the agreements that 
constitute a tradition, it is difficult to define the circumstances in which a tradition 
may subdivide into warring factions, or to specify the conditions in which two 
independent traditions can come to coalesce into a new united tradition.  
Doctrine, Tradition and Identity 
Lindbeck identifies the source of identity of a religious community with the set of 
beliefs and practices that constitute the doctrines of that religious community and 
these doctrines also play a constitutive role with respect to the identity of 
members of that community by providing implicit tests of community 
membership.641 Thus while doctrines may be used to express beliefs or 
symbolise experiences, their central function is to act as rules that regulate the 
beliefs and practices of a community. They undertake this function by defining 
what beliefs should be expressed or denied, and what practices are to be 
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pursued or avoided if a person is to be a member of the community in good 
standing.  Lindbeck argues that doctrines emerge and develop out of the type of 
internal and external conflict that MacIntyre sees as driving the development of a 
tradition.642 7KHUHDUHWKHUHIRUHFOHDUDQDORJLHVEHWZHHQ/LQGEHFN¶VDFFRXQWRI
WKHRULJLQRIGRFWULQHDQG0DF,QW\UH¶VDFFRXQWRIWKHHYROXWLRQRIDWUDGLWLRQ
Indeed, some of the similarities between their positions can be seen as arising 
RXWRIWKHFRPPRQLQIOXHQFHRI1HZPDQ¶VZRUNRQWKHGHYHORSPHQWRIGRFWULQH
on both authors.643  
0DF,QW\UH¶VXVHRIWKHWHUP³IXQGDPHQWDODJUHHPHQWV´VXJJHVWVDSDUDOOHO
EHWZHHQKLVDFFRXQWRIWUDGLWLRQDQG/LQGEHFN¶VDFFRXQWRIGRFWULQH$Q
agreement may go beyond the acceptance of some particular propositions by 
two or more parties; it may also point to the acceptance of a contract which 
requires the parties to act in certain ways. Such a contract may be formal or 
informal, but in either case it will serve to regulate the future conduct of the 
parties to the agreement. To breach the terms of such an agreement is to do 
PRUHWKDQFKDQJHRQH¶VPLQGDERXWDEHOLHIRUVHWRIEHOLHIV,WLVWRRSHQ
oneself to legitimate censure for a failure to conform to expected standards of 
conduct. Agreements can perform a regulative function which is analogous to the 
regulative functions of doctrine highlighted by Lindbeck. This analogy suggests 
WKDWLWPD\EHIUXLWIXOWRXVH/LQGEHFN¶VDFFRXQWRIGRFWULQHDVDPodel for the 
fundamental agreements that constitute a MacIntyrean tradition.  
However, such a model needs to have regard to the significant differences in 
their accounts. Traditions as defined by MacIntyre appear to be evolving patterns 
of social interaction and debate that do not have a formal authority structure, 
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while the doctrines of religious bodies are characteristically formal statements of 
belief and practice that are authoritative within the believing community. A 
tradition of enquiry is a far less formally organised social structure than a Church 
or a religious community, and will not necessarily have the type of authority 
embedded into its structure that would enable the tradition to construct, and to 
sustain as authoritative, formal statements of belief. How, then, can we apply 
/LQGEHFN¶VFRQFHSWRIGRFWULQHWR0DF,QW\UH¶VDFFRXQWRIDWUDGLWLRQ" 
Lindbeck makes an important distinction between formal and operative 
doctrines.644 The construction of formal statements of doctrine is a process 
triggered by some pressing controversy or dilemma, and therefore the most 
important beliefs of a community may never become formalised in statements of 
doctrine. 645 The most central Christian beliefs, that God is love for example, may 
not be formalised precisely because they remain fundamentally unchallenged, at 
least in the process of internal debate. 646  Indeed, Lindbeck acknowledges that 
religious groups that define themselves as having no creed do not, thereby, 
escape from having some fundamental beliefs that serve to define communal 
identity and membership of the group.647  Within those communities that are 
characterised by formal statements of doctrine, doctrines promulgated at one 
time, in response to some pressing issue for example, may no longer be 
accepted as binding by that community at a later time, even if these statements 
have not been formally rescinded.  As a result, such formal statements of 
doctrine may no longer reflect the beliefs of a community. If the denial of a formal 
doctrine does not exclude someone from membership of a religious community 
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...it is evident that the belief has ceased to be communally formative, and it is 
therefore no longer an operative doctrine even though it may continue to be a 
formal or official one. In any case, operative doctrines, even if not official ones, are 
necessary to communal identity. A religious body cannot exist as a recognizably 
distinctive collectivity unless it has some beliefs and/or practices by which it can be 
identified.648 
It is the operative rather than the formal doctrines of the community, then, that 
are most important in determining the identity of the group and of its individual 
members, and it is necessary to examine the informal beliefs which are held to 
be non-negotiable if one is to comprehend the way in which a community 
understands its identity and the identity of its members. Informal operative 
doctrines are therefore central to defining identity and group membership, both in 
those communities which possess formal doctrines, and in those groups which 
do not have such formal mechanisms. There is therefore no theoretical barrier to 
H[WHQGLQJ/LQGEHFN¶VDFFRXQWRIRSHUDWLYHGRFWULQHVWRVRFLDOJURXSVZKRGRQRW
have a formal body of doctrine but which share a set of beliefs that define both 
their purpose and what it is to be a member of the group.   
An analogy with operative doctrines can, therefore, provide a basis for the 
FKDUDFWHULVDWLRQRIWKH³IXQGDPHQWDODJUHHPHQWV´WKDWSDUWLDOO\GHILQHWKHLGHQWLW\
of a MacIntyrean tradition. Such agreements can be interpreted as regulative 
principles that define those conceptual categories and practices that are central 
to community identity. These operative doctrines will require members of the 
tradition to assert certain beliefs in appropriate circumstances, and will promote 
the adherence of members to those practices which contribute to the well-being 
of the community. Such regulative principles will also enable the tradition to 
manage and control processes of internal debate which have emerged as 
responses to internal disagreements and external challenges, and which are 
seen as enabling the tradition to pursue its telos. 
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$SSO\LQJWKHQRWLRQRI³RSHUDWLYHGRFWULQHV´WR0DF,QW\UH¶VDFFRXQWRIWUDGLWLRQLV
YDOXDEOHLQWKUHHZD\V/LQGEHFN¶VUHJXODWLYHDFFRXQWRIGoctrine provides a 
means by which those beliefs that are fundamental to the identity of a tradition 
and its members can be distinguished from more peripheral beliefs. Secondly, 
the notion of operative doctrines can provide more specificity to the notions of 
epistemological crisis and the rationality of a tradition, as we shall see below.  
Thirdly, drawing an analogy between the fundamental agreements that constitute 
DWUDGLWLRQDQG/LQGEHFN¶VQRWLRQRIRSHUDWLYHGRFWULQHVDOVRSRLQWVWRWKHZD\LQ
which such agreements can act as rules that govern legitimate assertion and 
rules of conduct. As a result of this function such rules will shape the distinctive 
standards of justification and argument that characterise the tradition, that is, the 
nature of its tradition-constituted rationality.  
A particular strength of the concept of operative doctrines is that it acts as a 
counterbalance to the over-intellectualisation of traditions that characterises 
0DF,QW\UH¶VDFFRXQWLQ:-:5DQG7590HPEHUVRIDWUDGLWLRQRUinterpretative 
medium will understand themselves as having particular beliefs and 
responsibilities imposed by the regulative functions of the operative doctrines of 
the tradition, even if for the most part this understanding is implicit and only 
brought to consciousness by a reaction to some perceived challenge to these 
beliefs or practices. Conceptualising membership of a tradition in terms of the 
adherence to the operative doctrines that regulate what can be asserted, and 
therefore how one must act if one is to be a continuing member, explains why 
even the least theoretically inclined member of a tradition has a stake in the 
continued coherence of the rules defined by its operative doctrines: a challenge 
to these rules threatens core components of the membHU¶VLGHQWLW\ 
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4.4 Applying the Notion of a Hermeneutic Framework  
The emergence of concepts, rules of assertion and tradition-constituted 
standards of rationality in a tradition which are incommensurable with those that 
emerge in alternative traditions can be explained if the fundamental agreements 
that constitute the identity of a tradition act as regulative principles. Regulative 
principles create the capacity of a tradition to act as a hermeneutic framework by 
defining the non-negotiable elements that constitute the core presuppositions of 
the tradition. Recalling my previous definition of a tradition, these rules define the 
³FRQFHSWXDOFDWHJRULHV«whose abandonment would constitute a rejection of the 
WUDGLWLRQ¶VIXQGDPHQWDOSUHVXSSRVLWLRQV´649 and therefore define what it is 
necessary to assert or do if one is to be a member of the tradition in good 
standing. They also limit what can be asserted without contradicting the 
requirements of belief; and in doing this they set limits to the way in which 
phenomena external to the tradition can be legitimately interpreted, and through 
this generate rules of assertion and processes of interpretation.  
Such regulative principles will also shape the set of concepts that are unique to 
the tradition. As a result of their relationship to these tradition-based rules of 
assertion, these concepts may be incommensurable with the concepts formed in 
some alternative tradition, even though both traditions may use the same words 
in similar contexts. Thus both Trinitarian ChristiDQVDQG-HKRYDK¶V:LWQHVVHV
-:ZRXOGGHVFULEH-HVXV&KULVWDVWKH³6RQRI*RG´EXWWKLVGHVFULSWLRQ
conveys a different meaning to the latter because JWs deny the divinity of 
Christ.650 The rules as to what it is legitimate to assert of Christ in different 
contexts will therefore vary between the different groups, and will also shape 
ZKDWFDQEHLQIHUUHGIURPWKHXVHRIWKHGHVFULSWLRQ³6RQRI*RG´)RUWKH-:V
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such a description does not indicate that he is God, but that he is the first created 
being,651 and they would thus deny the divinity accorded to him by Trinitarian 
Christians. 
7KHEHOLHIVRI-HKRYDK¶V:LWQHVVHVFDQDOVRKHOSWRLOOXVWUDWHPRUHJHQHUDO
characteristics of a hermeneutic framework, and its relationship to the 
interpretation of rational beOLHIDQGSUDFWLFDOUHDVRQLQJ-:¶VKROGWKDWWRWDNH
blood into the body as either food or as a form of medical treatment is explicitly 
against the will of God as expressed in Scripture.652 It has been asserted that 
around 1000 members of the sect die each year as a result of this prohibition.653  
A member of the sect who accepts transfusion and is not repentant will be 
³GLVIHOORZVKLSSHG´- in effect excommunicated from the sect.654 The prohibition on 
blood transfusion therefore acts as an operative doctrine of the community. It is a 
belief whose abandonment would represent a rejection of one of the fundamental 
agreements which are required for membership of the church.  Such agreements 
DOVRHPERG\³UXOHVRIDVVHUWLRQ´ZKLFKOLPLWZKDWSURSRVLWLRQVFDQEHKHOGWR be 
true while maintaining intellectual consistency with the operative doctrines of the 
sect. For example, it would not be consistent with the belief system for someone 
to assert that it is legitimate for members to accept blood transfusion on the 
basis of the promptings of their private conscience.  
The question of the rationality of JW decisions on transfusion has been debated 
within the medical ethics literature. Julian Savulescu and Richard Momeyer 
argue that the prohibition is not rationally based, although they do not suggest 
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that the wishes of JW should simply be overruled. Rather they suggest that 
Medical Practitioners should act as educators in order to encourage people to 
recognise when the beliefs on which they are basing their decisions are not 
rationally held.655 But the judgement that such beliefs are not rationally held 
presupposes not only that there may be stronger evidence for some alternative 
set of underpinning beliefs, but also that what counts as evidence for or against a 
set of beliefs can be identified independently of the presuppositions of the 
individuals concerned. They dismiss the scriptural basis on which JW reject 
transfusion as based on a selective and unjustified reading,656 but their critique of 
the foundations of these beliefs has been criticised in turn by Bock.657 %RFN¶V
arguments indicate that the sect would not be without some of the resources 
needed to repudiate such external criticism. Where Momeyer and Savulescu 
accuse them of inconsistency, for example in allowing  consumption of wine in 
communion as the blood of Christ, a more careful examination of their underlying 
beliefs demonstrates that their practice is consistent with the prohibition, as they 
do not believe in transubstantiation or any notion of the real presence.658  
7KHSURKLELWLRQRQWUDQVIXVLRQLVMXVWLILHGE\WKHFRPPXQLW\¶VLQWHUSUHWDWLRQRID
QXPEHURI%LEOLFDOWH[WVLQFOXGLQJWKHEHOLHIWKDWWKHVHFWLVWKH³¶IDLWKIXODQG
discreet VODYH¶UHIHUUHGWRLQ-HVXV¶SDUDEOHDW0DWWKHZ´7KLVEHOLHILVXVHG
in turn to underpin the claim that only the JW can appropriately interpret the 
Bible, and enables the sect to resist claims that its interpretation of the bible is 
arbitrary and selective. The priority that the sect gives to conformity with the rule 
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concerning blood transfusion also reflects the priority given to other beliefs held 
by the sect. For example, the sect holds that the time of judgement is near at 
hand and that salvation depends on how well individuals follow the rules that 
define appropriate conduct for JW, including the prohibition on blood 
transfusion.659  
7KHVHFW¶VWHDFKLQJVDURXQGEORRGWUDQVIXVLRQSURYLGHDEDVLVIRUSUDFWLFDO
reasoning because they are connected to a range of other commitments that 
together shape the identity of the sect and of its members. These beliefs render 
both the  prohibition and also the behaviour of members of the tradition 
intelligible and show how a member may rationally choose a course of action 
which they recognise may end their life (by refusing transfusion) on the basis of a 
set of beliefs that are not shared by their critic. From the perspective of the 
committed believer their action in refusing a lifesaving transfusion could be seen 
to be based on a version RI3DVFDO¶VZDJHULQWKDWWKH\DUHFKRRVLQJWRSXUVXH
DQLQILQLWHJRRGHWHUQDOOLIHDWWKHFRVWRIDPRUHOLPLWHGJRRGH[WHQGLQJRQH¶V
life on earth).660 If the tenets on which they have based their decision are correct, 
their decision is arguably rationally founded.  
The process of describing the relationship between the practical decisions and 
WKHXQGHUO\LQJQHWZRUNRIFRPPLWPHQWVUHQGHUVWKHPHPEHU¶VEHKDYLRXU
intelligible, illustrates the nature of practical reasoning and sheds light on the 
distinctive rationality of the sect. In this process of elucidation, we may move 
from a perception of the sect as having a set of concepts of well-being (for 
example) that are incoherent and incommensurable with our own understanding 
of well-being, to an understanding of those concepts as intelligible and rationally 
based, although we may still reject the fundamental presuppositions that are 
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used to justify them. But in this process the debate has shifted from a critique of 
the rationality of their behaviour (or, alternatively, from a conflict between 
incommensurable concepts of well-being), to a dispute about the truth of the 
beliefs and the processes of reasoning that are used to justify different moral 
judgements. This example therefore illustrates the process described by Stout 
(see Section 2.6), in which traditions divided by incommensurable concepts may 
come to establish an understanding of the judgements made by each community 
through processes of thick description, but remain in dispute over the legitimacy 
of these judgements, and the strength and relevance of the evidence used to 
justify them. 
,IZHFRQVLGHUWKHH[DPSOHRI-:EHOLHIVLQWHUPVRI0DF,QW\UH¶VDFFRXQWRID
WUDGLWLRQRIHQTXLU\WKHQ0DF,QW\UH¶VWKHRU\RIWUDGLWLRQ-constituted rationality 
suggests that the rules, practices and concepts which together define the identity 
of the JW sect will interact with its history of debate to shape the distinctive 
rationality of that tradition. However, for MacIntyre the test of the rationality of 
any tradition is its epistemological openness: for, he argues, only a degenerate 
tradition will construct defences that will ensure that it cannot be brought into 
question.661 But the JW (and other groups of religious believers) are unlikely to 
accept that counter-examples to elements of their faith have undermined the 
coherence of their belief system. They are much more likely to modify one or 
other elements of their belief system in order to remove the inconsistency 
between belief and experience. For example, the JW originally held to the view 
that the last days would occur while some of those people who were living in 
1914 were still alive. The passage of time had rendered such a specific 
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millenarian belief less plausible, and the sect has now revised its doctrine, a 
process mapped by David Weddle. 662  
Weddle points out that the JWs have had to reconsider their position because 
the passage of time has naturally led to a decline in the numbers of people alive 
who were born in the early part of the 20th Century. As a result an apparently 
identity defining doctrine faces falsification rather than confirmation. Weddle 
notes that: 
As the twentieth century draws to a close the only predictive text that has so far 
been confirmed is the actuarial table charting the dwindling numbers of the 
generation of 1914.663  
He sensitively describes the evolution of JW eschatology in response to this 
challenge. This has involved an implicit acceptance that the original doctrine has 
been falsified by history. In order to retain the integrity of the belief system the 
VHFWKDVUHLQWHUSUHWHGWKHWHUP³JHQHUDWLRQ´VRWKDWLWKDVFRPHWRV\PEROLVHWKH
sinful but unrepentant people who are present in every age, rather than referring 
to a specific cohort living at a particular period.664 This has the benefit of 
protecting the sect from the challenge that its beliefs have been falsified, as the 
revised doctrine is consistent with virtually any timescale for the occurrence of 
Armageddon. But while this protective reconstruction of the doctrine renders the 
belief system less vulnerable to falsification, it also raises questions as to the 
extent to which such religious groups can be interpreted as engaged in pursuit of 
a tradition of enquiry whose object is truth.   
And this also reveals a more general challenge to 0DF,QW\UH¶VSRVLWLRQ7KH
strategy of tolerating anomalies or seeking a limited change to beliefs and 
                                               
662
 'DYLG/:HGGOH³1HZ*HQHUDWLRQRI-HKRYDK¶V:LWQHVVHV´Nova Religio: Journal of 
Alternative and Emergent Religions 3:2 April 2000 pp.350-367; pp.351-352. 
663
 Weddle p.354. 
664
 Weddle p.351. 
245 
 
principles so that the overall position is protected from challenge is not only a 
form of defence employed by religious sects. It is also a characteristic of the 
perspective Kuhn describes as normal science, in which inconsistencies are not 
treated as counter-examples but as puzzles to be resolved within the framework 
specified by the dominant paradigm.665 Indeed, the ability to recognise 
challenges and adapWRQH¶VEHOLHIVWRWKHGHPDQGVRIHYLGHQFHLVLQLWVHOIDVLJQ
RIDUDWLRQDOUHVSRQVHWRH[SHULHQFH7RDEDQGRQWKHIXOOUDQJHRIRQH¶VEHOLHIV
and adopt a new set at the first sign of inconsistency would result in such 
frequent changes of belief system as WRUHQGHUWKHLQGLYLGXDO¶VEHKDYLRXU
inconsistent and apparently irrational.  But if any system is able to defend itself 
by modifying one or more tenets in order to avoid falsification then we would 
appear to have no basis on which to choose between different belief-systems, 
DQGWKHSUREOHPVZKLFKOHGWR0DF,QW\UH¶VHSLVWHPRORJLFDOFULVLVDWWKHHQGRI
WKHVZLOOUHPDLQXQUHVROYHG7KHFKDOOHQJHIRU0DF,QW\UH¶VWKHRU\OLHVLQ
whether it is able to clearly specify the circumstances in which an 
epistemological crisis may arise which will, if unresolved, result in the dissolution 
of the tradition so that there is a clear basis for identifying a failed system of 
belief.  
Identity and Epistemological Crisis 
,Q&KDSWHU,GHVFULEHG0DF,QW\UH¶VDFFRXQWRIWhe development of a personal 
epistemological crisis in terms of the subversion of the conceptual scheme or 
³VFKHPDWD´ through which an individual interprets the world, and holds their 
beliefs about the world to be justified.666 The notion of operative doctrines as the 
identity-forming elements of a tradition of enquiry suggests that such doctrines 
may be interpreted as embodying the rules which underpin these processes of 
interpretation and criteria of justification and which therefore contribute to the 
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distinctive rationality of the tradition. If this model is accepted, one way to explain 
the nature of epistemological crisis might be to suggest that such crises will arise 
when the viability of the fundamental agreements/operative doctrines of a 
tradition are challenged by contradictory events or internal inconsistencies, and 
the tradition lacks the resources to respond. In order to give this account 
precision one would have to be able to identify those beliefs that are intrinsic to 
the identity of the tradition.  
Lindbeck attempted to address this problem by constructing a taxonomy of 
doctrines, in which he distinguishes between those doctrines that are 
³XQFRQGLWLRQDOO\QHFHVVDU\´EHFDXVH³WKH\DUHSDUWRIWKHLQGLVSHQVDEOHJUDPPDU
RUORJLFRIWKHIDLWK´667 and other doctrines that may simply be conditionally 
necessary, such as the doctrine of the immortality of the soul. Lindbeck suggests 
that the latter may be abandoned without compromising the integrity of the faith 
when the conceptual resources available to the community have changed.668 
Unconditionally necessary doctrines, however, cannot be abandoned without 
undermining the coherence of the belief system. It might be argued, therefore, 
that an epistemological crisis will arise when there are unresolved challenges to 
some of these unconditionally necessary doctrines. Does this solve the problem 
of specifying the circumstances under which an epistemological crisis may arise? 
,IWKHFRQFHSWVRI³VFKHPDWD´RU³XQFRQGLWLRQDOO\QHFHVVDU\GRFWULQHV´DUHWR
explain the genesis of epistemological crises they would have to be identifiable 
independently of their involvement in an epistemological crisis. But whether a 
doctrine comes to count as indispensable and identity-forming for a tradition will 
reflect the history of that tradition, rather than being determined by some 
particular content of the doctrine. Beliefs that might in other circumstances be 
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considered peripheral to the identity of the faith may become identity-defining 
when subject to challenge, as Lindbeck himself points out, citing Luther and 
Newman in support of this contention.669 Moreover a limited readjustment of 
presuppositions will always be a possible response to an unresolved challenge, 
as the example of the JWs has indicated. If this strategy is employed a belief or 
practice that apparently constituted an unconditionally necessary doctrine will be 
redefined in terms which mean that it can be dispensed with without undermining 
the coherence of the belief system.  
The possibility of employing such strategies to redefine challenged beliefs means 
that it is not possible to specify a priori criteria to identify the beliefs or rules that 
are unconditionally necessary elements of a belief system. Moreover, the 
evolution of a tradition may generate changes in the set of doctrines that are 
considered to be necessary at different times, although one would anticipate that 
WKHUHZRXOGEHLGHQWLILDEOH³IDPLO\UHVHPEODQFHV´LQ:LWWJHQVWHLQLDQWHUPV
between the network of beliefs and practices that characterise the tradition at 
one time and those that characterise it at a later time. If this is the case the 
question as to whether a particular belief-statement or principle of action acts as 
an unconditionally necessary operative doctrine of a particular religious group or 
tradition of enquiry will have to be determined by examining what doctrines the 
group members hold to be the indispensable tenets of group membership at that 
particular point in time.  
Determining whether a particular belief acts as an operative doctrine would 
WKHUHIRUHUHTXLUHDSURFHVVRI*HHUW]LDQ³WKLFNGHVFULSWLRQ´670 to explore how 
particular beliefs govern the way members of a religion or tradition conceptualise 
the identity of that belief system  - and therefore how members of that system 
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also conceptualise their own identity. One way forward for research in this area 
would be the detailed analysis of the accounts of members of traditions (religious 
and secular) in order to identify their understanding of the non-negotiable 
elements of community membership, perhaps drawing on the techniques of 
discourse analysis that have been developed in social psychology.671 Once the 
repertoire of rules, practices and beliefs that are considered to be identity-
forming have been identified it will be possible to identify the way in which 
challenges to these beliefs may or may not precipitate epistemological crises.  
There may, however, be other elements of a tradition which can provide a 
complementary basis for an understanding of the grounds of an epistemological 
crisis, over and above the existence of some doctrines that are considered 
necessary. The continuity of a tradition of enquiry may not depend on the 
existence of some unchanging doctrines but on the extent to which the evolution 
of its doctrines in response to challenge can be seen by participants to represent 
progress in the pursuit of the goal of that enquiry. This progress will strengthen 
the claims of the community to knowledge, by enabling it to explain the reasons 
why the unmodified tradition was originally unable to resolve the challenges 
which it has now resolved. In this process of modification and evolution it will 
have developed a deeper understanding of the nature of its object of enquiry and 
a deeper understanding of that process of enquiry itself. What acts as the centre 
of identity of the tradition may not, therefore, be a set of fixed beliefs (although 
these may play an important role), but an ability to identify progress towards the 
achievement of its central purpose.  
,IZHWDNH0DF,QW\UH¶VUHVXVcitation of the Aristotelian tradition as an example, it 
is apparent that in his work the identity and continuity of the tradition is balanced 
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with conceptual development. The aim of articulating the overall good for human 
beings has remained constant through the historical transmutations of that 
WUDGLWLRQDQGWKDWDLPLVDOVRFHQWUDOWR0DF,QW\UH¶VDFFRXQW$FFRUGLQJWR
MacIntyre, the decline of the Aristotelian tradition occurred when the growth of 
non-teleological forms of explanation (among other factors) eroded the credibility 
of the notion of a human telos.672 0DF,QW\UH¶VZRUNLQ$9RQZDUGVUHSUHVHQWVDQ
attempt to revive a version of Aristotelian ethics by reconstructing its central aim 
of constructing an account of the human good, without relying on the 
metaphysical presuppositions of its founder. Despite the significant conceptual 
FKDQJHVKHKDVLQWURGXFHG0DF,QW\UH¶VZRUNUHPDLQVDQH[WHQVLRQRIWKH
Aristotelian ethical tradition rather than a replacement for it, because 
development is balanced with continuity in three ways. Firstly, the overall goal of 
the enquiry has remained the same despite changes to the concepts in which 
that goal is expressed - particularly the notion of a telos and the virtues. 
Secondly, these concepts are reinterpreted by MacIntyre in ways that are 
consistent with contemporary metaphysical presuppositions in order to enhance 
their credibility, but despite these changes their function in his overall philosophy 
remains the same as the role of the equivalent concepts in AristotlH¶VHWKLFV
Thirdly, MacIntyre is able to demonstrate progress as well as continuity in 
enquiry by explaining why the original concepts were found to be inadequate and 
by demonstrating how these modified concepts have overcome these 
inadequacies. 
MacIntyre¶VUHYLYDORI$ULVWRWHOLDQLVPWKHUHIRUHSURYLGHVDQLOOXVWUDWLRQRI
/LQGEHFN¶VFODLPWKDWDQLQWHUSUHWDWLYHPHGLXPLVFDSDEOHRIUHWDLQLQJLWVLGHQWLW\
through successive transformations of the concepts in which it is expressed. It is 
the commitment to the notion of telos itself, and to the value of the process of 
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enquiry aimed at elucidating that telos, that defines one as an Aristotelian, rather 
than the acceptance or rejection of particular conceptualisations of telos. In the 
same way, the second order activities of theology are united by the shared 
purpose of articulating the meaning of the Christian faith, notwithstanding major 
differences in the way that that meaning has been expressed.  The identity of a 
tradition will be maintained by a continued commitment to its purpose and to the 
coherence of its processes of enquiry. And this explains why epistemological 
openness is an important characteristic of a living tradition: strategies which 
protect a belief-V\VWHP¶VLGHQWLW\-forming doctrines from challenge, such as 
GHIHQVLYHUHGHILQLWLRQDVLQWKHH[DPSOHRIWKH-HKRYDK¶V:LWQHVVHVZLOODOVR
tend to frustrate progress in the pursuit of its purpose and act to undermine its 
intellectual credibility, even among its adherents. 
To summarise, I have argued in this section that the emergence of an 
epistemological crisis can be understood in terms of the interaction between two 
characteristics of a tradition of enquiry.  Firstly, an epistemological crisis may 
arise when one or more doctrines that are held to be unconditionally necessary 
are challenged, unless the tradition is able to respond to this challenge in a way 
that maintains its overall coherence. Defensive redefinition of doctrines is always 
a potential strategy for dealing with such challenges to particular elements of the 
belief system. However, such responses risk undermining the coherence of the 
processes of enquiry which embody the rationality of the tradition and, as a 
result, may frustrate its progress in enquiry. This may undermine the credibility of 
the tradition as a rational belief system, frustrate progress towards the 
achievement of its purpose and lead to epistemological crisis in a second way, 
through the loss of its credibility as a form of enquiry amongst its own adherents. 
The development of these ideas would require empirical investigation aimed at 
examining the way in which adherents of different traditions conceptualise the 
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identity forming characteristics of their tradition, the nature of the rational (and a-
rational) processes of justification used within the tradition, and the 
consequences of unresolved challenges on the stability and coherence of that 
tradition.  
4.5 Lindbeck on Inter-religious superiority 
7KHILUVWSDUWRIWKLVFKDSWHUKDVXVHG/LQGEHFN¶VDFFRXQWRIGRFWULQHWRprovide a 
more precise account of the nature of a tradition, and in doing this it has shed 
some light on the conditions under which an epistemological crisis may arise. 
The second part of the chapter now shifts the focus to the identification of two 
unresoOYHGLVVXHVLQ/LQGEHFN¶VZRUNDQGWKHUHOHYDQFHRI0DF,QW\UH¶V
philosophy to their resolution. These issues are both related to the question of 
superiority in matters of religion. The first issue is the basis on which one religion 
might be considered superior to another religion, which is the focus of the current 
section. The second issue is the question of the basis on which one can 
distinguish between authentic and inauthentic interpretations of the faith in 
controversies within the Christian religion. This issue is addressed in the 
following section. 
Inter-religious superiority and relativism 
Different religions characteristically assert their superiority to others by claiming 
that they are true while their rivals are (at least partially) false. The question of 
inter-religious superiority is therefore intimately entwined with questions about 
the nature of religious truth, and how such truth can be recognised. The question 
of the nature of truth is problematic for Lindbeck because he holds that religions 
can be identified with interpretative mediums that set their own incommensurable 
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standards of truth and justification.673 A historical or anthropological perspective 
can describe the criteria that have evolved within these different traditions or 
religions, subject to the limits set by translatability and conceptual 
commensurability, but a repudiation of tradition-transcendent standards of 
justification appears to rule out the possibility of making universally cogent 
judgments as to which set of standards are superior to others. As Lindbeck 
acknowledges, the CL model of religion does not appear to be fertile ground for 
the interpretation of concepts of superiority, because it treats religions as cultural 
constructions and:  
2QHODQJXDJHRUFXOWXUHLVQRWJHQHUDOO\WKRXJKWRIDV³WUXHU´WKDQDQRWKHUPXFK
less unsurpassable, and yet that is what some religions profess to be.674 
If the CL model cannot show how one religion (or secular philosophy) can be 
superior to another it would appear to legitimate a form of relativism or 
SHUVSHFWLYLVPDQGWKLVZRXOGEHLQFRQVLVWHQWZLWKDEHOLHYHU¶VFODLPWKDWWKHLU
UHOLJLRQUHSUHVHQWVXQLTXHDQGXQVXUSDVVDEOHWUXWK/LQGEHFN¶VGLVFXVVLRQLV
therefore, shaped by the desire to show that the CL model allows for a coherent 
account of the meaning of claims of superiority, without claiming ultimate and 
unsurpassable truth for one particular religion or sect.  In ND Lindbeck therefore 
SXUVXHVD³QRQWKHRORJLFDO´DQDO\VLVRIWKHLPSOLFDWLRQVRIWKHFXOWXUDO-linguistic 
model, which is restricted to elucidating the meaning of claims to superiority:  
It is not the business of a nontheological theory of religion to argue for or against 
the superiority of any one faith; but it does have the job, if it is to be religiously 
useful, of allowing the possibility of such superiority. It must not, in other words, 
exclude the claims religions make about themselves, and it must supply an 
interpretation of what these claims mean.675 
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 Lindbeck develops his CL account of superiority by contrasting it with CP and 
EE accounts of superiority.  He suggests that the CP model identifies superiority 
with the possession of propositional truth as opposed to propositional falsity, and 
would identify as superior to all others the religion that asserts the greatest 
number of significant propositional truths about ultimate reality. It would hold a 
religion to be unsurpassably true if it only asserted true propositions about the 
REMHFWRIXOWLPDWHFRQFHUQDQGZDV³H[HPSWIURPHUURU´676 In contrast, 
experiential-expressive models presuppose that, while there may be diverse 
routes to religious experiences, all such experiences arise from an experience of 
the divine that is common to everyone.677 One religion therefore cannot claim to 
be superior to others on the basis that it uniquely provides access to an 
experience of the divine, although it might claim to provide a greater intensity of 
religious experience than others, and this might act as a measure of 
superiority.678  
In contrast to CP and EE models, the CL model explains the capacity of religions 
to assert propositional truths and to mediate religious experience as flowing from 
their creation of a set of interpretative resources that can be used to understand 
reality and experience, in accordance with culturally-approved norms of usage. 
/LQGEHFNWHUPVWKHVHUHVRXUFHV³FDWHJRULHV´DQGDUJXHVWKDWRQO\WKRVH
categories which can be used to make reference to what is real can underpin the 
expression of religious truth and the appropriate characterisation of religious 
experience, and thereby underpin judgements of superiority or inferiority.  
...in a cultural-linguistic outlook, religions are thought of primarily as different 
idioms for construing reality, expressing experience, and ordering life. Attention, 
ZKHQFRQVLGHULQJWKHTXHVWLRQRIWUXWKIRFXVHVRQWKHFDWHJRULHVRUµJUDPPDU¶RU
µUXOHVRIWKHJDPH¶LQWHUPVRIZKLFKWUXWKFODLPVDUHPDGHDQGH[SUHVVLYH
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symbolisms are employed. Thus the questions raised in comparing religions have 
to do first of all with the adequacy of their categories.  Adequate categories are 
those which can be made to apply to what is taken to be real and which therefore 
make possible, though they do not guarantee propositional, practical and symbolic 
truth. A religion that is thought of as having such categories can be said to be 
categorially true.679 
The CL model therefore identifies the overall criterion of superiority in religion 
with the possession of categorial truth, defined as the capacity of the semiotic 
categories to be used (in principle) to interpret reality and human experience 
FRUUHFWO\7KLVFDSDFLW\LVDSUHFRQGLWLRQRIWKHUHOLJLRQ¶VSRZHUWRIRUPXODWH
assertoric propositions that are (potentially) true and to categorise experience in 
a meaningful way. Categorial truth therefore underpins those functions of 
religions which CP and EE models mistakenly privilege.680 /LQGEHFN¶VDFFRXQWRI
inter-religious superiority can, therefore, be summarised as follows: 
A religion is categorially adequate if it has created semiotic resources 
(categories) which can correspond to aspects of ontological and experiential 
reality. Categorial adequacy will make possible the expression of truth about 
such aspects of reality by those versed in the semiotic system. A religion which 
possesses such categories is superior to one that does not.  
Participation in a categorially adequate religion provides the capacity to construct 
meaningful propositions about ultimate reality, but does not guarantee their truth. 
It also provides a capacity to characterise spiritual experience, but does not 
guarantee that such characterisations correctly represent the nature of that 
experience. However, Lindbeck suggests that religions which are categorially 
false would never be capable of either propositional truth or falsity or symbolic 
HIILFDF\³WKH\ZRXOGEHUHOLJLRXVO\PHDQLQJOHVV´681 Lindbeck suggests that if 
there is only one religion that has constructed the unique set of categories that 
can be used to refer to the ultimate reality then such a religion would be the only 
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one with resources capable of expressing propositional and expressive truth and 
would therefore be unsurpassably true.682 However, Lindbeck does not exclude 
the possibility that several different religions may possess some categories that 
are adequate, and which allow those religions to address aspects of the ultimate 
that are not within the direct purview of the peoples of Messianic witness, but that 
are nevertheless God-willed and God-approved aspects of the coming kingdom.683 
 
If this is the case, several religions (and indeed some secular philosophies) may 
have created categories that are categorially true, and which can underpin the 
construction of true (and false) propositions about ultimate reality and 
appropriate characterisations of spiritual experience.  
However, unless there is some criterion by which one can distinguish between 
those categories that are adequate and those that are empty of significance 
/LQGEHFN¶VDFFRXQWRIinter-religious superiority will be devoid of any practical 
application. Specifying such a criterion is problematic for Lindbeck because he 
claims that the notions of categorial adequacy and truth constructed in one 
religion may be incommensurable with those constructed in another religion. As 
DUHVXOWWKHUHZLOOEH³QRFRPPRQIUDPHZRUN«ZLWKLQZKLFKWRFRPSDUH
UHOLJLRQV´684 If there is no such common framework for evaluation, it would 
DSSHDUWKDW/LQGEHFN¶VQRQ-theological account of religion does not provide a 
practical basis for judgements of superiority/inferiority which transcend the 
conflicting standards formulated within different religions. The superior religion 
may be that religion which is true rather than false ± but how do we tell which 
religion is true? 
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Categorial and Performative Truth 
The question of identifying religious truth is made more complicated by the fact 
that Lindbeck identifies several different varieties of truth in ND, including 
categorial, intrasystematic, and ontological forms of truth.  Categorial truth was 
GHILQHGLQWKHSUHYLRXVVHFWLRQLQWHUPVRIDUHOLJLRQ¶VSRVVHVVLRQRIVHPLRWLF
categories which can be made to apply to what is real, but the possession of 
such categories is a necessary rather than sufficient condition for ³SURSRVLWLRQDO
SUDFWLFDODQGV\PEROLFWUXWK´685 Lindbeck defines intrasystematic truth in terms of 
the coherence of an utterance or action with the total context defined by the 
discourse and practices of a religion:  
Utterances are intrasystematically true when they cohere with the total relevant 
context, which, in the case of a religion when viewed as a cultural-linguistic terms, 
is not only other utterances but also the correlative forms of life. Thus for a 
&KULVWLDQµ*RGLV7KUHHDQG2QH¶RU&KULVWLV Lord" are true only as part of a total 
pattern of speaking, thinking, feeling and acting.  They are false when their use in 
any given instance is inconsistent with what the pattern as a whole affirms of 
*RG¶VEHLQJDQGZLOO686  
For an utterance to be intrasystematically true, therefore, it must be expressed in 
categories which can be made to apply to that which is real (as otherwise it will 
be meaningless687), and cohere with the overall form of life that constitutes the 
religion. The combination of categorial and intrasystematic truth makes possible 
the expression of ontological truth, but such truth is not to be identified with a 
conventional correspondence theory of truth in which sentences or propositions 
are true by virtue of their relationship to what is UHDO,Q/LQGEHFN¶VDFFRXQW
religious ontological truth is created through the correspondence of the whole 
person and community to aspects of the divine.688 The creation of ontological 
                                               
685
 ND pp.47-48. 
686
 ND p.64. 
687
 See ND p.50. 
688
 ND p.65. 
257 
 
WUXWKUHTXLUHVWKHXVHRIWKHUHOLJLRQ¶VFDWHJRULHVLQDPRUHFRPSOH[Uange of 
human activities than in the construction of grammatically correct sentences. 
6XFKVHQWHQFHVKDYHWR³EHPDGHWRDSSO\WRZKDWLVWDNHQWREHUHDO´689 
through their employment within a set of religious practices690Ontological 
religious truth therefore has to be expressed in a pattern of life, rather than 
through the assertion of a set of abstract propositions. According to Lindbeck: 
A religion thought of as comparable to a cultural system, as a set of language 
games correlated with a form of life, may as a whole correspond or not correspond 
WRZKDWDWKHLVWFDOOV*RG¶VEHLQJDQGZLOO$VDFWXDOO\OLYHGDUHOLJLRQPD\EH
pictured as a single gigantic proposition.  It is a true proposition to the extent that 
its objectivities are interiorised and exercised by groups and individuals in such a 
way as to conform them in some measure in the various dimensions of their 
existence to the ultimate reality and goodness that lies at the heart of things.  It is 
a false proposition to the extent that this does not happen.691 
The truth (and therefore the superiority) of a religion cannot be divorced from its 
ability to shape the life of an individual and her community, by 
 «JXLGLQJWKRXJKWSDVVLRQVDQGDFWLRQLQDZD\WKDWFRUUHVSRQGVWRXOWLPDWH
reality, and of thuVEHLQJRQWRORJLFDOO\DQGµSURSRVLWLRQDOO\¶WUXH692  
 
The truth of the Christian religion for Lindbeck is thus expressed in its capacity to 
IRVWHUWKHGHYHORSPHQWRI³&KULVWLFLGHQWLWLHV´693  /LQGEHFN¶VDFFRXQWWKHUHIRUH
emphasises that ontological truth is about shaping human behaviour in ways that 
correspond to the understanding of the divine embodied in a religion.  
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/LQGEHFN¶VDFFRXQWRIUHOLJLRXVWUXWKKDVOHGVRPHFRPPHQWDWRUVWRVXJJHVWWKDW
his position undermines ontological realism in religious belief. I have already 
QRWHG$GRQLV9LGX¶VUHVHUYDWLRQVLQWKLVUHVSHFWLQ&KDSWHUDERYH694 and 
)DWKHU&ROPDQ2¶1HLOOKDVDOVRVXJJHVWHGWKDW/LQGEHFNLVFRPPLWWHGWRD
³PRUDORUSUDJPDWLFGHILQLWLRQRIWUXWK´UDWKHUWKDQWRDUHDOLVWSRVLWLRQ695 Such 
interpUHWDWLRQVDUHHQWLUHO\LQFRQVLVWHQWZLWK/LQGEHFN¶VLQWHQWLRQV696 One of 
/LQGEHFN¶VPRVWV\PSDWKHWLFFRPPHQWDWRUV%UXFH0DUVKDOOKDVDUJXHGWKDW
/LQGEHFN¶VDFFRXQWRIPXOWLSOHYDULHWLHVRIWUXWKLVPLVOHDGLQJDQGVKRXOGEH
reframed into a set of theories about meaning, warrant and ontological truth to 
avoid such difficulties of interpretation. He suggests that 
«>RQWRORJLFDOWUXWK@OLQHVXSGLUHFWO\ZLWKWUDGLWLRQDOQRWLRQVRIWUXWKDV
FRUUHVSRQGHQFHWRUHDOLW\RUDGHTXDWLRPHQWLVDGUHP%XWFDWHJRULDO³WUXWK´KDVWR
do with ...matters of meaning and reference, and iQWUDV\VWHPDWLF³WUXWK´KDVWRGR
with warrant or justification...It is therefore misleading for Lindbeck to speak as 
though there were three different kinds of truth; it would have been clearer to 
speak of meaning, warrant and truth. That Lindbeck insists on an unusually 
intimate connection between practice and belief when it comes to meaning and 
ZDUUDQWFDWHJRULDODQGLQWUDV\VWHPDWLF³WUXWK´KDVVHUYHGWRKHLJKWHQWKH
provocation [to his critics].697 
,QKLVSDSHU³$TXLQDVDV3RVWOLEHUDO7KHRORJLDQ´ Marshall distinguishes between 
/LQGEHFN¶VXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIRQWRORJLFDOUHDOLVPDQGKLVjustification of that 
realism in terms of categorial and intrasystematic coherence.  Marshall responds 
WR)DWKHU2¶1HLOO¶VFULWLFLVPVDQGDUJXHVWKDW2¶1HLOOKDGZURQJO\DVVXmed that 
/LQGEHFN¶VDFFRXQWRIMXVWLILFDWLRQFDQQRWXQGHUSLQDUREXVWO\UHDOLVWDFFRXQWRI
religious truth.698  $V0DUVKDOOSRLQWVRXWLQKLVSDSHU/LQGEHFN¶VDFFRXQWRI
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ontological truth is defined in terms of the conformity of a person to a religious 
reality that exists independently of human institutions and conceptualisations.699 
/LQGEHFN¶VDFFRXQWWKHUHIRUHSUHVXSSRVHVWKHWUXWKRIRQWRORJLFDOUHDOLVP7KH
notions of Intrasystematic and categorial truth specify the necessary conditions 
under which a claim to ontological truth can be held to be justified,700 they do not 
UHSODFHWKHQRWLRQRIRQWRORJLFDOWUXWK/LQGEHFNKLPVHOIKDVHQGRUVHG0DUVKDOO¶V
interpretation (or development) of his position.701  
0DUVKDOOLGHQWLILHVWZRFKDOOHQJHVWR/LQGEHFN¶VDFFRXQWRI ontological truth in his 
SDSHU)LUVWO\KHDVVHUWVWKDWIRU/LQGEHFN³DGHTXDWHFDWHJRULHVDQG
intrasystematic coherence are not only necessary but sufficient conditions for the 
WUXWKRIUHOLJLRXVXWWHUDQFHVLQWKLV>RQWRORJLFDO@VHQVH´0DUVKDOOVXJJHVWV that 
this is a position that needs further development in order to show how it was 
possible for these two criteria to act as guarantors of ontological truth.702  An 
DQDORJRXVWDVNKDVEHHQDGGUHVVHGLQ0DUVKDOO¶VVXEVHTXHQWZRUNRQWKH
nature of Christian truth.703 In that work he has sought to develop an account of 
UHOLJLRXVWUXWKZKLFKLVFRPSDUDEOHWR/LQGEHFN¶VDFFRXQWDQGZKLFKLOOXPLQDWHV
the way in which the nature of Christ can underpin that conformity of the mind 
(and the whole person) to the divine.704 0DUVKDOO¶VDFFRXQWDVVXPHVDQGGRHV
not seek to justify the truth of the central beliefs of Christianity and makes these 
religious beliefs control what can be taken to be epistemologically legitimate.705 
However, assuming the categorial and intrasystematic truth of one religion will 
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appear to be question begging to someone who is not already committed to the 
truth of Christianity. 
0DUVKDOO¶VVHFRQGFKDOOHQJHWR/LQGEHFN¶VDFFRXQWRIRQWRORJLFDOWUXWKLV
therefore, concerned with the question of the justification of the claim that 
Christianity (or any other religion) possesses such categorial and intrasystematic 
truth. As a Christian, Lindbeck holds that Christianity meets these requirements, 
and is, therefore, capable of achieving ontological truth. But on what basis can 
such a claim be made? Marshall comments that  
/LQGEHFN¶VDFFRXQWRIWKHMXVWLILFDWLRQRI&KULVWLDQEHOLHIVLVERXQGWRVHHPOLNH
a flagrant evasion [to his critics]. To say that we are justified in holding a given 
proposition to be (ontologically) true because it coheres with the norms of 
Christian belief and practice is, so the objection goes, to beg the decisive question: 
KRZFDQWKHVHQRUPVWKHPVHOYHVEHMXVWLILHG"«7KHSUREOHPFDQEHVHHQDV
explicating how the whole internally normed scheme of belief and practice called 
µ&KULVWLDQLW\¶FDQEHMXVWLILHG«>$WWKLVSRLQWVRPHFULWLFVFODLPWKDW@/LQGEHFN¶V
account of justification seems to degenerate into fideism and relativism.706  
To respond to this demand for a general justification of the validity of the 
Christian faith (or any other faith that claims ontological truth) in a way that would 
be convincing to the challenger would apparently require an appeal to publicly 
accepted standards to adjudicate between the claims to justification of such 
³FRPSUHKHQVLYHV\VWHPVRIEHOLHI´707 But as Marshall has pointed out, this 
DVVXPSWLRQLVLQFRQVLVWHQWZLWK/LQGEHFN¶VYLHZWKDWWKHUHLVQR³QHXWUDO
framework-LQGHSHQGHQWODQJXDJH´LQZKLFKVXFKVWDQGDUGVFDQEHIRUPXODWHG708 
The criteria for the truth of the system must, therefore, be internal to it.709 As a 
result, each religion will justify itself in its own terms and will not need (or be able 
to) to justify itself in terms of the standards evinced by other religions or by 
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secular philosophies.710 But every belief system considered as a cultural-
linguistic form of life would also appear to be able to justify its claims to truth in 
WKHVDPHZD\/LQGEHFN¶VSRVLWLRQGRHVQRWWKHUHIRUHDSSHDUWRSURYLGHDQ\
criteria that could be used to identify one religion as superior to another in a way 
which might transcend the limits of a particular cultural perspective. Can 
/LQGEHFN¶VDFFRXQWEHPRGLILHGLQRUGHUWRDGGUHVVWKLVSRLQW" 
A pessimistic answer to this question would ignore the fact that religions are not 
only patterns of life and worship: they are also self-conscious and reflexive forms 
of life which seek to articulate and develop their own understanding of truth in 
their engagement with their cultural and intellectual contexts. They are driven to 
construct the type of warranted assertions that Lindbeck and Marshall identify 
ZLWK³LQWUDV\VWHPDWLFWUXWK´E\VHOI-consciously articulating the meaning of the 
doctrines, practices and experiences that arise within the life of the community in 
ways that are both internally consistent and reconcile conflicts with external 
perspectives and events. While ontological truth may not be embodied in these 
second-order reflections on the meaning of the religious faith, the coherence and 
rationality of this developing self-conceptualisation will be under test both 
internally, from rival interpretations of the meaning of beliefs and practices, and 
H[WHUQDOO\WKURXJKWKHUHOLJLRQ¶VHQJDJHPHQWZLWKLQFRPSDWLEOHLGHDVLQLWVZLGHU
environment. In section 4.6 I will consider RRZDQ:LOOLDPV¶FULWLFLVPVRI
Lindbeck711 and argue that the progressive development of such statements of 
WKHPHDQLQJRIWKHIDLWKHFKRHV0DF,QW\UH¶VGHVFULSWLRQRIWKHHYROXWLRQRID
WUDGLWLRQRIHQTXLU\,Q:LOOLDPV¶WHUPVVXFKDWWHPSWVWRIRUPXODWHDQGDUWLFXODWH
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the meaning of the religion interact with and judge the world - but are themselves 
judged by the world in this process of engagement.712  
Through these processes of mutual judgement Christian theologies can come to 
HPERG\LQ0DF,QW\UH¶VSKUDVHWUDGLWLRQVRIHQTXLU\LQWRWKHQDWXUHRIthe good.  
6XFKDWKHRORJ\ZLOOVHHNWRDUWLFXODWHWKHFRPPXQLW\¶VLQWHUSUHWDWLRQRIWKDW
JRRGDQGVHHNWRFODULI\DQGV\VWHPDWLVHWKHFRPPXQLW\¶VXQGHUVWDQGLQJRI
reality by elucidating beliefs and reconciling inconsistencies. It will seek to 
expound the meaning of practices and provide a focus for debate and for the 
reconciliation of divided opinions. It will help the community to respond to the 
challenge of external events by articulating new concepts which may be 
LQFRUSRUDWHGLQWRWKHFRPPXQLW\¶VVHOI-understanding.  These processes may 
result in the development and revision of informal and formal doctrines. If these 
theological reflections are successful in overcoming the problems and 
inconsistencies that have emerged from challenge they will strengthen the 
hermeneutic framework embodied in the religion. This capacity to evolve may 
SURYLGHDWHVWRIWKDWIUDPHZRUN¶VVXSHULRULW\RULQIHULRULW\WRRWKHUKHUPHQHXWLF
frameworks.  
0DF,QW\UH¶VDFFRXQWRIWUDGLWLRQFRQVWLWXWHGUDWLRQDOLW\SURYLGHVDZD\RI
exploring this notion of superiority. But before I turn to the relevance of 
0DF,QW\UH¶VSKLORVRSK\WRWKLVTXHVWLRQ,ZDQWWRH[DPLQHDUHODWHGLVVXH
discussed by Lindbeck, which is the question of how one can adjudicate between 
conflicting theological perspectives within the same religion. Lindbeck uses the 
QRWLRQRI³LQWUDWH[WXDOLW\´DVDZD\RIFRQFHSWXDOLVLQJWKHEDVLVRQZKLFKVXFK
judgements can be made. This discussion, and the identification of the limitations 
RI/LQGEHFN¶VDFFRXQWRILQWUDWH[WXDOLW\ will further clarify the resemblance 
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EHWZHHQ/LQGEHFN¶VDFFRXQWRIDUHOLJLRQDVDQLQWHUSUHWDWLYHPHGLXPDQG
0DF,QW\UH¶VDFFRXQWRIDWUDGLWLRQRIHQTXLU\ 
4.6 Intratextuality and Superiority 
When controversies arise within a tradition or religion, judgements have to be 
made as to whether one position is superior to another. Such controversies 
might relate to the question of which of two formulations of doctrine is correct, or 
which of several interpretations of scripture are valid, and the conflict generated 
by these debates may threaten the identity and stability of the religious 
community. Failure to resolve such disputes has the potential to create crises 
which may result in schism and the creation of two or more separate sects from 
what was initially a single community. The question of which of two competing 
interpretations is faithful to the religion may, therefore, become central to the 
stability of the religious community. As a result, such disputes may act as a 
driving force for the formulation of doctrinal statements which are intended to 
resolve conflict by constructing a fixed authoritative position on the matter in 
question. Such a position however has to be capable of being seen as faithful to 
the underlying identity of the religion. A critical question, therefore, is the 
question of how interpretations and developments within a religion can be 
identified as faithful to the religion as a whole.  
Experiential-expressive and cognitive propositional models seek to ground 
theological meaning on some reality that is external to the religion (religious 
experience or propositional correspondence).  However such external validation 
would be inconsistent with the CL model, and the metaphor of a system that can 
³DEVRUEWKHXQLYHUVH´7KHFXOWXUDO-linguistic model focuses attention on the way 
in which religious practices and beliefs acquire their significance and justification 
from their function within the semiotic system of a religious community. Events 
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defined by that framework, and therefore cannot act as external tests of validity. 
7KHUHLVQRWKLQJ³RXWVLGH´WKHV\VWHPDQGDs a result  the meaning of terms used 
ZLWKLQWKHV\VWHPVXFKDV³*RG´KDVWREHDUWLFXODWHGintratextually, by showing 
how these terms are used within the semiotic system embodied in the culture, 
narratives, practices and canonical scriptures of the religion. Such accounts of 
the meaning of terms can be accurate or inaccurate, and the test of authenticity 
is faithfulness to the other elements of the system. Lindbeck therefore puts 
IRUZDUGWKHFRQFHSWRI³LQWUDWH[WXDOLW\´DVWKHFULWHULRQRIIDLWKIXOQHVVLn 
theological argument and interpretation.713  
The reference to the interpretation of religious practices and canonical scriptures 
SRLQWVWRZDUGVWZRGLIIHUHQWVHQVHVRIWKHWHUP³LQWUDWH[WXDO´,QWKHILUVWVHQVHDQ
intratextual explication involves a proceVVRI*HHUW]LDQ³WKLFNGHVFULSWLRQ´WKDWLV
the very detailed analysis of the minutiae of religious life to articulate the cultural 
context which render religious words and practices intelligible. In this sense 
intratextuality is a term which can be applied to any cultural linguistic 
interpretation of any religion or religious practice.714 However, religions such as 
Christianity also have a core canon of texts which provide that religion with an 
important source of stability and identity, and intratextuality in this less extended 
sense relates to the faithful explication of the meaning of these sacred texts, and 
the application of that meaning to the understanding of the external 
environment.715 Lindbeck suggests that the criterion of superiority with respect to 
competing theological interpretations therefore has to be the degree to which 
such interpretations faithfully reflect the paradigmatic semiotic system encoded 
in these texts.  
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DOO>WKHZRUOG¶VPDMRUIDLWKV@KDYHUHODWLYHO\IL[HGFDQRQVRIZULWLQJVWKat they 
treat as exemplary or normative exemplifications of their semiotic codes. One test 
of faithfulness for all of them is the degree to which descriptions correspond to the 
semiotic universe paradigmatically encoded in holy writ.716 
7KHVHFRQGVHQVHRI³LQWUDWH[WXDO´WKHUHIRUHUHODWHVWRWKHH[SOLFDWLRQDQG
application of these canonical texts in Christian discourse and practice, and at a 
second-order level, to the explication of their meaning in normative theological 
analysis. This concept therefore provides a programmatic perspective in terms of 
the way in which theology should be pursued in future: it should engage in the 
explication of this original framework of meaning. The legitimacy of such 
LQWHUSUHWDWLRQVLVGHWHUPLQHGE\VRPH³LQWUDWH[WXDOQRUPRI IDLWKIXOQHVV´717 Such 
a norm would specify what counts as a legitimate interpretation or theological 
development and what should be rejected, and therefore provides a criterion of 
intrasystematic truth or warranted assertion.  
Lindbeck is aware of some limLWDWLRQVWRWKHLGHDRILQWUDWH[WXDOLW\DVD³QRUPRI
IDLWKIXOQHVV´:KLOHWKHUHPD\EHDJUHHPHQWWKDWFRQIRUPLW\WRVXFKDQRUP
ZRXOGEH³WRGHVFULEHOLIHDQGUHDOLW\LQZD\VFRQIRUPDEOHWRZKDWWKHVH
>VFULSWXUDO@VWRULHVLQGLFDWHDERXW*RG´718 different theologies may emphasise 
different aspects of those stories, depending on the cultural and philosophical 
environment, and therefore construct radically different interpretations. Lindbeck 
also acknowledges that there may be disagreement about the norm itself, 
perhaps reflecting disagreement as to the overall content of the canon or in 
terms of the relative priority given to different texts. The canon can be extended 
by debates within the tradition, but these potential extensions may be 
challenged, leading to different views as to what might count as the basis for 
interpretation. There may also be fundamental disagreements about how to 
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interpret the genre of scripture and therefore disagreement as to what counts as 
an accurate reading.719 
Disputes such as these cannot be resolved by appeals to intratextuality, because 
the choice one makes with respect to these positions determines what will count 
as an accurate intratextual reading. This observation provides support for Paul 
'H+DUW¶VFULWLFLVPVRI/LQGEHFN'H+DUt argues that it is unclear how the 
scriptural foundations of intratextuality can give clear and unambiguous 
frameworks for interpretation.720 DeHart argues that in order to justify his position 
Lindbeck needs to be able to identify the archetypal semiotic system which can 
act as the basis for his norm of faithfulness, and DeHart challenges whether 
such a system can be identified.721 He suggests that without the possibility of 
such identification there is no criterion available to distinguish legitimate from 
illegitimate theological developments: 
... when intratextuality becomes a theological criterion of faithfulness demands are 
placed on semiotic networks informing Christian practice which they cannot 
bear.722 
 
The difficulty here is determining how one would resolve disputes around the 
legitimacy and authority of such a system - by a further appeal to a criterion of 
intratextuality? If so, an infinite regress of appeals to intratextuality beckons. In 
isolation the notion of intratextuality fails to provide a clear criterion by which one 
could distinguish correct from incorrect theological interpretations, because it 
presupposes a prior consensus on the legitimacy and authority of the system of 
interpretation. I will return to this issue in the following section. 
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7KHFHQWUDOGHIHFWRI/LQGEHFN¶VDFFRXQWRILQWUDWH[WXDOLW\LVWKDWLWDSSHDUVWR
disregard the influence that external events can have on the interpretative 
system, because of the power of his metaphor of such a system absorbing the 
universe. Absorption is a unidirectional process. But a religion is not insulated 
from challenges and threats from its environment; it both acts upon and is 
LQIOXHQFHGE\WKDWHQYLURQPHQW'H+DUWFODLPVWKDW/LQGEHFN¶VSRVLWLRQ
presupposes that the world is interpreted in terms of the frame of reference 
provided by scripture, while that frame of reference remains unchanged through 
this interaction. This is implausible, and DeHart723 draws on work by theologians 
such as Rowan Williams724 and Terrence Tilley, who emphasise the importance 
of the dialogue between the Christian semiotic universe and the secular culture. 
725
 They both depict the relationship between Christianity's semiotic practices and 
those of the wider environment as a matter of mutual interaction and influence, 
and their essays are instructive.  
Tilley challenges the coherence of the idea that religions can form independent 
semiotic systems. His argument turns on a point that I discussed in Chapter 4.3, 
which is the question of what constitutes an independent tradition. Tilley asks 
³'R6W$XJXVWLQH6W7KRPDV/XWKHUDQG/LQGEHFNOLYHLQWKHsame cultural-
OLQJXLVWLFIUDPHZRUN"´726 Tilley argues that they do not, because the semiotic 
system which they and each of us occupies and instantiates in our behaviour is 
shaped by both temporal and geographical factors. Different times and places 
will shape different semiotic systems, but if this is the case then there will not be 
a single Christian semiotic system that continues through history that can be 
used as a basis for interpretation of texts and as a basis for conflict resolution. 
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Moreover, if the non-religious concepts which characterise these varying 
geographical and historical settings have to be invoked to interpret the meaning 
of the Christian semiotic system, that system will be partly constituted by these 
concepts and cannot be conceptualised as existing entirely independently of its 
environment.727  
Tilley points out that the depiction of a semiotic system in texts can only ever be 
an abstraction from the form of life embedded in the community, and therefore 
/LQGEHFN¶VDWWHPSWWRLGHQWLI\WKHSDUDGLJPDWLFsemiotic system with something 
that is embedded in canonical texts must be mistaken.728 Tilley argues 
SHUVXDVLYHO\WKDW/LQGEHFN¶VQRWLRQRIWKH&KULVWLDQWH[WDEVRUELQJWKHZRUOGLQ
some unidirectional way is incoherent, because the concepts that constitute the 
world that is being interpreted have to be reinterpreted and expressed within that 
Christian framework. In this process the resources of the original Christian 
framework will not be sufficient for this task in themselves, because if genuinely 
alien concepts have to be absorbed, the existing semiotic resources of the 
system will have to be extended. New concepts will have to be incorporated into 
the Christian semiotic system and as a result that system will be extended 
through its engagement with the external culture, and will no longer be identical 
with the original semiotic system.729  
Tilley argues that there is a second reason why the idea of a semiotic system 
embedded in texts is incoherent. The meaning of a text is not something fixed 
and given, but something which is constructed in the interaction between text 
and audience. If the Christian semiotic system is to be communicated to a non-
Christian audience (and that is something that the mission of the Church 
requires) it will have to be put into terms that are comprehensible to the target 
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audience.  If that audience lives in another semiotic world (as will be the case if 
the audience is non-Christian) the communication of that text will initially need to 
begin by translating Christian ideas into a form that is intelligible within the alien 
semiotic framework.730 Both semiotic systems will be extended in this process 
and this interaction will open up the possibility of transformation on both sides.731  
It is this possibility of mutual transformation that is at the heart of Rowan 
:LOOLDPV¶SDSHU  Williams challenges the image of a static hermeneutic 
IUDPHZRUNWKDWXQGHUSLQVWKHXQLGLUHFWLRQDOODQJXDJHRI³DEVRUELQJWKH
XQLYHUVH´ 
The church may be committed to interpreting the world in terms of its own 
foundational narratives; but the very act of interpreting affects the narratives as 
well as the world for good and ill...732 
 
Williams argues that the application of scriptural narratives to the new contexts 
that emerge in the world reshapes the meaning of those stories, at the same 
time as those stories reshape the interpretation of world events. Thus the 
PHDQLQJRIWKH$EUDKDPDQG,VDDFVWRU\KDVEHHQUHGHILQHGE\:LOIUHG2ZHQ¶V
UHFRQVWUXFWLRQRIWKHVDFULILFHVRIWKH)LUVW:RUOG:DUZLWKLQLWVLPDJHU\2ZHQ¶V
account 
RIKRZWKHROGPDQUHIXVHGWRKHDUWKHDQJHOµDQGVOHZKLVVRQ$QGKDOIWKHVHHG
RI(XURSHRQHE\RQH¶SRLQWVXSZKDWZHPLJKWPLVVLQ*HQHVLVWKHILQDO
drawing back from slaughter is an act of obedience as great as or greater than the 
first decision to sacrifice Isaac.733 
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The discovery of the meanings of scriptural narratives is generated through the 
encounter with new contexts, cultures and events, and through the interpretation 
of these alien contexts within the framework of the narrative. This in turn can 
change the interpretation of the original narratives. As a result, interpretation is 
bi- rather than uni-directional,734 and in this process of mutual interpretation the 
church re-identifies and reconstructs its own identity. Its engagement with 
external cultures is necessary because it is the vehicle that brings the message 
RI&KULVWWRWKHZRUOG7KHFKXUFKLV³HVVHQWLDOO\PLVVLRQDU\LQLWVQDWXUH´735 and 
as such must have something to contribute to all cultures at all times and places. 
This eVVHQWLDORSHQQHVVWRWKHZRUOGLVDFRQWULEXWLRQWRWKH³FRQVWUXFWLRQRI
PHDQLQJV´736 through interaction between church and culture, and through this 
process the church both judges and is judged by the world.737  
The underlying complacency of the image of a religion as a community that is 
capable of absorbing and interpreting the world within its own semiotic 
IUDPHZRUNLVUHSODFHGLQ:LOOLDPV¶SDSHUE\WKHLPDJHRID&KULVWLDQFRPPXQLW\
whose grasp of a transforming truth is always tentative and provisional. The 
ability of that community to apply that truth to the events with which it engages in 
its history is equally provisional, and its understanding of that truth will be 
challenged and ultimately deepened in its interaction with what is alien and new. 
And this implies that the understanding of Christian truth is itself continually 
changing in response to changing environments. As Rowan Williams says: 
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The Christian engaged at the frontier with politics, art or science will frequently find 
that he or she will not know what to say [emphasis original]. There can be a real 
sense of loss in respect to traditional formulae ± not because they are being 
translated, but because they are being tested: we are discovering whether there is 
any sense in which the other languages we are working with can be at home in our 
theology.738 
 
What is put to the question in these engagements is the identity of the truth, the 
identity of the church and the identity of the participants in this process of 
missionary engagement. But if this is the case the problematic issue of the 
nature of Christian identity (and the identity of any hermeneutic framework) 
cannot be resolved by establishing some definitive criterion of identity or 
justification. The identity and legitimacy of the hermeneutic framework is an 
achievement negotiated in the process of interpretation. Dissonant events and 
information will challenge that legitimacy and force the creation of new 
meanings. Through this process the framework will change and develop in 
pursuit of an ultimately unachievable final stability.  
The Christian claim, then, is bound always to be something evolving and acquiring 
definition in the conversations of history; it offers a direction for the historical 
construction of human meaning, but it does not offer to end history... it envisages a 
µORQJUHYROXWLRQ¶DWEest an asymptotic approach to a condition that history is itself 
(by definition) incapable of realizing ± a perfect communality of language and 
action...739 
 
What is encoded in the semiotic systems of the Christian religion is a developing 
but never fully realised image of the good for humanity. The history of 
Christianity is the progressive elaboration of the meaning of that good as it is 
embodied and expressed in the life, death and resurrection of Christ. This is a 
continuing history which will unfold and GHYHORSLQUHVSRQVHWRWKHFKXUFK¶V
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engagement with the boundary between the religious and the secular, in ways 
that remain unpredictable That development, however, must demonstrate 
consistency and coherence with the underlying principles of the faith at the same 
time as it helps to elaborate these principles and deepen the understanding of 
the church and its nature and role.  The importance of faithfulness to the 
scriptural cannon is not that it provides an answer to a criteriological problem but 
that it expresses a set of underlying beliefs and values whose meaning is 
constantly being explored, modified and elaborated through the process of 
engagement with new contexts and challenges. 
The criticisms of DeHart, Tilley and Williams have considerable validity if 
/LQGEHFN¶VLPDJHRIDXQLGLUHFWLRQDOSURFHVVRILQWHUSUHWDWLRQIURPVFULSWXUHWR
the world is accepted as defining his position. But Lindbeck is a victim of his own 
rhetoric. There is textual evidence in ND to support the view that his position is 
more complex and balanced than these criticisms would suggest. DeHart and 
the other critics overemphasise the extent to which Lindbeck sees the absorption 
of the world by a religion as a straightforwardly unidirectional process. Lindbeck 
points out that the interpretation of the canon, and, indeed, what counts as the 
canon will be variable and subject to debate. Lindbeck also acknowledges that 
there will be mutual influence between the environment and the Christian 
hermeneutic framework: 
...as current debates over feminism vividly remind us, past tradition or present 
consensus can serve as extensions of the canon and deeply influence the 
interpretation of the whole. These extensions can on occasion go beyond the 
specifically Christian or religious realm. The philosophical tradition from Plato to 
Heidegger operates as the canonical corpus for much Western reflection on God 
or the human condition; and when this reflection is recognised as operating with a 
peculiarly Western rather than transculturally available idiom, it begins to acquire 
some of the features of intratextuality. In short intratextuality may be a condition for 
the faithful description and development of a religion or tradition, but the material 
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or doctrinal consequences of this self-evidently depend in part on what canon is 
appealed to.740 
 
And, one should add, the outcome of this appeal will be determined not only by 
the part of the canon appealed to but the specific principles of interpretation that 
are applied. As Lindbeck points out, different theological perspectives imply that 
different elements of the canon should be given greater priority than others.741 
Together with his acknowledgement of development in the canon in interaction 
with the environment, this is sufficient to repudiate the suggestion that he is 
conceptualising the Christian semiotic framework as a rigid template that can be 
applied to external events without being changed in this process. DeHart is 
correct, however, in arguing that intratextuality does not provide a criterion for 
the resolution of internal disputes about the nature of that Christian framework, 
nor will it resolve disputes in relation to the significance and interpretation of the 
different elements of that canon. An intratextual understanding has to be 
constructed through engagement in such debates.  
Intratextuality does not, therefore, provide a criterion for distinguishing between 
superior and inferior perspectives within theology, any more than the concept of 
categorial adequacy provides a solution to the question of choosing between the 
conflicting claims to superiority of different religions. The inability to specify a 
robust tradition transcendent criterion of categorial adequacy and truth and the 
inability to specify a robust intratextual criterion to resolve internal disputes 
leaves Lindbeck open to the challenge that his position endorses fideism or 
relativism.742 Lindbeck acknowledges this challenge, even though such broad 
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epistemological issues are not central to his concerns. He raises the question as 
to  
... whether postliberal theologies would help make religions more intelligible and 
credible. This is a practical as well as a theoretical question, and it can be 
formulated in terms of two closely related problems. First, intratextuality seems 
wholly relativistic: it turns religions, so one can argue, into self-enclosed and 
incommensurable ghettoes. Associated with this is the fideistic dilemma: it 
appears that choice between religions is purely arbitrary, a matter of blind faith.743 
 
Lindbeck argues that the assumption that his position must lead to relativism and 
fideism depends on a false foundationalist model of reason. He points out that 
the repudiation of foundationalism should not be equated with irrationalism. 
Reason, he argues, is more subtle than this.744 What this observation points 
towards is the need for an alternative account of the nature of rationality to the 
IRXQGDWLRQDOLVWPRGHORIUHDVRQLI/LQGEHFN¶VDFFRXQWLVWRDYRLGUHODWLYLVP)RU
such an alternative account we can turn to Alasdair MacIntyre and his account of 
tradition-constituted rationality. The notion of intratextuality points towards the 
processes through which such tradition-constituted rationality and its associated 
standards emerge and develop, and I will argue that the function of doctrines as 
regulative principles is to embody, express and enforce elements of this 
HPHUJHQWUDWLRQDOLW\,QWKHQH[WVHFWLRQ,ZLOOVHHNWRVWUHQJWKHQ/LQGEHFN¶V
DFFRXQWRIVXSHULRULW\E\XQLWLQJKLVDFFRXQWZLWK0DF,QW\UH¶VDFFRXQWRIWKH
superiority of a tradition. In the final section I will then turn to the question of 
whether this account of superiority enables Lindbeck and Macintyre to repudiate 
accusations of relativism. 
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4.7 Superiority and the rationality of a tradition 
Criteria, Consensus and Tradition Constituted Rationality 
/LQGEHFN¶VFRQFHSWRIFDWHJRULDODGHTXDF\UHSUHVHQWVDQDWWHPSWWRVSHFLI\WKH
conditions that have to be met if a religion is to possess a capacity to construct 
ontological truths, while intratextuality represents an attempt to formulate a 
general criterion of authentic theological development. But the application of a 
concept of categorial adequacy would require an ability to distinguish between 
those categories that can genuinely correspond to aspects of reality and those 
that cannot, and Lindbeck does not specify how such a distinction could be made 
in practice. Equally, the concept of intratextuality appears to rely on the 
assumption that there is an original and fixed semiotic core to Christianity which 
defines the abiding identity of the religion and which can provide the basis for 
judgments of authenticity.  But for intratextuality to be a practicable mechanism 
for resolving theological debate there would need to be consensus around the 
nature of that original interpretative system, and agreement with respect to the 
criteria for its application. Paradoxically it is the lack of such consensus that the 
concept of intratextuality is intended to address. As a result of these limitations I 
argued in the two preceding sections that neither concept is able to provide a 
robust basis for judgements of superiority. 
Moreover, these attempts to define invariable criteria of authenticity and 
RQWRORJLFDOWUXWKFRQIOLFWZLWKRWKHUDVSHFWVRI/LQGEHFN¶VDFFRXQW)RUH[DPSOH
the idea of categorial adequacy does not sit easily with the notion of 
correspondence to ultimate reality as embodied in performative truths that are 
only tentatively and transiently created through the practice of worship within a 
Christian community.  Equally, the notion of the existence of an original semiotic 
core to Christianity sits uneasily with /LQGEHFN¶VFRQWHQWLRQWKDWWKHRSHUDWLYH
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and formal doctrines that are identified with the rules that define the religious 
semiotic system are themselves subject to change, development and 
abandonment as cultural and conceptual contexts change over time. If doctrines 
change and develop contemporary divisions and disagreements cannot be 
resolved by reference to some general criterion of legitimate interpretation and 
development of the Christian faith, if only because such a criterion will also be 
subject to challenge and modification. As Kathryn Tanner has pointed out, the 
image of a culture generated by Lindbeck fails to recognise the extent to which 
all aspects of that culture will be subject to continued contest between differing 
perspectives.745 The outcome of such debates can neither be anticipated nor 
enforced by reference to an archetypal semiotic system embedded in scripture. 
Judgements have to gain their authority from the accepted presuppositions of a 
community, from its established modes of argument, and from its culturally 
determined assumptions about warranted assertion. These beliefs and standards 
arise through victories and compromises between competing perspectives 
forged in an evolutionary process. If consensus is to be achieved, it has to be 
generated through debate underpinned by shared faith and mutual trust, and 
taken forward by the ad hoc application of logic, rhetoric and other means of 
persuasion. 
Such historical processes drive cultural change and conflict and can result in the 
emergence of rival sects and churches. These processes are therefore the 
creators of religious diversity, but the historical relationships that can be traced 
between these divergent communities provide an underlying continuity that 
makes these separate communities different but related elements of a single 
religious movement, a movement which maintains its unity despite the 
differences in belief that can be identified at different times, in different places 
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and in different cultures. The common history and shared devotion to Christ of 
Christian communities makes them part of the same religious movement, and 
creates networks of family resemblance and difference that shape their common 
and separate identities. But as a result of these processes, each community may 
have divergent beliefs, practices and standards of authenticity. My argument is 
that these variant beliefs, practices and standards shape the distinct (and 
continually contested and developing) tradition-constituted rationality (TCR) of 
each community. That rationality has two dimensions. The first is the implicit or 
unconscious rationality that guides the judgement of the community and is 
embodied in what Lindbeck refers to as the operative doctrines of the 
community. The second dimension relates to the communit\¶VDWWHPSWWRIRUPDOO\
articulate that rationality through the promulgation of formal doctrines and the 
pursuit of theological reflection and enquiry.  
The rationale for applying the concept of TCR to a religion lies in the parallels 
EHWZHHQ/LQGEHFN¶VDQG0DF,QW\UH¶VDFFRXQWVRIUHOLJLRQDQGWUDGLWLRQ$VZH
VDZLQ&KDSWHU/LQGEHFN¶VGHILQLWLRQRIDUHOLJLRQLQ1'LVYHU\EURDGDQG
emphasises its role in providing an integrative framework for all aspects of 
intellectual and moral life. 746 These functions are shared by what MacIntyre calls 
DWUDGLWLRQRIHQTXLU\2Q/LQGEHFN¶VGHILQLWLRQWKHUHIRUHWKRVHWUDGLWLRQVWKDW
have sought to clarify the nature of the human telos could be considered to be 
religions, given that within these traditions the pursuit of the good acts as the 
RUJDQLVLQJSULQFLSOHRIKXPDQOLIH,ZLOOWKHUHIRUHXVHWKHWHUP³WUDGLWLRQ´WRUHIHU
both to traditions of enquiry and to religions in this section, but I will also seek to 
identify significant differences between religions and traditions when this is 
appropriate. 
 
                                               
746
 1'$QQLYHUVDU\(GLWLRQ³$IWHUZRUG´S 
278 
 
Informal rationality 
,Q&KDSWHU,EULHIO\GLVFXVVHG0DF,QW\UH¶VDFFRXQWRIWKHHPHUJHQFHRIWKH
distinctive rationality of a tradition of enquiry. I now need to describe this aspect 
of his thought in greater detail in order to demonstrate the relevance of his 
account to LiQGEHFN¶VFXOWXUDOOLQJXLVWLFPRGHO)RU0DF,QW\UHWKHRULJLQVRID
tradition lie in the pre-theoretical utterances of figures whose statements shape 
the consciousness of their community in significant ways.  
Consider first those founders of traditions of rational enquiry who themselves may 
not even have engaged in something recognizable at the time at which they spoke 
or write as rational enquiry. They perhaps uttered aphorisms or recounted myths, 
they gave enigmatic advice, they were valued by their contemporaries as oracular 
sages or as poets ... But it is only of course insofar as their aphorisms, myths and 
counsels turn out retrospectively, often through some later work of reinterpretation, 
to have contributed to systematic argument and questioning that they become 
figures in the history of enquiry, revealing to us, although without having done so 
to themselves, how aphorism and myth may contribute to enquiry. It is only insofar 
as this occurs that these primal cultural figures become the founders of traditions 
of rational enquiry.747 
This creation myth need not be taken too literally, given that traditions of enquiry 
may have emerged from centuries of pre-theoretical debate whose origins are 
REVFXUH%XW0DF,QW\UH¶VLPDJHHPSKDVLVHVWKDWWKHHYROXWLRQRID tradition may 
develop initially from the inchoate assertion of beliefs or imperatives which 
become significant in shaping the moral behaviour and theoretical understanding 
of a community, and which provide a conceptual framework for the interpretation 
of its environment. At first, the assumptions that underpin the emerging beliefs of 
a tradition may be unchallenged, but MacIntyre suggests that this initial 
unquestioning phase is inevitably followed by a second stage in which members 
of a tradition have become aware of inconsistencies and inadequacies in their 
initial beliefs, and will enter into debate in order to reformulate their beliefs in 
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ways that address these inconsistencies.748 Such questions of meaning and 
consistency will arise for the disciples of a nascent religion as well as for the 
adherents of a tradition, and both traditions and religions will evolve and change 
in response to challenges from their external environment and in response to 
processes of internal debate.749 How communities respond to these challenges 
...will depend not only on what stock of reasons and questioning and reasoning 
abilities they already possess but also upon their inventiveness. And these in turn 
will determine the possible range of outcomes in the rejection, the emendation, 
and reformulation of beliefs, the revaluation of authorities, the reinterpretation of 
texts, the emergence of new forms of authority, and the production of new texts.  
Since beliefs are expressed in and through rituals and ritual dramas, masks and 
modes of dress, the ways in which houses are structured and villages and towns 
laid out, and of course by actions in general, the reformulations of belief are not to 
be thought of only an intellectual terms; or rather the intellect is not to be thought 
of as either a Cartesian mind or a materialist brain, but as that through which 
thinking individuals relate themselves to each other and to natural and social 
objects as these present themselves to them.750 
 
The processes of debate, conceptual development and social innovation that 
characterise the evolution of a tradition are embodied, therefore, not only in 
forms of argument but also in modes of life and social practices, and in power 
relationships and authority structures. The resolution of a dispute may be 
exemplified in the crystallisation of definitive statements of belief, but it may also 
be exemplified in the formalisation of rituals and other practices. This process of 
conceptual innovation and social evolution shapes the development of the 
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distinctive form of rationality that characterises the particular tradition, by defining 
what activities, arguments and patterns of inference are counted as legitimate 
and consistent with the founding assumptions of the tradition - and, indeed, in 
determining what will count as legitimate assumptions in the first place. One way 
of conceptualising this emergent rationality is through the notion of the regulative 
function of operative doctrines. The informal rules that emerge through debate 
crystallise the developing grammar of the religion, and determine what can count 
as legitimate forms of speech, inference and practice for those who are expert in 
WKHVHPLRWLFV\VWHP,IZHLQWHJUDWH0DF,QW\UH¶VQRWion of the rationality of a 
WUDGLWLRQZLWK/LQGEHFN¶VUHJXODWLYHYLHZRIGRFWULQHIRUPDOGRFWULQHVFDQEHVHHQ
DVHPERG\LQJWKHUDWLRQDOLW\RIWKHWUDGLWLRQE\DFWLQJDV³H[HPSODU\
LQVWDQWLDWLRQVRUSDUDGLJPVRIWKHDSSOLFDWLRQRIUXOHV´751 and by specifying what 
are held to be legitimate patterns of argument or inference at a particular point in 
time.  
The role of operative and formal doctrines in addressing conflicting beliefs and in 
FRQVWLWXWLQJIRUPVRIUDWLRQDOLW\FDQEHLOOXVWUDWHGE\/LQGEHFN¶VDFFRXQt of the 
development of the creeds. Lindbeck argues that the Nicene formulation of 
doctrine reconciles three principles that were already evident in the earliest 
apostolic traditions of the church. These are: the monotheist principle ± that there 
is only one God; the principle of historical specificity ± that Jesus was a real 
SHUVRQZKROLYHGWKURXJKUHDOHYHQWVDQGWKHSULQFLSOHRI³&KULVWRORJLFDO
PD[LPDOLVP«WKDWHYHU\SRVVLEOHLPSRUWDQFHLVWREHDVFULEHGWR-HVXVWKDWLV
not inconsistent with the first WZRUXOHV´752 For Lindbeck, the Nicene Creed 
represents the reconciliation of these three principles in a way that was less 
dissonant than any of the rejected (heretical) alternatives.753  This reconciliation 
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is exemplified for Lindbeck in the type of rule enunciated by Athanasius for the 
LQWHUSUHWDWLRQRIFRQVXEVWDQWLDOLW\WKDW³ZKDWHYHULVVDLGRIWKH)DWKHULVVDLGRI
WKH6RQH[FHSWWKDWWKH6RQLVQRWWKH)DWKHU´754  
While the extent to which Athanasius treated consubstantiality as a semiotic 
rather than an ontological issue is disputed,755 the creed illustrates the way in 
which the evolution of the distinctive rationality of a tradition or religion can be 
interpreted as a response to internal tensions created by the dissonance of 
important but potentially conflicting beliefs. Indeed, John Henry Newman 
graphically described the way in which the formalisation of the Athanasian Creed 
reflected the strongly held commitments of the faithful, and their successful 
resistance to alternative formulations which were promulgated by the 
Ecclesiastical authorities of the time, but which were subsequently deemed 
heretical. Ultimately the operative doctrines of the community determined the 
outcome of debate and shaped the endorsement of the Nicene interpretation of 
the Trinity, an interpretation that had seemed unlikely to triumph for much of the 
4th Century.756 
The reconciliation of these tensions in the Athanasian Creed is not, of course, 
primarily a way of ordering argument. It is an expression of faith in the divinity of 
Christ. The evolution of doctrines can therefore be seen as driven both by the 
desire to better articulate the underlying beliefs that constitute the religion, and to 
resolve tensions and inconsistencies within and between different formulations of 
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these beliefs. The rules that emerge from this process may formalise elements of 
the distinctive rationality of the community which are already embodied in its 
informal patterns of assertion, argument and practice. The operation of this 
rationality provides a communally approved basis for determining the appropriate 
response to questions that arise within the tradition, acts as a limit to the kind of 
statements that can be legitimately made when speaking of Christ and God (for 
example), and expresses the operative doctrines that underpin the practices of 
the community and form core elements of its identity at that point in time.  
Rationality and Formal Doctrines 
It is important to make a distinction between a form of life and the implicit rules 
that constitute the rationale for its practices, and the articulation of that rationale 
in philosophical or theological reflection. The explicit expression of the operative 
rules that underpin assertion, argument and practice will help to render that form 
of life intelligible, but this process bears the same relationship to the form of life 
as anthropological description bears to participation in a culture, and the 
construction of a formal code of ethics bears to the moral practices it seeks to 
make intelligible.  Indeed, it was the underlying difference between 
characterising the nature of participation in a tradition and making explicit the 
rules that articulate the rationality of such a tradition that led to the apparent 
GLIIHUHQFHVEHWZHHQ0DF,QW\UH¶VDFFRXQWRIDWUDGLWLRQLQ$9759DQG:-:5DV
identified by Jean Porter (see Section 4.3). In this process of self-articulation, a 
tradition may progress from the implicit acceptance of certain rules of 
interpretation, to the explicit formulation and justification of those rules. At this 
stage the second order articulation of the rationality that underpins the form of 
life may come to play a central role in shaping the development of the tradition, 
and the tradition may generate formal processes of theological and philosophical 
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enquiry, whose origins and justification lie in their attempt to articulate the 
rationale of a particular form of life.  
According to MacIntyre, the transition to a form of enquiry takes place once a 
tradition has succeeded in reconciling the initial inconsistencies that emerge from 
the early formulations of its founding stories and beliefs. As a result of this 
reformulation it will recognise that these initial formulations of belief were 
incomplete or unsatisfactory in some respects. As a result, these formulations 
will have been replaced by constructions that are perceived as being superior to 
their predecessors in specific ways. Through this process of debate the tradition 
will develop methods of analysis, and standards for judging the success of 
different arguments, which will characterise the nature of rational investigation 
within the tradition (or religion). This does not mean that controversy is at an end. 
Multiple answers to questions may compete with each other, and each attempt at 
resolution will initiate new questions and directions for investigation. The tradition 
(and the religion in its intellectual or theological dimensions) will have become a 
form of enquiry.757 Once this stage is reached  
Standard forms of argument will be developed, and requirements for successful 
dialectical questioning established.  The weakest form of argument, but none the 
less that which will prevail in the absence of any other, will be the appeal to the 
authority of established belief, merely as established.  The identification of 
incoherence within established belief will always provide a reason for enquiring 
further, but not in itself a conclusive reason for rejecting established belief, until 
something more adequate because less incoherent has been discovered.  At 
every stage beliefs and judgements will be justified by reference to the beliefs and 
judgements of the previous stage, and insofar as the tradition has constituted itself 
as a successful form of enquiry, the claims to truth made within a tradition will 
always be in some specifiable way less vulnerable to dialectical questioning and 
objection than were their predecessors.758 
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Thus the concept of justification that emerges within a tradition is not absolute in 
the sense that the claim to truth is unassailable. It is progressive and dependent 
on the preceding history of the tradition. Claims to justification will rely on 
reference to the preceding stages of the argument, and the superiority of a 
formulation will be related to the very specific challenges that previous 
formulations have faced. Each formulation will be justified by reference to those 
related formulations that have survived dialectical examination to date, but this 
does not guarantee that these statements will not be found wanting in future. All 
that can be known is that the formulation is superior to other beliefs that have not 
survived the process of dialectical challenge and examination. The process of 
GHYHORSPHQWLQWKHWUDGLWLRQLVWKHUHIRUHLQWUDWH[WXDOLQ/LQGEHFN¶VWHUPUDWKHU
than extratextual. What counts as successful development will be determined by 
the nature of the specific challenges to which the reformulation is a response, 
rather than by success in demonstrating some unassailable truths. This account 
of theoretical progress avoids the Enlightenment problem of identifying some set 
of indubitable foundations of knowledge, and is not therefore subject to the 
difficulties that were identifieGLQWKHHDUOLHUGLVFXVVLRQRI/LQGEHFN¶VDFFRXQWRI
categorial adequacy. It does not, however, rule out the possibility of identifying 
the underlying meaning of a religion with ultimate truth, although the articulation 
of that truth through theological enquiry will always be tentative and subject to 
revision. 
Progress and Knowledge 
0DF,QW\UH¶VDFFRXQWRIWKHUDWLRQDOGHYHORSPHQWRIDWUDGLWLRQDOORZVRQHWRPDNH
a distinction between the gradual development and realisation of the ultimate 
telos of a tradition, and the attempt to express that telos in language. The latter 
represents the self-conscious articulation of the goals of the tradition and in what 
follows I will be focusing on this process of reflexive formulation of a rational 
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account of that goal and associated theses. Any and all attempts to construct 
such descriptions may be found to be inadequate. Both MacIntyre and Lindbeck 
hold that humanity does not have the power to construct statements that fully 
express transcendent truths, and any formulation will be provisional and subject 
to development. As we have seen, propositions which seek to articulate 
ontological truths are, for Lindbeck, generated by the re-interpretation of different 
world pictures within the framework provided by the Christian religion. As a 
result, as the conceptual resources of the societies in which Christian 
communities are embedded change so the form in which such truth claims are 
expressed will change. 
The first-order truth claims of a religion change insofar as these arise from the 
application of the interpretive scheme to the shifting worlds that human beings 
inhabit.759 
2QHOLPLWDWLRQRI/LQGEHFNµVDFFRXQWLVWKDWLWGRHVQRWDSSHDUWRSURYLGHDQ\
basis on which one might seek to distinguish between superior and inferior 
attempts to articulate such truths, and this is a feature of his account that leaves 
him open to the accusation of relativism. In contrast, MacIntyre argues that, while 
absolute truth cannot be fully expressed in propositional terms, rational progress 
within a tradition reflects the ability of the mind to recognise the limitations of 
each of its successive attempt to formulate such truths, and to recognise that 
some elements of what it had previously believed are now demonstrably false. 
This ability reflects the capacity of participants in a developing tradition to 
acknowledge that 
...  between those older beliefs and the world as they now understand it there is a 
radical discrepancy to be perceived.  It is this lack of correspondence, between 
what the mind then judged and believed and reality as now perceived, classified, 
and understood, which is described when those earlier judgements and beliefs are 
called false.  The original and most elementary version of the correspondence 
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theory of truth is one in which it is applied retrospectively in the form of a 
correspondence theory of falsity.760 
It is the reflexive ability of a person or community to recognise that their previous 
formulations of beliefs were in error that represents progress towards an 
understanding of truth. In recognising this, the person also recognises that the 
falsehood did not rest primarily in some inaccurately formulated proposition but 
in the constitution of their own mind. Truth on this model is not primarily 
conceived as a question of the correspondence of propositions to some 
metaphysical realm of facts but in Thomistic terms as a matter of the 
correspondence of the mind to reality.761 This correspondence is manifested 
through the active and effective engagement of the whole person with their 
environment, and the use of their beliefs to form expectations which may or may 
not be met:  
The mind is adequate to its objects insofar as the expectations which it frames on 
the basis of these activities are not liable to disappointment and the remembering 
which it engages in enables it to return to and recover what it had encountered 
previously...762 
The mind is constantly reaching out to incorporate aspects of that world into its 
understanding, and through this process it will build and test expectations of 
order and consistency. As these expectations of order are confirmed through 
successful engagement with activities they may become more generalised, and 
the confidence of the person that they have grasped some aspect of truth will 
grow. However, it is always possible that the expectations of order that have led 
to the belief that one has grasped some truth will be frustrated by some further 
HYHQW:KDWRQHFDQFRPHWRNQRZGHILQLWLYHO\LVWKDWRQH¶VH[SHFWDWLRQVKDYH
been disappointed. It is this process of provisional confirmation and absolute 
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falsification that underlies the evolution of the distinctive form of rationality within 
a tradition. What can be claimed to be true within the tradition is that which has 
sufficiently withstood the process of dialectical questioning to secure confidence 
at that point in time. The criteria that are used to determine whether something 
has survived dialectical testing will also have been developed within the tradition 
and will form part of its rationality.763  
In this process of development, the initial presuppositions of the tradition will 
have been subjected to such dialectical testing and will no longer be held as 
mere assumptions. However, although adherents of the tradition will come to see 
their fundamental precepts as rationally justified, their confidence may not be 
communicable to an outsider, because that person will lack the requisite 
understanding of the semiotic system and its history. As a result the outsider will 
not be able to understand the role played by its presuppositions and founding 
principles, nor grasp the methodology by which these assumptions and 
principles have been tested, and are held to be rationally justified by the 
adherents of the tradition. 
... such first principles are not self-sufficient, self-justifying epistemological first 
principles.  They may indeed be regarded as both necessary and evident, but their 
necessity and their evidentness will be characterisable as such only to and by 
those whose thought is framed by the kind of conceptual scheme from which they 
emerge...764 
The language of conceptual schemes suggests that engagement with a tradition 
involves abstract philosophical enquiry, and indeed engagement in a tradition of 
enquiry may include such reflection. However, both Lindbeck and MacIntyre 
emphasise that (provisional) truth can only be achieved by human beings 
through their active engagement in the world, and through the shaping of their 
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minds towards conformity with that truth in a range of practices which extend 
beyond intellectual reflection. Knowledge within the tradition may be largely 
LPSOLFLWDQGH[KLELWHGWKURXJKWKHZKROHSHUVRQ¶VHQJDJHPHQWZLWKWKHZRUOG
through their activity and practical rationality rather than through the construction 
of propositions. How can this account of the development of rationality be linked 
WR/LQGEHFN¶V&/PRGHO" 
/LQGEHFN¶VDFFRXQWRISHUIRUPDWLYHWUXWKFRQFHLYHVRIFRUUHVSRQGHQFHWRWKH
divine as transiently exemplified in the lives of members of a religious 
community. However, it would appear to be impossible to specify strict criteria by 
which one could identify the achievement of such correspondence, if only 
because the formulation of such criteria  would require a notion of the divine that 
is independent of and prior to, such performative expressions of divine reality. 
Canonical texts, religious practices, theological reflection, tales of martyrs, acts 
of charity and love (among other elements of religious life) will provide some 
conceptual resources in which one can express an understanding of the divine. 
But the interpretations of these resources will also be illuminated, shaped and 
H[WHQGHGE\DFWVZKLFKDUHVHHQE\WKHFRPPXQLW\WREHLQVSLUHGE\*RG¶V
grace and embody moments of performative correspondence to the divine. Such 
acts will extend the communities understanding of God and reshape to a (more 
or less) limited extent the hermeneutic framework in which it seeks to understand 
and imitate the divine nature. I would suggest that a way of conceiving of such 
performative truth would be as a progressive movement towards the expression 
of the telos of the life of the religious community. This telos might be 
conceptualised in terms of progress towards a complete correspondence with 
&KULVWWKHIRUPDWLRQRI³&KULVWLFLGHQWLWLHV´DV/LQGEHFNSXWVLW765 a telos which 
will never be finally realised prior to the eschaton. Such performative truth might 
                                               
765
 /LQGEHFN³,QIDOOLELOLW\´S 
289 
 
be understood in terms of the achievement of a total consistency between 
thought and action in the lives of the faithful, as their lives are shaped by their 
UHOLJLRQ¶VLQVWLWXWLRQVDQGSUDFWLFHVWRZDUGV³DSHUIHFWFRPPunality of language 
and action´ in the words that Rowan Williams uses to describe the ultimate and 
unachievable telos of history.766  
The pursuit of such conformity of thought and action also entails the pursuit of a 
deeper understanding of the nature of the divine.  Such deepening 
understanding will shape the development of the operative doctrines that govern 
practices, conduct and assertion in such a community. As controversies arise 
debates will address inconsistencies in the formulation of belief and dissonances 
between practices, and these debates will be informed by, and add to the 
rationality of, the religious tradition. This process will ensure that some 
formulations and practices are abandoned while others will be held to be justified 
- although thLVMXVWLILFDWLRQZLOODOZD\VEHSURYLVLRQDOLQ0DF,QW\UH¶VVHQVH6XFK
processes of discernment are intratextual in the sense that they do not rely on 
resources that are external to the tradition for the validation of judgement, but 
neither do they depend on the recreation of an archetypal semiotic system. 
Rather, they depend on the renewal and continued development of the 
contemporary semiotic system whose faithfulness reflects its historical evolution 
from the events that established the Christian faith. It is this evolving system that 
embodies the developing rationality of the tradition. 
Superiority 
As we have seen, MacIntyre and Lindbeck share similar assumptions with 
respect to the contingency of standards of justification, and endorse similar 
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notions with respect to the nature of truth and belief. I have suggested that 
/LQGEHFN¶Vregulative account of doctrine can be used as a way of identifying the 
emergent rationality of a tradition. Given these similarities, it is not surprising that 
LQKLV³$IWHUZRUG´WR1'/LQGEHFNWXUQVWR0DF,QW\UHLQRUGHUWRFODULI\KLV
account of how one religion may demonstrate its superiority to another.767 In the 
³$IWHUZRUG´/LQGEHFNLVFRQFHUQHGWKDWKLVFKDUDFWHULVDWLRQRIUHOLJLRQDVD
comprehensive world-absorbing interpretative framework might legitimate 
religious imperialism or isolationism, because each religion will consider itself 
superior to other religions in accordance with its own frame of reference.  
However, neither imperialism nor isolationism is consistent wLWKDUHOLJLRQ¶VQHHG
to demonstrate its superior ability to encompass and interpret the whole of 
reality: 
Their very universalism impels them to seek for measuring rods, for public criteria 
of reasonableness, by means of which they can argue their respective cases for 
greater comprehensiveness to outsiders.768 
 
7KHGULYHWRXQLYHUVDOLVPLQ/LQGEHFN¶VDFFRXQWSD\VDVLPLODUUROHWRWKH
SULQFLSOHRIHSLVWHPRORJLFDORSHQQHVVLQ0DF,QW\UH¶VDFFRXQWRIWUDGLWLRQ,W
impels a religion to seek to resolve and incorporate within its framework 
apparently dissonant elements of experience and belief. On this basis, Lindbeck 
argues that the superiority of one religion to another rests on the extent to which 
it can incorporate and explain the insights of another religion within its own 
conceptual framework, without compromising its identity.769 Lindbeck himself 
FRPSDUHVWKLVWR0DF,QW\UH¶VDFFRXQWRIWKHLQWHUDFWLRQEHWZHHQFRQIOLFWLQJ
traditions of enquiry. He suggests that arguments in inter-religious debates 
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...illustrate a pattern similar to the interaction of conflicting traditions of enquiry as 
described by Alisdair McIntyre (sic). To put it crassly, the religion that can better 
incorporate strengths from the other without losing its own is the one that wins. 
Conclusive victories will rarely if ever conclude such competitions before the 
eschaton.770 
 
Lindbeck asserts that this argument is implicit in his comments in the first edition 
of ND, in which he suggests that  
the reasonableness of a religion is largely a function of its assimilative powers; of 
its ability to provide an intelligible interpretation in its own terms of the varied 
realities and situations its adherents encounter.771 
The ability to accommodate the strengths of another religion is one example of 
this assimilative power. MacIntyre observes that the successful resolution of an 
epistemological crisis requires a tradition to formulate a new account of its 
history which explains and overcomes the difficulties which had led to the crisis 
emerging.772 /LQGEHFN¶VREVHUvation suggests that one might extend this 
requirement to the possession of a more general capacity to explain, absorb and 
render intelligible both external events and the insights of rival traditions, thus 
demonstrating a superior interpretative ability.  There needs to be sufficient 
conceptual overlap between religions to allow such debate to take place and in 
WKH³$IWHUZRUG´/LQGEHFNVHHWKLVDVUHIOHFWLQJWKHXQLYHUVDOGLPHQVLRQRIWKH
³SDUWLFXODULVWLFXQLYHUVDOLVP´WKDWFKDUDFWHULVHVDOOUHOLJLRQ Religions have shared 
universalistic characteristics because they share an identity as interpretative 
mediums which provide a basis for dialogue and communication, if not 
agreement. But religions are also defined by their unique texts and belief 
systems, and iQWKLVVHQVHWKH\DUHDOVR³SDUWLFXODULVWLF´ 773 
The argument in ND is developed further to anticipate the possibility of religions 
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being subject to processes of testing akin to falsification, albeit a process which 
is unlikely to be conclusive: 
«DOWKRXJKa religion is not subject to decisive disproof, it is subject ... to rational 
testing procedures not wholly unlike those which apply to general scientific 
theories or paradigms...Confirmation or disconfirmation occurs through an 
accumulation of successes and failures in making practically and cognitively 
coherent sense of relevant data, and the process does not conclude, in the case of 
religions, until the disappearance of the last communities of believers or, if the faith 
survives, until the end of history.774 
 
/LQGEHFN¶VUHYLVHGDFFRXQWRIWKHVXSHULRULW\RIUHOLJLRQVLQWKHAfterword places 
additional emphasis on two elements of his position in ND. The identity of a 
religion as an interpretative medium drives its search for universality, coherence 
and for standards through which it can demonstrate its (distinctive and tradition-
constituted) rationality.775 However, this engagement with alien perspectives will 
also lead to the recognition of inconsistencies between its own perspectives and 
other elements in the external environment. In this process of interaction 
religions must face challenges to their interpretative capacity, and it is these 
challenges that act as rational tests of their coherence. Religions are not, 
therefore, the isolated self-justifying systems that the rhetoric of absorbing the 
universe might seem to imply. 
Similarly, MacIntyre also argues that traditions are not isolated self-justifying 
systems. MacIntyre points out that some traditions overlap each other in terms of 
their "beliefs, images and texts",776 and this provides a basis for their interaction. 
He argues that members of one tradition may ignore the arguments and 
contentions of another tradition only at the risk of ignoring substantive grounds 
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for re-evaluating their own conclusions and beliefs, relative to the internal 
standards established within their own tradition.777 MacIntyre contends that the 
need to develop and consolidate the underlying rationality of a tradition drives 
forward the search for consistency and coherence. Progress in rationality is 
demonstrated by a capacity to reconcile underlying inconsistencies.  
The response to such challenges lies in conceptual innovation and the 
reformulation of certain beliefs (see WJWR 355), but there is a limit to the extent 
to which the fundamental telos of a tradition can be redefined if that tradition is to 
maintain its identity. As we saw in Chapter 3.5, MacIntyre introduces the concept 
of "epistemological crisis" to mark the point at which such inconsistencies 
threaten the coherence of a tradition. As we have seen,  
The solution to a genuine epistemological crisis requires the invention or discovery 
of new concepts and the framing of some new type or types of theory...778 
 
 Lindbeck also emphasises the importance of conceptual innovation in 
responding to dissonance between a religion and its environment: 
Prophetic figures apprehend, often with dramatic vividness, how the inherited 
patterns of belief, practice, and ritual need to be (and can be) reminted.  They 
discover concepts that remove the anomalies.779 
 
Both Lindbeck and MacIntyre therefore argue that religions or traditions will seek 
to overcome dissonance through introducing new ways of thinking about the 
problematic which has given rise to the crisis: "Imaginative conceptual innovation 
ZLOOKDYHKDGWRRFFXU´780. These innovations will extend the resources of the 
tradition in unanticipated ways, but they must also be consistent with and 
creatively derivable from the elements that define its identity. Such innovation will 
                                               
777
 WJWR p.350. 
778
 WJWR p.362. 
779
 ND p.39. 
780
 WJWR p.362. 
294 
 
provide the resources for a retrospective account of why the difficulties had 
DULVHQDQGKRZWKH\KDYHEHHQUHVROYHGDV(LQVWHLQ¶V7KHRU\RI5HODWLYLW\
explained why the motion of the earth through the ether could not be detected by 
the Michelson-Morley experiment. As MacIntyre argues: 
To have passed through an epistemological crisis successfully enables the 
adherents of a tradition of enquiry to rewrite its history in a more insightful way.  
And such a history of a particular tradition provides not only a way of identifying 
continuities in virtue of which that tradition of enquiry has survived and flourished 
as one and the same tradition, but also of identifying more accurately that 
structure of justification which underpins whatever claims to truth are made within 
it.781 
 
When an epistemological crisis is neither resolved nor resolvable, it may reveal 
that the interpretative medium lacks the resources and capacity to respond to 
internal and external challenges As a result of this failure the interpretative 
medium may lose its coherence and decay.  In this fact lies the basis for 
judgements of inferiority and superiority, and these are, as MacIntyre indicates, 
judgements passed by history. Such a crisis may not initiate a sudden collapse, 
but may result in the gradual loss of adherents and the slow decline of the 
tradition. 
To what extent can we see these concepts of epistemological crisis and 
superiority as relevant to the understanding of change and development in 
religion and theology? The example that is closest to hand is Lindbeck himself. 
/LQGEHFN¶VHFXPHQLFDOZRUNKDGVKRZQWKDWQRWZLWKVWDQGLQJDSHUFHSWLRQRI
doctrinal differences as church-dividing disputes about spiritual truth, doctrinal 
reconciliation was possible in many circumstances. Lindbeck recognised that 
contemporary theories of religion and doctrine were unable to explain such 
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ecumenical progress without presupposing doctrinal capitulation. As he puts it in 
WKH³$IWHUZRUG´ 
How is it possible not to surrender or relativise historically church-dividing 
doctrines and yet maintain that these doctrines are no longer divisive? ...Most 
starkly stated, the problem is how doctrines that contradicted each other in one 
historical context can cease to be contradictory in another and remain 
unchanged?782 
The dissonance between theological interpretations of doctrine on the one hand 
and ecumenical reality on the other represents an epistemological crisis for 
theology which could not be resolved within the conceptual frameworks of the 
dominant CP and EE models of religion.783 /LQGEHFN¶V&/PRGHODWWHPSWVWR
provide a solution to this crisis through conceptual innovation aimed at reframing 
the understanding of religion, theology and doctrine. His approach embodies the 
features that MacIntyre argues are required for an effective response to such a 
crisis. These are that the solution: 
1. Must resolve the problems which have proved intractable in a systematic 
and coherent way 
2. Explain what it was that previously rendered the tradition incapable of 
solving these problems 
3. Complete the first two tasks in a way which demonstrates continuity with 
the previous elements of the tradition.784 
 
/LQGEHFN¶VDSSURDFKLQ1'PDWFKHVWKHVHUHTXLUHPHQWVE\VKRZLQJWKDWWKH
intractability of the issues lies in conceptual confusion about the nature of religion 
embodied in the CP and EE models of religion. The cultural-linguistic model 
provides the type of conceptual innovation that is required to resolve the 
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dissonance between the understanding of doctrine and the reality of 
ecumenicism, and does so coherently and systematically. Lindbeck also shows 
how continuity with the tradition can be maintained by demonstrating that 
ecumenical progress can be made without doctrinal capitulation. The text of The 
Nature of Doctrine LVWKHUHIRUHDGHPRQVWUDWLRQRIWKHUHOHYDQFHRI0DF,QW\UH¶V
account of tradition to understanding the way in which religions may respond to 
internal and external challenges to their coherence, and through this continue to 
develop their own tradition-constituted forms of rationality. 
Religions and their adherents are confident of the truth of their beliefs, and 
confident of their ability to withstand challenges. This confidence gives religious 
communities a resilience to challenge that is not possessed by most secular 
philosophies. Nonetheless, religious belief may crumble in the face of interaction 
with external challenges, as evidenced by the fate of the Polynesian belief 
system in the early nineteenth century.785 These challenges cannot be avoided 
by religions, because their intrinsic drive towards universality requires that they 
engage with and make sense of this environment. In the early 21st Century 
much of that environment is antagonistic to Christianity and to other religions. 
Christians must engage in debate with these hostile forces, not for apologetic 
reasons, but to demonstrate the coherence and resilience of their religion to 
themselves, and, to borrow a phrase from Rowan Williams once again, to shape 
the judgement of the world. 
4.8 Overall Conclusions: MacIntyre, Lindbeck and Relativism 
The Contribution of this Thesis 
My discussion to date has made a contribution in three main areas. Firstly, it has 
WUDFHGWKHUHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQ0DF,QW\UH¶VHDUO\SKLORVRSKLFDOGHYHORSPHnt and 
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his mature philosophy, and shows that his work can be understood as exhibiting 
an overall historical coherence notwithstanding his changing epistemological, 
political and religious commitments. It has argued that the underlying continuity 
of his position rests on his continuing struggle to articulate the basis on which 
belief in a comprehensive metaphysical perspective can be held to be justified.  
My discussion of the development of his mature philosophy led me to argue that 
his attempt to formulate an Aristotelian ethic that was relevant to the modern 
world had been enhanced by his biological account of human telos in Dependent 
Rational Animals, anGWKDWWKHVLJQLILFDQFHRIWKDWZRUNWR0DF,QW\UH¶VSKLORVRSK\
RXJKWWREHPRUHZLGHO\DFNQRZOHGJHG0\H[SRVLWLRQRI0DF,QW\UH¶VPDWXUH
position led me to identify some unresolved issues in his account. This thesis 
has focused particularly on the vagueness of the concept of a tradition and the 
associated lack of clarity as to the conditions under which an epistemological 
FULVLVPLJKWDULVH7KLVZDVDQLPSRUWDQWGHILFLWJLYHQWKDW0DF,QW\UH¶VDFFRXQWRI
rationality and justification is framed in terms of the concepts of tradition and 
epistemological crisis.  
The thesis introduced the voice of George Lindbeck and his regulative account of 
WKHQDWXUHRIGRFWULQHDVDZD\RISURYLGLQJJUHDWHUVSHFLILFLW\WR0DF,QW\UH¶V
account. The thesis explored the similarities between the epistemological 
SRVLWLRQVRI0DF,QW\UHDQG/LQGEHFNDQGLQWURGXFHGWKHLGHDRID³KHUPHQHXWLF
IUDPHZRUN´DVDZD\RIFKDUDFWHULVLQJWKHLUVKDUHGDVVXPSWLRQVDERXWWKH
culturally specific nature of knowledge claims, and the relation of such claims to 
rules of assertion, interpretation and practical rationality. MacIntyre argues that 
WUDGLWLRQVDUHLGHQWLILHGDQGGLIIHUHQWLDWHGE\DVHWRI³IXQGDPHQWDODJUHHPHQWV´
DQG,GUHZDQDQDORJ\EHWZHHQVXFKDJUHHPHQWVDQG/LQGEHFN¶VUHJXODWLYH
account of doctrine. I argued that understanding the agreements that constitute a 
tradition in these terms both illuminates the process through which tradition 
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constituted rationality develops and gives greater precision to the idea of 
epistemological crisis aVZHOODVWRRWKHUHOHPHQWVRI0DF,QW\UH¶VWKHRU\
,QFRUSRUDWLQJHOHPHQWVRI/LQGEHFN¶VZRUNLQWR0DFLQW\UH¶VSKLORVRSK\WKHUHIRUH
strengthens his account of tradition and tradition constituted rationality.  
7KHWKHVLVWKHQUHYLHZHG/LQGEHFN¶VDFFRXQWRILnter-religious superiority in 
terms of categorial adequacy and his account of intra-religious or theological 
superiority in terms of the notion of intratextuality. It concluded that neither 
account provided a basis for judgements of superiority in practice.  It argued that 
/LQGEHFN¶VSRVLWLRQFRXOGEHVWUHQJWKHQHGLI0DF,QW\UHµVDFFRXQWRIWUDGLWLRQ-
constituted rationality was incorporated into his account, a point that Lindbeck 
KLPVHOIKDVDFNQRZOHGJHG5RZDQ:LOOLDPV¶FULWLFLVPRI/LQGEHFNKHOSHGWRJLYH
this recommendation theological edge by providing an account of Christianity in 
which Christians are always at the boundary between the world and their 
religion, both judging and being judged. This boundary situation is precisely the 
circumstance in which standards of truth and justification and judgements of 
validity are brought into question, as MacIntyre pointed out in his presidential 
address to the American Philosophical Association in 1985.786 It is in these 
circumstances that the rules which govern justification within a conceptual 
scheme are tested and renewed ± or found wanting. Judgements of superiority 
and inferiority are therefore provisional, and subject to the test of further 
challenges, both to the adequacy of the evaluations made, and to the standards 
that are used to justify these evaluations. Through this testing process they 
develop the distinctive rationality of the tradition. This rationality is internal to the 
tradition in the sense that it formulates the standards that are applied in 
judgement (and it is therefore intratextual in LindbecN¶VVHQVH%XWLWLVDOVR
engaged with the world that it interprets, and through this engagement it can be 
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tested by its capacity to render the events that occur in that world intelligible 
within its framework.   
There is a fourth question that has motivated this thesis. This is the question of 
the extent to which the epistemological perspectives adopted by MacIntyre and 
Lindbeck commit either or both to a form of relativism. This issue has been 
addressed implicitly throughout the thesis, but the conclusions of this element of 
the thesis now need to be made explicit.  
Is MacIntyre a Relativist? 
7KLVWKHVLVKDVDUJXHGWKDWDQXQGHUO\LQJWKHPHRI0DF,QW\UH¶VZRUNLVWKH
question of the rational justification of belief in a comprehensive metaphysical 
framework. His initial attempts to address this question are illustrated by his 
engagement with Christianity and Marxism in his early work. What counts as an 
appropriate answer to the question of justification is dependent on the 
interpretation given to the associated notions of rationality, knowledge and truth. 
0DF,QW\UH¶VUHVSRQVHWRWKLVTXHVWLRQLQKLVPDWXUHSKLORVRSK\LQYROYHVD
fundamental reconstruction of these concepts, and this thesis has provided an 
exposition of these revised accounts. The claim that MDF,QW\UH¶VSRVLWLRQLV
relativist reflects a failure to appreciate the extent of this reconstruction. This 
criticism assumes that there is no middle ground between Enlightenment 
epistemological standards, and a version of relativism which is based on the 
view that, without such standards, one is unable to rationally assess the merits of 
different traditions.  
Richard Bernstein argues that this Enlightenment concept of relativism is 
SDUDVLWLFRQWKHFRQFHSWRIZKDWKHFDOOV³REMHFWLYLVP´+HGHILQHVREMHFWLYism as 
the view that there 
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is or must be some permanent ahistorical matrix or framework to which we can 
ultimately appeal in determining the nature of rationality, knowledge, truth, reality, 
goodness or rightness.787 
 
 Let us call this the objectivist claim. Relativism, on the other hand he describes 
as the claim that  
when we turn to the examination of those concepts that philosophers have taken 
to be the most fundamental [rationality, truth, reality, the good or norms] ... all such 
concepts must be understood as relative to a particular conceptual scheme, 
theoretical paradigm, form of life, society or  culture.788 
 
Let us call this the relativist thesis. If the relativist thesis is true, then the 
REMHFWLYLVW¶VFODLPWKDWWKHUHLVDIUDPHZRUNZKLFKWUDQVFHQGVWhese different and 
potentially incompatible culturally determined accounts of truth and so on must 
be false. Assertions of truth will be relative to such culturally determined 
frameworks, and there will be no rational basis on which one can choose 
between the evaluations of truth or justification that emanate from these 
frameworks. There is nothing beyond warranted assertability that can act as a 
test of truth, and it is only the ethical presuppositions of a particular culture that 
can justify moral evaluatLRQV,IWKLVDUJXPHQWLVFRUUHFWWKHQ0DF,QW\UH¶VSRVLWLRQ
would be relativist, because he argues that 
There is no standing ground , no place for enquiry, no way to engage in the 
practices of advancing, evaluating and rejecting reasoned argument apart from 
that which is provided by some tradition or another.789 
 
If the truth of the objectivist thesis is a necessary condition of the repudiation of 
relativism, MacIntyre¶VUHSXGLDWLRQRIWKLVWKHVLV must lead to relativism. 
However, one flaw in this argument is the implicit assumption that it is only an 
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objectivist meta-framework that could provide the basis for rationally founded 
judgements that transcend the limitations of a specific cultural perspective. If it is 
possible for something other than such a meta-framework to provide the basis 
for framework-transcendent judgements, there would be no contradiction 
involved in holding both WKDWWKHREMHFWLYLVW¶VFODLPLVIDOVHand that one can be 
justified in claiming that the judgements made in one tradition may be shown to 
EHGHPRQVWUDEO\VXSHULRUWRWKRVHPDGHLQDQRWKHU7KLVLV0DF,QW\UH¶VSRVLWLRQ 
The tests of rational justification for MacIntyre can be ranked in series. The first 
is the consistency of a judgement with the standards established within a 
tradition at a particular point in time ± warranted assertability. The second is the 
ability of that position to withstand subsequent challenge and critique as the 
theoretical resources of the tradition develop, both in response to internal 
debates and through its interaction with other traditions and external events. The 
third type of test arises when the tradition fails to render events or arguments 
intelligible within its framework of presuppositions and standards of justification. 
This may bring the internal standards of justification and ontological 
presuppositions of the tradition into question, and as a result an epistemological 
crisis may arise. In extreme cases the fundamental presuppositions and/or 
standards of justification of the tradition may be modified, or the tradition may 
lapse into incoherence and fail. This account does not require reference to a 
tradition transcendent meta-framework, but nor does it provide some absolute 
standard of justification. Rather it acknowledges that positions will be treated as 
justified until that assessment is shown to be inadequate with respect to the 
standards that have emerged within that tradition.  
0DF,QW\UH¶VSRVLWLRQWKHUHIRUHXQGHUPLQHVDVHFRQGUHODWLYLVWWKHVLV7KLVLVWKH
claim that the warranted judgements made in one tradition can always be 
justified by reference to the assumptions of that tradition. Justification is 
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conditional, not only on the assumptions and rules of inference of the tradition, 
but also on whether that judgement can be sustained in the face of incompatible 
external events and arguments which are inconsistent with the rules that are held 
to endorse it. The potential mismatch between conceptual framework and 
H[SHULHQFHGULYHV0DF,QW\UH¶VPRGLILFDWLRQRIWKHQRWLRQRIWUXWK
Correspondence theories of truth conceptualise the objectivist meta-framework 
as being provided by the relationship between propositions and states of affairs 
or facts which constitute what is ultimately real. However, this conceptualisation 
of truth as correspondence to the real cannot be sustained if there is no theory-
independent way of characterising what is real.  If this is the case, there will be 
no tradition-independent access to the states of affairs that allegedly validate 
truth-claims. MacIntyre therefore sketches an alternative Thomistic theory of 
truth in which it is the correspondence of mind to reality that is the goal of 
enquiry.790  
This MacIntyrean mind is embodied in the active engagement of the whole 
person (and indeed the community of which that person is a part) with his or her 
environment. What can be discovered in this engagement is not primarily what is 
true, but what may come to be known to be false and unjustified.  The original 
aim of such engagement is to secure a relationship between the individual or 
community and the environment which is coherent so that action is effective in 
meeting human need. The relationship between individual and environment will 
involve interpretation of what is the case and this interpretation will underpin 
practical reasoning and action. Learning to interpret and to act appropriately 
involves the socialisation of the individual into the tradition and the assimilation of 
what I described earlier as a hermeneutic framework.  However, there is no 
guarantee that the interpretations of reality which emerge from the application of 
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this hermeneutic framework represent some ultimate truth, or indeed that the 
framework itself will remain adequate. Justification and claims of truth are always 
provisional rather than absolute. 
One can therefore draw a legitimate distinction between what is believed to be 
WUXHDQGZKDWLVDFWXDOO\WKHFDVHRQ0DF,QW\UH¶VDFFRXQW0RUHRYHUKLVSRVLWLRQ
retains a notion of absolute truth as the comprehensive correspondence of mind 
to reality - but it is impossible for anyone to know whether they have acquired 
such truth, although progress in enquiry will be characterised by a series of 
attempts to shape the mind to embody such truths. But attempts to express such 
truths may be undermined by future events, and may need to be revised or 
abandoned. The question of the justification of a comprehensive metaphysical 
system is therefore a question of whether a system has sustained itself against 
challenge rather than whether the truth of its claims can be demonstrated. As a 
FRQVHTXHQFH0DF,QW\UH¶VDFFRXQWRIVXSHULRULW\LVSUDJPDWLFDQGHPSLULFDO± 
what is credible are those beliefs and traditions that survive in practice. This 
notion of superiority acknowledges the limits of human knowledge, and its 
underlying humility is consonant with apophaticism, and with the recognition that 
KXPDQNQRZOHGJHLVLQ3HFNQROG¶VKDSS\SKUDVHDOZD\VSHQXOWLPDWH791  
At the heart of this account of superiority lies the principle of epistemological 
RSHQQHVV3(2ZKLFK,LGHQWLILHGDVRQHRIWKHIRXUHOHPHQWVRI0DF,QW\UH¶V
account of tradition- constituted rationality in Chapter 2.6. If traditions can 
legitimately construct defences that can fully insulate their presuppositions from 
challenge, then each could remain a self-justifying island of belief. It is unclear 
how they would achieve such isolation but let us concede this possibility for the 
sake of argument. If such traditions existed then it would not be possible to show 
that any of them were false, and acceptance of a form of relativism would appear 
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to be legitimate. MacIntyre dismisses such self-justifying traditions on the basis 
WKDWWKH\DUH³GHJHQHUDWH´7KHUe appear to be three reasons for his judgement. 
The first is pragmatic. A tradition which insulates itself from openness may be 
vulnerable to overwhelming epistemological crisis when, through changes to its 
cultural context, it finds itself exposed to new concepts for which it is not 
prepared and which contradict its fundamental assumptions. MacIntyre illustrates 
this process by outlining the collapse of Polynesian ethics when exposed to 
Western cultural influences in the late 18th and early 19th Centuries.792 Openness 
is therefore a way of strengthening traditions by developing forms of rationality 
that are tested through challenge and provide the resources required to 
repudiate other challenges. The second reason is that the PEO is supported by 
observation and history: traditions, communities and individuals recognise that 
human knowledge is limited and fallible and accept that beliefs will develop in 
response to change. And this process can be observed in the history of the 
emergence, development and decline of different traditions of enquiry. 
The third reason for accepting the PEO is more fundamental. If traditions are 
able to insulate themselves from any challenge there would be no progress in 
the discovery of falsehood and no movement in the direction of knowledge. 
MacIntyre is committed to a quasi-Aristotelian view of humanity as creatures 
whose defining characteristics lie in their mutual dependence, their animal nature 
and their rationality.  Openness to challenge is a condition of rational belief. 
Without such openness we cannot fully realise our potentiality The Principle of 
Epistemological Openness is therefore required by our nature and is a condition 
of achieving our telos as rational animals.  
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Is Lindbeck a Relativist? 
Pecknold argues in his recent ERRNWKDW/LQGEHFN¶VSUDJPDWLVPGRHVQRWHQWDLO
UHODWLYLVPDVRWKHUFULWLFVKDYHDUJXHG+HFODLPVWKDW/LQGEHFN¶VSRVLWLRQLV
non-relativist because Lindbeck holds that there is an ultimate truth, even though 
it may not be possible to adequately articulate what constitutes that truth at any 
point in history.793 3HFNQROGLQWHUSUHWV/LQGEHFN¶VDFFRXQWRIWUXWKDVSUDJPDWLF
and empirical in orientation: it is what happens in the long-term that determines 
what can be held to be true794 and in this respect LindbeFNVKDUHV0DF,QW\UH¶V
KLVWRULFLVP3HFNQROGDUJXHVWKDW/LQGEHFN¶VSUDJPDWLVPHQDEOHVKLPWREDODQFH
the danger of relativism associated with the CL model with the recognition that 
God is the ultimate reality.795 He suggests that postliberal theology does not 
H[FOXGHPHWDSK\VLFDORURQWRORJLFDOFRPPLWPHQWVEXWHQFRXUDJHV³DFHUWDLQ
SUDJPDWLFWHQWDWLYHQHVV´WRZDUGVWKHP796 /LQGEHFN¶VSRVLWLRQGRHVQRWH[FOXGH
the legitimacy of affirming a particular ontology but nor does his CL model 
require this commitment. The rule theory of doctrine relegates the discussion "of 
the possible correspondence of Trinitarian patterns of Christian language to the 
metaphysical structure of the Godhead" to something that is neither doctrinally 
necessary nor binding.797 Whether the Trinitarian language of the Creeds 
embodies ontological truths is unknowable in this life. As Pecknold indicates, 
³/LQGEHFNORFDWHVRQWRORJLFDOUHIHUHQFHLQWKHHVFKDWRQLQWKHIXWXUH´ 798 - as 
indeed does MacIntyre¶V theory of justification.  
Pecknold argues that those critics who accuse Lindbeck of relativism have 
misunderstood his intentions in ND which is not to offer a theory of truth, but to 
offer scripturally founded guidance on the pragmatic exploration of the truth 
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embodied in the scriptures. This aim does not require a treatise on truth, 
according to Pecknold: 
In sum, one of the strengths of Lindbeck's book, in response to his critics, is that 
he does not offer a definition of truth.  His interest in the truth is always practically 
guided by that which is accessible within the mediating semiotic system in use.  
7KLVGRHVQRWPHDQWKDWWKHUHLVQRWUXWKµEH\RQG¶WKDWVHPLRWLFV\VWHPRQO\WKDW
truth is identified with God in such a way as to prevent the mind from grasping it as 
such without the mediation of signs.  This is why Lindbeck is happier with likening 
Christianity to a whole gigantic proposition (a whole semiotic universe), rather than 
reducing it to a set of propositions.  Communal engagement with the scriptures is 
itself a journey into truth for Lindbeck, but a journey of intensification, of searching 
out the truth of the Scriptures, discovering and performing the faith that is inscribed 
there.799   
 
3HFNQROG¶VLQWHUSUHWDWLRQRI/LQGEHFN¶VSRVLWLRQRQWUXWKLVRQO\SDUWLDOO\SODXVLEOH
His interpreWDWLRQLVOHJLWLPDWHZLWKUHVSHFWWR/LQGEHFN¶VH[SORUDWLRQRIKLV
religious and theological concerns. In the latter part of ND Lindbeck is writing as 
a committed Christian theologian, and he is concerned to explore the 
implications of his theory for a postliberal approach to theology, rather than to 
MXVWLI\WKHIXQGDPHQWDOVRIUHOLJLRXVIDLWK+RZHYHU/LQGEHFN¶VWKHRORJLFDO
position in ND is built upon his philosophical or non-WKHRORJLFDOLQ/LQGEHFN¶V
term) account of the nature of religion as a CL system, and on his prior attempt 
to formulate an account of the nature of truth and superiority that is consistent 
with this model. It is misleading to claim that Lindbeck does not offer a definition 
of truth, because as we have seen, Lindbeck explores several different 
characterisations of truth in The Nature of Doctrine and places great importance 
RQKLVH[SRVLWLRQRIWKHQDWXUHRIWUXWKLQWKH³([FXUVXV´DWWDFKHGWR1'&KDSWHU
3. These points indicate that Lindbeck recognised that he had to address the 
impliFDWLRQVRIKLVJHQHUDOPRGHORIUHOLJLRQIRUDQDFFRXQWRIWUXWK3HFNQROG¶V
GHIHQFHRI/LQGEHFN¶VSRVLWLRQDVQRQ-relativist depends on his interpretation of 
                                               
799
 Pecknold p.104. 
307 
 
relativism as equivalent to the claim that there is no ultimate truth,800 but as it 
stands this is not an adequate characterisation of the concept of relativism. In the 
OLJKWRI%HUQVWHLQ¶VGHILQLWLRQTXRWHGDERYHLWLVPRUHOHJLWLPDWHWRVHHUHODWLYLVP
as the claim that there is no basis on which one can choose between the 
competing claims to truth of GLIIHUHQWWUDGLWLRQVRUWKHRULHV/LQGEHFN¶VGLIILFXOWLHV
with relativism arise because he is unable to construct an account of the nature 
of truth and justification which can be applied in practice to distinguish between 
inferior and superior truth-claimV)RUWKDWUHDVRQ,DUJXHGWKDW/LQGEHFN¶V
SRVLWLRQQHHGVWREHVXSSOHPHQWHGE\0DF,QW\UH¶VDFFRXQWRIUDWLRQDOLW\DQG by 
5RZDQ:LOOLDPV¶DFFRXQWRIWKHQHJRWLDWLRQRI&KULVWLDQLGHQWLW\LQLQWHUDFWLRQZLWK
the world, in order to develop a more adequate notion of superiority.   
0DF,QW\UH¶VQRWLRQRIVXSHULRULW\DQG:LOOLDPV¶LPDJHRIMXGJHPHQWFDQEH
DSSOLHGWR/LQGEHFN¶VSRVLWLRQEHFDXVH/LQGEHFNKLPVHOIDFNQRZOHGJHVDORJLFDO
gap between the human capacity to formulate an understanding of what is true, 
and the nature of reality as it is in itself. Such a logical gap means that any 
human formulation will be an inadequate attempt to assert a religious truth 
whose nature lies far beyond human powers of conceptualisation. Error and 
revision will characterise the progress of human knowledge towards the 
asymptotic point of conformity of human understanding and practice with the 
nature of that reality. This is a point that Pecknold recognises when he 
comments that   
Lindbeck underlines the science-like reasonableQHVVRIUHOLJLRQDQGWKHRORJ\«DV
DµORQJ-UXQ¶DQWLGRWHWRWKHUHODWLYLVWLFDQGILGHLVWLFLPSOLFDWLRQVRIKLV
DUJXPHQW«$QGZKDWKHSURSRVHVLVWKHFRQVWDQWWHVWLQJWKDWFRPHVLQWKH
process of critical learning over a long period of time.801 
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7KH³VFLHQFH-likHUHDVRQDEOHQHVV´of /LQGEHFN¶VWKHRU\SURYLGHVWKHSRWHQWLDOIRU
a repudiation of relativism, but his account needed to be supplemented by an 
account of rational justification for that potential to be realised. The relativistic 
consequences of the absence of such an account can be illustrated by a 
quotation from a paper Lindbeck published in 1989: 
... physics and poetry are not differentiated ontologically or epistemologically: it is 
not that they refer to distinct types of reality or arise in distinct ways of knowing 
which makes them different.  Rather they are seen as products of social practices 
which, though diverse in structure and purpose, have overlapping features... The 
epistemological grounding of quarks and Homeric Gods is basically the same.  It is 
rhetorical force rooted in communal practice which gives them their cognitive 
status, and when rhetoric and practice change, so does that status.  Homeric 
Gods were real and quarks non-existent for ancient Greeks, their status is 
reversed for us, and there are no definitively formulatable context-free criteria for 
determining who is right and who is wrong (though there may be unformulated 
implicit ones).802  
 
This seems to express a thoroughly relativist position ± until one reads the final 
clause which reIHUVWRWKHH[LVWHQFHRI³XQIRUPXODWHGLPSOLFLW´FULWHULDIRU
distinguishing between the legitimacy of a belief in Greek mythology and a belief 
in the findings of particle physics. Lindbeck goes on to argue in his paper that 
there are criteria that can be used to justify different beliefs, although these vary 
from age to age.803 These implicit criteria can be illuminated, I have suggested, 
E\UHIHUHQFHWR0DF,QW\UH¶VQRWLRQRIWUDGLWLRQFRQVWLWXWHGUDWLRQDOLW\0DF,QW\UH¶V
work helps to conceptualise the way in which criteria for distinguishing between 
superior and inferior beliefs are formulated and tested in the development of a 
tradition. There is a basis on which the adequacy of explanation in terms of 
particle physics can be assessed relative to explanation in terms of Homeric 
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Gods, although those standards are not universal standards, and could not have 
been understood or applied by the ancient Greeks. They are internal to our 
Western scientific tradition. 
This is not to claim that the findings of particle physics are correct and represent 
some formulation of ultimate ontological truth. Propositions about quarks and 
Higgs bosons form provisional truth claims at best and may be shown to be 
inadequate by future events and come to be replaced by new theories that 
explain these events in a more comprehensive and consistent fashion. It is 
possible to acquire a more adequate understanding of the nature of reality. But 
claims to knowledge always remain provisional and subject to revision. The most 
important virtue in seeking knowledge is the virtue of humility; that is, the 
recognition that what one can achieve is only a provisional and tentative 
approximation to truth. This recognition provides the basis for an account of the 
rational superiority or inferiority of any intellectual position which incorporates the 
RSHQQHVVWRFKDOOHQJHHPERGLHGLQ0DF,QW\UH¶V3(2(DFKUHVSRQVHWR
challenge that successfully retains and elaborates the fundamental agreements 
that constitute the identity of a tradition will strengthen its claims to justification, 
and resist and shape the judgement of the world. 
7KHUHOHYDQFHRI0DF,QW\UH¶V3KLORVRSK\ 
As we have seen, Pecknold argues that Lindbeck should not be considered a 
relativist because he holds that there is indeed some ultimate truth, albeit a truth 
which cannot be fully comprehended prior to the eschaton. While this might 
PHDQWKDW/LQGEHFN¶VSRVLWLRQDYRLGVDQH[WUHPHUHODWLYLVWGHQLDORIWKHH[LVWHQFH
of any universal truth, his failure to provide a practicable criterion of superiority 
renders his position epistemologically relativist in practice, as it provides no basis 
IRUFKRRVLQJEHWZHHQFRQIOLFWLQJSRVLWLRQV%XWGRHV0DF,QW\UH¶VDFFRXQWIDUH
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any better? There are two elements that need to be considered in relation to this 
question. Firstly, has he been successful in setting out a coherent account of the 
justification of a tradition? Secondly, does that account provide any help to the 
individual who is struggling to determine which of several traditions might be 
worthy of commitment?  
In the final Chapter of WJWR MacIntyre notes that his enquiry into  
«MXVWLFHDQGSUDFWLFDOUDWLRQDOLW\ZDV«LQIRUPHGE\DFRQYLFWLRQWKDWHDFK
particular conception of justice requires as its counterpart some particular 
conception of practical rDWLRQDOLW\DQGYLFHYHUVD«LWKDVEHFRPHHYLGHQW>LQWKH
process of enquiry] that conceptions of justice and of practical rationality generally 
and characteristically confront us as closely related aspects of some 
ODUJHU«RYHUDOOYLHZRIKXPDQOLIHDQGLWVSlace in nature. Such overall views, 
insofar as they make claims upon our rational allegiance, give expression to 
traditions of enquiry which are at one and the same time traditions embodied in 
particular types of social relationship.804 
 
I called such overalOYLHZVRIKXPDQOLIHDQGLWVSODFHLQQDWXUH³FRPSUHKHQVLYH
PHWDSK\VLFDOV\VWHPV´&06LQ6HFWLRQDQGGHILQHGVXFKV\VWHPVDV³a set 
of ontological and ethical presuppositions which are taken to encompass and 
explain the nature of the universe of which our species is a part, and which also 
SURYLGHDIUDPHZRUNIRUKXPDQSUDFWLFDOUHDVRQLQJDQGDFWLRQ´7KHDWWHPSWWR
ensure that such systems are coherent and comprehensive accounts of human 
life and its place in nature, and to apply them to the interpretations of events and 
experience, gives rise to what MacIntyre calls a tradition of enquiry. As we have 
seen MacIntyre argues that while the tradition of enquiry is able to make 
progress and to resolve the challenges that emerge from its engagement with 
external events and from internal and external criticism, it can consider itself and 
its parent tradition to be provisionally justified. A failure to resolve such 
challenges may result in a tradition falling into crisis and into decline. Ultimately, 
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the judgement of success or failure is based on the historical trajectory of a 
tradition, rather than on universal criteria of adequacy or truth. 
,KDYHDUJXHGWKDW0DF,QW\UH¶VDFFRXQWLVVXFFHVVIXOLQDYRLGLQJUHODWLYLVP
because it provides a clear criterion of superiority of one tradition with respect to 
another. Through historical study it is possible to identify those traditions and 
their associated forms of enquiry which are provisionally justified,805 and those 
which can be considered to have failed, although, as I pointed out in Section 2.6, 
apparently moribund traditions may be revived. This observation suggests that 
caution should be exercised in passing judgement on the failure of particular 
WUDGLWLRQV'HVSLWHWKLVFDYHDW0DF,QW\UH¶VDFFRXQWRIVXSHULRULWy can be applied 
in practice to underpin retrospective judgements of superiority and inferiority, and 
LQWKDWUHVSHFWLWDYRLGVWKHGHILFLWVRI/LQGEHFN¶VDFFRXQW,WPHHWVWKHREMHFWLYH
of providing a measure of the success or failure of a comprehensive 
metaphysical system by providing a historical assessment of its capacity to deal 
with challenges to its coherence. But is it of any practical value in the here-and-
now?  
,QFRQVLGHULQJWKLVVHFRQGTXHVWLRQLWLVLPSRUWDQWWRUHFRJQLVHWKDW0DF,QW\UH¶V
account may be more or less relevant to different people in different situations, 
as he points out in WJWR.806 I will consider three examples. Firstly, a person 
who is a committed adherent to a tradition whose enquiry is proceeding smoothly 
and which appears to be making progress in response to its current challenges. 
Secondly, a person who is a committed adherent of a tradition which is at a point 
of epistemological crisis; and, thirdly, a person who is considering the respective 
claims of different traditions of enquiry from the perspective of an uncommitted 
but earnest enquirer after truth.  
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 MacIntyre would cite Thomism as such a tradition. WJWR pp.402-403. 
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$QDZDUHQHVVRI0DF,QW\UH¶VDFFRXQWRIMXVWLILFDWLRQZLOOEHRILQWHOOHFWXDOLQWHUHVW
to the first type of person and may promote a degree of humility with respect to 
the ability of their tradition to sustain progress in future. It may also help to 
LOOXPLQDWHWKHWUDGLWLRQ¶VKLVWRU\E\SURYLGLQJDFRQFHSWXDOIUDPHZRUNZLWKLQ
which to understand its historic difficulties and the developments which helped to 
resolve them. The individual is, however, entirely justified in their adherence to 
the tradition at that stage because it has demonstrated that it is capable of 
overcoming the challenges that it has faced to date. She may recognise that this 
progress may not continue, and may be cautious in describing the assertions 
enunciated by the tradition as unconditionally demonstrated, but has no reason 
to abandon her confidence in the tradition ± unless it falls into an irresolvable 
epistemological crisis. 
0DF,QW\UH¶VWKHRU\LVUelevant to the adherent of a tradition in epistemological 
crisis in two ways. Firstly, it explains the nature of that crisis and describes what 
the tradition as a whole must do in order to resolve that crisis, provided it is able 
to acquire the resources needed for that resolution. In this thesis, this process of 
UHVROXWLRQKDVEHHQLOOXVWUDWHGE\/LQGEHFN¶VFRQVWUXFWLRQRIDFXOWXUDO-linguistic 
account of the nature of religion and rule theory of doctrine in order to resolve a 
theological impasse engendered by CP and EE accounts. Lindbeck did not 
FRQFHSWXDOLVHKLVZRUNLQWHUPVRI0DF,QW\UH¶VWKHRU\EXWWKDWWKHRU\SRWHQWLDOO\
provides a way in which participants of a tradition in crisis can understand the 
challenges it faces, and enable them to address these challenges in a way which 
UHFRJQLVHVWKHQDWXUHRISURJUHVVDQGMXVWLILFDWLRQLQDWUDGLWLRQ0DF,QW\UH¶V
philosophy can, therefore, play a role in guiding tradition-constituted enquiry 
ZKLFKLVVLPLODUWRWKHUROHSOD\HGE\.XKQ¶VDFFRXQWRIWKHQDWXUe of scientific 
revolutions in shaping the contemporary understanding of progress in scientific 
HQTXLU\0DFLQW\UH¶VZRUNFDQHQFRXUDJHDQDZDUHQHVVRIWKHOLPLWDWLRQVRI
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tradition constituted enquiry; an awareness of the possibility of epistemological 
crisis, and an awareness of the need to engage with alternative traditions as a 
means of conceptual cross fertilisation.   
6HFRQGO\0DF,QW\UH¶VSKLORVRSK\PD\DOVREHRIYDOXHWRWKHLQGLYLGXDOHQJDJHG
in a tradition in crisis by enabling that person to understand the nature of the 
challenge to their personal beliefs, and by encouraging them to engage in debate 
and evaluation in order to test and develop their noetic coherence. The 
RSSRUWXQLW\WRUHVSRQGWRWKH³MXGJHPHQWRIWKHZRUOG´LVDQRSSRUWXQLW\WR
witness to their beliefs and to test and strengthen their personal belief system 
through engaging with external challenges. The success experienced by 
individuals in addressing such challenges will also help to build the conceptual 
resources available to the whole tradition to address underlying inconsistencies. 
)LQDOO\LV0DF,QW\UH¶VDFFRXQWUHOHYDQWWRWKHLQGLYLGXDOZKRLVQRWDQDGKHUHQW
of any tradition, but who is considering which, if any, should gain her 
commitment? The most extreme example is the individual who applies the 
impossible standards of justification promoted by the Enlightenment as a 
condition of their commitment to any position. As such standards cannot be met, 
they will find that they are unable to commit themselves to any tradition, and as a 
result they will be excluded from processes of communal enquiry. 807 MacIntyre 
asks: 
How, if at all, could such a person as a result of an encounter with some particular 
tradition of enquiry come instead to inhabit that tradition as a rational agent? What 
kind of transformation would be required?808 
The first stage in resolving their intellectual isolation is for the individual to 
recognise that their adherence to Enlightenment standards of justification is a 
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commitment to the problematic standards of rational justification that have 
developed in one challenged tradition.809 Her adoption of these standards is, 
therefore, not an expression of tradition independence, but an unreflective 
commitment to one such tradition, a commitment which excludes her from 
engagement with an alternative tradition which might enable her to progress 
towards (provisional) knowledge. A precondition of progress is therefore for her 
to reassess these Enlightenment standards, and to consider the alternative 
standards that are embedded in rival traditions of enquiry.  Addressing the 
TXHVWLRQ³ZKLFKRIWKHVHULYDOWUDGLWLRQVLVVXSHULRU"´UHTXLUHVDQXQGHUVWDQGLQJ
of the basic concepts and modes of enquiry of the different traditions, which can 
only be acquired through at least partial socialisation  into more than one of 
these traditions, and, ultimately, by making a commitment to the rational 
standards of evaluation that characterise one of those traditions. This is the 
second step required to overcome their intellectual isolation.810 
The knowledge of rival traditions that such a process presupposes is perhaps not 
as problematic as it might appear.  As MacIntyre points out, our diverse liberal 
culture is characterised by a lack of awareness of the extent to which our 
knowledge claims and patterns of argument are in fact derived from multiple 
traditions of enquiry,811 whether those traditions of enquiry are founded in natural 
science, philosophy, political thought, literature, art or religion (among others).  
Paradoxically, assumptions about universal standards of rational justification are 
so engrained in our culture that their foundations in tradition have become 
invisible. To recognise this is to recognise that any claim to rational justification is 
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 WJWR p.396. 
810
 Rorty makes the point that it is first necessary to be educated in a prevalent 
epistemological scheme before one can legitimately innovate and challenge the 
presuppositions of such a scheme and subject them to hermeneutical critique (Richard 
Rorty Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979; 
pp.365-366). If this is the case, then the individual who resists education into a tradition 
will prevent themselves from making intellectual progress. 
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always the provisional claim of some particular cultural group at a particular point 
in its historical development. Such claims may prove to be valid but they may 
also ultimately prove to be invalid. Our task is to determine the community to 
which we should commit ourselves, but this cannot be done from a tradition-
independent perspective. 
The individual who seeks to stand outside all traditions in order to judge their 
merits lacks awareness of the extent to which some of these traditions will have 
shaped their identity through their upbringing and education. Such a person 
needs to develop the self-knowledge that will enable them to recognise the 
elements of their noetic structure that are derived from different traditions and 
consider which of these elements is of greatest significance to them. Like 
MacIntyre in his early development, they will become aware of inconsistencies in 
the different elements of their belief system; they will engage with that tradition 
that speaks to them most clearly, and will have the opportunity to address those 
inconsistencies. In this process of re-evaluation and reconstruction they may 
ultimately come to identify themselves with one tradition and commit themselves 
to its process of enquiry, as MacIntyre came to identify with Thomist Catholicism.   
0DF,QW\UH¶VMRXUQH\Ls unusual only because it has been expressed through the 
development of an innovative account of rationality and tradition. We may not be 
faced with the conflict between the tales of Iain Lom and Brian Boru on the one 
hand and an inchoate liberalism on the RWKHUWKDWKDGFKDUDFWHULVHG0DF,QW\UH¶V
childhood, but each of us will have been exposed to multiple tradition based 
influences as we developed, because of the diversity of our society - some of 
them secular, some religious. Each of us, therefore, may arrive at a point in 
which we have to decide where our commitments lie. At that stage we may be 
called upon to recognise and address inconsistencies in our beliefs, and seek to 
identify our most important spiritual, ethical and political commitments. 
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MacIntyUH¶VSKLORVRSK\DQGSHUVRQDOKLVWRU\FDQKHOSXVWRXQGHUVWDQGWKH
nature of that process of intellectual and moral development, and enable us to 
recognise that we need to seek for the support of a tradition and its communities 
if we are to be able to continue our journey. 
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